April 2005

Disciplinary Notices

These notices of imposition of disciplinary sanctions and actions are published pursuant to Rule 3.5(d) of the Washington State Supreme Court Rules for Enforcement of Lawyer Conduct, and pursuant to the February 18, 1995, policy statement of the WSBA Board of Governors.

For a complete copy of any disciplinary decision, call the Washington State Disciplinary Board at 206-733-5926, leaving the case name, and your name and address.

Note: Nearly 29,000 persons are eligible to practice law in Washington state. Some of them share the same or similar names. Bar News strives to include a clarification whenever an attorney listed in the Disciplinary Notices has the same name as one or more other WSBA members; however, all discipline reports should be read carefully for names, cities, and bar numbers.

Correction: The Lawyers’ Fund for Client Protection Committee Report in the February 2005 issue of Bar News incorrectly stated that Michael R. Hutton (WSBA No. 5673) was disbarred; in fact, Mr. Hutton was suspended for 3 years effective 1/31/05.

Clarification: The February issue included a notice of admonition for Eugene C. Wong of San Francisco, CA. The notice should have included the following: “Mr. Wong is to be distinguished from Eugene W. Wong of Seattle.” Our apologies to Mr. Wong of Seattle.

Disbarred
Adina A. Atwood (WSBA No. 27787, admitted 1998), of Kent, was disbarred, effective September 15, 2004, by order of the Washington State Supreme Court following a default hearing. This discipline was based on her conduct in 2001 through 2003 involving abandonment of her law practice, multiple acts of misconduct in representing individual clients, and failure to cooperate with a disciplinary investigation.

In the summer of 2002, Ms. Atwood abandoned her law practice. She removed client files from her law office, but did not return the client files to the clients or to the law office. She did not inform clients that she had abandoned her law practice and had ceased handling their legal matters. She took no action to return remaining client funds in her trust account to the rightful owners.

Matter 1: In 2002, a client paid Ms. Atwood $3,000 to represent her in a dissolution matter. The client directed Ms. Atwood to obtain a temporary restraining order because she feared that her husband would physically harm her. Ms. Atwood obtained an ex parte restraining order that failed to include a provision preventing the husband from entering the family residence. Consequently, Ms. Atwood was obliged to request an amended order that included such a provision. At a hearing on the entry of temporary orders at which the client was not present, Ms. Atwood agreed to a provision allowing the husband to have access to the family home to remove certain property. Ms. Atwood failed to notify the client of this provision. The client did not learn of the provision until the husband appeared at her home with a copy of the order. When the client terminated Ms. Atwood’s services, the client requested an itemized bill and a refund of the remaining balance. Ms. Atwood never responded to these requests, never contacted the client, and did not file a notice of withdrawal. The client obtained a default judgment against Ms. Atwood in small claims court for $3,036.

Matter 2: In 2002, a client paid Ms. Atwood $950 to represent her in a Chapter 7 bankruptcy. Following commencement of the bankruptcy proceeding, a judgment creditor continued to enforce an order of garnishment against the client. The client paid Ms. Atwood an additional $150 to quash the garnishment. Ms. Atwood failed to file a motion to quash or to do anything else to prevent the judgment creditor from garnishing the client’s wages. Despite the client’s repeated efforts to contact her, Ms. Atwood failed to communicate with the client. Although the client obtained a refund of $300 in garnished wages, she lost $648 as a result of Ms. Atwood’s failure to take action.

Matter 3: In 1998 or 1999, a client with mental-health and substance-abuse problems hired Ms. Atwood to represent her in various matters, including a marital dissolution. Under the terms of a stipulated property distribution, Ms. Atwood, on the client’s behalf, was to receive $18,760 pursuant to a Qualified Domestic Relations Order. Out of that sum Ms. Atwood was to discharge an $8,500 third-party debt and provide the lawyer for the former spouse with proof of payment. Following receipt of the proceeds in January 2001, Ms. Atwood deposited the sum into her trust account. Shortly thereafter, although she had no client authorization to do so, Ms. Atwood disbursed $12,000 to herself. At the time, Ms. Atwood was not owed $12,000 by the client. When the lawyer for the former spouse inquired about discharge of the debt, Ms. Atwood intentionally misrepresented to him that she was waiting for the check to clear. Ms. Atwood disregarded further communications from the lawyer. In April 2002, Ms. Atwood disbursed to herself another $2,000 of the client’s money without the client’s authority, knowledge, or consent. Ms. Atwood took no steps to return the funds remaining in her trust account to the client.

