May 2003
Disciplinary Notices
These notices of imposition of disciplinary sanctions and actions are published pursuant to Rule 3.5(d) of the Washington State Supreme Court Rules for Enforcement of Lawyer Conduct, and pursuant to the February 18, 1995, policy statement of the WSBA Board of Governors.
For a complete copy of any disciplinary decision, call the Washington State Disciplinary Board at 206-733-5926, leaving the case name, and your name and address.
Disbarred
David B. Harris (WSBA No. 25881, admitted 1996), of Portland, Oregon, was disbarred, based on a disbarment order from the Oregon Supreme Court. The Washington State Supreme Court’s order of reciprocal discipline was effective February 5, 2003. This discipline is based on 32 violations involving six clients, criminal conduct, and practicing between 1996 and 1999 while his license was suspended. (Mr. Harris is to be distinguished from David E. Harris of Issaquah.)
Matter 1: In November 1996, Mr. Harris agreed to assist a client with an appeal of a decision denying his petition for post-conviction relief. He did not inform the client of the oral argument date or the final outcome of the appeal. Mr. Harris stated falsely during the investigation that he had informed the client of these matters.
Matter 2: In February 1998, Mr. Harris agreed to represent a client in a petition for post-conviction relief. Mr. Harris filed a brief, but did not send a copy to the client. Mr. Harris did not tell the client that the court had dismissed the petition. Mr. Harris also gave false responses to the Bar Association in this matter.
Matter 3: In September 1997, Mr. Harris was appointed to represent a client in an appeal. He filed several questionable compensation requests and failed to offer an explanation when requested by the court. After Mr. Harris failed to file a brief, the court ordered him to appear at a show-cause hearing. Mr. Harris failed to appear as ordered. Mr. Harris told the court he could not appear because of a family medical emergency and a computer failure. He refused to identify the family member involved in the medical emergency. The Court of Appeals referred Mr. Harris for criminal prosecution.
Matter 4: In December 1998, Mr. Harris was appointed to represent a client charged with assault, burglary and kidnapping. He appeared late for pretrial motions and did not appear for the trial. He called the court and said that he had a conflicting court appearance and had been in a car accident. Later, he admitted to the court that his statements were not true. The court He failed to appear, made further misrepresentation to the court, was removed as counsel on the case, and found in contempt of court. He was sentenced to 18 months’ probation, and drug and alcohol treatment. He violated the terms of his probation.
Matter 5: In July 1999, Mr. Harris filed a police report that his car had been stolen. Later, he admitted he had loaned his car to another person for 12 hours as payment for a drug purchase. The other person did not return the car, so Mr. Harris filed the police report.
Matter 6: In April 1998, the court appointed Mr. Harris to represent a client charged with attempted murder and assault. Mr. Harris appeared late for the first trial date and not at all for the subsequent trial dates. He also failed to provide discovery and to inspect evidence in the state’s custody; communicate with his client, including a plea offer and communication from counsel for a co-defendant; and subpoena witnesses.
Matter 7: In February 1997, Mr. Harris was appointed to represent a client in the appeal of an order denying his habeas corpus petition. After the court denied the appeal, the client requested that Mr. Harris mail his file to his sister. Mr. Harris wrote a letter to the Bar Association indicating he had located the file, but he never sent it to the client’s sister.
Matter 8: Mr. Harris continued to practice law when his license was suspended.
Mr. Harris’s conduct violated ORS 162. 375; and DRs 6-101(B), 1-102(A)(3), 1-102 (A)(4), 7-106(A), 1-103(C) and 1-102 (A) (2).
Felice Congalton and Leslie Allen represented the Bar Association. Mr. Harris represented himself.
Disbarred
James D. Jensen (WSBA No. 25733, admitted 1996), of Bellingham, was disbarred, following a default hearing, by order of the Supreme Court, effective February 5, 2003. This discipline is based on 38 counts of misconduct involving 11 clients from 1999 through 2001.
