August 2004
Disciplinary Notices
These notices of imposition of disciplinary sanctions and actions are published pursuant to Rule 3.5(d) of the Washington State Supreme Court Rules for Enforcement of Lawyer Conduct, and pursuant to the February 18, 1995, policy statement of the WSBA Board of Governors. For a complete copy of any disciplinary decision, call the Washington State Disciplinary Board at 206-733-5926, leaving the case name, and your name and address.
NOTE: In July's Bar News, the name of Thomas Frey, who served as special disciplinary counsel representing the WSBA at hearing in In re Kagele, was inadvertently omitted. We apologize for the omission.
Resigned in Lieu of Disbarment
Charles B. Allen (WSBA No. 9193, admitted 1979), of Bellevue, resigned in lieu of disbarment effective February 6, 2004. This resignation was based on his conduct in 2002, involving assisting a California estate-planning company in the unauthorized practice of law.
In July 2002, Mr. Allen agreed to associate with a California estate-planning company. Mr. Allen reviewed estate-planning documents completed by company representatives in the clients' homes. Mr. Allen knew that the company representatives were not lawyers and were not supervised by Washington lawyers. Mr. Allen also knew that these representatives gave legal advice to, and solicited services from, the clients. When Mr. Allen reviewed the clients' documents, either he or a staff member sometimes verified factual issues with the clients by telephone. Mr. Allen did not adequately ascertain whether the clients understood the terms or legal effect of the documents they signed. Some of the clients suffered actual harm because they purchased unnecessary or inappropriate living trusts or charitable remainder trusts. Mr. Allen did not advise these clients of the legal and financial consequences of the trust documents. Mr. Allen did not advise the clients of his business relationship with the estate-planning company. Mr. Allen required each client to sign a disclaimer stating "Charles B. Allen is not responsible for any claims arising from an invalid Trust, Will or Power of Attorney." Mr. Allen shared fees with the estate-planning company.
Mr. Allen's conduct violated RPCs 1.3, 1.4(a), and 1.4(b), requiring lawyers to diligently represent clients, keep them informed of the status of their matters, and explain matters to the extent reasonably necessary for clients to make informed decisions; 1.1, requiring lawyers to competently represent clients; 5.5(b), prohibiting lawyers from assisting the unauthorized practice of law; 5.4(a), prohibiting sharing fees with nonlawyers; 1.8(h), prohibiting making agreements prospectively limiting the lawyer's malpractice liability to clients, unless permitted by law and the client is independently represented; and 1.7(b), requiring lawyers to decline client representation if the representation may be materially limited by the lawyer's own interests.
Kevin Bank represented the Bar Association. Mr. Allen represented himself.
Disbarred
John W. Alderson (WSBA No. 29479, admitted 1999), of Pasco, was disbarred effective October 29, 2003, by order of the Washington State Supreme Court approving a stipulation. This discipline was based on his criminal conduct in 2002.
Mr. Alderson's uncle and father were two of three partners in a farming business. In April and May 2002, while visiting his father's home, Mr. Alderson gained access to the business checkbook and wrote eight unauthorized checks for a total of $21,550. Mr. Alderson's father reimbursed the business account. At the time of the stipulation, Mr. Alderson had not paid his father.
Mr. Alderson's conduct violated RPCs 8.4(b), by committing a criminal act (forgery) that reflects adversely on the lawyer's honesty, trustworthiness, or fitness as a lawyer in other respects; 8.4(c), by engaging in conduct involving dishonesty, fraud, deceit, or misrepresentation; and 8.4(i), by engaging in an act involving moral turpitude, corruption, unjustified assault, or other acts which reflect disregard for the rule of law.
Anthony Butler represented the Bar Association. Leland Ripley represented Mr. Alderson.
Disbarred
Armando R. Cobos (WSBA No. 27006, admitted 1997), of Seattle, was disbarred effective January 12, 2004, by order of the Washington State Supreme Court following a default hearing. This discipline was based on his conduct in 2002 involving multiple acts of misconduct in two client matters during 2002.
Matter 1: In January 2002, Mr. Cobos agreed to represent a corporation in two pending lawsuits. Mr. Cobos did not deposit the client's payment into his trust account, bill the client, or provide an accounting for these funds. On May 23, 2002, the court issued an order compelling discovery and imposing $500 in attorney's fees on Mr. Cobos's client. Mr. Cobos did not notify his client of this order, provide the discovery, or pay the fees. In June 2002, the opposing party filed a summary judgment motion. Mr. Cobos did not tell his client about this motion, but the client's corporate counsel learned of the motion from the court file. On June 23, 2002, Mr. Cobos notified his client that the summary judgment motion had been continued and that he had completed the responsive pleadings. Mr. Cobos had not actually prepared responsive pleadings and did not contact his client after this date. Mr. Cobos did not inform his client or the court of his withdrawal from this case. In early July, the opposing party filed a motion for contempt against Mr. Cobos's client. Mr. Cobos did not tell opposing counsel that he no longer represented the company, or forward the pleadings to the corporation. At the end of July 2002, Mr. Cobos vacated his office, and, by August, his office phone number was disconnected. Mr. Cobos did not return the client file to the client or produce the file in response to the Bar Association's subpoena.
