April 2003

Letters

Animal Rights Is a Bunch of Bull

Editor:

I boggled in disbelief when I saw that the cover of the February issue of Bar News was devoted to the false issue of "animal law."

Animals are animals. They may feel pain and affection, but they can't do what we do. That is why they are our possessions. That they feel pain means that they deserve our compassion, and common decency forbids meaningless, indiscriminate harm to them.

The injuries to animals Mr. Karp describes in his article are indeed terrible, but the law already allows for redress to the animals' owners. And, as the author notes, there are criminal penalties for the harm of animals. But the impositions of a C felony for the act does not, despite Mr. Karp's urging, make them "just like" police officers who are the victims of another C felony, Assault 3.

Mr. Karp shifts his argument from animal/human equivalency halfway through his article, from treating animals as our co-equals before the law, to redress for the emotional injuries sustained by their owners.

It always gets back to that, for that is the proper status of domesticated animals. We own them. Consequently we have a duty to avoid wantonly inflicting harm upon them. But if they are harmed, the injury is to our status as their owners. If they feel pain it is our compassionate duty to assuage it. But, legally, the animal itself should have no standing to sue. The "liberal construction" of RCWs 4.20.010 and 020 urged by Mr. Karp, equating a distressed master of a pet to a bereaved parent or sibling, is deeply offensive to anyone who has mourned the loss of or injury to his or her parent, child or sibling.

To consider an animal as plaintiff in a tort action (or defendant for that matter) is a well meaning but sentimentally indulgent gesture that cheapens both human dignity and the law.

Joseph M. Woodland
Shelton

 Editor:

The next time Bar News wonders why lawyers are the butt of popular jokes, consider the answer under your nose: the presumably serious front-page article by Professor Adam Karp, "Practicing Animal Law in Washington." This is a fine example of the excesses of apparently smart lawyers who seek to create new and fanciful "rights" with which to litigate new causes of action to enrich themselves. Even more troublesome, Professor Karp probably believes he and his disciples are doing good.

Of course, there is an established "animal law" which, as reported by Professor Karp, is quite unremarkable and could have been summarized in a few paragraphs rather than the nine pages in Bar News, including 28 footnotes and picture of little girl and fuzzy cat. This article was especially disappointing in that it followed a common-sense piece by Dick Manning examining the question why "much of the public is disaffected with what we trial lawyers do."

What is remarkable (and silly) about Professor Karp's article in its lead in: "Sadly, no state grants a deceased or injured animal standing to sue in its own name for even the most monstrous torment." To whom would damages go, other than the plaintiffs' lawyers? There is something wrong with a society that produces lawyers, bar sections and even law school courses that obsess over such trivia. It is perhaps a sign that we have too much wealth and free time, at least for a certain elite segment of our population.

I must admit a certain personal interest in Professor Karp's movement towards "animal rights." As a youth growing up on an acre in north Seattle, I slit the throats of many a rabbit and beheaded probably thousands of chickens as part of my chores to provide protein to a family of 11 (seven children, my mother and father, and two grandmothers). I am now president and part owner of a company that kills approximately 107 million pollocks every year, plus hundreds of thousands of codfish, not to mention thousands of pounds of salmon and whitefish fillets that we donate to local food banks each year. (The Alaska seafood industry is the largest supplier of protein to the national food-bank system in the United States.) We pride ourselves on providing pure and healthy frozen fish products to world markets, but perhaps Professor Karp has another idea.

Am I just paranoid about Professor Karp and the students learning at his feet at Seattle University? Perhaps. The statute of limitations has probably run on the chickens and rabbits. But what about the pollock? The People for Ethical Treatment of Animals (PETA) has active campaigns based on the "pain" to fish caused by the sportsman's hook and, specifically, the horror of pollock "tumbling in the trawler's net." Even Sir Paul McCartney actively promotes this nonsense in Europe.

I do believe in the common sense of people in a free society to correct the urban excesses represented by Professor Karp. My question for Bar News: must you accept every New Age idea, no matter how goofy? 

