April 2007

Disciplinary Notices

These notices of imposition of disciplinary sanctions and actions are published pursuant to Rule 3.5(d) of the Washington State Supreme Court Rules for Enforcement of Lawyer Conduct, and pursuant to the February 18, 1995, policy statement of the WSBA Board of Governors.

For a complete copy of any disciplinary decision, call the Washington State Disciplinary Board at 206-733-5926, leaving the case name, and your name and address.
NOTE: Approximately 30,000 persons are eligible to practice law in Washington state. Some of them share the same or similar names. Bar News strives to include a clarification whenever an attorney listed in the Disciplinary Notices has the same name as another WSBA member; however, all discipline reports should be read carefully for names, cities, and bar numbers.

Disbarred

William Dean Adams (WSBA No. 7565, admitted 1977), of Oak Harbor, was disbarred, effective November 2, 2006, by order of the Washington State Supreme Court following a stipulation approved by the Disciplinary Board. This discipline was based on his conduct in multiple matters involving the communication of false information to clients and commission of multiple acts of forgery. Mr. Adams is to be distinguished from William Douglas Adams of New Berlin and William Grey Adams of Carnation.

Between 2003 and 2005, Mr. Adams represented clients in four unrelated matters. Two of the matters were adoptions, and two were marital dissolutions. Mr. Adams took little or no action to pursue or complete the cases. In two of the matters, Mr. Adams never filed papers to initiate the cases and did not tell the clients that there were no pending proceedings. Eventually, Mr. Adams persuaded each client that the matter was final by fabricating and providing the client with a fake decree, in some instances bearing the forged signature of a superior court judge.

In 2006, Mr. Adams pleaded guilty to four felony counts of forgery. He was sentenced to serve a total of four months in jail and to pay restitution to the clients.

Mr. Adams’s conduct violated RPC 1.4, requiring a lawyer to keep a client reasonably informed about the status of a matter, promptly comply with reasonable requests for information, and explain a matter to the extent reasonably necessary to permit the client to make informed decisions regarding the representation; RPC 8.4(b), prohibiting a lawyer from committing a criminal act that reflects adversely on the lawyer’s honesty, trustworthiness, or fitness as a lawyer in other respects; RPC 8.4(c), prohibiting a lawyer from engaging in conduct involving dishonesty, fraud, deceit, or misrepresentation; and RPC 8.4(i), prohibiting a lawyer from committing any act involving moral turpitude, or corruption, or any unjustified act of assault or other act which reflects disregard for the rule of law.

Joanne S. Abelson represented the Bar Association. Mr. Adams represented himself.

Disbarred

Robert E. Brandt (WSBA No. 23058, admitted 1993), of Bothell, was disbarred, effective September 19, 2006, by order of the Washington State Supreme Court following a stipulation approved by the Disciplinary Board. In entering into the stipulation, Mr. Brandt agreed that if the matter were to proceed to a public hearing, there was a substantial likelihood that the Bar Association would be able to prove, by a clear preponderance of the evidence, the facts and misconduct described therein (and summarized herein). The discipline was based on his conduct in 2004 involving conflicts of interest, trust account irregularities, failure to comply with discovery requests, false statements, failure to adequately supervise a nonlawyer employee, commission of a criminal act, dishonesty, and conduct prejudicial to the administration of justice. 

Mr. Brandt operated a high-volume real estate escrow business, known as Escrow Authority, which was the assumed business name of Mr. Brandt’s law firm/professional corporation. Escrow Authority was Mr. Brandt’s primary business; he handled only a few legal matters for family and friends. Mr. Brandt used his law firm’s trust account to receive and disburse funds associated with the real estate closings handled by Escrow Authority, which operated two limited liability corporations out of the Escrow Authority office, as well as several branch offices.