Matter 4: In April 2002, a client paid Ms. Atwood $775 to represent her in a Chapter 7 bankruptcy. After filing the bankruptcy, Ms. Atwood failed to inform the client of the date for the meeting of creditors, and did not attend the meeting of creditors. Ms. Atwood never contacted the client again about the bankruptcy, which was dismissed in October 2002 because no one had appeared at the meeting of creditors.

Matter 5: Ms. Atwood did not respond to Bar Association requests for information about and responses to the grievances in matters 1 through 4 above. In April 2003, Ms. Atwood failed to appear for a deposition as required by a subpoena duces tecum. Owing to her failure to cooperate with the Bar Association’s disciplinary investigation, on August 6, 2003, the Supreme Court suspended Ms. Atwood from the practice of law pending the outcome of disciplinary proceedings.

Ms. Atwood’s conduct violated RPC 1.3, requiring a lawyer to act with reasonable diligence and promptness in representing a client; RPC 1.4, requiring a lawyer to keep the client reasonably informed about the status of a matter and to explain a matter to the extent reasonably necessary to permit the client to make informed decisions; RPC 1.5(a), requiring that a lawyer’s fee be reasonable; RPC 1.14, requiring a lawyer to deposit client funds into a trust account and to pay to the client funds that the client is entitled to receive; RPC 1.15(d), requiring that a lawyer take reasonably practicable steps to protect a client’s interests upon termination of representation (including surrendering papers and property to which the client is entitled and refunding any advance payment of fee that has not been earned); RPC 4.1(a), prohibiting a lawyer from knowingly making a false statement of material fact or law to a third person; RPC 8.4(b), prohibiting commission of a criminal act (namely, theft) that reflects adversely on the lawyer’s honesty, trustworthiness, or fitness as a lawyer in other respects; RPC 8.4(c), prohibiting conduct involving dishonesty, deceit, fraud, or misrepresentation; RPC 8.4(d), prohibiting conduct prejudicial to the administration of justice; and RPC 8.4(l), prohibiting a lawyer from violating a duty imposed by or under the Rules for Enforcement of Lawyer Conduct.

Jonathan H. Burke represented the Bar Association. Ms. Atwood represented herself. Marc L. Silverman was the hearing officer.

Disbarred
D. Willas Miller (WSBA No. 25454, admitted 1995), of Seattle, was disbarred, effective September 17, 2004, by order of the Washington State Supreme Court following a stipulation approved by the Disciplinary Board. This discipline was based on his conduct in 1999 involving commission of several violations of the Uniform Controlled Substances Act.

In February 1999, Mr. Miller was charged by information in King County Superior Court with five felony violations of the Uniform Controlled Substances Act. In July 2000, a jury convicted Mr. Miller of three counts of delivery of a controlled substance and one count of attempted delivery of a controlled substance. In September 2000, Mr. Miller was sentenced to 48 months in prison.

Mr. Miller’s conduct violated RPC 8.4(b), prohibiting a lawyer from committing a criminal act that reflects adversely on the lawyer’s honesty, trustworthiness, or fitness as a lawyer in other respects; RPC 8.4(i), which prohibits a lawyer from, inter alia, committing any act which reflects disregard for the rule of law; and RPC 8.4(k), prohibiting a lawyer from violating his or her oath as an attorney (namely, the oath to “abide by” the laws of the state of Washington).

Douglas J. Ende and Debra Slater represented the Bar Association. Mr. Miller represented himself.

Disbarred
S. Don Phelps (WSBA No. 21247, admitted 1991), of Olympia, was disbarred, effective September 17, 2004, by order of the Washington State Supreme Court following a stipulation approved by the Disciplinary Board. This discipline was based on his conduct in two matters involving the commission of criminal acts, failure to avoid a conflict of interest, having sexual relations with a client, and engaging in conduct prejudicial to the administration of justice.

Matter 1: On August 12, 2002, Mr. Phelps was charged with two counts of first-degree child molestation based on allegations that, inter alia, he reached into the pants and fondled the genitalia of a 15-year-old boy who was staying overnight at his home. In November 2002, a jury convicted Mr. Phelps on both counts. He was sentenced to a 17.5-month term of confinement.

Matter 2: Mr. Phelps represented a client charged with second-degree murder in Thurston County Superior Court. The client was released from custody prior to trial. The conditions of release included requirements that the client reside with his grandmother and be at her home between 8:00 p.m. and 6:00 a.m., that when not at work or at home he be accompanied by someone at least 25 years old and aware of the restrictions, and that he not possess or consume alcohol. Violation of the conditions of pretrial release could have resulted in the client’s incarceration pending trial.