John Bundy
Seattle

Editor:

Adam Karp laments (February Bar News) that "sadly, no state grants a deceased or injured animal standing to sue in its own name" and that he believes that an ethical society should "want a legal system prepared to rectify all illegal harms through civil redress" by "compensat[ing] for every dimension of harm unlawfully inflicted." These are broad pronouncements that beg for contradiction. Despite Mr. Karp's presumed well-meaning sentiments, it is impossible to conceive how such propositions can possibly work in the real world.

In the first instance, allowing an animal to sue "in its own name" has a number of obvious flaws. First and foremost, what is the exact legal status of the animal? Is there an animal age of majority? Can a weanling sue, or must it await its "adulthood"? Must the animal be given legal status to enter into contracts (i.e., a fee agreement with its attorney), and how do we establish proof of the contract, the "meeting of the minds"? Regardless of its age, it cannot read, write or understand language, so one would presume a guardian ad litem must be appointed since, among other things, an animal suing "in its own name" cannot possibly be expected to answer interrogatories, be deposed, or otherwise participate in its case.

Let's take the next step — suppose the animal wins its case. Who gets the money? If the animal is given status to sue in its own name, must we then give the animal the status to open its own checking account, or to own property? Obviously, decisions must be made over that property, and the animal cannot make those decisions. This would appear to necessitate a general guardian for the animal, in perpetuity, or at least until the money runs out. Should our courts become embroiled in deciding how that money is used? For example, in the case of a stray injured intentionally by negligence, does the animal now get to buy a house and caretaker?

This all presupposes that the animal survives the unlawful harm inflicted upon it. If not, then does the animal's estate have the right to sue? Who are the animal's beneficiaries? Tracing "issue" or siblings, or issue of siblings could become a monstrous task, especially in the case of a "mutt" which lacks the documentation of pedigree and registration of heritage with the American Kennel Club, or in the case of a stray or a wild animal. What is the standing of the owner of the animal, if there is one? Once an animal is "adopted" by a human (to use the term often used by the animal shelters), is that or would that be similar to adoption of a human child, such that the owner becomes the "parent"? If so, one can imagine the chance "adoption" of a hurt animal at the roadside by a following driver, merely for the prospect of suing the driver who struck it and gaining the right to the animal's jury award. Madness ensues.

Okay, enough of that. Let's move on to the second grand proposition, also faulty in my estimation — that our legal system should be a forum of redress for all unlawfully inflicted harm. As Mr. Karp notes, it is already a crime to mistreat an animal. Why then must every violation of law result in a civil cause of action as well? Can a child sue a parent for the emotional distress of witnessing the parent commit domestic violence upon the other parent? Or upon the child him/herself? If there are any laws allowing such suits, I am not aware of them. Isn't protection of children against harm at least as important as protection of animals? Another logical next step arises as well. If animals can sue, then should they not be able to be sued? Thus, if one wild animal kills and eats another, can the latter sue the former? Oh, but there is no deep pocket there. How about suing the state Department of Wildlife for failure to properly protect prey from predators? More madness, and madness on top of madness.

It would seem as though Mr. Karp wants to extend to animals the benefit of the civil legal system, without imposing upon them the necessary obligations of understanding and conforming with laws. Rights without responsibility. Is that where our society should be headed? Mr. Karp would have a system in which the animal could sue you for striking it with your car (negligence is "unlawful" after all, and if we accord animals rights, it only stands to reason that we humans assume a duty not to interfere with the animal's rights), but it is unclear whether the animal would have any duty at all. If the animal cannot understand that it is not permitted to cross in the middle of a street, or against a light, how can it be bound to a duty, or be shown to have violated it? This might result in a need to establish a whole new definition of duty on the part of animals, and on the body of law regarding comparative negligence. Who gets the right to sue on behalf of the undomesticated and ownerless raccoon hit by the possibly negligent motorist? This would truly be a plaintiff attorney's full-employment act. It is inconceivable that we need to create such a morass just to review and reconsider laws regarding compensation for loss of an animal, which, as it turns out, is the main thrust of his article.

