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February 2004Disciplinary NoticesThese notices of imposition of disciplinary sanctions and actions are published pursuant to Rule 3.5(d) of the Washington State Supreme Court Rules for Enforcement of Lawyer Conduct, and pursuant to the February 18, 1995, policy statement of the WSBA Board of Governors. For a complete copy of any disciplinary decision, call the Washington State Disciplinary Board at 206-733-5926, leaving the case name, and your name and address.
In 1991, prior to admission to the Washington State Bar Association, Mr. Cason was convicted of felony Misapplication of Bank Funds, a violation of 18 USC § 656. Between July and August 2001, Mr. Cason made $463.87 in unauthorized personal charges on his employer's credit card. Mr. Cason was employed as an associate at a law firm (the firm). In August 2001, the firm cancelled the credit card and accepted Mr. Cason's explanation that his unauthorized charges were inadvertent. The firm obtained a replacement credit card. Between October and December 2001, Mr. Cason made $1,530.43 in unauthorized personal charges to the firm's replacement credit card. In early December 2001, Mr. Cason started working at a different law firm. During his employment there, he incurred approximately $12,589.25 in Lexis-Nexis charges using his prior employer's password. He also incurred $1,800 in Lexis-Nexis fees that were unrelated to his current employment. Mr. Cason also opened an unauthorized account with a computer company and purchased a flat-screen monitor. He also applied for an unauthorized account in the firm's name with Amazon.com. Mr. Cason's conduct violated RPCs 8.4(b), prohibiting committing a criminal act involving dishonesty, trustworthiness, or fitness as a lawyer in other respects [felony of Misapplication of Bank Funds]; and 8.4(c), prohibiting conduct involving dishonesty, deceit, fraud, or misrepresentation; and RLDs 1.1(i), prohibiting committing an act involving moral turpitude, dishonesty, or corruption; and 1.1(p), prohibiting conduct demonstrating unfitness to practice law. Christine Gray represented the Bar Association. Mr. Cason represented himself. Kelby Fletcher was the hearing officer. Disbarred Matter 1: In February 1997, Mr. Cobb agreed to represent two brothers in a real-estate dispute. Mr. Cobb told the clients that he had filed the complaint in August 2000, that opposing counsel had accepted service, and that the trial date was set for January 2001. None of these statements was true. Mr. Cobb completed the complaint in March 2001 and the client filed it with the court. The case was set for trial in October 2001. Mr. Cobb failed to appear for the readiness hearing or file pre-trial witness and exhibit lists. On October 23, 2001, Mr. Cobb filed a notice of withdrawal and requested that the court continue the trial date. The court directed Mr. Cobb to show cause why he should not be sanctioned. Mr. Cobb failed to appear for the show-cause hearing, and the court imposed sanctions of $6,013. Mr. Cobb also failed to cooperate with the disciplinary investigation in this matter. Matter 2: In February 1996, Mr. Cobb agreed to represent clients whose property had been damaged in a landslide. The clients obtained a $124,000 damage appraisal and wanted to rescind their purchase. During the next four or five years, Mr. Cobb told the clients that he had filed a complaint and was conducting discovery, and that a trial date was set. None of this was true. The clients filed a lawsuit against Mr. Cobb and obtained a $156,893 judgment against him. At the time of the hearing, the judgment had not been satisfied. Mr. Cobb failed to cooperate with the disciplinary investigation of this matter. Matter 3: In 1998, Mr. Cobb agreed to represent a client in a real-estate dispute. Over the next few years, Mr. Cobb told the client that the opposing party was delaying the matter, when, in reality, Mr. Cobb had not taken any action. In September 2001, Mr. Cobb told the client that he had obtained a default judgment. In fact, Mr. Cobb had not filed the complaint or obtained a judgment. Mr. Cobb provided the client with pleadings that included a non-existent cause number and a forged signature of a judge or commissioner. Mr. Cobb's conduct violated RPCs 1.3 and 3.2, requiring lawyers to diligently represent clients and expedite clients' litigation; 1.4, requiring lawyers to keep clients reasonably informed of the status of their matters; 8.4(c), prohibiting conduct involving dishonesty, fraud, deceit, or misrepresentation; and RLD 1.1(a), prohibiting acts involving disregard for the rule of law. Linda Eide represented the Bar Association. Mr. Cobb represented himself.