Matter 2: In March 2002, Mr. Cobos agreed to represent the wife in a marriage-dissolution action. In April 2002, Mr. Cobos submitted pleadings indicating that the husband had stocks, bonds, and a pension. The client told Mr. Cobos that the husband did not have these assets. The wife initially asked that the husband contribute to her tuition costs. Later, the wife received a tuition grant, and asked Mr. Cobos to withdraw the request for contribution. Mr. Cobos told the client to keep quiet about the grant and pocket the money from her husband. Mr. Cobos continued to ask for this tuition contribution against the client's expressed wishes. On two occasions, while discussing payment of attorney's fees, Mr. Cobos asked the client to assist him in obtaining a false Mexican birth certificate and passport. In May 2002, the husband's lawyer filed a motion to revise the temporary order, including attorney's fees and sanctions against Mr. Cobos. Prior to the date of this hearing, the client told Mr. Cobos that she and her husband were discussing reconciliation. Mr. Cobos advised the client several times not to reconcile with her husband until after the hearing, so the court could award attorney's fees to Mr. Cobos. Mr. Cobos made several verbal attempts to become intimate with the client during the representation. The client terminated the representation prior to the hearing. The parties filed a joint motion dismissing the dissolution petition. Mr. Cobos threatened to sue the husband for filing the grievance in this matter.
Mr. Cobos's conduct violated RPCs 1.2, requiring lawyers to abide by a client's decisions regarding the objectives of the representation; 1.3, requiring lawyers to diligently represent their clients; 1.4, requiring lawyers to keep clients informed about the status of their matters; 1.7(b), prohibiting lawyers from representing a client if the representation might be materially limited by the lawyer's own interests, unless the client consents in writing after a full disclosure; 1.8(k), prohibiting a lawyer from having sexual relations with a current client, unless the sexual relationship existed between them at the time the lawyer-client relationship commenced; 1.14(a) and (b), requiring lawyers to deposit client funds in a trust account, maintain records of client funds, and provide accountings of those funds; 1.15(d), requiring lawyers to take steps to the extent reasonably practicable to protect clients' interests upon withdrawal; 3.3(a), prohibiting lawyers from making false statements of material fact or law to the tribunal; 8.4(b), prohibiting committing criminal acts (attempt to violate Title 18 U.S.C. § 1028) that reflect adversely on the lawyer's honesty, trustworthiness, or fitness as a lawyer in other respects; and 8.4(d), prohibiting conduct prejudicial to the administration of justice; and ELC 5.3(e) (formerly RLD 2.8), requiring lawyers to promptly cooperate with disciplinary investigations.
Christine Gray represented the Bar Association. Mr. Cobos represented himself. Paul M. Larson was the hearing officer.
Disbarred
Jeffrey L. Danzig (WSBA No. 13243, admitted 1983), of Bellingham, was disbarred effective November 25, 2003, by order of the Washington State Supreme Court following a default hearing. This discipline was based on his conduct between 1998 and 2001 involving theft of client funds and conflict of interest in a medical-malpractice matter.
In October 1998, Mr. Danzig agreed to represent clients in a medical-malpractice matter. The clients signed a written fee agreement for a $5,000 nonrefundable retainer and a contingency fee. Between October 1998 and November 2000, the clients paid Mr. Danzig $49,436.15 for costs, and an additional $2,700 in costs directly to third parties. Mr. Danzig deposited many of these payments into his personal checking account. By summer 2000, the clients could not afford to pay costs, so Mr. Danzig agreed to find a lawyer who could advance costs. He also prepared a new agreement stating that the clients agreed to pay fees in addition to those in the original fee agreement, and that they had no disagreement with "regard to money or preparation of our case." The clients initially refused to sign the new agreement, but did so after Mr. Danzig threatened to withdraw and make it difficult for the clients to find new counsel. Mr. Danzig did not tell the clients that they should obtain independent legal advice prior to signing the new fee agreement.
In November 2000, Mr. Danzig associated with another lawyer, who agreed to advance costs to the clients prospectively. The new agreement also provided that Mr. Danzig and the new lawyer would receive a 50 percent contingency fee. In January 2001, the clients' case settled for $600,000. After signing the settlement check, the clients asked Mr. Danzig to provide an accounting. He told them he did not have receipts, could not provide an accounting, and would not refund any money. The hearing officer found that the clients were entitled to a $35,603.76 refund of unused and unaccounted for advanced costs. Mr. Danzig did not refund any money to the clients.
Mr. Danzig's conduct violated RPCs 1.14(b)(3), 1.4, and 1.5(c), requiring lawyers to maintain complete records of client funds in their possession, and to render appropriate accountings to their clients; 1.4(b)(4) and 1.15(d), requiring lawyers to promptly refund unused advanced costs; 8.4(b), prohibiting lawyers from committing criminal acts [theft of client funds] that reflect adversely on the lawyers' honesty, trustworthiness, or fitness as lawyers in other respects; and 1.8(a) and 1.4, requiring lawyers entering business transactions with clients to provide full disclosure and a reasonable opportunity for the clients to seek independent legal advice.
Marsha Matsumoto represented the Bar Association. Mr. Danzig represented himself. Michael Lewis was the hearing officer.
Disbarred
Hollis Wayne Duncan (WSBA No. 27937, admitted 1998), of Edmonds, was disbarred effective January 23, 2004, by order of the Washington State Supreme Court following a default hearing. This discipline was based on his conduct in 2001, involving willful disobedience of court orders and other acts of misconduct in litigation matters.
Matter 1: Mr. Duncan represented the plaintiff in a King County Superior Court lawsuit. Although Mr. Duncan knew that the case was assigned to Kent, he designated his pleadings as Seattle Assignment Area. The defendant filed a motion to move the case to Kent, and served the motion on Mr. Duncan by certified mail to his rented postal box. In November 2000, the postal-box operator signed the certified-mail receipt for the motion. In December, Mr. Duncan told opposing counsel that he had not received the motion and that he did not accept certified mail. In March 2001, Mr. Duncan told the judge that someone would be available at the post office box facility to accept personally delivered documents; however, he instructed the facility personnel not to accept or sign for any documents. Mr. Duncan sent responsive letters to the assigned judge, but did not file any pleadings. Mr. Duncan also failed to provide signed complete answers to interrogatories, even after a court order. In June 2001, the court awarded sanctions against Mr. Duncan, which he failed to pay.