Matters 1 and 2: In March 2000, Mr. Jensen’s firm closed its Fife office and he assumed responsibility for two clients’ bankruptcy matters. Mr. Jensen did not notify either client that the Fife office had been closed or that he had taken over responsibility for their representation. He failed to complete the required work on both cases. He failed to file required corrected schedules in one case, leading to a delay in the sale of the client’s house. In the other, Mr. Jensen placed the client’s filing fee in his business account and took no action on the case. He failed to refund the client’s money upon request. Mr. Jensen did not cooperate with disciplinary counsel’s requests for information regarding these matters.
Matters 3, 4 and 5: In August 2000, Mr. Jensen agreed to assist three clients with bankruptcy matters. Mr. Jensen deposited the clients’ funds in his business account and did not complete the agreed work. He did not return the clients’ funds upon request, although he did make a partial refund to one client in January 2001. In one case, Mr. Jensen testified falsely in his deposition that he had paid the client’s funds to the bankruptcy court. He also stated falsely that he had filed documents to reopen the client’s bankruptcy.
Matter 6: In April 2000, Mr. Jensen agreed to represent a client in a bankruptcy petition, and attended the meeting of creditors. In August 2000, the trustee filed a motion to dismiss. Mr. Jensen failed to respond to the motion and the court dismissed the client’s petition. At the courthouse on the day of the hearing, Mr. Jensen falsely told the client that the hearing had been continued until October 1, 2000. In October, Mr. Jensen told the client that he had filed an appeal. The client asked for a refund when he learned from the court that Mr. Jensen had not filed an appeal. Mr. Jensen did not provide a refund.
Matter 7: In August 2000, Mr. Jensen agreed to represent a client in an uncontested marriage-dissolution action. Mr. Jensen sent the client a letter stating that the dissolution would be final in 90 days. Mr. Jensen’s assistant told the client the dissolution would be final on January 6, 2001. Mr. Jensen had no further communication with the client. On May 5, 2001, believing he was divorced, the client remarried. The court finalized the dissolution on June 25, 2001.
Matters 8, 9 and 10: In late 1999 and in June 2001, Mr. Jensen agreed to represent three clients in bankruptcy matters. In each case, Mr. Jensen accepted the client’s money and did not complete the required work. In one case, the wife was discharged in bankruptcy, but the husband’s petition was dismissed. Mr. Jensen did not tell the client about the dismissal, and the creditors garnished the client’s paycheck. In another case, Mr. Jensen failed to list the client’s potential lawsuit against the sellers of her house. The client retained separate counsel for the claim against the sellers. Although Mr. Jensen filed a motion to reopen the bankruptcy to list the lawsuit, he failed to attend the hearing, and the motion was stricken. The client’s bankruptcy was reopened and the claim against the seller settled. The client retained substitute counsel and incurred additional attorney’s fees.
Matter 11: In September 1998, Mr. Jensen agreed to represent a client in a marriage-dissolution action, but not work on the client’s matter. Mr. Jensen failed to comply with the client’s requests for a restraining order. The client retained substitute counsel and requested her file. Mr. Jensen told the client he had lost the file. Mr. Jensen delivered the file to the client on August 9, 2001. The file contained original documents necessary for trial. The client’s trial was set for August 20, 2001.
Mr. Jensen’s conduct violated RPCs 1.3, requiring lawyers to act with reasonable diligence and promptness in representing clients; 1.4, requiring lawyers to keep clients reasonably informed about the status of their matters and promptly comply with reasonable requests for information; 5.3, requiring lawyers with direct supervisory authority over a nonlawyer to make reasonable efforts to ensure that the nonlawyer’s conduct is compatible with the lawyer’s professional obligations; 1.14, requiring lawyers to deposit client funds into trust accounts; 1.15(d), requiring lawyers, upon termination of representation, to take reasonable steps to protect a client’s interests; 8.4(c), prohibiting lawyers from engaging in conduct involving dishonesty, fraud, deceit or misrepresentation; and RLDs 2.8, requiring lawyers to promptly respond to disciplinary counsel’s requests for information relevant to grievances; and 1.1(p), subjecting lawyers to discipline for conduct demonstrating unfitness to practice law.
Marsha Matsumoto represented the Bar Association. Mr. Jensen represented himself. The hearing officer was Kelby Fletcher.