Matter 1: In 2001, Ms. K retained Mr. Grahn to represent her in a petition to increase her child-support payments. Mr. Grahn filed the petition on March 9, 2001, and the court set a June 21, 2001, trial date. Prior to trial, Mr. Grahn filed a child-support worksheet, but he did not file the required financial declaration, tax returns, or pay stubs. Mr. Grahn also failed to attend the trial, even though the clerk called him twice. The court then set child support at the lower amount proposed by the opposing party. Mr. Grahn failed to cooperate with the Office of Disciplinary Counsel's investigation of this matter. Mr. Grahn's conduct violated RPCs 1.3, requiring lawyers to diligently represent their clients; 8.4(d), prohibiting conduct prejudicial to the administration of justice; 1.15(a)(1), requiring lawyers to withdraw from representation if continuing results in an RPC violation; and 5.5, prohibiting practicing law where doing so violates the RPCs; and RLDs 8.2, prohibiting suspended lawyers from acting as a lawyer for another after the effective date of the suspension; 8.1(a), imposing duties on suspended lawyers; 8.3, requiring lawyers to notify their clients and opposing counsel of an inability to act and file a notice of compliance; and 2.8, requiring lawyers to fully and diligently cooperate with the Office of Disciplinary Counsel's investigation. Anne Seidel represented the Bar Association. Mr. Grahn represented himself.
In 1982, Mr. Kuvara agreed to probate the estate of Mr. H, a police officer killed in the line of duty. The estate contained a piece of real property in California. Mr. Kuvara contacted California lawyers, but the property was never actually transferred to the widow, Ms. H. In 1990, Ms. H sold the property to her sister-in-law. Ms. H and the purchaser asked Mr. Kuvara to provide documentation of the transfer, but he did not respond to these requests. In January 1998, Ms. H went to Mr. Kuvara's office to sign the documents to formally transfer the property to her sister-in-law. When Ms. H arrived a quit-claim deed was prepared, listing Mr. H as the grantor. Ms. H signed her dead husband's name to the deed. Mr. Kuvara notarized the signature. The deed was recorded in March 1999. In early 1999, the sister-in-law received an offer to purchase the property and contacted an escrow agent. The agent found the deed and knew it was a forgery because Mr. H had died 16 years before the deed was signed. Ms. H and the sister contacted Mr. Kuvara about the false signature, but he failed to respond. The sale of the property was finally completed in November 1999. Mr. Kuvara's conduct violated RPCs 8.4(b), prohibiting committing a criminal act that reflects adversely on a lawyer's honesty, trustworthiness, or fitness as a lawyer in other respects (by violating RCW 9A.60.020 [forgery], RCW 9A.60.050 [false certification], RCW 42.44.106 [notarial misconduct], and RCW 9A.76.175 [false statement by public servant]); 8.4(c), prohibiting engaging in conduct involving dishonesty, fraud, deceit, or misrepresentation; and 8.4(d), prohibiting conduct prejudicial to the administration of justice. Kathy A. Cochran and Joanne Abelson represented the Bar Association. Leland Ripley represented Mr. Kuvara. Marc Silverman was the hearing officer.