Matter 2: In June 2001, Mr. Duncan filed a petition for a show cause order in a records disclosure matter. In July 2001, the defendant stated in a declaration that the records did not exist. About a week later, Mr. Duncan filed a second petition for a show cause order requiring disclosure of the same records. Mr. Duncan sent a fax directly to a represented party, knowing that opposing counsel was out of town during this time.
Matter 3: In June 2001, Mr. Duncan filed, but did not serve on opposing counsel, a notice of motion to change the assigned judge in a litigation matter. Mr. Duncan failed to serve four other required documents on opposing counsel. Mr. Duncan presented and obtained an ex parte order changing the assigned judge at a time he knew that opposing counsel was out of town, and failed to serve the order on opposing counsel. After receiving the order changing the assigned judge, Mr. Duncan intentionally presented an ex parte order to a commissioner pro tem. Mr. Duncan also intentionally misstated the date of service in his declaration filed with the court.
Matter 4: On July 24, 2001, Mr. Duncan faxed opposing counsel a notice and motion to extend time. The notice stated that the motion would be heard on July 13, 2001. The motion also stated that a judge other than the judge assigned to the case would hear the matter. Opposing counsel did not respond to the motion, because it was set for a date that had already passed. Mr. Duncan altered his motion, indicating it was to be heard July 26, 2001, and by the judge assigned to the case. He then presented the motion and obtained an order extending time for his response without allowing opposing counsel to respond.
In September 2001, the judge ordered $500 in sanctions against Mr. Duncan. Mr. Duncan willfully failed to pay the sanctions. In March 2002, the judge held Mr. Duncan in contempt of court and ordered that he forfeit $50 per day for each day the sanctions remain unpaid. The court also imposed an additional $500 in attorney's fees.
Mr. Duncan's conduct violated RPCs 3.1, prohibiting lawyers from bringing or defending a proceeding, or asserting or controverting an issue, unless there is a nonfrivolous basis for doing so; 3.4(c), prohibiting a lawyer from knowingly disobeying an obligation under the rules of a tribunal; 3.4(d), requiring lawyers to make diligent efforts to comply with legally proper discovery requests by an opposing party; 4.2, prohibiting lawyers from communicating about the subject matter of the representation with represented parties without consent of the other lawyer or legal authorization; 8.4(c), prohibiting conduct involving dishonesty, deceit, fraud, or misrepresentation; 8.4(d), prohibiting conduct prejudicial to the administration of justice; and 8.4(j), prohibiting willful disobedience or violation of a court order directed to the lawyer.
Randy Beitel represented the Bar Association. Mr. Duncan represented himself. James M. Danielson was the hearing officer.
Disbarred
Thomas J. Earl (WSBA No. 10902, admitted 1980), of Moses Lake, was disbarred effective May 13, 2004, by order of the Washington State Supreme Court following a hearing. This discipline was based on his conduct from 1992 through 1998, involving charging fees while representing clients as court-appointed criminal-defense counsel, failing to explain the choice between appointed counsel and retained counsel, charging unreasonable fees, and voluntarily maintaining an excessive caseload while one of the lawyers under contract to provide indigent criminal defense in Grant County.
Matter 1: In 1996, Mr. Earl was appointed to defend a client in two criminal matters. In September and October 1997, Mr. Earl was appointed to represent the same client in a sentencing violation and two new felony charges. Mr. Earl filed notices of appearance in the new cases, but not in the sentencing violation matter. The client's Determination of Indigency form was filed, but not signed by the court. Although Mr. Earl testified that he was not appointed to represent this client, the hearing officer found that he was appointed counsel. Mr. Earl charged the client $3,000 for this representation.
Matter 2: In June 1998, the court appointed Mr. Earl to represent a client on a criminal felony charge. The client wanted to retain a particular lawyer. The client only partially completed the indigency report, and the court found him not indigent. Mr. Earl did not fully explain the client's rights to seek appointed counsel and made no effort to complete the indigency report or argue that the client was actually indigent. Mr. Earl contacted the client on the day of the hearing and suggested that the client retain him. The client agreed to pay Mr. Earl $3,000, but could not meet the payment schedule. Mr. Earl withheld services pending the client's payments.
Matter 3: In September 1993, Grant County Superior Court issued an order appointing the indigent defenders to represent a defendant. Following the usual procedure, the court appointed the indigent defenders at the first hearing, prior to filing of the indigency report. Five days later, Mr. Earl filed his notice of appearance and a document identifying himself as the client's lawyer. No determination of indigency report was ever filed in this case. In October and again in November 1993, the client's mother paid Mr. Earl $1,500 for the client's representation. Mr. Earl was obligated to provide this representation without charge to the client.
Matter 4: On December 18, 1992, the court appointed the "contract defenders" to represent a criminal defendant. The defendant agreed to accept appointed counsel, but indicated he might attempt to retain counsel. Mr. Earl appeared in court with the defendant that same day. By June 1993, the client had paid Mr. Earl $2,220. Mr. Earl did not provide his client a full and fair explanation regarding the decision to retain Mr. Earl, after the court entered an order appointing counsel.
Matter 5: In April 1998, Mr. Earl was appointed to represent a criminal defendant. In May, the court found the client indigent, but able to contribute. On August 5, 1998, a jury found the client guilty. On August 10, 1998, prior to sentencing and without a determination of the client's indigency status for appeal, Mr. Earl talked to the client about the cost of retaining him for the appeal. Mr. Earl agreed to do the client's appeal for a flat fee of $5,000. By accepting the client's money during the appointed representation and prior to a determination of the client's indigency for appeal, Mr. Earl may have created a conflict between his personal interests in keeping the client's funds and the client's interests in qualifying for appointed counsel. The hearing officer found the $5,000 fee to be unreasonable based on the actual work Mr. Earl performed.
