July 05

Disciplinary Notices

These notices of imposition of disciplinary sanctions and actions are published pursuant to Rule 3.5(d) of the Washington State Supreme Court Rules for Enforcement of Lawyer Conduct, and pursuant to the February 18, 1995, policy statement of the WSBA Board of Governors.

For a complete copy of any disciplinary decision, call the Washington State Disciplinary Board at 206-733-5926, leaving the case name, and your name and address.
Note: Nearly 29,000 persons are eligible to practice law in Washington state. Some of them share the same or similar names. Bar News strives to include a clarification whenever an attorney listed in the Disciplinary Notices has the same name as another WSBA member; however, all discipline reports should be read carefully for names, cities, and bar numbers.

Suspended

Margaret D. Christopher (WSBA No. 24884, admitted 1995), of Seattle, was suspended for 18 months, effective February 14, 2005, by order of the Washington State Supreme Court following a hearing. This discipline was based on her conduct in 1999 involving falsification of documents and forgery of a signature in connection with the filing of an offer of judgment. For additional information, see In re Discipline of Christopher, 153 Wn.2d 669, 105 P.3d 976 (2005).

In 1999, Ms. Christopher worked as an associate at a Seattle law firm. In the first case Ms. Christopher was assigned to handle on her own, she represented the defendants in a civil action that was subject to mandatory arbitration. The arbitrator ruled in favor of the plaintiff. After receiving the arbitrator’s ruling, Ms. Christopher became concerned, erroneously, that she had made a mistake by not submitting an offer of judgment to the plaintiff prior to the arbitration in order to preserve her clients’ right to an award of attorney fees in the event of a successful appeal to the superior court.

On August 25, 1999, Ms. Christopher created an offer of judgment pleading, which she signed and backdated to July 27, 1999. She attached a stamped declaration of mailing on which she forged her secretary’s signature. Ms. Christopher filed the offer of judgment pleading and mailed a copy to opposing counsel. She also created a declaration in support of attorney fees, which stated that the offer of judgment was a true and correct copy of the defendants’ offer to settle and that it had been served on the plaintiff on July 27, 1999. Ms. Christopher created an entry in her billing records to falsely reflect that she had prepared and finalized the offer of judgment on July 27, 1999.

Ms. Christopher’s secretary subsequently concluded that Ms. Christopher had forged the signature, and she reported the matter to the law firm’s management. Ms. Christopher was fired and informed that if she did not self-report the matter to the WSBA, the law firm would report it. On October 13, 1999, Ms. Christopher reported the matter to the WSBA.

Ms. Christopher’s conduct violated RPC 3.3(a)(1), prohibiting a lawyer from making a false statement of material fact or law to a tribunal; RPC 3.3(a)(4), prohibiting a lawyer from offering evidence the lawyer knows to be false; RPC 8.4(b), prohibiting a lawyer from committing a criminal act (here forgery) that reflects adversely on the lawyer’s honesty, trustworthiness, or fitness as a lawyer in other respects; RPC 8.4(c), prohibiting a lawyer from engaging in conduct involving dishonesty, fraud, deceit, or misrepresentation; and RPC 8.4(d), prohibiting a lawyer from engaging in conduct that is prejudicial to the administration of justice.

Stevan D. Phillips represented the Bar Association at the hearing and Kevin M. Bank represented the Bar Association on appeal. Kurt M. Bulmer represented Ms. Christopher. Jack J. Cullen was the hearing officer.

Suspended

Sandra L. Davis (WSBA No. 12618, admitted 1982), of Lynnwood, was suspended for 18 months, effective February 23, 2005, by order of the Washington State Supreme Court following a stipulation approved by the Disciplinary Board. This discipline was based on her conduct involving preparation of a will giving a substantial gift to her mother, delay in distribution of assets of an estate, and misrepresentation of estate assets.

In July 2002, an individual with whom Ms. Davis’s mother had lived for eight years was hospitalized. During his hospitalization, Ms. Davis prepared a will for him. The will provided that Ms. Davis’s mother would receive a testamentary gift of $10,000, in addition to a car and other personal property. The will further provided that the residue of the estate would be distributed among the testator’s children. Ms. Davis did not advise him to consult with another lawyer about the will.

Shortly after the testator’s death in August 2002, Ms. Davis wrote to his children to inform them that he had left a will, that she was the executor, and that she would provide them with a copy of the will and contact them about settling the estate. But she did not promptly do so; instead, Ms. Davis decided to deliberately delay the distribution of estate assets. Between December 2002 and June 2003, Ms. Davis misrepresented her intentions regarding settlement of the estate and failed to provide the beneficiaries with an inventory of estate assets. In July 2003, after the children-beneficiaries filed a grievance against Ms. Davis with the Bar Association, Ms. Davis prepared and provided the beneficiaries with an inventory.