In June 2005, the Kirkland Police Department executed a search warrant on Escrow Authority’s Kirkland office and seized some of its business records. Subsequently, it was discovered that there was a shortage of about $3 million in Mr. Brandt’s trust account. This shortage was allegedly due to the theft by one or more of Mr. Brandt’s employees. Mr. Brandt could not account for the shortfall, which resulted in the filing of a number of grievances against him. The following conduct, which did not arise from the theft of trust account funds, established grounds for discipline:

• Failing to maintain complete records of client funds in the trust account and failing to provide an accounting of trust account funds;
• Failing to reimburse funds to a client when requested;
• Failing to maintain client funds in a trust account, to properly review trust account records, and to supervise his staff in handling these records;
• Falsely stating under oath that he did not have malpractice insurance;
• Permitting an employee to handle a real estate closing when the employee was the purchaser and reseller of the real property;
• Failing to disclose to parties in three different matters that the limited liability corporation and Escrow Authority, to which they were paying various fees, were his businesses and that the fees were being paid to him;
• Failing to ensure that the conduct of employees handling client escrow funds was compatible with Mr. Brandt’s professional obligations as a lawyer, such as ensuring that documents were being notarized by persons having personal contact with the parties, that closing disbursements were not being made until after the recording of the deeds, and that tax payments and any promised reimbursement for tax penalties were promptly made;
• Failing to promptly disburse funds from the trust account in accordance with escrow instructions.

Mr. Brandt’s conduct violated RPC 1.5(b), requiring that when a lawyer has not regularly represented the client, or if the fee agreement is substantially different than that previously used by the parties, the basis or rate of the fee or factors involved in determining the charges for legal services and the lawyer’s billing practices shall be communicated to the client, before or within a reasonable time after commencing the representation;  RPC 1.7(b), prohibiting a lawyer from representing a client if the representation of that client may be materially limited by the lawyer’s responsibilities to another client or to a third person, or by the lawyer’s own interests, unless the lawyer reasonably believes the representation will not be affected and the client consents in writing after consultation and a full disclosure in writing of the material facts; RPC 1.14(a), requiring that all funds of clients paid to a lawyer or law firm, including advances for costs and expenses, be deposited in one or more identifiable interest-bearing trust accounts and that no funds belonging to the lawyer or law firm be deposited therein; RPC 1.14(b)(3), requiring a lawyer to maintain complete records of all funds, securities, and other properties of a client coming into the possession of the lawyer and render appropriate accounts to his or her client regarding them; RPC 1.14(b)(4), requiring a lawyer to promptly pay or deliver to the client as requested by a client the funds, securities, or other properties in the possession of the lawyer which the client is entitled to receive; RPC 1.15(d), requiring a lawyer to take steps to the extent reasonably practicable to protect a client’s interests upon termination of representation; RPC 3.4(d), prohibiting a lawyer, in pretrial procedure, from failing to make reasonably diligent efforts to comply with a legally proper discovery request by an opposing party; RPC 4.1(a), prohibiting a lawyer, in the course of representing a client, from knowingly making a false statement of material fact or law to a third person; RPC 5.3(a), requiring that a partner in a law firm make reasonable efforts to ensure that the firm has in effect measures giving reasonable assurance that a nonlawyer assistant's conduct is compatible with the professional obligations of the lawyer; RPC 5.3(b), requiring a lawyer with direct supervisory authority over a nonlawyer assistant to make reasonable efforts to ensure that the person's conduct is compatible with the professional obligations of the lawyer; RPC 8.4(b), prohibiting a lawyer from committing a criminal act that reflects adversely on the lawyer’s honesty, trustworthiness, or fitness as a lawyer in other respects; RPC 8.4(c), prohibiting a lawyer from engaging in conduct involving dishonesty, fraud, deceit, or misrepresentation; and RPC 8.4(d), prohibiting a lawyer from engaging in conduct that is prejudicial to the administration of justice.

Debra J. Slater represented the Bar Association. Joel E. Wright represented Mr. Brandt. Michael J. Heatherly was the hearing officer.

Disbarred

Alan L. Gallagher (WSBA No. 16116, admitted 1986), of Canby, Oregon, was disbarred, effective November 3, 2006, by order of the Washington State Supreme Court imposing reciprocal discipline in accordance with an order of the Supreme Court of the State of Oregon. This discipline was based on his conduct involving allegations of neglect, trust account violations, conflicts of interest, practicing law while suspended, and non-cooperation in a disciplinary investigation. For more information, see Oregon State Bar Bulletin, Discipline (November 2004), available at www.osbar.org/publications/
bulletin/archive.html.