Matter 6: On August 1, 1994, Mr. Earl appeared in court as appointed counsel with an indigent criminal defendant. The next day, Mr. Earl filed a notice of appearance. The client believed he would receive better representation if he hired a lawyer rather than using appointed counsel. By January 1995, the client paid Mr. Earl $2,700. Mr. Earl did not initiate the discussion leading to the client's retaining him, but he took advantage of the client's belief that he would receive a better outcome if he retained Mr. Earl. The hearing officer found that Mr. Earl was obligated to represent the client and should have refused the payment.
Matter 7: In April 1993, Mr. Earl was assigned counsel for a criminal defendant charged with child rape and child molestation. The client and his family believed that Mr. Earl was not aggressively defending the client. During an in-chambers meeting with the judge prior to trial, Mr. Earl stated, "he [the client] believes my role is to find proof that he's innocent of this particular charge. I've explained to him the role, or my role, is to see his constitutions rights are protected." The hearing officer found that Mr. Earl fundamentally misunderstood his role as assigned counsel. The hearing officer also found that Mr. Earl's voluntarily excessive caseload was prejudicial to the administration of justice.
Matter 8: In July 1996, Mr. Earl appeared as appointed counsel for a criminal defendant on felony charges, including attempted murder. The client was acquitted by reason of insanity and committed to Eastern State Hospital. Mr. Earl's appointed representation ended. In August 2000, the client retained Mr. Earl to represent him in an attempt to modify his conditions of confinement and to explore revoking his guilty plea. The court docket reflects no work on the client's case after August 2000. In fall 2000, the client asked Mr. Earl to withdraw and refund the unused portion of his $2,500 in fees. Mr. Earl did not withdraw or refund any of the fees. A few weeks later, the client filed a grievance against Mr. Earl. Mr. Earl told the client he would take no further action on his case while the grievance was pending. In June 2001, new appointed counsel successfully withdrew the client's insanity plea and entered a guilty plea to a reduced charge with no additional confinement.
Mr. Earl's conduct violated RPCs 1.3, requiring lawyers to diligently represent their clients; 1.4(b), requiring lawyers to explain client matters to the extent reasonably necessary to permit the client to make an informed decision regarding the representation; 1.5(a), requiring lawyers to charge reasonable fees; 1.7(b), prohibiting lawyers from representing a client if the representation may be materially limited by the lawyer's own interests; 7.1, prohibiting lawyers from making false or misleading statements communications about the lawyer or the lawyer's services; 8.4(c), prohibiting lawyers from engaging in conduct involving dishonesty, deceit, fraud, or misrepresentation; 8.4(d), prohibiting conduct prejudicial to the administration of justice; and 8.4(i), prohibiting lawyers from committing acts involving moral turpitude.
Christine Gray and Linda B. Eide represented the Bar Association. Nels Hansen represented Mr. Earl at hearing. Mr. Earl represented himself on appeal. Kenneth Fielding was the hearing officer.
Disbarred
Edward A. Judge (WSBA No. 18950, admitted 1989), of Kensington, CA, was disbarred by order of the Washington State Supreme Court imposing reciprocal discipline based on an order from the state of California. This discipline was based on his 1997 conviction of one count of attempted robbery, a felony. In 2001, pursuant to a plea agreement, Mr. Judge's felony conviction was reduced to a misdemeanor and then dismissed by the court.
Mr. Judge was disbarred in California based on Business and Professions Code § 6102(c), allowing summary disbarment in cases of criminal convictions involving moral turpitude.
Marsha Matsumoto represented the Bar Association. Mr. Judge represented himself.
Disbarred
Billy S. Mitchell (WSBA No. 24718, admitted 1995), of Seattle, was disbarred effective March 25, 2004, by order of the Washington State Supreme Court following a default hearing. This discipline was based on his conduct in 2002 involving theft of client funds. (Mr. Mitchell is to be distinguished from William Genther Mitchell of Lynden and William Patrick Mitchell of Seattle.)
Mr. Mitchell represented a client in a claim for damages sustained in an automobile accident. Mr. Mitchell also agreed to represent the insurance company that had a subrogated interest in the client's claim. In March 2002, Mr. Mitchell settled the claim and deposited the funds into his trust account. Mr. Mitchell did not inform the insurance company of the settlement, and embezzled the company's funds. The insurance company learned of the settlement and made several requests that Mr. Mitchell forward the funds to them. Mr. Mitchell promised to send the funds, knowing he had already embezzled them. As of the date of the hearing, Mr. Mitchell had not paid the funds to the insurance company. Mr. Mitchell also failed to cooperate with the disciplinary investigation.
Mr. Mitchell's conduct violated RPCs 8.4(b), prohibiting committing a criminal act [RCW 9A.56.030, Theft in the First Degree] that reflects adversely on the lawyer's honesty, trustworthiness, or fitness as a lawyer in other respects; 8.4(c), prohibiting conduct involving dishonesty, fraud, deceit, or misrepresentation; 8.4(i), prohibiting committing an act involving moral turpitude; 1.14(b)(1), requiring lawyers to promptly notify clients of deposit of client funds; 1.14(b)(4), requiring lawyers to promptly deliver client funds upon request; and 8.4(l) and ELC 5.3, requiring lawyers to promptly respond to requests for information during disciplinary investigations.
Randy Beitel represented the Bar Association. Mr. Mitchell represented himself. James M. Danielson was the hearing officer.
Suspended
Norman W. Cohen (WSBA No. 373, admitted 1965), of Seattle, was suspended for one year, effective January 15, 2004, by order of the Washington State Supreme Court following a hearing. For further information, please see In re Discipline of Cohen, 150 Wn.2d 774, 82 P.3d 224 (2004). This discipline was based on his lack of diligence, communication, and improper withdrawal in a litigation matter from 1996 through 2000.