Law should be based upon reason, not emotion. While it may be reasonable to broaden, preferably legislatively, the laws regarding compensable damages available to owners of animals in such instances as the grisly mauling described in Karp's article, this is a far cry from according animals "human" status to sue on their own behalf. While many animals are inarguably "sentient," mere consciousness is insufficient in my view to confer such status. It is hard to disagree with the proposition that animals should not have to bear unnecessary pain and suffering. But it is a non sequitur to go from that proposition to one of granting animals rights similar to the rights of adult humans, even leaving aside the practical problems inherent in determining where those rights would begin and end. The suffering (both human and animal) described in the vivid example in Mr. Karp's article is to be avoided if possible, but such emotional scenarios should not lead to opening up Pandora's box to the kinds of mischief sure to result from giving human rights to animals.

Gordon G. Hauschild
Lakewood

Never mind all that, I'm still right

Editor:

I am responding to a letter from Michael Hanbey of Columbia Legal Services in the February Bar News. This letter challenged my criticism of the proposed rule 6.1, which would designate certain legal work as pro bono, and my criticism of Columbia Legal Services. Rule 6.1 would improperly allow supposed public-interest lawyers to be considered official approved pro bono lawyers, an impropriety because the Supreme Court should neither make rules regarding different legal practices nor depart from its prescribed neutrality by anointing some lawyers and causes as better than others. The proposed rule would designate individuals or organizations which claim to protect civil rights, civil liberties or "public rights" as pro bono approved, and likewise designate charitable, religious, civil, community, governmental and education organizations as pro bono! Better than the lawyers who oppose them. This is wrong because many people do not agree with the goals of such organizations, and many people do not think the courts are the proper forum for deciding public issues of interest to these groups and individuals.

To get back to Mr. Hanbey's letter, first, he dissociates Columbia from connection with the inception of IOLTA. In fact, Columbia's predecessor, Evergreen, was around and received money from IOLTA when it began. The IOLTA fund distributes money mostly to Columbia, with some going to similar agencies, not to individuals in need. Columbia receives the money for lawyer salaries and maintaining itself and for litigation it commences, such as suing the post office, but it does not fund individuals that I know of.

Second, I commented on the lack of Second Amendment advocacy by public lawyers, arguing that this shows that they litigate their own ideology, not their clients'. Columbia says this does not apply to them. But most no-contact orders include a no-firearms provision, and probably many dissolution cases provide similar orders, so there is plenty of opportunity for Columbia to litigate orders that involve the Second Amendment. I agree, though, that I was primarily thinking of criminal cases when I made this comment.

Third, I have never said that Columbia's cases are trivial. They are serious matters because they tend to dilute the democratic character of government.

Fourth, Columbia sued the post office to force them to provide different services, and Mr. Hanbey defends this. This is a good example of Columbia using the court system to promote a political position it favors, rather than helping individuals. There must be a Senate committee with oversight over the post office. It is they, Senator Murray, Senator Lott, Senator Olympia Snow (Maine), whoever might be on that committee, who should decide what level of services the post office provides, not Columbia lawyers insulated from the voters and judges appointed for life. Columbia is invading the executive and legislative branches of government and chipping away at our concept of democratic government.

Finally, Mr. Hanbey suggests that I might have a different opinion if I knew some Columbia lawyers. I do know several Columbia lawyers. They are able and dedicated. This does not mean that I approve of their employer or of the political impact of their work. The matter of differentiating between one's politics and goals and the clients' goals is a subtle matter. I doubt if Columbia lawyers often take positions that are opposed to their own ideological positions. I doubt that Columbia lawyers often counsel their clients on the possible negative impact of receiving government largesse. See Rule of Professional Conduct 2.1, which says "in rendering advice, a lawyer may refer not only to law but to other considerations such as moral, economic, social and political factors, that may be relevant to the client's situation."

I stand by my comments.

Roger Ley
Seattle

Readers are invited to submit letters of reasonable length to the editor via e-mail at comm@wsba.org, by fax (206-727-8319), or mail. Due date is the 10th of the month for the second issue following, e.g., April 10 for publication in the June issue. Letters to Bar News will usually be published, unless the writer specifically asks to withhold publication. The editor reserves the right to edit letters as deemed appropriate.