March 2003

Disciplinary Notices

These notices of imposition of disciplinary sanctions and actions are published pursuant to Rule 11.2(c)(4) of the Supreme Court's Rules for Lawyer Discipline, and pursuant to the February 18, 1995 policy statement of the WSBA Board of Governors.

Pursuant to Rule for Enforcement of Lawyer Conduct 3.6(b), file materials relating to a matter concluded with an admonition may be destroyed five years after the admonition was issued. In admonition matters, it is the WSBA's policy to remove the disciplinary notice from the Washington State Bar News website archive five years after the admonition was issued, regardless of whether the WSBA's file materials are destroyed.

For a complete copy of any disciplinary decision, call the Washington State Disciplinary Board at 206-733-5926, leaving the case name and your address, or electronically submit your requests. A list of recent disciplinary notices is available on the WSBA Web site.

Suspended

Richard A. Alcorn (WSBA No. 7973, admitted 1977), of Phoenix , AZ , was suspended for six months by order of the Supreme Court, effective April 25, 2002 . This reciprocal discipline was based on a six-month suspension imposed by the Supreme Court of Arizona.

Mr. Alcorn agreed to represent a doctor in a medical malpractice case. The hospital was dismissed from the case on summary judgment. The doctor's insurer was insolvent and the doctor did not have assets to support the expected judgment. Just prior to trial, plaintiffs' counsel proposed, and Mr. Alcorn agreed, to the following plan: 1) the plaintiffs would give the doctor a covenant not to execute; 2) the parties would agree to go through the entire jury trial with plaintiffs presenting all their evidence; 3) the plaintiffs would agree that at the close of their case, they would voluntarily dismiss with prejudice all claims against the doctor, and not bring any new claims; and 4) the parties would agree to keep this agreement confidential. The parties proceeded to trial and did not disclose the agreement to the trial judge, even under questioning.

Following the plaintiffs' 10-day presentation to the jury, the parties made a motion to dismiss with prejudice. Prior to ruling on the motion, the judge stated: "I don't want any sweetheart deals that I am not fully informed about anywhere … and I don't want it crafted in some way or another that is — that would be misleading to me."

Mr. Alcorn assured the judge that there were no sweetheart deals. The judge then dismissed the case with prejudice. The judge learned of the agreement during a motion for a new trial in the claim against the hospital. The judge imposed sanctions against the lawyers involved.

Mr. Alcorn's conduct violated Arizona ER 3.3(a)(1), prohibiting false statements of law or fact to the tribunal; and 8.4(c), prohibiting conduct involving fraud, deceit or misrepresentation.

Felice Congalton represented the Bar Association. Mr. Alcorn represented himself.  

Suspended

Frederic E. Cann (WSBA No. 15962, admitted 1986), of Portland , OR , was suspended for six months by order of the Supreme Court, effective July 4, 2002 . This reciprocal discipline was based on a six-month suspension imposed by the Supreme Court of Oregon. Mr. Cann has been reinstated to active practice in Washington .

In 1996, Mr. Cann agreed to represent the personal representative of an estate. In May, Mr. Cann decided to purchase a piece of property from this estate. The estate was financially troubled, and Mr. Cann believed that the sale would benefit the estate. Mr. Cann did not want to purchase the property in his own name, so he arranged for Mr. S to act as the purchaser. At the time of the purchase, Mr. Cann did not obtain the personal representative's consent to the conflict of interest after a full disclosure. In 1998, Mr. Cann told the personal representative that he was the actual purchaser. The personal representative approved the sale to Mr. Cann.

Mr. Cann's conduct violated Oregon DRs 1-102(A)(3), prohibiting conduct involving dishonesty, fraud, deceit or misrepresentation; 102(A)(4), prohibiting conduct prejudicial to the administration of justice; 5-101(A), prohibiting representing a client if the lawyer's judgment will be affected by the lawyer's financial, business, property or personal interests, unless the client consents after full disclosure; and 5-104(A), prohibiting entering a business transaction with a client if the client's interests differ from the lawyer's, and if the client expects the lawyer to exercise professional judgment for the client's protection, unless the client consents after a full disclosure.

Felice Congalton represented the Bar Association. Mr. Cann represented himself.  

Suspended

Stephen T. Carmick (WSBA No. 11365, admitted 1980), of Chehalis, was suspended for 60 days by order of the Supreme Court, effective July 10, 2002 . Mr. Carmick has been reinstated to active practice. This discipline was based on his lack of candor with the court, and communication with a represented party in 1994 and 1995. For more information, please see the published Supreme Court opinion.