Matter 1: In 1996, Mr. Kyaw agreed to represent a minor in a personal-injury matter. Mr. Kyaw agreed to accept a contingent fee, but did not reduce the agreement to writing. Mr. Kyaw did not obtain the treating doctor's records or the police report of the accident. In 1997, Mr. Kyaw told the client's father that he was negotiating with the insurance company, but he did not contact the insurance company until November 1998. In December 1998, Mr. Kyaw was informed by the insurance company that it determined it had no liability in 1996, and denied the client's claim. Mr. Kyaw did not tell the client or his father that the claim had been denied in 1998 or 1999. Mr. Kyaw told the client not to contact the doctor directly, that Mr. Kyaw would handle the bills. The insurance company asked Mr. Kyaw to send all of the client's medical bills, but he did not respond to this letter. Mr. Kyaw then falsely told the doctor's office manager that the doctor had agreed to write off the client's bill. During the investigation of this matter, Mr. Kyaw intentionally fabricated letters with the intent to deceive the Bar Association. Matter 2: In January 2002, Mr. Kyaw agreed to represent a client in a child-support-modification matter. In March 2002, Mr. Kyaw discussed draft pleading with his client and the client asked for changes. The client was not able to contact Mr. Kyaw after this time. Matter 3: In March 2002, Mr. Kyaw agreed to represent a client in a bankruptcy matter. The bankruptcy plan was confirmed, but Mr. Kyaw failed to file the final decree with the bankruptcy court. He also failed to challenge a $550 per-month late fee assessed by the client's mortgage company. Mr. Kyaw did not respond to the client's phone calls or letters. Matter 4: In May 2000, Mr. Kyaw agreed to represent clients in a dispute with their neighbors. Mr. Kyaw agreed to file a complaint and to seek a temporary restraining order. Mr. Kyaw sent the clients an order of default that appeared to have been entered in their case in July 2000. In late 2001 or early 2002, the clients retained substitute counsel because they were unable to contact Mr. Kyaw. The clients learned that no order of default had been entered and that their case had been dismissed in February 2001. Mr. Kyaw's conduct violated RPCs 1.5(c), requiring contingent fee agreements to be in writing; 1.3, requiring lawyers to diligently represent their clients; 1.4, requiring lawyers to keep their clients reasonably informed of the status of their matters; 8.4(c), prohibiting lawyers from engaging in conduct involving dishonesty, fraud, deceit, or misrepresentation; 8.4(d), prohibiting conduct prejudicial to the administration of justice; and 8.4(l), requiring lawyers to fully and promptly cooperate with disciplinary investigations. Linda Eide represented the Bar Association. Mr. Kyaw represented himself.
On April 9, 2002, Mr. Norwood pleaded guilty to the Unlawful Manufacture of a Controlled Substance — Marijuana. He agreed to complete in-patient drug treatment in return for dismissal of two other counts. Mr. Norwood entered treatment in April 2002, and was then formally sentenced. In May 2002, Mr. Norwood was arrested on suspicion of possession of a controlled substance (methamphetamine) with intent to manufacture. Mr. Norwood was charged and pleaded guilty to this offense. Mr. Norwood's conduct violated RPC 8.4(b), prohibiting committing criminal acts that reflect adversely on the lawyer's honesty, trustworthiness, or fitness as a lawyer in other respects; and RLDs 1.1(a), prohibiting acts of moral turpitude; and 1.1(c), prohibiting violations of the oath of attorney. Randy Beitel represented the Bar Association. James Dixon represented Mr. Norwood. George S. Lundin was the hearing officer.
In 1990, Mr. Quigley formed a business relationship with LA, a Washington corporation. Mr. Quigley referred personal-injury clients to LA. LA provided legal services to these clients in exchange for a percentage of the attorney's contingent fee. LA did not employ any lawyers, and Mr. Quigley did not adequately supervise LA's employees. In early 1998, Mr. Quigley formed a business relationship with a second Washington corporation. The corporation agreed to expand Mr. Quigley's practice in the Russian community and provide legal services to these clients. The corporation did not employ any lawyers, and Mr. Quigley did not adequately supervise the corporation's employees. Mr. Quigley allowed the corporation employees to imply that they were lawyers. Mr. Quigley had no contact with many of the clients. He split his legal fees with the corporation. Between March 1998 and late 2001, Mr. Quigley paid the corporation over $1,250,000 for its services to hundreds of clients. During the Bar Association deposition in this matter, Mr. Quigley stated falsely that he had not shared fees with the corporation. Mr. Quigley's conduct violated RPCs 5.3(b), requiring lawyers with direct supervisory authority over nonlawyers to make reasonable efforts to ensure that the nonlawyers' conduct conforms to the lawyer's ethical obligations; 5.4(a), prohibiting lawyers from sharing legal fees with nonlawyers; 5.5(b), prohibiting assisting persons who are not members of the Bar Association in the unauthorized practice of law; 1.4, requiring lawyers to keep their clients informed of the status of their matters; 8.4(c), prohibiting conduct involving dishonesty, fraud, deceit, or misrepresentation; and 8.4 (d), prohibiting conduct prejudicial to the administration of justice. Kevin Bank represented the Bar Association. Leland Ripley represented Mr. Quigley.