At the time of his death, the testator had money in two bank accounts; with respect to each account, his daughter was a joint tenant with a right of survivorship. Hence, as of the date of his death, each account was the property of the daughter and not an asset of the estate. In a July 2003 letter sent to the beneficiaries, and in the inventory of estate assets that accompanied it, Ms. Davis stated that the two bank accounts were estate assets subject to distribution under the will. Included with the letter were affidavits prepared by Ms. Davis to effect the distribution of the bank accounts. The affidavit prepared for Ms. Davis’s mother stated that her mother was claiming $10,000 from one of the bank accounts. The affidavits represented that the two bank accounts were subject to probate. At the time she mailed the affidavits, Ms. Davis knew that the two bank accounts were not estate assets and were not subject to probate. Ms. Davis never informed the daughter that the accounts were the daughter’s property and not subject to distribution under the will.

Ms. Davis’s conduct violated RPC 1.3, requiring a lawyer to act with reasonable diligence and promptness in representing a client; RPC 1.8(c), prohibiting a lawyer from preparing an instrument giving the lawyer or a person related to the lawyer as parent, child, sibling, or spouse any substantial gift from a client, including a testamentary gift; RPC 4.1, prohibiting a lawyer, in the course of representing a client, from knowingly making a false statement of material fact or law to a third person; and RPC 8.4(c), prohibiting a lawyer from engaging in conduct involving dishonesty, fraud, deceit, or misrepresentation.

Scott G. Busby represented the Bar Association. Patrick C. Sheldon represented Ms. Davis.

Suspended

Michael R. Hutton (WSBA No. 5673, admitted 1974), of Seattle, was suspended for three years, effective January 31, 2005, by order of the Washington State Supreme Court following a default hearing. This discipline was based on his conduct in 2002 and 2003 involving lack of diligence, failure to communicate with clients, failure to deposit client funds into a trust account, retention of unreasonable fees, sexual relations with a client, and failure to cooperate with disciplinary investigations.

Matter 1: In 2002, Client A hired Mr. Hutton to reinstate the client’s right to own a firearm. The client paid a $500 advance fee deposit by check. Mr. Hutton did not deposit the sum into a trust account. Between July 2002 and October 2003, the client telephoned Mr. Hutton approximately 20 times for information, but he was able to speak with Mr. Hutton on only four occasions. The client had no contact with Mr. Hutton after March 2003. Mr. Hutton did not perform any work on the client’s matter. Mr. Hutton did not respond to disciplinary counsel’s requests for information about the client’s grievance.

Matter 2: In 2002, Client B hired Mr. Hutton to represent her in a pending dissolution of marriage proceeding. The client gave Mr. Hutton a rifle as an advance fee payment, because she had no money to pay a fee. Mr. Hutton assisted the client with responding to the dissolution petition but performed no other work on the matter. In 2003, the client paid Mr. Hutton with money received from a tax refund. Mr. Hutton did not deposit the payment into a trust account. The client gave Mr. Hutton dissolution documents to review. After that meeting, the client repeatedly telephoned Mr. Hutton, but he did not return the calls or contact the lawyer for the opposing party as the client had requested. Mr. Hutton did not provide a prompt, full, and complete response to disciplinary counsel’s requests for information about the client’s grievance.

Matter 3: In 2002, Client C hired Mr. Hutton to set aside the client’s plea of guilty to a felony conviction. The client paid Mr. Hutton in cash, but Mr. Hutton did not deposit the sum into a trust account. Mr. Hutton failed to file any documents prior to the deadline for moving to withdraw the plea, failed to take any other steps to collaterally attack the conviction, and did not discuss the matter with the client. Subsequently, Mr. Hutton persuaded the client to have sexual relations with him. In January 2003, after the client refused to continue the sexual relationship, Mr. Hutton did no further work on the matter. Mr. Hutton did not provide a prompt, full, and complete response to disciplinary counsel’s requests for information about the client’s grievance.

Mr. Hutton’s conduct violated RPC 1.3, requiring a lawyer to act with reasonable diligence and promptness in representing a client; RPC 1.4, requiring a lawyer to keep the client reasonably informed about the status of a matter and to explain a matter to the extent reasonably necessary to permit the client to make informed decisions; RPC 1.5(a), requiring that a lawyer’s fee be reasonable; RPC 1.7(b), prohibiting a lawyer from representing a client if the representation of that client may be materially limited by the lawyer’s own interests; RPC 1.8(k), prohibiting a lawyer from having sexual relations with a current client; RPC 1.14(a), requiring a lawyer to deposit client funds into a trust account; and RPC 8.4(l), prohibiting a lawyer from violating a duty imposed by or under the Rules for Enforcement of Lawyer Conduct (here, ELC 5.3(e), requiring a lawyer to promptly respond to any inquiry or request for information relevant to grievances).