In July 1994, Mr. Carmick agreed to represent the father in negotiations for interest payments on a judgment for past-due child support under URESA. The court granted a $15,037.40 judgment in 1985. The father paid the face amount of the judgment, but interest was still owing. In June 1994, the father contacted the Lewis County prosecutor's office to find out the amount then owing. Prosecutor A calculated the amount as $11,000, but the father believed the correct amount was lower. Prosecutor A agreed to release the lien in exchange for the father's title company, tendering $11,000 to the Lewis County Superior Court.

Mr. Carmick reviewed the court file. Almost all the pleadings in the court file referenced prosecutor B. Instead of contacting prosecutor B, Mr. Carmick contacted the mother directly. During this conversation, Mr. Carmick did not disclose that $11,000 had been deposited with the court. Additionally, Mr. Carmick told the mother that neither of the prosecutors she was working with were available; however, both prosecutors later testified that they had been available.

In July 1994, Mr. Carmick sent the mother an offer to settle for $5,000. He implied that she would have a difficult time collecting any more than this amount, and directed her to sign and return the settlement agreement and any documents she had received from the prosecutor's office. On July 25, Mr. Carmick filed the signed settlement pleadings and a notice of appearance. He did not serve the notice of appearance on the mother or the prosecutors working on the case. In August, Mr. Carmick presented an ex parte order disbursing $6,000 to his client and $5,000 to the mother. Mr. Carmick told the judge that the mother and prosecutor B had approved the order. The judge entered the order and the funds were disbursed. Later, prosecutor B learned of Mr. Carmick's actions and filed a motion to vacate the order, based on fraud. Mr. Carmick withdrew from the representation.

Mr. Carmick's conduct violated RPCs 3.3(f), requiring lawyers to inform the tribunal of all relevant facts the lawyer knows should be disclosed in ex parte proceedings to permit an informed decision, whether or not the facts are adverse; 3.5(b), prohibiting lawyers from communicating ex parte with a judge, juror, prospective juror or other official except as permitted by law; and 4.2, prohibiting lawyers from communicating about the subject of the representation with a party the lawyer knows to be represented, without the other lawyer's consent.

Jonathan Burke represented the Bar Association. Kurt Bulmer represented Mr. Carmick. The hearing officer was Michael L. Lewis.

Suspended

James R. Watt (WSBA No. 12177, admitted 1981), of Issaquah, has been suspended for two years by order of the Supreme Court approving a stipulation, effective May 29, 2002 . This discipline is based on his practicing law while his license was suspended, conflicts of interest, and lack of diligence in representing clients. These acts occurred from 1996 through 1998. (Mr. Watt is to be distinguished from James R. Watts of Portland , Oregon [WSBA No. 33317].)

Matter 1: In December 1997, the Supreme Court suspended Mr. Watt's license to practice law for failure to comply with continuing legal education requirements. Despite several notifications from the Office of Disciplinary Counsel, Mr. Watt continued to practice law while his license was suspended.

Mr. Watt's conduct violated RPCs 5.5(a), prohibiting lawyers from practicing law in a jurisdiction where doing so violates the regulations; and 8.4(d), prohibiting conduct prejudicial to the administration of justice; and RLD 8.2 (now ELC 14.2), prohibiting lawyers from continuing to practice when their licenses are suspended.

Matter 2: In 1989, Mr. Watt began representing a client in a condominium development project. Part way through the project, Mr. Watt agreed to oversee the construction. Mr. Watt did not fully disclose the terms of the business agreement to the client in writing. Mr. Watt also did not allow the client an opportunity to seek independent counsel.

Mr. Watt's conduct violated RPC 1.8, prohibiting lawyers from entering a business transaction with a client unless the terms are fair to the client, the client consents in writing after a full disclosure, and the client is given a reasonable opportunity to seek independent counsel.

Matter 3: In March 1996, Mr. Watt agreed to represent a husband and wife in a potential lawsuit regarding a home sale. The clients sold their home, and shortly thereafter the roof began leaking. In April 1996, the buyers sued the clients for the cost of replacing the roof. By this time, the husband had been transferred to Riyadh , Saudi Arabia . The husband sent a letter to the court requesting relief under the Soldiers' and Sailors' Civil Relief Act.

In July 1996, the wife was served with a default judgment. Mr. Watt told the clients he would file a motion to vacate the default. He then told the clients that a hearing was scheduled for November 12, 1996 , but in fact he never filed the motion. On November 19, 1996 , the clients learned that Mr. Watt's phone was disconnected.

Mr. Watt's conduct violated RPCs 1.3, requiring lawyers to diligently represent their clients; and 1.4, requiring lawyers to keep clients reasonably informed about the status of their matters.

Matter 4: In 1992, Mr. Watt agreed to represent a client in a defamation suit. Mr. Watt filed the lawsuit in 1992, and the court set trial for December 1994. The court later struck this trial date because neither side had conducted any discovery. Mr. Watt did not take any other action on the client's case until after the client filed the grievance with the Bar Association. The court reset trial for late 1996. Again, defendant's counsel filed a motion to strike the trial date because no discovery had been conducted. Mr. Watt did not attend the hearing, and the court granted the motion and assessed attorney's fees.