In 1993, Mr. Cohen agreed to represent clients in an employment matter. In February 1994, the defendant filed a summary judgment motion. Mr. Cohen did not make any effort to respond to the motion until at or near the time the response was due. Mr. Cohen asked for additional time to respond and/or a continuance of the trial date. The court ordered Mr. Cohen to either take a voluntary nonsuit or request a continuance with $1,000 in costs. The court order stated that the suit would be dismissed on March 7 if Mr. Cohen had not taken one of the options by that date. Mr. Cohen mailed a letter to the court on March 2 stating he was tendering the costs, but did not pay them until March 10. The court dismissed the lawsuit. In April 1994, Mr. Cohen filed a notice of appeal. In March 1994, Mr. Cohen sent a bill to the clients, but did not tell the clients that their case had been dismissed. In April, the clients paid $11,982.25. The Court of Appeals affirmed the dismissal. After this decision, Mr. Cohen billed the clients an additional $3,000 for the appeal. Mr. Cohen's conduct violated RPCs 1.3, requiring lawyers to diligently represent their clients; 1.4(a), requiring lawyers to keep clients reasonably informed of the status of their matters; 1.4(b), requiring lawyers to explain matters to clients to the extent necessary to make reasonable decisions; and 1.5, requiring lawyers' fees to be reasonable. Robert F. Greer and Anne Seidel represented the Bar Association. Kurt Bulmer represented Mr. Cohen. Donald Logerwell was the hearing officer.
Mr. Dexter represented Mr. M. In July 1998, Mr. Dexter sued Mr. M for failing to abide by a contingent-fee agreement. Mr. M's counsel, Ms. A, scheduled Mr. Dexter's deposition. In response to a question about his residence address, Mr. Dexter stated: "None of your business. I do all my work from my office and as you instructed your client to answer yesterday, it's none of your business where I live — and as far as having sex with you, forget it. I'm not interested." Ms. A. responded: "Mr. Dexter, please do not pose any personal comments to me of that kind. This is a deposition. Could you please, restrict it to the questions asked?" Mr. Dexter answered: "I was just responding to your request and I refuse to have sex with you under any circumstances." Following the deposition, Mr. Dexter wrote the following in a letter to Ms. A: "Your attempt to expose yourself by spreading your legs from time to time during the deposition on Tuesday, January 12, 1999 does not impress me. It disgusts me. Please keep your legs together whenever in my presence. I consider it unprofessional and sexual harassment." Mr. Dexter made similar false statements to opposing counsel. Ms. A filed a motion to withdraw from the case. Mr. Dexter objected to the withdrawal. In his objection to the withdrawal, Mr. Dexter told the court that Ms. A had offered him sexual favors in return for settling the case and alleged that she had exposed herself to him during the deposition. Mr. Dexter's allegations were false. The court allowed Ms. A to withdraw and granted a continuance. Mr. Dexter's conduct violated RPCs 4.1(a), prohibiting knowingly making a false statement of fact or law to a third person; 4.4, prohibiting lawyers from using means that have no substantial purpose other than to embarrass, delay, or burden a third person; 8.4(c), prohibiting conduct involving dishonesty, fraud, deceit, or misrepresentation; and 8.4(d), prohibiting conduct prejudicial to the administration of justice. Joseph C. Klein and Anthony Butler represented the Bar Association. Mr. Dexter represented himself. Terence M. Ryan was the hearing officer.