Mr. Phelps assisted and encouraged the client in violating the conditions of pretrial release by having the client spend the night at his home, by having the client run errands without being accompanied by someone over the age of 25, by supplying the client with alcoholic drinks, and by allowing the client to drink alcoholic beverages in front to him. When the client asked Mr. Phelps whether these actions were in violation of his pretrial release, Mr. Phelps assured him that it was permissible either because the client was going to see his lawyer, because the client was following the directions of his lawyer, or because Mr. Phelps had “taken care of it.” During this period, Mr. Phelps gave the client gifts and money, bought him meals, greeted him with hugs, and complimented him on his physique. On one occasion, while the client was showering in Mr. Phelps’s home, Mr. Phelps entered the bathroom; while the client was attempting to attire himself, Mr. Phelps grabbed the client’s genitalia. The client instructed Mr. Phelps not to go any further.

Mr. Phelps’s conduct violated RPC 1.7(b), prohibiting a lawyer from representing a client if the representation may be materially limited by the lawyer’s own interests, unless the lawyer reasonably believes the representation will not be adversely affected and the client consents in writing after a full disclosure; RPC 1.8(k), prohibiting a lawyer from having sexual relations with a current client; RPC 8.4(b), prohibiting a lawyer from committing a criminal act (namely, child molestation and assault) that reflects adversely on the lawyer’s honesty, trustworthiness, or fitness as a lawyer in other respects; RPC 8.4(d), prohibiting conduct prejudicial to the administration of justice; and former RLD 1.1(a), which prohibits a lawyer from, inter alia, committing any unjustified act of assault or any act which reflects disregard for the rule of law.

Sachia Stonefeld Powell represented the Bar Association. Mr. Phelps represented himself. Ronald A. Roberts was the hearing officer.

Disbarred
Curtis A. Shelton (WSBA No. 9629, admitted 1979), of Vancouver, was disbarred, effective September 15, 2004, by order of the Washington State Supreme Court following a hearing. This discipline was based on his conduct in 2001 involving failure to avoid multiple conflicts of interest; testifying untruthfully under oath; advancing prohibited financial assistance to a client; violating the oath of attorney; and using means that had no substantial purpose other than to embarrass, delay, or burden a third person.

Mr. Shelton represented Client A, who had been charged in two matters with multiple criminal offenses involving, inter alia, possession and delivery of methamphetamine in Clark County Superior Court. Mr. Shelton also represented Client B, who had been charged in two matters with multiple criminal offenses involving manufacturing, possession of, and delivery of methamphetamine in Clark County Superior Court. Prior to commencing either representation, Mr. Shelton knew that Client B regularly supplied Client A with methamphetamine.

Over a period of several months, before and during Mr. Shelton’s representation of them, both Client A and Client B supplied Mr. Shelton with controlled substances, including methamphetamine, for his personal use. Mr. Shelton used illegal controlled substances, in his office and elsewhere, with Client A and Client B.

In April 2001, Mr. Shelton represented Client A at trial in both matters. In each instance, Client B paid Mr. Shelton to represent Client A.

Following the trials, another lawyer appeared in both matters on behalf of Client A. The lawyer filed motions for new trial in both cases. The court ordered new trials because Mr. Shelton’s simultaneous representation of Client A and Client B, when their legal positions and interests were likely adverse, resulted in a conflict of interest. Mr. Shelton had not disclosed to Client A the material facts regarding possible conflicts of interest, nor did he obtain the client’s written consent to the conflicts.

In June and July 2001, while representing Client B, Mr. Shelton paid Client B’s landlord $1,300 for rent, which payments constituted loans to Client B.

In July 2001, Client B was charged in federal district court with possession of methamphetamine with intent to deliver. At an arraignment in August 2001, Mr. Shelton appeared on behalf of Client B. Attorneys for the United States filed a motion for an in camera hearing regarding Mr. Shelton’s ability to represent Client B. In October 2001, the federal district court conducted an in camera hearing to address the issue of Mr. Shelton’s conflict of interest. During the in camera hearing, Mr. Shelton untruthfully testified under oath that he and Client B had never used methamphetamine in Mr. Shelton’s office, that he had never used methamphetamine in the presence of Client A, and that Client B had never provided him with methamphetamine for his own personal use. At the conclusion of the in camera hearing, the court found a possible conflict of interest, discharged Mr. Shelton, and appointed a new lawyer for Client B. Mr. Shelton had not disclosed to Client B the material facts regarding possible conflicts of interest, nor did he obtain the client’s written consent to the conflicts.

