October 2003
Disciplinary Notices
These notices of imposition of disciplinary sanctions and actions are published pursuant to Rule 3.5(d) of the Washington State Supreme Court Rules for Enforcement of Lawyer Conduct, and pursuant to the February 18, 1995, policy statement of the WSBA Board of Governors.
For a complete copy of any disciplinary decision, call the Washington State Disciplinary Board at 206-733-5926, leaving the case name, and your name and address.
Disbarred
Brian W. Chance (WSBA No. 11649, admitted 1981), of Lowell, MA, was disbarred effective May 8, 2002, following disbarment in Massachusetts. This discipline was based on his misuse of estate assets in 2000.
Matter 1: In 1999, Mr. Chance drafted estate-planning documents for an elderly client. In January 2000, the client died, leaving all of her assets in trust for the care of her disabled son. An employee in Mr. Chance's office was appointed trustee and executor of the client's estate. The employee gave Mr. Chance a $204,585.19 check to deposit into his IOLTA account until an estate account could be established. Between July 2000 and February 2001, Mr. Chance disbursed $120,000 of the estate funds for unrelated matters. When Mr. Chance failed to provide an accounting, the employee filed a civil suit seeking return of the funds.
Matter 2: In 1998, Mr. Chance agreed to represent a trustee in funding and managing a trust. In September 1998, Mr. Chance paid himself $8,900 from these trust funds without authorization. Between August 1998 and November 2000, Mr. Chance disbursed another $67,000 in trust funds to himself without the trustee's authorization. In July 2000, the trustee discharged Mr. Chance. After his discharge, Mr. Chance disbursed $20,000 to the trustee, using funds belonging to the estate discussed in matter 1.
Mr. Chance's conduct violated Massachusetts RPCs 1.15(a), (b), (d), and (e), requiring lawyers to withdraw when asked by the client and to protect the client's interests upon withdrawal; 8.4(c), prohibiting dishonesty, fraud, deceit, or misrepresentation; 1.1, requiring lawyers to provide competent representation; 1.2(a), requiring lawyers to abide by their clients' decisions concerning the objectives of the representation; 1.3, requiring lawyers to diligently represent their clients; and 1.4(a), requiring lawyers to keep their clients reasonably informed about the status of their matters.
Felice Congalton represented the Bar Association. Mr. Chance represented himself.
Disbarred
Reginald Johnson (WSBA No. 26726, admitted 1997), of Tacoma, was disbarred effective March 27, 2003, following a hearing. This discipline was based on 44 acts of misconduct involving 14 clients and the Bar Association from 1999 through 2002.
In late 1999 or early 2000, Mr. Johnson began working on a contract basis for a landlord-services company. The company provided eviction and collection services for landlord clients. Mr. Johnson signed pleadings that were prepared and selected by company staff, and appeared in court. Mr. Johnson usually did not meet with the clients or review the files prior to signing the pleadings.
In 2001 and 2002, Mr. Johnson authorized company staff to sign his name on pleadings he had not reviewed. Mr. Johnson assisted the company's unauthorized practice of law. The company paid Mr. Johnson a fee for each order entered and paid him a flat fee for time spent in the company offices.
During 2000 and 2001, while working for landlord clients, Mr. Johnson failed to notify clients of hearings; failed to attend hearings; failed to respond to motions, resulting in sanctions and attorney's fees imposed against himself and his clients; obtained default orders against tenants although they had served answers; filed motions in previously dismissed actions; signed pleadings without investigating any of the information or contacting the clients; pursued eviction actions knowing the tenants had filed bankruptcy petitions; purported to represent clients without authorization; filed eviction proceedings knowing that the tenant had insufficient notice; and provided false information to the court and to the Bar Association.