Mr. Gallagher’s conduct violated Oregon DR 1-102(A)(3), prohibiting a lawyer from engaging in conduct involving dishonesty, fraud, deceit, or misrepresentation; DR 1-103(C), requiring a lawyer who is the subject of a disciplinary investigation to respond fully and truthfully to inquiries from and comply with reasonable requests of a tribunal or other authority empowered to investigate or act upon the conduct of lawyers; DR 3-101(B), prohibiting a lawyer from practicing law in a jurisdiction where to do so would be in violation of the regulations of the profession in that jurisdiction; DR 5-105(C), prohibiting a lawyer who has represented a client in a matter from subsequently representing another client in the same or a significantly related matter when the interests of the current and former clients are in actual or likely conflict; DR 5-105(E), prohibiting a lawyer from representing multiple current clients in any matter when such representation would result in an actual or likely conflict; DR 6-101(B), prohibiting a lawyer from neglecting a legal matter entrusted to the lawyer; DR 9-101(A), requiring all funds paid to a lawyer or law firm to be deposited or maintained in one or more identifiable trust accounts in the state in which the law office is situated; and DR 9-101(C)(3), requiring a lawyer to maintain complete records of all funds, securities, and other properties of a client coming into the possession of the lawyer and render appropriate accounts to the lawyer’s client regarding them.

Felice P. Congalton represented the Bar Association. Mr. Gallagher was not represented by counsel.

Disbarred

James E. Graham (WSBA No. 15290, admitted 1985), of Renton, was disbarred, effective October 5, 2006, by order of the Washington State Supreme Court following a default hearing. This discipline was based on his conduct between 2000 and 2005 involving commission of criminal acts with intent to defraud a client, dishonesty, failure to keep a client reasonably informed, lack of competence, lack of diligence, failure to expedite litigation, failure to maintain appropriate records of client funds, and failure to cooperate with a disciplinary investigation.

From 1995 until early 2005, Mr. Graham lived in a furnished apartment in Renton. Mr. Graham paid no rent during the time he lived there, instead performing legal work for the building owner (“client”) and her family. Under their arrangement, Mr. Graham did not charge the client any legal fees, but would charge her for costs incurred in connection with litigation and other legal matters. Mr. Graham did not provide his client with actual bills, court receipts, or an accounting of how he spent the money she gave him for costs. He also did not maintain records of his receipts and disbursements. Between May 2000 and September 2004, Mr. Graham provided the client with eight forged documents, including falsified court orders, judgments, and other correspondence, thereby fraudulently inducing her to give him money for nonexistent legal costs.

In November 2004, in a matter pending in superior court, the judge dismissed the case with prejudice because Mr. Graham had failed to comply with a discovery order and failed to respond to the adverse party’s third motion to dismiss. Mr. Graham never informed his client that her case had been dismissed.

In February 2005, disciplinary counsel transmitted to Mr. Graham a copy of the client’s grievance and requested a response. Mr. Graham never provided a response, did not comply with a subpoena duces tecum issued by disciplinary counsel, and failed to otherwise cooperate during the disciplinary investigation.

Mr. Graham’s conduct violated RPC 1.1, requiring a lawyer to provide competent representation to a client; RPC 1.3, requiring a lawyer to act with reasonable diligence and promptness in representing a client; RPC 1.4(a), requiring a lawyer to keep a client reasonably informed about the status of a matter and promptly comply with reasonable requests for information; RPC 1.14(b)(3), requiring a lawyer to maintain complete records of all funds, securities, and other properties of a client coming into the possession of the lawyer and render appropriate accounts to his or her client regarding them; RPC 3.2, requiring a lawyer to make reasonable efforts to expedite litigation consistent with the interests of the client; RPC 8.4(b), prohibiting a lawyer from committing a criminal act that reflects adversely on the lawyer’s honesty, trustworthiness, or fitness as a lawyer in other respects; RPC 8.4(c), prohibiting a lawyer from engaging in conduct involving dishonesty, fraud, deceit, or misrepresentation; RPC 8.4(i), prohibiting a lawyer from committing any act involving moral turpitude, or corruption, or any unjustified act of assault or other act which reflects disregard for the rule of law; RPC 8.4(l), prohibiting a lawyer from violating a duty or sanction imposed by or under the Rules for Enforcement of Lawyer Conduct in connection with a disciplinary matter; and RPC 8.4(n), prohibiting a lawyer from engaging in conduct demonstrating unfitness to practice law.
 