In August 2001, while representing Client B, Mr. Shelton telephoned one of the lawyers who had substituted as counsel for Client A. During the course of the telephone conversation, Mr. Shelton made a number of gratuitously offensive, abusive, and scurrilous remarks to the lawyer.

Mr. Shelton’s conduct violated RPC 1.7(a) and (b), prohibiting a lawyer from representing a client if the representation will be directly adverse to another client or if the representation may be materially limited by the lawyer’s responsibilities to another client or the lawyer’s own interests, unless the lawyer reasonably believes the representation will not be adversely affected and the client consents in writing after a full disclosure; RPC 1.8(e), prohibiting, except in specified circumstances, a lawyer from advancing or guaranteeing financial assistance to a client in connection with contemplated or pending litigation; RPC 1.8(f), prohibiting a lawyer from accepting compensation for representing a client from one other than the client (unless the client consents after consultation, there is no interference with the lawyer’s independence of professional judgment or the client-lawyer relationship, and confidential client information is protected); RPC 3.3(a), prohibiting a lawyer from knowingly making a false statement of fact or law to a tribunal; RPC 4.4, prohibiting a lawyer, in representing a client, from using means that have no substantial purpose other than to embarrass, delay, or burden a third person; RPC 8.4(b), prohibiting commission of a criminal act (namely perjury, false swearing, and false declaration) that reflects adversely on the lawyer’s honesty, trustworthiness, or fitness as a lawyer in other respects; RPC 8.4(c), prohibiting conduct involving dishonesty, deceit, fraud, or misrepresentation; RPC 8.4(d), prohibiting conduct prejudicial to the administration of justice; and former RLD 1.1(c), subjecting a lawyer to discipline for violation of his or her oath or duties as a lawyer.

Randy Beitel and Sachia Stonefeld Powell represented the Bar Association. Mr. Shelton represented himself. Peter A. Matty was the hearing officer.

Disbarred
Diane L. VanDerbeek (WSBA No. 11884, admitted 1981), of Mercer Island, was disbarred, effective November 24, 2004, by order of the Washington State Supreme Court following a hearing. This discipline was based on her conduct over an extended period of time in the 1990s involving a pattern of billing misconduct. For additional information, see In re Discipline of VanDerbeek, 153 Wn.2d 64, 98 P.3d 444 (2004).

Ms. VanDerbeek opened a solo practice in family law in 1986. Her husband, who has a J.D. degree but never took the bar examination, managed her practice’s bookkeeping and accounting. In 1995, 28 former clients sued the VanDerbeeks for charging excessive fees. Ms. VanDerbeek signed a declaration in June 1996 declaring that she was in the process of changing her billing software to remedy client complaints about her billing practices. The lawsuit settled in 1996. Ms. VanDerbeek did not change her billing software until May 2000.

During the time period at issue, Ms. VanDerbeek engaged in the following conduct that established grounds for discipline:

• Intentionally charging excessive and unreasonable fees to 11 clients;
• Billing seven clients for attorney fees and costs incurred in attempting to collect the clients’ outstanding fees, where the fee agreement did not authorize her to charge for such activities;
• Recording attorney liens on the proceeds of the sales of real property owned by three clients in an attempt to coerce the clients into paying disputed fees, and charging those clients for fees and costs incurred in connection with placing the liens;
• Refusing to provide clients with itemized bills upon request and failing to keep back-up documentation in order to properly respond to such requests;
• Failing to supervise her firm’s nonlawyer bookkeeper/accountant to ensure that his billing practices, which included adding charges to client bills without explanation and billing legal assistant time at Ms. VanDerbeek’s rate, did not violate the Rules of Professional Conduct.

Ms. VanDerbeek’s conduct violated RPC 1.4, requiring a lawyer to keep a client reasonably informed about the status of a matter and to promptly comply with reasonable requests for information; RPC 1.5(a), requiring that a lawyer’s fee be reasonable; RPC 5.3(a), requiring a lawyer to make reasonable efforts to ensure that the firm has in effect measures giving reasonable assurance that the conduct of nonlawyer employees or assistants is compatible with the professional obligations of the lawyer; RPC 5.3(b), requiring a lawyer with direct supervisory authority over a nonlawyer to make reasonable efforts to ensure that the nonlawyer’s conduct is compatible with the professional obligations of the lawyer; RPC 8.4(c), prohibiting a lawyer from engaging in conduct involving dishonesty, fraud, deceit, or misrepresentation; and RPC 8.4(d), prohibiting a lawyer from engaging in conduct that is prejudicial to the administration of justice.