In May 1996, Mr. Cohen agreed to represent a client in an employment dispute. Mr. Cohen obtained a continuance of the trial date without the client's knowledge, despite the client's request for a quick resolution. In July 1998, when opposing counsel hesitated to agree to a second continuance request, Mr. Cohen agreed to voluntarily dismiss the client's suit. Mr. Cohen told his client the employer had requested the second continuance. In September 1998, Mr. Cohen refiled the client's lawsuit. In April 1999, after Mr. Cohen had failed to file required pleadings and attend a status conference, the court dismissed the client's suit and imposed sanctions. In June 1999, Mr. Cohen paid the sanctions, and the court reinstated the client's case. In November, Mr. Cohen agreed, without his client's authority, to transfer the case to mandatory arbitration. At the arbitration hearing, Mr. Cohen called two witnesses and asked for $1.00 in damages. The arbitrator ruled against the client, and Mr. Cohen filed a trial de novo request, but failed to file a jury demand. In November 2000, after the employer filed a summary judgment motion, Mr. Cohen filed a motion to withdraw. Mr. Cohen based his motion on a letter from his physician detailing health conditions he had suffered for over a year. Mr. Cohen did not notify his client prior to filing this motion. The client was not able to obtain new counsel, and agreed to a dismissal with prejudice.
Mr. Cohen's conduct violated RPCs 1.3 and 3.2, requiring lawyers to diligently represent clients and expedite litigation; 1.4(a), requiring lawyers to keep clients reasonably informed of the status of their matters; 1.4(b), requiring lawyers to explain matters to the extent necessary for clients to make informed decisions; and 1.15, requiring lawyers to take reasonable steps to protect clients' interests upon withdrawal.
Anne I. Seidel represented the Bar Association. Kurt Bulmer represented Mr. Cohen. Robert Bibb was the hearing officer.
Suspended
Bruce C. Dawson (WSBA No. 9115, admitted 1979), of Fresno, CA, was suspended for 60 days and reprimanded, by order of the Washington State Supreme Court imposing retroactive reciprocal discipline based on an order from the state of California. This discipline was based on his failure to comply with conditions ordered in a prior disciplinary proceeding.
In 1993, Mr. Dawson received a public reproval with conditions, including that he take and pass the California Professional Responsibility Examination (exam). Mr. Dawson failed to complete this condition, and a new disciplinary proceeding was instituted. Mr. Dawson agreed, in lieu of additional disciplinary proceedings, to take and pass the exam, and attend the state bar ethics school prior to May 23, 1995. Mr. Dawson passed the exam, but failed to attend ethics school.
Mr. Dawson's conduct violated Business and Professions Code § 6068(1), requiring lawyers to keep all agreements made in lieu of disciplinary prosecution.
Felice Congalton represented the Bar Association. Mr. Dawson represented himself.
Suspended
Brett L. Francisco (WSBA No. 8427, admitted 1978), of Bellevue, was suspended for 60 days, effective December 5, 2003, by order of the Washington State Supreme Court imposing reciprocal discipline based on an order from the state of California. This discipline was based on his conduct in 1993, involving failure to promptly deliver client settlement funds in his possession in a litigation matter.
In 1992, Mr. Francisco represented a company in a lawsuit against a builder. In July 1993, the builder issued a settlement check pursuant to a court ordered judgment. Despite the clients' requests, Mr. Francisco did not send them any part of the settlement funds until late October 1992.
Mr. Francisco's conduct violated Rule 4-100, requiring lawyers to promptly pay funds to clients, upon request.
Felice Congalton represented the Bar Association. Mr. Francisco represented himself.
Suspended
Phillip C. Gilbert (WSBA No. 21868, admitted 1992), of Gresham, OR, was suspended for 30 days effective February 17, 2004, by order of the Washington State Supreme Court imposing reciprocal discipline based on an order from the state of Oregon. This discipline was based on his conduct involving an unauthorized settlement offer in a personal-injury matter.
Mr. Gilbert represented a client in a personal-injury matter. Days before the statute of limitations would expire, Mr. Gilbert made a settlement offer that the opposing party accepted. Mr. Gilbert made the settlement offer without his client's knowledge or authority.
Mr. Gilbert's conduct violated DR 1-102(A)(3), prohibiting conduct involving dishonesty, fraud, deceit, or misrepresentation.
Felice Congalton represented the Bar Association. Mr. Gilbert represented himself.
Suspended
Linda J. Toner (WSBA No. 19521, admitted 1990), of Beaverton, OR, was suspended for 30 days by order of the Washington State Supreme Court imposing reciprocal discipline based on an order from the state of Oregon. The Washington order, entered November 18, 2003, imposed a retroactive suspension in Washington based on the dates in the Oregon order. This discipline was based on her assisting with the unauthorized practice of law in 1992.
In August 1992, Ms. Toner entered a retainer agreement with A, a corporation engaged in the nonlawyer sale of revocable living trusts to the public. Ms. Toner rented office space from A and accepted client referrals and fees from A. She agreed to use only forms drafted and supplied by A. The agreement increased the fees due Ms. Toner as the total number of living trusts sold increased. In December 1993, the court issued an injunction against A, enjoining it from engaging in the practice of law. Ms. Toner did not disclose the conflicts of interest to the living-trust clients.
Ms. Toner's conduct violated DR 3-101(A), by assisting in the unauthorized practice of law; DRs 5-101(A) and 5-105(E), by failing to disclose conflicts of interest to the living trust clients; and 5-108(A), by accepting compensation from a person other than the client, without full disclosure.
Felice Congalton represented the Bar Association. Ms. Toner represented herself.