Nancy Bickford Miller represented the Bar Association. Mr. Hutton represented himself. Erik S. Bakke Sr. was the hearing officer.

Suspended

Antonio Salazar (WSBA No. 6273, admitted 1975), of Seattle, was suspended for 30 days, effective February 15, 2005, by order of the Washington State Supreme Court following a hearing. This discipline was based on his conduct in 2000 and 2001 involving lack of diligence, failure to communicate the basis of his fee to a client, retention of an unreasonable fee, and failure to cooperate with disciplinary investigations.

Matter 1: On February 3, 2000, Client A, a citizen of Japan, hired Mr. Salazar to assist her in obtaining an H-1B visa. Although Mr. Salazar believed that the client met the professional criteria for the visa, he advised her that her job description was insufficient to meet the criteria for a specialty occupation. Mr. Salazar told her that they needed to work with the client’s employer to improve the job description. He emphasized the need to move quickly, since there was a cap on the number of H-1B visas issued in a fiscal year and most of the H-1B visas for 2000 were gone.

After obtaining necessary paperwork from the client and her employer, Mr. Salazar submitted an H-1B visa application to the INS on April 27, 2000, indicating the client’s intended dates of employment were from April 30, 2000, to April 30, 2003. In May 2000, the application was returned to Mr. Salazar with an explanation that on March 21, 2000, the INS had given notice that the statutory cap for H-1B visas had been reached for employment scheduled to begin prior to October 1, 2000. Accordingly, the application was rejected.

The client’s visa expired on April 30, 2000, and she returned to Japan in June 2000. In August 2000, Mr. Salazar resubmitted the client’s application to the INS with an employment start date of October 1, 2000.

The client returned to the United States on a tourist visa on November 18, 2000, and notified Mr. Salazar of her whereabouts. On November 27, Mr. Salazar received an INS Request for Evidence letter indicating that the visa application was insufficient and describing the additional documentation needed for favorable consideration. The letter stated that the additional information must be received by February 13, 2001. Mr. Salazar did not notify the client that he had received the letter.

After repeated unsuccessful attempts to contact Mr. Salazar, the client met with him on January 10, 2001. Mr. Salazar asked the client to provide him with a new job description, but he failed to notify her that he had received the Request for Evidence letter. The client provided Mr. Salazar with the requested job description within a week. On February 6, 2001, Mr. Salazar informed the client that the revised job description was not sufficient. At that time, he mentioned that he had received the Request for Evidence letter and provided a copy to the client. The client provided Mr. Salazar with another revised job description, and Mr. Salazar submitted a response to the Request for Evidence letter on February 12, 2001.

On May 21, 2001, the INS denied the visa application, ruling that although the position was a specialty occupation, the evidence did not establish that the client had recognition of expertise in the specialty as required. The decision noted that various materials that had been specifically requested in the Request for Evidence letter had not been provided with the application.

Matter 2: In January 2000, Client B hired Mr. Salazar to handle multiple matters. The client made an initial $3,750 payment. Both the client and Mr. Salazar speak Spanish, and Mr. Salazar communicated with the client exclusively in Spanish. Mr. Salazar documented the initial fee agreement in a memorandum that specified how portions of the initial $3,750 would be applied to the different matters. The memorandum was written in English. In the memorandum, part of the payment was characterized as a “down payment” and other parts were characterized as “retainers.” Although Mr. Salazar explained the meaning of the term “down payment” to the client, he did not explain the meaning of “retainer” nor did he explain the difference between a “down payment” and a “retainer.” The client was never told the basis of the fees nor the factors used to determine the fees. He was simply told the amounts for initial fees and that additional money would be needed in the future. In June and November 2000, the client made two additional payments totaling $2,100. Mr. Salazar did not tell the client the matters for which these funds were needed.

In May 2001, in connection with one of the matters, Mr. Salazar filed a complaint against the Social Security Administration on behalf of the client in federal district court. The client was unaware that Mr. Salazar had filed this case on his behalf. Mr. Salazar also filed a complaint against an individual relating to a property dispute. Although the client denied having hired Mr. Salazar for that purpose, Mr. Salazar spent more time on that matter than on any of the client’s other matters. When Mr. Salazar subsequently withdrew from these cases, the client was confused about which matters Mr. Salazar was actually withdrawing from.