Disbarred
Charles E. Robbins (WSBA No. 3976, admitted 1967), of Puyallup, was disbarred, following a stipulation to discipline approved by the Supreme Court on January 22, 2003. This discipline is based on his dishonest conduct in 2000, and failure to return disputed funds to his trust account in 1999. (Mr. Robbins is to be distinguished from Charles M. Robbins of Tacoma.)
Matter 1: In October 1997, Mr. Robbins agreed to represent a client in a personal-injury claim. In May 2000, the client settled the claim for $49,500. Mr. Robbins told the client that he would attempt to negotiate a reduced amount with the medical providers to increase her recovery. The client specifically asked Mr. Robbins to pay the PA (medical provider) bill in full. Mr. Robbins paid seven providers in full, but paid PA and PH (medical provider) only 75 percent of their billed amount. Mr. Robbins sent a cover letter to PA stating that the payment “represent[s] payment in full of [the client’s] outstanding account, less 25 percent for attorney’s fees in collecting this account, per Washington State law.” Washington law did not entitle Mr. Robbins to these fees.
On June 9, 2000, Mr. Robbins sent the client a settlement statement indicating he had paid PA and PH’s entire bills. On June 12, 2000, PA disputed the payment. In response, Mr. Robbins reissued a check to PA in the same amount. Four days later, without notice to his client, Mr. Robbins paid himself the $1,684.51 remaining in his trust account.
Matter 2: In May 2000, Mr. Robbins filled out a credit-card application for Robbins Enterprises. He used his office address and his business post-office box address. He used a birthdate close to his son’s and his son’s Social Security number. The credit-card company believed the application was from Mr. Robbins’s son; however, Mr. Robbins’s son did not authorize use of his Social Security number for the credit-card application.
Matter 3: In January 1997, Mr. Robbins agreed to represent a minor in a personal-injury claim. Mr. Robbins did not prepare a written fee agreement. He told the clients any fee had to be approved by the court, but would likely be one-third of any recovery. Later in 1997, Mr. Robbins began representing the minor’s grandparents. In December 1998, the grandparents’ case settled and they disputed Mr. Robbins’s $4,400 fee. Although he told the grandparents he would not take the fee, he did not return the money to the trust account. In January 1999, the personal-injury client, who was now over 18, terminated Mr. Robbins’s services. Mr. Robbins wrote a letter to her parents indicating he was charging $6,241.25 for work on the daughter’s case and that he would apply the grandparents’ $4,400 to the unpaid balance. The grandparents objected to use of their funds to satisfy a bill for an unrelated matter. As of the date of the stipulation, Mr. Robbins had not returned the grandparents’ money to his trust account.
Mr. Robbins’s conduct violated RPCs 8.4(b), prohibiting committing a criminal act that reflects adversely on the lawyer’s honesty, trustworthiness or fitness as a lawyer in other respects; 8.4(c), prohibiting conduct involving dishonesty, deceit, fraud or misrepresentation; and 1.14(a), requiring lawyers to deposit all client funds in a trust account.
John Bergmann and Christine Gray represented the Bar Association. Steven J. Brown represented Mr. Robbins.
Suspended
G. Patrick Healy (WSBA No. 4835, admitted 1972), of Tacoma, was suspended for one year, following a stipulation to discipline, by order of the Supreme Court, effective January 22, 2003. This discipline is based on his conduct in several investment partnerships and corporations in the late 1980s and early 1990s.
In the early 1980s, Mr. Healy and Richard Butko began investing in real estate development ventures. By the late 1980s, they began forming partnerships and corporations to manage these ventures. Mr. Butko’s mother, Ann, and Mr. Healy’s brother Michael were involved in some of these corporations and partnerships.
In early 1992, Mr. Healy and Mr. Butko encountered financial difficulties, and loan-default proceedings were begun. Mr. Healy asked Mr. Butko to make capital contributions to the entities with property in default. When Mr. Butko made no capital contributions, Mr. Healy, claiming to protect the corporate and partnership assets, extinguished the Butkos’ interests. Mr. Healy took many actions to accomplish this goal over the next two years. In several cases, Mr. Healy prepared resolutions purporting to transfer property, dissolve corporations, or forfeit the Butkos’ interest in property. These resolutions stated that they had been unanimously approved by the shareholders. In fact, Mr. Butko, and sometimes Ms. Butko, voted against these resolutions. In other cases, Mr. Healy prepared partnership resolutions, even though he did not have a majority interest.