Suspended
Carlos Valero (WSBA No. 29192, admitted 1999), of Spokane, was suspended for six months, effective December 1, 2003, by order of the Washington State Supreme Court approving a stipulation. This discipline was based on his knowingly disobeying court orders in 2001.
Matter 1: In July 2000, Mr. Valero filed an adversary proceeding in U.S. Bankruptcy Court. Mr. Valero named three defendants without any factual basis. The court dismissed the adversary proceeding, deeming the plaintiffs "vexatious litigants," and imposed sanctions and conditions on filing pleadings in any U.S. court. The order imposed sanctions totaling $32,500 against the plaintiffs and Mr. Valero, jointly and severally. Mr. Valero did not pay these sanctions. The order also provided that any other U.S. court could refuse to accept pleadings relating to this subject matter, unless certain conditions were satisfied. Mr. Valero filed pleadings in the 9th Circuit Court of Appeals relating to the earlier subject matter, without complying with the conditions in the bankruptcy court's order. In June 2001, the 9th Circuit Court of Appeals required Mr. Valero to show cause why sanctions should not be imposed for his failure to comply with that court's rules and orders. Mr. Valero did not promptly respond, and the court imposed sanctions. Mr. Valero paid these sanctions.
Matter 2: In March 1999, a bankruptcy judge awarded a partnership a judgment in an adversary proceeding. In late 1999 or early 2000, the partnership retained Mr. Valero. After several hearings, motions, and a premature appeal, the court entered a final order in favor of Mr. Valero's client in this matter on May 11, 2000. The defendants paid the judgment, and the payment was accepted and negotiated. Mr. Valero declined to file a satisfaction of judgment, despite repeated requests. His client refused to accept that the judgment had been satisfied. In October 2001, the court found that the judgment was satisfied and imposed sanctions of $2,909 jointly and severally against Mr. Valero and his clients. Mr. Valero did not pay these sanctions. Mr. Valero did not cooperate with the disciplinary investigation of this matter.
Mr. Valero's conduct violated RPCs 3.4(c), by his knowingly disobeying court orders and failing to pay court-imposed sanctions; 8.4(d), by his engaging in conduct prejudicial to the administration of justice; 8.4(i), by his committing an act reflecting disregard for the rule of law; and 8.4(l), by his failing to cooperate with the disciplinary investigation.
G. Val Tollefson represented the Bar Association. Mr. Valero represented himself.
Reprimanded
Tucker F. Blair (WSBA No. 29567, admitted 1999), of Seattle, received a reprimand effective February 23, 2004, following a stipulation approved by the hearing officer. Although Mr. Blair disagreed with the violation analysis, he entered into this stipulation. This discipline is based on his unauthorized access of another lawyer's computer files in 2002.
In August 2002, after business hours, Mr. Blair accessed computer files stored on lawyer C's computer. Mr. Blair rented office space in the same building as lawyer C. Mr. Blair went to lawyer C's office at around 11 p.m., when no firm or staff members were present. Mr. Blair copied files to a diskette and downloaded them to his law firm's computer. Lawyer C had previously allowed Mr. Blair to access certain computer files upon request and with permission, but was unaware of this August 2002 access. Mr. Blair returned the diskette and deleted all of the files from his firm computer.
Mr. Blair's conduct violated RPCs 8.4(b), prohibiting lawyers from committing criminal acts [RCW 9A.52.120(2), Computer Trespass in the Second Degree] that reflect adversely on the lawyer's honesty, trustworthiness, or fitness as a lawyer in other respects; and 8.4(i), prohibiting committing acts of moral turpitude.
Kevin Bank represented the Bar Association. Mr. Blair represented himself. Gayle T. McElroy was the hearing officer.
Reprimanded
Robert E. Brandt (WSBA No. 23058, admitted 1993), of Kirkland, received a reprimand effective February 17, 2004, following a stipulation approved by the hearing officer. This discipline is based on Mr. Brandt's failure to provide diligent representation and follow the client's instructions in a personal-injury matter between 1998 and 2001.
In September 1998, Mr. Brandt agreed to represent a client injured in an automobile accident. Shortly after agreeing to a contingent fee, Mr. Brandt learned that the client had pre-existing injuries. Although Mr. Brandt was concerned that the pre-existing injuries would affect the client's case, he did not communicate this concern to her. Mr. Brandt did not answer the client's phone calls or work on her case until February 2000, when he met with the client and reviewed a settlement demand letter. Mr. Brandt did not send the settlement letter or make any other attempts to communicate with the other driver's insurance company. In early 2001, in response to the client's statute of limitations concerns, Mr. Brandt drafted a complaint. Mr. Brandt did not file the complaint prior to expiration of the statute of limitations. In May 2002, the client fired Mr. Brandt and requested that he return her file. Mr. Brandt did not return the client's file. Mr. Brandt did not promptly respond to the Bar Association's requests for information about the grievance, but did appear for his deposition.
Mr. Brandt's conduct violated RPCs 1.2(a), requiring lawyers to abide by the client's decisions concerning the objectives of the representation; 1.3, requiring lawyers to diligently represent their clients; 1.4, requiring lawyers to keep clients reasonably informed of the status of their matters; 1.15(d), requiring lawyers to take reasonable steps to protect clients' interests upon withdrawal from representation; and RPC 8.4(l) and ELC 5.3, requiring lawyers to promptly respond to requests for information during disciplinary investigations.
Anthony Butler represented the Bar Association. Mr. Brandt represented himself. Teena Killian was the hearing officer.
Reprimanded
Donald B. Lundahl (WSBA No. 21424, admitted 1992), of Tacoma, received a reprimand effective December 29, 2003, following a stipulation approved by the chief hearing officer. This discipline is based on his conduct in 1996, involving failure to diligently represent a criminal defendant.