Mr. Johnson's conduct violated RPCs 1.1, requiring lawyers to provide competent representation; 1.3, requiring lawyers to diligently represent their clients; 1.4, requiring lawyers to keep clients reasonably informed about the status of their matters; 1.8(f), prohibiting lawyers from accepting compensation from a person other than the client, unless the client consents and there is no interference with the lawyer-client relationship or the lawyer's professional judgment; 3.1, prohibiting bringing or defending frivolous claims; 3.3(f), requiring lawyers, in ex parte proceedings, to inform the tribunal of all relevant facts, whether or not they are adverse; 3.5(b), prohibiting ex parte communication with the tribunal; 5.4(c), prohibiting allowing the lawyer's employer to direct the lawyer's professional judgment; 5.5(b), prohibiting assisting nonlawyers with the unauthorized practice of law; 5.5(c), prohibiting the lawyer from allowing his name to be used by a nonlawyer in the unauthorized practice of law; 8.4(b), prohibiting committing a criminal act reflecting adversely on the lawyer's honesty, trustworthiness, or fitness as a lawyer in other respects; 8.4(c), prohibiting conduct involving dishonesty, fraud, deceit, or misrepresentation; and 8.4(d), prohibiting conduct prejudicial to the administration of justice; and RLDs 1.1(d), prohibiting acting as a person's lawyer without authority; and 1.1(p), prohibiting conduct demonstrating unfitness to practice law.
Jonathan Burke represented the Bar Association. Mr. Johnson represented himself. The hearing officer was Steven W. Hale.
Disbarred
Kirk W. Jones (WSBA No. 7089, admitted 1976), of Bridgeport, CT, was disbarred effective July 18, 2002, based on a disbarment order from the Supreme Judicial Court of the Commonwealth of Massachusetts. This discipline was based on his criminal conduct involving creating false evidence in 1994.
Matter 1: In January 1994, Mr. Jones filed a lawsuit on his client's behalf in Massachusetts Superior Court. In February 1994, Mr. Jones learned that the defendant had filed a bankruptcy petition. Mr. Jones's client asserted that his claim was nondischargeable due to fraud, but Mr. Jones failed to file the required nondischargeability complaint prior to the deadline. In June 1994, Mr. Jones filed a motion to extend the time to file the nondischargeability complaint. In July, Mr. Jones's client died. In August, Mr. Jones drafted his client's affidavit and signed the client's name. Mr. Jones filed the affidavit in court in support of his motion for additional time. The court denied the motion. In March 2000, Mr. Jones pleaded guilty to two counts of mail fraud.
Mr. Jones's conduct violated Massachusetts Disciplinary Rules 102(A)(4) and (6), prohibiting conduct involving dishonesty, fraud, deceit, or misrepresentation; 1-1-2(A)(5), prohibiting knowingly using perjured testimony and false evidence; 7-102(A)(5), prohibiting knowingly making a false statement of law or fact; and 7-102(A)(6), prohibiting creating and using false evidence.
Douglas Ende represented the Bar Association. Mr. Jones represented himself.
Disbarred
Chul Shirts (WSBA No. 24993, admitted 1995), of Vancouver, was disbarred effective October 8, 2002, following a hearing. This discipline was based on his criminal conduct, failure to diligently represent clients, and charging unreasonable fees in 1999 and 2000.
During 1999 and 2000, Mr. Shirts agreed to represent seven clients in parenting-plan modifications or marriage dissolutions. In each case, the clients paid Mr. Shirts advance fee deposits. Mr. Shirts took some actions, but did not complete any of these cases. In one case, Mr. Shirts failed to file proof of service, so the client was not able to complete the case. Mr. Shirts did not return his clients' phone calls. In some cases, Mr. Shirts did not account for or return unearned fees, and did not return clients' original documents.
Mr. Shirts's conduct violated RPCs 8.4(b), prohibiting committing criminal acts that reflect adversely on the lawyer's honesty, trustworthiness, or fitness as a lawyer in other respects; 1.4, requiring lawyers to keep lawyers reasonably informed about the status of their matters; 1.3, requiring lawyers to diligently represent their clients; 1.15(d), requiring lawyers to refund unearned fees upon termination of representation; and 1.5(a), requiring lawyers' fees to be reasonable.
Linda Eide represented the Bar Association. Mr. Shirts represented himself. The hearing officer was David A. Thorner.
Suspended
Hollis Wayne Duncan (WSBA No.27937, admitted 1998), of Edmonds, was suspended for 12 months, effective October 11, 2002, by order of the Supreme Court, following a hearing. This discipline is based on his failure to avoid conflicts of interest from 1999 through 2000, and charging an unreasonable fee.