Mr. Fraley was an associate at a law firm. In 2000, a client of the firm and an undercover detective entered into a money-laundering agreement. The client told the detective that Mr. Fraley could draft the legal documents to facilitate the money-laundering scheme. In December 2000, the client asked Mr. Fraley to hold $9,000 in his trust account. Mr. Fraley believed this money was to set up a joint venture between the detective and the client. In late December, Mr. Fraley deposited $8,000 of the client's money into the firm trust account. In February 2001, Mr. Fraley drafted a trust agreement for the client and the detective to sign. Mr. Fraley also counseled the client and the detective to structure their transactions so that the amount deposited each time would be less than $10,000, to circumvent the financial institution's obligation to generate currency transaction reports. In April 2002, the court accepted Mr. Fraley's guilty plea to one count of Attempting to Structure a Currency Transaction, in violation of United States Code §5324(a)(3). Mr. Fraley's conduct violated RPC 8.4(b), prohibiting commission of a criminal act that reflects adversely on the lawyer's honesty, trustworthiness, or fitness as a lawyer in other respects. Sachia Stonefeld Powell represented the Bar Association. Michael E. Schwartz represented Mr. Fraley.
In December 1999, Ms. Levine married Mr. S. In February 2000, Mr. S left the marriage and returned to Canada. In August 2000, Ms. Levine entered into a purchase-and-sale agreement for her house, which was her separate property. The title company told Ms. Levine that Mr. S had to sign a quit-claim deed before the sale could close. In September 2000, Ms. Levine signed Mr. S's name on the quit-claim deed without his permission and then notarized his signature. Ms. Levine's conduct violated RPCs 8.4(b), prohibiting committing a criminal act that reflects adversely on the lawyer's honesty (RCW 9A.60.020 [forgery], and 9A.60.050 [false certification]); and 8.4(c), prohibiting conduct involving dishonesty, fraud, deceit, or misrepresentation. Sachia Stonefeld Powell represented the Bar Association. David Allen represented Ms. Levine.
In August 1992, Mr. Schafer agreed to form a corporation for a client. The purpose of the corporation was to purchase a bowling alley from an estate. During a conversation, the client told Mr. Schafer that Mr. X, the personal representative of the estate, had been "milking" the estate for four years. The client also told Mr. Schafer that Mr. X was giving the client a "good deal" on the bowling alley and that he would repay Mr. X "down the road." Three years later, Mr. Schafer represented a client in a case before Mr. X, who had become a judge. In December 1995, Mr. X ruled against Mr. Schafer's client, imposing sanction. On that same day, Mr. Schafer started investigating Mr. X's role in the H estate. On February 1, 1996, the client terminated Mr. Schafer's representation and told Mr. Schafer he had "no authority to disclose any privileged information, relating to your prior representation of me." The client retained new counsel, who wrote to Mr. Schafer that any disclosure regarding Mr. X would be in violation of RPC 1.6. During February 1996, Mr. Schafer prepared a document which revealed his conversations with his client. He met with and provided this document and others to the Pierce County Prosecutor's Office, Federal Bureau of Investigation, Internal Revenue Service, Seattle Times, Seattle Post-Intelligencer, The News Tribune, and two other local newspapers. In April 1996, Mr. Schafer attached documents disclosing his client's statements to court pleadings without asking the court to protect their confidentiality. In July 1999, Mr. X was removed from judicial office. The Court found that Mr. Schafer could have made his allegations against Mr. X without revealing his client's secrets and confidences. Mr. Schafer's conduct violated RPC 1.6(a), prohibiting lawyers from revealing a client's secrets or confidences unless the client consents after consultation. Christine Gray represented the Bar Association. Shawn Newman, Donald H. Mullins, and Douglas Schafer represented Mr. Schafer. Lawrence R. Mills was the hearing officer.