In March 1996, Mr. Lundahl began representing a client in a criminal matter. In June 1996, Mr. Lundahl received an expert report stating that his client was not mentally competent to stand trial. Mr. Lundahl did not raise this issue with the court prior to going on vacation for the month of July. Mr. Lundahl arranged for another lawyer to take over his caseload during his vacation. During Mr. Lundahl's vacation, the client entered a guilty plea. In August, the client told Mr. Lundahl that the other lawyer had forced him to accept the guilty plea. Mr. Lundahl decided the client's complaints were frivolous and took no action to withdraw the plea. Mr. Lundahl withdrew from the representation, and the court appointed another lawyer. The court denied the new lawyer's motion to withdraw the plea, and sentenced the client to 176 months in prison. Later, the court granted the client's personal-restraint petition and vacated the guilty plea based on Mr. Lundahl's failure to raise the client's potential incompetency.
Mr. Lundahl's conduct violated RPCs 1.3, requiring that lawyers diligently represent their clients; and 8.4(d), prohibiting conduct prejudicial to the administration of justice.
Leslie Ching Allen represented the Bar Association. Donald Lundahl represented himself. James M. Danielson was the hearing officer.
Reprimanded
Michael T. Mullen (WSBA No. 23116, admitted 1993), of Milwaukie, OR, received a reprimand effective September 8, 2003, by order of the Washington State Supreme Court imposing reciprocal discipline based on an order from the state of Oregon. This discipline is based on his neglect of a marital-dissolution matter in 2000.
In 2000, Mr. Mullen represented a client in a dissolution-of-marriage action. After an October 2000 hearing, the court asked Mr. Mullen to prepare an order. Mr. Mullen took no action to draft an order until December 2000. Although Mr. Mullen thought he had mailed the draft order to opposing counsel, his billing records do not reflect this action. Opposing counsel did not receive a draft order, so he drafted his own. Mr. Mullen did not respond to opposing counsel's draft order. In December 2000, the court signed opposing counsel's order. The client was not aware that this order had been entered. In January 2001, Mr. Mullen's client retained new counsel. New counsel discovered that the December order was inaccurate.
Mr. Mullen's conduct violated DR 6-101(B), prohibiting lawyers from neglecting legal matters entrusted to them.
Felice Congalton represented the Bar Association. Mr. Mullen represented himself.
Reprimanded
Christopher J. Nickola (WSBA No. 6737, admitted 1976), of Richland, received a reprimand effective January 20, 2004, following a stipulation approved by the hearing officer. This discipline is based on his conduct in 2002, involving failure to competently analyze his responsibilities in a property-division matter.
In February 2002, Mr. Nickola agreed to represent a client in a proceeding to terminate a long-term nonmarital relationship. In March 2002, Mr. Nickola filed a petition for property division, and, in April, the court granted his request for temporary orders. In May 2002, Mr. Nickola requested an order of contempt and judgment against the opposing client for violation of the temporary orders. Prior to the hearing on the motion, Mr. Nickola's client committed suicide. After talking with the client's family, Mr. Nickola attended the contempt hearing and did not inform the court that his client had died. At the time of the hearing, Mr. Nickola erroneously believed he had authority to represent the client's estate, that his conduct was permitted by the RPCs, and that the client's death was not material to the outcome of the hearing.
Mr. Nickola's conduct violated RPC 1.1, requiring lawyers to competently represent their clients.
Christine Gray represented the Bar Association. Leland G. Ripley represented Mr. Nickola. Timothy Esser was the hearing officer.
Reprimanded
Mark Passannante (WSBA No. 25680, admitted 1996), of Portland, OR, received a reprimand by order of the Washington State Supreme Court order imposing reciprocal discipline based on an order from the state of Oregon. This discipline is based on his conduct between 1999 and 2001, involving neglect of a client matter and failure to protect the clients' interests upon withdrawal.
In August 1999, Mr. Passannante agreed to represent two clients in a claim for personal injuries they had sustained in a bar fight. Mr. Passannante deposited the client funds in an IOLTA account in Washington, while his office was in Oregon. In March 2000, Mr. Passannante learned that the bar's insurer denied the clients' claims. Mr. Passannante took no further action on the clients' claims until March 2001, when he determined the claims were not well founded. On March 8, 2001, Mr. Passannante notified the clients that he would not continue to represent them. He did not send an accounting, a refund of unearned fees, or a copy of the client file.
Mr. Passannante's conduct violated Oregon Code of Professional Responsibility DR 2-110(A)(2), prohibiting lawyers from withdrawing from employment until the lawyer has taken reasonable steps to avoid foreseeable prejudice to the rights of the lawyer's client; DR 6-101(B), prohibiting lawyers from neglecting legal matters entrusted to them; DR 9-101(A), requiring client funds to be deposited into lawyer trust accounts located in the state of Oregon; and DR 9-101
(C)(3), requiring lawyers to maintain complete records of client funds and render appropriate accountings.
Felice Congalton represented the Bar Association. Mr. Passannante represented himself.
Reprimanded
Dana M. Ryan (WSBA No. 17418, admitted 1987), of Sumner, received a reprimand effective December 5, 2003, following a stipulation approved by the hearing officer. This discipline is based on his conduct in 1999, involving failing to diligently represent a client, failing to comply with the trust account regulations, and charging an unreasonable fee.
In 1999, Mr. Ryan agreed to represent a client in vacating a guilty plea. The client was incarcerated, and Mr. Ryan agreed to help him purchase a used car. The client paid Mr. Ryan $50 for picking up the car. Mr. Ryan, with the client's permission, withdrew $2,050 from the client's jail account. Mr. Ryan did not deposit the client's money in his trust account or maintain any records of the funds. Between March 9 and March 27, 1999, Mr. Ryan made five appointments to pick up the car. He failed to appear for any of these appointments. The seller cancelled the deal and retained $100 of the client's funds to cover collect calls. By December 10, 1999, Mr. Ryan returned all of the client's funds.