In October 1998, Mr. Duncan began representing Mr. P and Mr. K. Mr. P supervised Mr. K in a city shop. In early 1999, Mr. Duncan also began representing Mr. S, another shop employee supervised by Mr. P. In May 1999, Mr. Duncan agreed to assist Mr. S with job-related issues involving his supervisor, Mr. P. Although the parties appear to have known about the conflict of interest, Mr. Duncan did not discuss the matter or obtain a written conflict waiver. Mr. S sent a letter to the city mayor complaining about Mr. P. Mr. Duncan helped Mr. S draft this letter. In June 1999, Mr. S paid his bill in full.
In June 1999, the city notified Mr. P that he was subject to disciplinary action, and Mr. Duncan represented him in this proceeding. Mr. S was interviewed as a witness in the disciplinary action. In July 1999, the city terminated Mr. P's employment, and Mr. Duncan filed a whistleblower action on Mr. P's behalf. During discovery in this action, Mr. Duncan requested Mr. S's employment records. A city attorney wrote Mr. Duncan about the conflict between Mr. S and Mr. P, but Mr. Duncan ignored the letter.
In January 2000, a judge disqualified Mr. Duncan from further representation in the whistleblower case. After this decision, Mr. Duncan sent Mr. S a letter demanding a $3,990 retainer in retaliation for the disqualification. In February, Mr. Duncan assisted Mr. K in filing a union complaint against Mr. S. Mr. Duncan participated in this complaint to further retaliate against Mr. S. In April and May 2000, Mr. Duncan made reports to animal control about Mr. S.
Mr. Duncan's conduct violated RPCs 1.7(a), prohibiting lawyers from representing clients whose interests are directly adverse, unless the clients consent in writing after full disclosure and the lawyer reasonably believes that the representation will not adversely affect the other client; 1.9, prohibiting a lawyer from representing a client in the same or a substantially related matter whose interests are materially adverse to a former client's interests, unless the former client consents in writing after a full disclosure; and 1.5, requiring lawyers' fees to be reasonable.
Michael Patterson and Christine Gray represented the Bar Association. Mr. Duncan represented himself. The hearing officer was Paul M. Larson.
Suspended
Michael J. Harris (WSBA No.18240, admitted 1988), of Finleyville, PA, was suspended for 90 days effective February 25, 2003, following a hearing. This discipline is based on his failure to diligently represent and reasonably communicate with a client, and conduct involving misrepresentation from 1996 to 1998. (Mr. Harris is to be distinguished from Michael E. Harris and Michael P. Harris, both of Seattle.)
In 1996, Mr. Harris represented the mother in a child-custody trial and appeal. The client's mother paid Mr. Harris $7,500 for the appeal and transcripts. Mr. Harris told the mother that none of the $7,500 would be applied to outstanding attorney's fees from the trial. Mr. Harris timely filed the notice of appeal, but without proof of service. The court sanctioned Mr. Harris three times for late filings between January and May 1997. In June, the court moved to conditionally dismiss the appeal and again sanctioned Mr. Harris for failing to file his client's brief. Following an additional sanction in August, the court dismissed the client's appeal.
During 1997 and 1998, Mr. Harris told the client that he was waiting for the opposing party's brief. The client learned of the dismissal in 1998 and discussed this with Mr. Harris. Mr. Harris told the client he did not know about the dismissal and that the court had made a mistake. Mr. Harris told the client he had applied the mother's money to the trial bill, including an additional amount she paid for transcripts, an item already included in the original payment.
Mr. Harris's conduct violated RPCs 1.3, requiring lawyers to act with reasonable diligence and promptness; 1.4, requiring lawyers to reasonably communicate with clients about the status of their matters; 3.2, requiring lawyers to expedite clients' litigation; and 8.4(c), prohibiting lawyers from engaging in conduct involving fraud, deceit, and misrepresentation.
Anthony Butler and Randy Beitel represented the Bar Association. Mr. Harris represented himself. The hearing officer was Teena M. Killian.
Suspended
Hugh J. Kelly (WSBA No. 14616, admitted 1984), of Spokane, was suspended for two years effective May 14, 2003, following a hearing. Mr. Kelly's reinstatement following the suspension is conditioned on his showing his fitness to practice. This discipline is based on his practicing law while his license was suspended, failing to refund an unearned fee deposit, and failing to properly document and account for client funds in 2000.