Jonathan H. Burke and Rebecca A. Neal represented the Bar Association. Kurt M. Bulmer represented Ms. VanDerbeek. Nancy K. McCoid was the hearing officer.

Disbarred
Paul White, a.k.a. Krishan Kumar (WSBA No. 26511, admitted 1996), of Jaipur, India, was disbarred, effective November 30, 2004, by order of the Washington State Supreme Court following a default hearing. This discipline was based on his conduct in 2002 and 2003 involving the submission of false material information on applications for admission to the Hawaii State Bar Association and the Law Society of British Columbia, failure to notify the Washington State Bar Association that he had changed his legal name, and failure to cooperate with a disciplinary investigation. (Mr. White is to be distinguished from Paul Joseph White of Golden, Paul R. White of Ephrata, and Paul S. White of Spokane.)

Mr. White, then named Krishan Kumar, was admitted to practice law in India in May 1992. He unsuccessfully applied for admission to the State Bar of California six times between 1993 and 1996. He was admitted to practice law in the state of Washington in December 1996 under the name Krishan Kumar. Between 1997 and 2003, he maintained an office and practiced law in Seattle.

In April 2001, identifying himself as a King County resident, he changed his name to Paul White in King County District Court. In May 2001, Mr. White changed his membership record with the Washington State Bar Association to reflect his new name.

In June 2001, Mr. White was suspended from the practice of law in the state of Washington for 30 days for violations of the Rules of Professional Conduct.

In January 2002, Mr. White submitted an application for enrollment in the Law Society of British Columbia using the name Krishan Kumar. Although declaring under oath that the information in the application was true, accurate, and complete, Mr. White omitted material facts in responding to questions concerning changes of name and use of other names, other admissions, and prior residences and employment. Specifically, he did not disclose his use of the name Paul White, his membership in the Washington State Bar Association, or his employment or residence in Washington. Mr. White withdrew his application after the Law Society of British Columbia instituted a character and fitness hearing based on the omitted information.

In July 2002, Mr. White submitted an application for admission to the Hawaii State Bar Association using the name Krishan Kumar. Although representing that he had answered all questions candidly, fully, frankly, and truthfully, and that the answers were complete and to the best of his knowledge, Mr. White omitted material facts in responding to questions concerning use of other names, admissions in other jurisdictions, membership in other bar associations, applications made in other jurisdictions, prior discipline, prior employment, and prior residences. Specifically, he did not disclose his use of the name Paul White, his admission to practice in Washington, his membership in the Washington State Bar Association, his applications for admission in California and Washington, his 30-day disciplinary suspension in Washington, or his employment or residence in Washington. (In October 2002, Mr. White amended his answers to indicate that he had applied for admission in “California/Washington” in “1993/1994” but was not admitted because he failed the bar examination.) In January 2003, Mr. White withdrew his application after the Hawaii Board of Examiners questioned the veracity of his application.

In March 2003, Mr. White changed his name back to Krishan Kumar in King County District Court. In July 2003, the Washington State Bar Association opened a grievance to investigate Mr. White’s statements in connection with his applications for admission in other jurisdictions. Between July and October 2003, disciplinary counsel endeavored to obtain Mr. White’s response to the grievance. Although Mr. White notified the Bar Association that he had returned permanently to India, he did not designate a resident agent for service as required by APR 5(e), nor did he respond to the grievance.

Mr. White’s conduct violated RPC 8.1, prohibiting a lawyer in connection with a bar admission application from knowingly making a false statement of material fact or failing to disclose a fact necessary to correct a misapprehension known to have arisen in the matter; RPC 8.4(b), prohibiting commission of a criminal act (namely, false swearing) that reflects adversely on the lawyer’s honesty, trustworthiness, or fitness as a lawyer in other respects; RPC 8.4(c), prohibiting conduct involving dishonesty, deceit, fraud, or misrepresentation; RPC 8.4(d), prohibiting conduct prejudicial to the administration of justice; RPC 8.4(n), prohibiting a lawyer from engaging in conduct demonstrating an unfitness to practice law; and ELC 5.3(e), requiring a lawyer to promptly respond to any inquiry or discovery request made in connection with a disciplinary investigation.

Sachia Stonefeld Powell represented the Bar Association. Mr. White represented himself. Scott M. Ellerby was the hearing officer.