In 1993, Richard and Ann Butko sued Mr. Healy under separate cause numbers. Ann Butko’s claim was resolved in arbitration with a judgment of $103,000 in her favor. The court granted Mr. Butko an award of $2.4 million. These lawsuits restored the Butkos’ interests in seven of the nine partnerships and corporations.
Mr. Healy’s conduct violated RPC 8.4(c), prohibiting conduct involving dishonesty, fraud, deceit or misrepresentation.
Linda Eide represented the Bar Association. Mr. Healy represented himself.
Suspended
Richard McKay (WSBA No. 19987, admitted 1990), of Venice, Florida, was suspended for one year, following a stipulation to discipline, by order of the Supreme Court, effective January 22, 2003. This discipline is based on his failure to protect two clients’ property and interests upon closing his office in 2000 and 2001.
Matter 1: In April 2001, Mr. McKay represented the defendant in a district court lawsuit. Following a trial, the court awarded the plaintiff $13,981.30. Mr. McKay told the client that she could appeal, but that he would not handle the appeal. Mr. McKay did not notify the client of the date for presentment of the judgment. The client learned of the date through her own efforts. She decided not to appeal and paid the judgment. The client tried to contact Mr. McKay to pay her bill and pick up her file, but was unable to contact him. Mr. McKay’s son tried unsuccessfully to locate the client’s file. Mr. McKay did not cooperate with disciplinary counsel’s requests for information on this matter.
Matter 2: In May 2000, Mr. McKay agreed to represent a client in a breach-of-contract case. The client paid a $1,000 advance fee deposit. Mr. McKay did not file the client’s lawsuit. The client learned that Mr. McKay planned to retire and wrote a letter requesting his file and an accounting of his fee deposit. Mr. McKay did not respond to the client’s letter. In September 2002, Mr. McKay sent disciplinary counsel a money order payable to the client 12 days prior to the scheduled hearing date. Mr. McKay did not cooperate with disciplinary counsel’s requests for information on this matter.
Mr. McKay’s conduct violated RPCs 1.4, requiring lawyers to keep clients reasonably informed about the status of their matters and promptly comply with reasonable requests for information; 1.14(b)(4), requiring lawyers to promptly pay or deliver client funds upon request; and 1.15(d), requiring lawyers, upon termination of representation, to take reasonable steps to protect a client’s interests.
Linda Eide represented the Bar Association. Mr. McKay represented himself.
Suspended
Mark A. Patlan (WSBA No. 24003, admitted 1994), of Fort Lauderdale, Florida, was suspended for six months, following a stipulation to discipline, by order of the Supreme Court, effective January 22, 2003. This discipline is based on his lack of diligence involving two clients in 2000.
Matter 1: In August 1999, Mr. Patlan agreed to represent a client in a lawsuit filed against him. In July 2000, Mr. Patlan filed the joint statement of arbitrability without advising his client the matter would be arbitrated. Mr. Patlan did not notify his client of the arbitration date, file a prehearing statement, or appear at the arbitration. The arbitrator attempted to contact Mr. Patlan, but Mr. Patlan’s telephone was not working. The arbitrator awarded the plaintiff $35,000 plus attorney’s fees.
Matter 2: Mr. Patlan agreed to represent clients in a lawsuit filed against them in December 1999. Mr. Patlan filed a notice of appearance, and an answer and counterclaim. After June 2000, the clients heard nothing from Mr. Patlan. In July 2000, Mr. Patlan’s former law partner told the clients Mr. Patlan was gone, and she agreed to represent them.
Mr. Patlan’s conduct violated RPCs 1.3, requiring lawyers to act with reasonable diligence and promptness in representing clients; and 1.4, requiring lawyers to keep clients reasonably informed about the status of their matters and promptly comply with reasonable requests for information.
Sachia Stonefeld Powell represented the Bar Association. Mr. Patlan represented himself.