In 1999, a client retained Mr. Kolin to represent her son. The son was a Russian citizen and had pled guilty to four criminal offenses. The client did not want her son to be deported and asked Mr. Kolin for an opinion about the likelihood of getting the charges reduced. Mr. Kolin charged the client $6,000. The client paid $3,200. Mr. Kolin signed an affidavit and wrote a letter to the prosecutor asking to amend two of the charges to which the son pled guilty. Mr. Kolin did not tell the client that it was unlikely that the prosecutor would agree to reduce the felony charges to misdemeanors prior to writing the letter. The prosecutor did not agree to reduce the charges. In May 2000, the son was deported. The hearing officer found that the reasonable value of Mr. Kolin's work was $1,000. Mr. Kolin's conduct violated RPCs 1.5(a), requiring lawyers' fees to be reasonable; 1.2(a), requiring lawyers to abide by the client's decisions concerning the objectives of the representation; and 1.1, requiring lawyers to provide competent representation. Tracy Calabrese represented the Bar Association. Mr. Kolin represented himself. James Danielson was the hearing officer.
In 1991, Mr. Nuxoll agreed to represent a client in several personal-injury matters involving two separate auto accidents, a surgery, and an insurance issue. In March 1991, Mr. Nuxoll filed a lawsuit joining all four matters. Mr. Nuxoll did not effectuate service of process on Mr. C, one of the defendants. Mr. C filed a motion to dismiss, and Mr. Nuxoll did not file a response. The court dismissed all claims against Mr. C. In December 1992, Mr. Nuxoll settled the lawsuit against the remaining defendants. In August 1992, Mr. Nuxoll filed a second lawsuit against Mr. C. The statute of limitations on the client's claim would expire in September 1992. Mr. Nuxoll learned that there were two possible defendants, a father and son. Mr. Nuxoll had the father served, but did not attempt to serve the son. In December 1992, the court dismissed the lawsuit based on failure to serve the correct defendant within the statue of limitations period. Mr. Nuxoll's conduct violated RPCs 1.1, requiring lawyers to provide competent representation to clients; and 1.3, requiring lawyers to diligently represent clients. Kevin Bank represented the Bar Association. Mr. Nuxoll represented himself. Moses F. Garcia was the hearing officer.
In 1987, Mr. Pflug represented three clients in a boundary-line dispute. In October 1990, a written settlement agreement was circulated among the parties. Mr. Pflug's letter to his clients indicated that all of the defendants had already signed the agreement. In fact, two of the five defendants had not yet signed. The final survey was completed in 1991, and Mr. Pflug made minor modifications to the agreement and circulated it for signature. Counsel for one of the defendants asked Mr. Pflug to make certain that the executed agreement and quit-claim deeds were properly recorded to finalize the case. Mr. Pflug sent the new agreement to the defendants, but the same defendants who did not sign the first time delayed again. In May 1992, the court dismissed the lawsuit for lack of prosecution. Mr. Pflug's clients believed that the case settled when they signed the original (1990) settlement agreement. In 1999, the clients realized the settlement had not been finalized and that the dispute was not resolved. Mr. Pflug's conduct violated RPCs 1.1, requiring lawyers to provide competent representation; 1.3 and 3.2, requiring lawyers to provide diligent representation; 1.4(a), requiring lawyers to keep clients reasonably informed of the status of their matters; and 1.4(b), requiring lawyers to explain matters to clients to the extent necessary to allow the clients to make informed decisions about the representation. Kevin Bank represented the Bar Association. Mr. Pflug represented himself.
In 1999, Mr. Gress represented a construction company in a workers' compensation matter. Mr. Gress took the employee's deposition and obtained his tax returns. During the deposition, the employee testified that he had done some work for a homeowner and had not declared the income on his federal tax return. Immediately after the deposition, Mr. Gress told opposing counsel that Mr. Gress would notify the IRS of the employee's failure to report income if the employee did not settle the case. Neither counsel discussed a settlement amount during this conversation. On October 28, 1999, the employee's counsel notified Mr. Gress that his client was not interested in settling the case. On November 2, 1999, Mr. Gress instructed his legal assistant to contact the IRS, which she did on November 16, 1999. The matter ultimately settled. Mr. Gress's conduct violated RPC 8.4(d), prohibiting lawyers from engaging in conduct prejudicial to the administration of justice. Becky Neal and Jonathan Burke represented the Bar Association. Christopher Hardman represented Mr. Gress. Back to table of contents >>
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