Mr. Watt's conduct violated RPCs 1.3, requiring lawyers to diligently represent their clients; and 1.4, requiring lawyers to keep clients reasonably informed about the status of their matters.

Leslie Allen represented the Bar Association. Frank R. Siderius represented Mr. Watt. The hearing officer was Edward Dunkerly.  

Suspended

Lois M. Wood (WSBA No. 17878, admitted 1988), of West Boylston , MA , has been suspended for 15 months by order of the Supreme Court approving a stipulation, effective July 19, 2002 . This discipline is based on her lack of diligence in representing a client in 2001.

Ms. Wood represented a client in post-conviction proceedings. In July 2000, she filed a personal restraint petition, which the court denied. The client's wife paid Ms. Wood $750 to prepare and file a motion for discretionary review. Ms. Wood negotiated the check, but did not file the motion. Ms. Wood told the wife that the court lost the motion. In January 2001, the client contacted a new lawyer, who obtained an electronic copy of the motion from Ms. Wood's home computer. The new lawyer revised the motion and filed it with a request to extend the filing deadline. The court denied the motion to extend time.

Ms. Wood's conduct violated RPCs 1.3, requiring lawyers to diligently represent their clients; 1.4, requiring lawyers to keep their clients reasonably informed about the status of their matters; 1.5, requiring lawyers' fees to be reasonable; and 8.4(c), prohibiting lawyers from engaging in conduct involving dishonestly, deceit, fraud or misrepresentation.

Joanne Abelson represented the Bar Association. Ms. Wood represented herself.  

Reprimand

Hari L. Alipuria (WSBA No. 26899, admitted 1997), of Tacoma , received a reprimand on July 26, 2002 , based on a stipulation approved by the Disciplinary Board in May 2002. This discipline is based on his failure to competently and diligently represent two clients in 1999.

Matter 1: In 1998, Mr. Alipuria agreed to represent a client in a wrongful-termination case. Mr. Alipuria filed the client's lawsuit in federal court. In May 1999, Mr. Alipuria demanded that the client meet him at his office the next day. When the client arrived, Mr. Alipuria told the client they would be traveling to Seattle to answer questions for opposing counsel. Opposing counsel deposed the client for five hours. Mr. Alipuria did not attend six witness depositions noted by opposing counsel.

On June 24, 1999 , Mr. Alipuria received opposing counsel's summary judgment motion. On July 9, he contacted the client for phone numbers of potential declarants to support a response to the summary judgment. Mr. Alipuria was not able to contact the witnesses prior to the time the response was due. Although he prepared a response, he did not file it because he could not contact the witnesses. The court dismissed the client's case. Mr. Alipuria did not provide the client copies of documents upon request. He also submitted the client's original documents to opposing counsel during discovery.

Matter 2: In April 1998, Mr. Alipuria agreed to represent the wife in a marital-dissolution action. Mr. Alipuria filed the dissolution petition in November 1998. The sheriff was unable to serve the husband, but the husband sent a letter directly to Mr. Alipuria. An independent contractor employed by Mr. Alipuria signed an affidavit indicating that she served the husband, but Mr. Alipuria doubted the accuracy of the affidavit. Mr. Alipuria told the client that the dissolution would be finalized on a date sooner than the required 90 days after service of the petition. Then, he continued the hearing to February 10, 1999 . Mr. Alipuria did not finalize the dissolution because he could not verify that the husband had been served.

Mr. Alipuria's conduct violated RPCs 1.1, requiring lawyers to provide competent representation; 1.3, requiring lawyers to diligently represent their clients; and 1.4, requiring lawyers to keep clients reasonably informed about the status of their matters.

Sachia Stonefeld Powell represented the Bar Association. Mr. Alipuria represented himself.  

Reprimand

Arthur H. Boelter (WSBA No. 9213, admitted 1979), of Seattle , received a reprimand on July 26, 2002 , based on a stipulation approved by the Disciplinary Board in May 2002. This discipline is based on his lack of diligence, and failure to adequately supervise assistants in 1998 and 1999.

In October 1998, Mr. Boelter agreed to represent a client in a bankruptcy proceeding. The client worked in Kuwait , so communication was by fax. Mr. Boelter assigned the client's case to a contract lawyer in his office, who filed the bankruptcy petition in November 1998. In January 1999, the court dismissed the petition because neither the client nor the lawyer attended the 341 Meeting of Creditors. Mr. Boelter's office did not forward the dismissal order to the client. The contract lawyer filed a motion to vacate the dismissal and a motion to have the first creditors' meeting by written interrogatory. The hearing on these motions was continued several times and then stricken by the bankruptcy trustee. In May 1999, the trustee returned the client's $3,085 payment. After the court closed the client's case, Mr. Boelter sent the client a bill for $2,893.33.