Suspended
Phillip L. Weinberg (WSBA No. 18622, admitted 1989), of Woodinville, was suspended for two years, effective September 17, 2004, by order of the Washington State Supreme Court following a stipulation approved by the Disciplinary Board. This discipline was based on his conduct in 2003 and 2004 involving failure to return unearned portions of client fees in four matters and his violations of the conditions of two suspended misdemeanor sentences.

Matter 1: In August 2003, Mr. Weinberg was hired to represent a client charged with second-degree murder in Snohomish County. He was paid a $12,000 fee by the client’s parents. He subsequently told them that he would require payment of up to an additional $8,000 for investigative costs and to associate with another lawyer. Shortly thereafter, the client terminated the representation and requested an accounting and a refund of any unearned portion of the fee. Mr. Weinberg never provided an accounting. Although he had not filed a notice of appearance, Mr. Weinberg claimed he had visited the crime scene, visited the client at the jail, and reviewed discovery materials. At the time of entry into the disciplinary stipulation, Mr. Weinberg had agreed to refund $9,000 but had repaid only $3,250.

Matter 2: Following his conviction of two counts of unlawful manufacture of methamphetamine in Thurston County, a client, whose conviction was on appeal, hired Mr. Weinberg in obtaining an appeal bond. In January and February 2004, the client’s brother wired Mr. Weinberg a total of $10,000. Mr. Weinberg subsequently contacted the client’s appointed appellate counsel, who had already filed the Brief of Appellant, and stated that he would be taking over the appeal and would prepare and file appropriate paperwork. Mr. Weinberg never sent such paperwork and never appeared as counsel in the appeal.

In March and April 2004, Mr. Weinberg spoke to the prosecuting attorney by telephone on a number of occasions about the procedures for obtaining an appeal bond. The prosecuting attorney suggested that he file a written motion and contact the judge’s assistant to schedule a hearing. Mr. Weinberg told the client’s brother that a hearing would be held on March 12, 2004. During the course of a series of telephone conversations between Mr. Weinberg and the judge’s assistant, the projected date changed several times. Mr. Weinberg never filed a written motion to obtain an appeal bond. When a member of the client’s family learned that no hearing had been noted, the client terminated the representation and demanded a full refund. At the time of his entry into the disciplinary stipulation, Mr. Weinberg had agreed to refund $9,000.

Matter 3: Commencing in December 2003, Mr. Weinberg represented a client charged with driving under the influence and possession of marijuana in Lynwood Municipal Court. The client paid Mr. Weinberg $2,500. In January 2004, Mr. Weinberg filed petitions for deferred prosecutions in both matters. At a hearing in March 2004, Mr. Weinberg failed to submit paperwork needed to demonstrate that the client was in treatment. Mr. Weinberg failed to appear for a second hearing in March 2004. At a hearing in April 2004, the client terminated the representation in open court. In May 2004, with the assistance of a public defender, the client succeeded in obtaining a deferred prosecution. At the time of his entry into the disciplinary stipulation, Mr. Weinberg had agreed to refund $500.

Matter 4: Mr. Weinberg was hired to represent a client charged with driving under the influence in Bothell Municipal Court. The client paid Mr. Weinberg $1,000 of an agreed $2,500 fee. Mr. Weinberg appeared at the client’s arraignment in April 2004, but failed to appear at a May 2004 hearing until well after the client had been heard, and advised the court that he had been unable to contact Mr. Weinberg at any of his known telephone numbers. Shortly thereafter, by letter, the client terminated the representation and requested a refund of unearned fees. Mr. Weinberg asked the client to allow him to continue the representation at a reduced fee, and he proposed that the client meet him the next day. Mr. Weinberg failed to appear for the meeting or for the client’s June 2004 pretrial conference. At that time, the client again terminated the representation. At the time of his entry into the disciplinary stipulation, Mr. Weinberg had agreed to refund $800.

Matter 5: In June 2002, having been charged with driving under the influence, Mr. Weinberg pleaded guilty to an amended charge of first-degree negligent driving in Pierce County District Court. Mr. Weinberg received a 90-day suspended sentence. A condition of the suspended sentence was that Mr. Weinberg have “no further violations for one year.” Less than one year later, in April 2003, Mr. Weinberg was charged with domestic violence malicious mischief in the third degree in Snohomish County District Court. In November 2003, Mr. Weinberg pleaded guilty to that charge and received a 365-day suspended sentence. Conditions of the suspended sentence included Mr. Weinberg’s having “no charge/conviction of any criminal offense” and completion of a specified treatment program. Mr. Weinberg did not complete the treatment program, and in January 2004 he was charged with domestic violence in Snohomish County Superior Court.