In June 2001, the client informed Mr. Salazar that he had hired another lawyer and he asked to have his money refunded. Mr. Salazar declined to refund any money and advised the client that he owed additional fees for work that had been done. In February 2003, the client’s new lawyer filed a claim against Mr. Salazar to recover the fees the client had paid. Mr. Salazar filed a counterclaim for additional fees that he claimed he was owed. Mr. Salazar settled with the client and refunded $4,000, but he did not admit any wrongdoing as part of the settlement.

Matter 3: In 2001, the Bar Association investigated five grievances that had been filed against Mr. Salazar. In each of the matters, Mr. Salazar failed to promptly comply with requests made by the Association for information relevant to the grievances.

Mr. Salazar’s conduct violated RPC 1.3, requiring a lawyer to act with reasonable diligence and promptness in representing a client; RPC 1.5(a), requiring that a lawyer’s fee be reasonable; RPC 1.5(b), requiring a lawyer who has not regularly represented a client to communicate to the client the basis or rate of the fee or factors involved in determining the charges for legal services and the lawyer’s billing practices; and former Rule for Lawyer Discipline 2.8(a), requiring a lawyer to promptly respond to any inquiry or request for information relevant to grievances.

Loren G. Armstrong represented the Bar Association. Mr. Salazar represented himself. Robert M. Scales was the hearing officer.

Suspended

E. Armstrong Williams (WSBA No. 30361, admitted 2000), of Spokane, was suspended for 60 days, effective March 3, 2005, by order of the Washington State Supreme Court following a hearing. This discipline was based on his conduct in 2001 involving sexual relations with a client.

Commencing in 2000, Mr. Williams represented a client concerning a sexual harassment claim against the client’s former employer and job supervisor. In January and February 2001, Mr. Williams and the client had extensive telephone contact in the evenings and on weekends and socialized with one another at night clubs. On two separate occasions in January and February 2001, at Mr. Williams’s residence, Mr. Williams had sexual relations with the client. After disclosing the facts regarding the sexual relations to her therapist and her spouse, the client terminated the representation and hired another lawyer.

Mr. Williams’s conduct violated RPC 1.8(k), prohibiting a lawyer from having sexual relations with a current client unless a consensual sexual relationship existed between them at the time the lawyer/client relationship commenced.

Leslie Ching Allen and Marsha A. Matsumoto represented the Bar Association. Lewis M. Wilson represented Mr. Williams. David A. Thorner was the hearing officer.

Reprimanded

Steven J. O’Neill (WSBA No. 21108, admitted 1991), of Monson, MA, was ordered to receive a reprimand on February 15, 2005, following a stipulation approved by a hearing officer. This discipline was based on his conduct in 1999 and 2000 involving the failure to provide clients with adequate notice of withdrawal. (Mr. O’Neill is to be distinguished from Stephen F.X. O’Neill of Blaine.)

Commencing in August 1999, Mr. O’Neill represented clients in a lawsuit arising from defective construction of a rock wall in the clients’ backyard. The clients paid Mr. O’Neill $2,500 as an advance fee deposit.

In September 1999, Mr. O’Neill filed a lawsuit against the contractor and its bonding company. At a June 2000 status conference, the matter was continued to October 2000 unless a confirmation of joinder, a statement of arbitrability, or a dismissal was filed before September 28, 2000.

Mr. O’Neill met with the clients in July 2000. As a result of that meeting, Mr. O’Neill believed that he had been terminated as counsel because the clients left with their file materials. The clients, however, did not intend to fire Mr. O’Neill and believed that he was still their lawyer.

Mr. O’Neill never filed a notice of withdrawal and never provided the clients with written notice that he was no longer their lawyer. In September 2000, the clients paid Mr. O’Neill additional legal fees of $355.69.

On October 5, 2000, the court dismissed the lawsuit without prejudice, because Mr. O’Neill did not appear at the status conference. Mr. O’Neill received a copy of the dismissal notice from the court. The clients did not receive a copy of the notice from him. The clients learned the case was dismissed in September 2001 after examining the court file.

Mr. O’Neill’s conduct violated RPC 1.4, requiring a lawyer to keep a client reasonably informed about the status of a matter and to explain a matter to the extent reasonably necessary to permit the client to make informed decisions, and RPC 1.15(d), requiring that a lawyer take reasonably practicable steps to protect a client’s interests upon termination of representation.

Joanne S. Abelson represented the Bar Association. Kenneth S. Kagan represented Mr. O’Neill. Margarita V. Latsinova was the hearing officer.

Nondisciplinary Notices

Transferred to Disability Inactive Status

Kevin Y. Jung (WSBA No. 18540, admitted 1989), of Bellevue, was by stipulation transferred to disability inactive status, effective April 5, 2005. This is not a disciplinary action.