The client also paid Mr. Ryan $110 to transcribe two tapes. Mr. Ryan did not complete the transcriptions, and retained the client's funds.
Mr. Ryan's conduct violated RPCs 1.14, requiring lawyers to deposit client funds into a trust account and maintain complete records of these funds; 1.3, requiring lawyers to diligently represent clients; and 1.5(a), requiring lawyers' fees to be reasonable.
Kevin Bank represented the Bar Association. Mr. Ryan represented himself. Mary Wechsler was the hearing officer.
Reprimanded
Brian J. Sunderland (WSBA No. 22665, admitted 1993), of Clackamas, OR, received a reprimand by order of the Washington State Supreme Court imposing reciprocal discipline based on an order from the state of Oregon. This discipline is based on his neglect of an adoption matter between 1999 and 2001.
In August 1999, Mr. Sunderland agreed to represent clients in a stepparent adoption. He timely filed the petition and sent the notice for publication three months later. Service by publication was completed in August 2000. In September 2001, Mr. Sunderland requested that the Department of Children and Families (Department) waive the required home study. After sending additional documents in November 2000, Mr. Sunderland had no further contact with the Department. The Department granted the waiver in May 2001. The adoption was finalized in June 2001.
Mr. Sunderland's conduct violated Oregon Code of Professional Responsibility DR 6-101(B), prohibiting lawyers from neglecting legal matters entrusted to them.
Felice Congalton represented the Bar Association. Mr. Sunderland represented himself.
Admonished
Charles W. Clapperton (WSBA No. 23574, admitted 1994), of Centralia, was admonished by a review committee of the Disciplinary Board effective January 27, 2004. The admonition was based on his conduct in 2001, involving conflict of interest in a marital-dissolution matter.
In 2001, Mr. Clapperton represented a client in a petition for dissolution of his marriage. The court entered temporary orders restraining the parties from disposing of any property in any way, except for in the usual course of business or for necessities of life. In July 2001, the client was ordered to serve jail time for contempt, and Mr. Clapperton withdrew from the representation. While the client was in jail, he asked Mr. Clapperton to resume the representation. Mr. Clapperton asked the client to pay his outstanding attorney's fees. Mr. Clapperton went to the jail and obtained title to a truck in payment of his past-due fees. The truck title was held by the client's closely held corporation. The court later determined that the transfer violated the temporary orders.
Mr. Clapperton's conduct violated RPC 1.8(j), prohibiting lawyers from acquiring a proprietary interest in the subject matter of the litigation.
Leslie Allen represented the Bar Association. Mr. Clapperton represented himself.
Admonished
Michael T. Johnson-Ortiz (WSBA No. 23580, admitted 1994), formerly of Seattle, was admonished effective December 15, 2003, following a stipulation approved by the hearing officer. The admonition was based upon his conduct in 2002 and 2003 involving lack of competence and failure to explain his fee in an immigration matter.
In November 2001, Mr. Johnson-Ortiz agreed to assist Ms. A in filing a citizenship application for her daughter. Mr. Johnson-Ortiz filed a citizenship application for the daughter under a section of the Immigration and Naturalization Act applying only to children with a parent who was a citizen at the time of the child's birth. Mr. Johnson-Ortiz knew that neither parent was a U.S. citizen when the daughter was born.
Ms. A and the daughter signed Mr. Johnson-Ortiz's fee agreement, and Ms. A paid the required $500 retainer. Ms. A reasonably believed this was the fee for the citizenship application. Later, Mr. Johnson-Ortiz's office told Ms. A that letters to the INS would cost her an additional $50 per page and that meetings with Mr. Johnson-Ortiz would cost an additional $50.
Mr. Johnson-Ortiz's conduct violated RPCs 1.1, requiring lawyers to competently represent their clients; and 1.5(b), requiring lawyers to explain the basis of their fees.
Christine Gray represented the Bar Association. Mr. Johnson-Ortiz represented himself. James M. Danielson, the chief hearing officer, approved the stipulation.
Admonished
Vernon H. McCray (WSBA No. 21263, admitted 1991), of Camas, was admonished by a review committee of the Disciplinary Board effective September 2003. The admonition was based on his conduct in 2001 involving failure to explain the basis for fees and failure to protect a client's interest upon withdrawal in a litigation matter.
In August 2000, Mr. McCray agreed to represent a client in a contract dispute. The written fee agreement stated "set fee agreed in advance of $1,000 plus costs short of trial." The $1,000 was nonrefundable. In March 2001, Mr. McCray billed his client separately for deposition preparation, deposition appearance, and preparing a notice of withdrawal. He also billed the client $500 for preparing interrogatory responses. The fee agreement did not explain that these items would not be included in the set fee. The client terminated Mr. McCray's services the day prior to the deposition. Mr. McCray attended the deposition without the client, and billed for his time.
Nancy Miller represented the Bar Association. Mr. McCray represented himself.
Admonished
James H. Schlotzhauer (WSBA No. 22075, admitted 1992), of Seattle, was admonished by a review committee of the Disciplinary Board effective January 21, 2004. The admonition was based upon his conduct in 2002 involving failure to file the annual trust account declaration.
In 2002, Mr. Schlotzhauer failed to file the required trust account declaration. Mr. Schlotzhauer stated that his paralegal opens his mail at an off-site location and that he could not guarantee that he received mail, other than certified items. Mr. Schlotzhauer now instructs his office staff to forward all mail to him.
Mr. Schlotzhauer's conduct violated RLD 13.5 [now ELC 15.5], requiring lawyers to file annual trust account declarations.
Anne I. Seidel represented the Bar Association. Mr. Schlotzhauer represented himself.
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