In October 1999, Mr. Kelly agreed to represent relatives of an Alzheimer's dementia patient. The clients wanted advice about financial and care decisions, and in particular how to qualify the patient for Medicaid long-term care. In December 1999, Mr. Kelly drafted two Medicaid gift-distribution documents and disbursement checks for the daughter's signature. Mr. Kelly deposited one of these checks into his trust account as an advance fee deposit.
By May 2000, Mr. Kelly had paid himself $5,000 in fees. Mr. Kelly's license to practice law was suspended in May, but he continued to practice. In June, Mr. Kelly told the clients he could no longer represent them, but did not disclose his interim suspension. In July 2000, Mr. Kelly submitted an outdated Medicaid form. The clients completed the corrected form and obtained Medicaid coverage for the patient without Mr. Kelly's assistance. The clients asked Mr. Kelly for an accounting of the $5,000. He did not provide an accounting or any billing statements to the clients. Mr. Kelly failed to respond to the Bar Association during the investigation of this matter. The sanction in this matter was affected by mitigating factors.
Mr. Kelly's conduct violated RPCs 8.4(b), prohibiting criminal acts that reflect adversely on the lawyer's honesty, trustworthiness, or fitness as a lawyer in other respects; 8.4(c), prohibiting conduct involving dishonesty, deceit, fraud, or misrepresentation; 1.5(a), requiring lawyers to refund unearned fee deposits; 1.14(b) (3), requiring lawyers to maintain records and provide accountings of client funds; and RLD 2.8, requiring lawyers to cooperate with the disciplinary process.
Randy Beitel represented the Bar Association. Mr. Kelly represented himself. The hearing officer was Vicki Lee Anne Parker.
Suspended
Sidney S. Rodabough (WSBA No. 4819, admitted 1972), of Kent, was suspended for two years effective October 1, 2002, by order of the Supreme Court, following a hearing on the facts and a stipulation to the sanction. This discipline is based on his failure to avoid conflict of interest; dishonest conduct; and failure to cooperate with the disciplinary investigation between 1992 and 1998.
In 1992, Mr. Rodabough agreed to represent a client in a mortgage-foreclosure action. The client sold his condominium to a purchaser who assumed the underlying mortgage, with no novation of the deed of trust. When the purchaser defaulted, the client continued to make the mortgage payments and wanted to make sure that his payments did not benefit the defaulting purchaser.
Mr. Rodabough and the client agreed that the client would pay off the outstanding balance on the deed of trust through a "straw man," to prevent the purchaser from benefiting from the payments. In addition, they agreed that Mr. Rodabough and the straw man would own the condominium if Mr. Rodabough paid the client the amount due on the deed of trust, plus nine percent interest, 11 months after the recording of the assignment of the deed of trust. Additionally, Mr. Rodabough agreed to rent the condominium and use the proceeds to pay for interest, real estate taxes, and condominium fees. Mr. Rodabough did not explain the conflict of interest to his client, obtain a written waiver of the conflict, or advise his client to seek independent advice.
In December 1992, the client paid the balance owing on the first deed of trust and Mr. Rodabough assigned the deed to his legal assistant, the "straw man." Mr. Rodabough promised the legal assistant a 50 percent share in any profits from the condominium sale.
On August 10, 1995, Mr. Rodabough paid the client the accumulated interest from December 1992 through the end of August 1995. Mr. Rodabough made no other payments to the client. The client requested that his name be placed back on the title. Mr. Rodabough stopped communicating with the client and did not change the title. During 1994 and 1995, Mr. Rodabough listed the condominium as his property on his income taxes, declared rental income, and took depreciation deductions.
In 1998, the client filed a civil lawsuit against Mr. Rodabough. Mr. Rodabough did not answer, and the client received a $48,332.66 judgment against him. On October 8, 1998, Mr. Rodabough filed a Chapter 13 bankruptcy petition. He did not list the condominium as an asset and told the court that it was owned by a friend. Mr. Rodabough listed a substantially smaller gross income than he had reported on his income-tax returns. Mr. Rodabough failed to cooperate with the disciplinary investigation of this matter.