Mr. Weinberg’s conduct violated RPC 1.5(a), requiring that a lawyer’s fee be reasonable; RPC 1.15(d), requiring that a lawyer take reasonably practicable steps to protect a client’s interests upon termination of representation (including refunding any advance payment of fee that has not been earned); RPC 8.4(i), prohibiting, inter alia, any act which reflects disregard for the rule of law; RPC 8.4(j), prohibiting a lawyer from willfully disobeying or violating a court order directing him or her to do, or ceasing to do, an act which he or she ought in good faith to do or forbear; and RPC 8.4(k), prohibiting a lawyer from violating his or her oath as an attorney (namely, “abide by” the laws of the State of Washington).

Linda B. Eide represented the Bar Association. Mr. Weinberg represented himself.

Reprimanded
William R. Brendgard (WSBA No. 21254, admitted 1991), of Everett, was ordered to receive a reprimand, effective November 19, 2004, following a stipulation approved by the hearing officer. This discipline was based on his conduct in 2002 and 2003 in failing to act with reasonable diligence and promptness, failing to communicate with the client, failing to pursue the client’s objectives, and failing to make reasonable efforts to expedite litigation.

In June 2002, Mr. Brendgard was hired to obtain post-dissolution financial relief against a client’s former spouse. In August 2002, when the client contacted Mr. Brendgard to inquire about progress on the matter, Mr. Brendgard assured her that he would present her claims and provide her with copies of the papers, but he failed to do so. In late August 2002, the client’s former spouse filed a motion for contempt, alleging that the client had failed to comply with a parenting plan. Mr. Brendgard represented the client at a hearing on the motion in September 2002, after which the court found the client in contempt and assessed $500 in attorney fees against her. Although Mr. Brendgard telephoned the client shortly thereafter, he failed to inform her that she had been found in contempt or that costs had been assessed against her.

In January 2003, the client’s former spouse filed a second motion for contempt, and the matter was scheduled for hearing on January 27. Although the client attempted to communicate with Mr. Brendgard before the hearing, he did not respond to her inquiries until January 31. Meanwhile, Mr. Brendgard obtained a continuance to acquire information from the client. At a hearing on February 6, the court again found the client in contempt and assessed $1,000 in attorney fees against her. Mr. Brendgard failed to inform the client of the outcome. For several months following the hearing, the client attempted to contact Mr. Brendgard, to no avail.

In April 2003, the client reached Mr. Brendgard by telephone. He informed her that he had moved and that her documents and information must have become lost. He assured her that he would contact her the next day about them. After that conversation, Mr. Brendgard had no further communication with the client. He did not send her any information or inform her of the result of the February 6 hearing. He did not commence action on the client’s post-dissolution claims, nor did he refund the fee the client had paid. He filed a notice of intent to withdraw from the case in November 2003.

Mr. Brendgard’s conduct violated RPC 1.2, requiring a lawyer to abide by a client’s decisions concerning the objectives of representation; RPC 1.3, requiring a lawyer to act with reasonable diligence and promptness in representing a client; RPC 1.4(a), requiring a lawyer to keep a client reasonably informed about the status of a matter and promptly comply with reasonable requests for information; and RPC 3.2, requiring a lawyer to make reasonable efforts to expedite litigation consistent with the interests of the client.

Natalea Skvir represented the Bar Association. Mr. Brendgard represented himself. Carolyn A. Lake was the hearing officer.

Reprimanded
Jeffrey J. Duggan (WSBA No. 18382, admitted 1988), of Kealakekua, HI, was ordered to receive a reprimand, effective August 31, 2004, by order of the Washington State Supreme Court imposing reciprocal discipline based on an order of the Disciplinary Board of the Hawaii Supreme Court. This discipline was based on his conduct between 1999 and 2002 involving making false statements and failing to correct misapprehensions known to have arisen in connection with applications for bar admission.

In November 1999, Mr. Duggan applied for admission to the Hawaii State Bar Association. In the signed and notarized application, Mr. Duggan represented that he had read the application and the required forms; that all questions had been answered candidly, fully, frankly, and truthfully; and that the answers were complete and true to the best of his knowledge. He further represented under oath that he understood that the application was of a continuing nature and that he would notify the Board of Examiners of the Hawaii Supreme Court in writing of any change in the information.

In responding to three application questions, Mr. Duggan failed to disclose material information or provided false answers.