Mr. Boelter's conduct violated RPCs 1.3, requiring lawyers to diligently represent their clients; 5.1, requiring lawyers having direct supervisory authority over another lawyer to make reasonable efforts to ensure that the other lawyer conforms to the RPCs; and 5.3, requiring lawyers having direct supervisory authority over nonlawyers to make reasonable efforts to ensure that they conform to the RPCs.

Barbara Duffy and Jonathan Burke represented the Bar Association. Kurt Bulmer represented Mr. Boelter.   

Reprimand

Mark A. Erikson (WSBA No. 23106, admitted 1993), of Vancouver , WA , received two reprimands on July 26, 2002 , and two years of probation based on a stipulation approved by the Disciplinary Board in May 2002. This discipline is based on his failure to avoid a conflict of interest.

Matter 1: In early 1999, Mr. Erikson agreed to represent two clients in a claim against a developer. In July 1999, the clients told Mr. Erikson they could not afford to continue the litigation. Mr. Erikson decided to secure his current and future legal fees with a deed of trust on the two parcels of real property that were the subject of the litigation. Mr. Erikson did not advise the clients of the conflict of interest, nor obtain their written consent to continuation of the representation. In August 2000, the associate who had worked on the client's case left Mr. Erikson's office and opened his own practice. The associate then settled the case. Mr. Erikson had to agree to the settlement because he held a deed of trust on the property.

Mr. Erikson's conduct violated RPCs 1.7(b), prohibiting lawyers from representing a client if the representation may be materially limited by the lawyer's responsibilities to another client, a third person, or the lawyer's own interests, unless the client consents in writing after a full disclosure; 1.8(a), prohibiting lawyers from entering a business transaction with a client or knowingly acquiring an ownership, possessory or security interest adverse to a client unless 1) the terms of the transaction are fair and reasonable to the client and are fully disclosed to the client in a reasonable manner, 2) the client is provided a reasonable opportunity to seek independent counsel, and 3) the client consents; and 1.8(j), prohibiting lawyers from acquiring a proprietary interest in the cause of action or the subject matter of the litigation the lawyer is conducting, except for 1) a lien granted by law to secure the lawyer's fees or expenses, and 2) a reasonable contingent fee in a civil case.

Matter 2: In 1999, Mr. Erikson agreed to represent a husband and wife in a damages claim against the city of Vancouver , WA, for sewer backups. An associate with Mr. Erikson's firm filed the clients' complaint after the statute of limitations had expired. When the associate left, the clients decided to stay with the firm. In July 2000, Mr. Erikson sent the file to the former associate, who refused to accept the clients or the file. Mr. Erikson also sued the builder of his home (the wife's brother) for installing faulty siding.

In August 2000, Mr. Erikson filed and served a notice of intent to withdraw from the client's case. The notice states that all further correspondence should be sent to the former associate as successor counsel; however, the former associate did not represent the clients. After filing the notice of intent to withdraw, Mr. Erikson did no further work on the case. A damage statement and interrogatory answers were due during that time. The clients were not able to find substitute counsel.

Mr. Erikson's conduct violated RPCs 1.3, requiring lawyers to represent their clients with reasonable diligence and promptness; 1.15(d), requiring lawyers, when withdrawing from a client's case, to take reasonable steps to protect the client's interest; and 8.4(d), prohibiting lawyers from engaging in conduct that is prejudicial to the administration of justice.

Matter 3: California lawyer K worked for Mr. Erikson from September 1999 through October 3, 2000 . She was sworn into active practice in Oregon on October 4, 2000 , and in Washington on December 7, 2000 . Mr. Erikson's fee agreement with K included 50 percent of the hourly fees billed for her work. Mr. Erikson identified K on his letterhead as "Of Counsel, Licensed in California ." Formal Opinion 178 indicates that only lawyers who are active members of the Washington State Bar Association may be listed as "of counsel."  

Non-Disciplinary Notices

Interim Suspensions

Dan P. Danilov (WSBA No. 170, admitted 1958), of Seattle , has been ordered suspended from the practice of law pending the outcome of disability proceedings by order of the Supreme Court,  effective December 12, 2002 .

Robert Kuvara (WSBA No. 3603, admitted 1963), of Kent , has been ordered suspended from the practice of law pending the outcome of disciplinary proceedings, by order of the Supreme Court, effective October 15, 2002 .

S. Don Phelps (WSBA No. 21247, admitted 1991), of Olympia , has been suspended from the practice of law pending the outcome of disciplinary proceedings, by order of the Supreme Court, effective December 2, 2002.