Mr. Rodabough's conduct violated RPCs 1.7(b), prohibiting lawyers from representing clients in matters in which the lawyer's representation may be materially limited by the lawyer's own interest; 1.8(a), prohibiting acquiring a business interest adverse to the client, unless the terms are fair and reasonable, and disclosed in writing to the client, and the client has a reasonable opportunity to seek independent legal advice in the transaction; and 8.4(c), prohibiting conduct involving dishonesty, fraud, deceit, or misrepresentation; and RLD 2.8, requiring lawyers to promptly cooperate with disciplinary investigations.
E.H. Knapp Jr. and Linda Eide represented the Bar Association. Kurt Bulmer represented Mr. Rodabough. The hearing officer was Patricia H. Wagner.
Suspended
Steven J. Rucker (WSBA No. 20407, admitted 1991), of Portland, OR, was suspended for one year effective October 3, 2001, by order of the Supreme Court approving a stipulation. This discipline is based on a driving-and-alcohol-related offense in 2000.
In November 2000, a police officer observed Mr. Rucker driving without headlights and crossing the centerline. When the police officer attempted to stop Mr. Rucker, he drove away at a high rate of speed. After a 21.6-mile chase at speeds between 85 and 120 miles per hour, Mr. Rucker stopped after running over a spike strip placed in the road. During this chase, Mr. Rucker crossed the state line from Washington into Oregon. Mr. Rucker pleaded guilty to attempt to elude and DUII in Oregon, and attempt to elude in Washington. He requested, and was sentenced, to 90 days of electronic monitoring and participation in a secure residential alcohol-treatment program in Oregon, and eight months' confinement in Washington. Mr. Rucker had prior driving-and-alcohol-related convictions from the late 1980s through 1999.
Mr. Rucker's conduct violated RPC 8.4(i), prohibiting acts reflecting disregard for the rule of law.
Sachia Stonefeld Powell represented the Bar Association. Mr. Rucker represented himself.
Reprimanded
Leta J. Schattauer (WSBA No. 19499, admitted 1990), of Seattle, received a reprimand on July 26, 2002, following a hearing. This discipline was based on her failing to disclose material facts to the tribunal.
In 1990, a firm assisting indigent inmates with post-conviction matters employed Ms. Schattauer. The firm assigned Ms. Schattauer to represent Mr. A in a personal-restraint petition. In 1993, Ms. Schattauer opened her own law practice and continued to represent Mr. A. In May 1993, Ms. Schattauer filed a motion to renew the client's appeal and to renew the order establishing indigency. The motion was supported by the client's certified statement advising the court that his marital status had changed. The client and Ms. Schattauer were married in April 1993. The motion did not disclose community assets, including Ms. Schattauer's home and a mutual fund.
In 1996, Ms. Schattauer filed a personal-restraint petition for the client. This petition requested waiver of the appellate filing fee and contained a statement of finances. Neither the petition nor the client's affidavit disclosed the client's marital status. The court waived the filing fee. At this same time, the undisclosed community mutual fund contained sufficient funds to pay the filing fee.
Ms. Schattauer's conduct violated RPCs 3.3(a)(1), prohibiting making a false statement of material fact to the tribunal; and 8.4(d), prohibiting conduct prejudicial to the administration of justice.
Leslie Allen represented the Bar Association. Kurt Bulmer represented Ms. Schattauer. The hearing officer was Vicki Lee Anne Parker.
Admonished
Robert P. Morrison (WSBA No. 23863, admitted 1994), of Seattle, received an admonition following a review committee meeting on April 4, 2003. The admonition was based on his failure to avoid conflicts of interest in 1998.
In April 1998, Mr. Morrison met with Ms. C and Ms. S regarding estate planning and a domestic-partner agreement (DPA). Mr. Morrison prepared a written fee agreement stating that he represented both clients. Mr. Morrison sent the draft DPA to both Ms. C and Ms. S, although he believed that he represented only Ms. S for purposes of this document. Mr. Morrison did not clearly explain this to Ms. C. Additionally, Mr. Morrison's fee agreement was not clear. Mr. Morrison continued to represent both Ms. C and Ms. S on various matters as their interests became adverse. He did not obtain written waivers of these conflicts.
Mr. Morrison's conduct violated RPC 1.7, prohibiting lawyers from representing two clients whose interests are directly adverse, unless the lawyer reasonably believes that the representation will not adversely affect the relationship with the clients, and the clients consent in writing after a full disclosure.
Nancy Miller represented the Bar Association. Kurt M. Bulmer represented Mr. Morrison.
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