In November 2000, Mr. Duggan again applied for admission to the Hawaii State Bar Association. Except for the signature page, the November 2000 application was a duplicate of the November 1999 application.

In May 2001, Mr. Duggan again applied for admission to the Hawaii State Bar Association. Except for the signature page, the May 2001 application was a duplicate of the November 1999 application.

In August 2001, while the May 2001 application was pending, Mr. Duggan was arrested. In December 2001, the charge was dismissed with prejudice. Although the information regarding his August 2001 arrest was pertinent to one of the application questions and should have been provided as supplemental information, Mr. Duggan failed to supplement his pending application with that information.

Having passed Hawaii’s June 2001 bar examination, Mr. Duggan was admitted to the practice of law in the state of Hawaii on January 25, 2002.

Mr. Duggan’s conduct violated Hawaii Rule of Professional Conduct (HRPC) 8.1(a), prohibiting an applicant for bar admission from knowingly making a false statement of material fact; HRPC 8.1(b), prohibiting an applicant for bar admission from failing to disclose a fact necessary to correct a misapprehension known to have arisen in the matter; HRPC 8.4(c), prohibiting a lawyer from engaging in conduct involving dishonesty, fraud, deceit, or misrepresentation; and HRPC 8.4(a), designating as professional misconduct a violation of the Rules of Professional Conduct.

Christine Gray represented the Bar Association. Mr. Duggan represented himself.

Reprimanded
Ray Hayes (WSBA No. 1577, admitted 1949), of Surprise, AZ, was ordered to receive a reprimand, effective November 29, 2004, by order of the Washington Supreme Court imposing reciprocal discipline based on a July 22, 2004 order of the Supreme Court of Arizona. This discipline was based on Mr. Hayes’ disclosure of confidential client information and use of confidential client information to the disadvantage of a former client without consent.

In 2001, Mr. Hayes was hired by the beneficiaries of an estate to probate a will. One of the beneficiaries subsequently hired another lawyer in the matter. Without client consent, Mr. Hayes told a funeral home that the beneficiary had received life insurance proceeds sufficient to pay the decedent’s funeral expenses. Following his withdrawal, without obtaining the former client’s consent, Mr. Hayes represented an assisted living facility in preparing a creditor’s claim against the estate, and he contacted a banking institution to ensure that the bank had filed a claim against the estate. Mr. Hayes’s conduct did not result in client harm.

Mr. Hayes’ conduct violated ER 1.6(a) of the Arizona Rules of Professional Conduct, prohibiting a lawyer from revealing information relating to representation of a client unless the client consents after consultation, and ER 1.9(a), prohibiting a lawyer from using information relating to the representation to the disadvantage of a former client except as ER 1.6 would permit with respect to a client or when the information has become generally known.

Randy Beitel represented the Bar Association. Mr. Hayes represented himself.

Reprimanded
Kyle W. Nolte (WSBA No. 27073, admitted 1997), of Spokane, was ordered to receive a reprimand, effective December 3, 2004, following a stipulation approved by the hearing officer. This discipline was based on his conduct in 2003 in providing false information on a questionnaire and failing to make full disclosure during an interview in connection with a background check conducted by the Air Force.

Mr. Nolte, while serving as an officer in the Air Force Judge Advocate General’s Department, was selected for an assignment that required a background check. While undergoing the background check, Mr. Nolte falsely answered one of the questions on a background questionnaire and failed to make full disclosure about another matter to the special agents with whom he interviewed.

Mr. Nolte afterwards voluntarily disclosed these actions to senior Air Force personnel. Following an investigation, Mr. Nolte received a nonjudicial punishment in the form of a reprimand and a $1,000 fine. He was subsequently advised that his service with the Air Force would be terminated. Mr. Nolte submitted his resignation, and he was ultimately discharged “under honorable conditions.” He was required to repay over $20,000 in educational benefits received during his last years of service.

Mr. Nolte’s conduct violated RPC 8.4(c), prohibiting a lawyer from engaging in conduct involving dishonesty, fraud, deceit, or misrepresentation.

Linda B. Eide represented the Bar Association. Kurt M. Bulmer represented Mr. Nolte. James M. Danielson was the hearing officer.

Nondisciplinary Notices

Suspended Pending Outcome of Disciplinary Proceedings
Joseph P. Whitney (WSBA No. 24073, admitted 1994), of Port Gamble, was suspended pending the outcome of disciplinary proceedings, pursuant to ELC 7.2(a)(2), effective January 20, 2005, by an order of the Washington State Supreme Court. This is not a disciplinary action.

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