Natalea Skvir represented the Bar Association. Mr. Graham did not appear either in person or through counsel. Lawrence R. Mills was the hearing officer.

Disbarred

F. Curtis Hilton (WSBA No. 4028, admitted 1958), of Lakewood, was disbarred, effective September 18, 2006, by order of the Washington State Supreme Court following a default hearing. This discipline was based on conduct between 1996 and 2004 involving failure to communicate with a client, lack of diligence, attempting to settle a matter without client authority, failure to expedite litigation, failure to put a contingent fee agreement in writing, conduct prejudicial to the administration of justice, and conduct involving dishonesty, fraud, deceit, or misrepresentation.

In May 1996, Mr. Hilton was hired to represent a client in a hearing involving the forfeiture of certain personal items seized by the county sheriff’s office. The client believed Mr. Hilton was representing her pro bono. Mr. Hilton believed that he and the client had entered into a contingent fee agreement under which he was to be paid one-third of any recovery, but Mr. Hilton had neither prepared a written contingent fee agreement nor had his client sign one. After a hearing examiner upheld the forfeiture of the client’s property, Mr. Hilton filed a petition for judicial review. Mr. Hilton took no further action on the case and did not communicate with his client for the next 16 months.

In March 1998, the court issued a notice of dismissal for want of prosecution. Mr. Hilton filed a response, signed under penalty of perjury, stating, “Petitioner will immediately proceed to prosecute this claim by her undersigned counsel.” Mr. Hilton took no action in the case for another 16 months. In July 1999, the court clerk again sought to dismiss the case for want of prosecution. Mr. Hilton filed another response again stating, “Petitioner will immediately proceed to prosecute this claim by her undersigned counsel.” Mr. Hilton filed a motion to set the briefing schedule, but did not file the brief as required. In November 1999, the defendant in the case filed a motion to dismiss for want of prosecution. The court denied the motion. For the next 19 months, Mr. Hilton took no action. In June 2001, the court clerk issued another notice of dismissal for want of prosecution. Mr. Hilton again filed a declaration stating, “Petitioner will immediately proceed to prosecute this claim by her undersigned counsel.”

In June 2001 and February 2003, the client sent Mr. Hilton letters in which she informed him of her current address and requested information about her case. Mr. Hilton did not respond. In August 2003, in response to another dismissal for want of prosecution from the court clerk, Mr. Hilton filed a motion requesting a briefing schedule. At that point, the deputy prosecuting attorney sent Mr. Hilton a letter indicating his willingness to discuss a settlement. The letter offered an equal distribution of the proceeds of the seized property, but stated that the offer would only be held open for a brief period. Mr. Hilton did not communicate the settlement offer to his client. In October 2003, the court clerk issued another dismissal notice.

In December 2003, Mr. Hilton and the deputy prosecutor reached agreement on the terms of a settlement. Mr. Hilton did not tell his client of the settlement offer or that he was accepting it. Over the next two weeks, the deputy prosecutor twice sent Mr. Hilton a proposed agreed order of dismissal and a settlement agreement to be signed by both Mr. Hilton and his client. Mr. Hilton did not present the documents to his client or return them to the deputy prosecutor. Mr. Hilton informed the court that the case had been settled. On January 26, 2004, the court informed the parties that the case would be dismissed if settlement papers were not filed by February 13. The deputy prosecutor sent Mr. Hilton two letters advising him that the settlement offer would be withdrawn and that he would request the court to dismiss the case if the papers were not signed and returned to him. Mr. Hilton did not respond to either letter and did not inform his client about the situation.

In April 2004, the court dismissed the case on its own motion. Mr. Hilton did not tell his client that her case had been dismissed. She learned about the dismissal after reviewing the docket for her case online. In response to an e-mail from the client, Mr. Hilton advised her that the case had been settled and that he held a bank draft in his file for $1,500. Mr. Hilton met with the client shortly thereafter, at which time Mr. Hilton admitted that he only had a draft of the settlement agreement and agreed order of dismissal in his file, not a bank draft for $1,500. Mr. Hilton then had his client sign the settlement agreement, without telling her that the settlement offer had been withdrawn. He transmitted the signed agreement to the deputy prosecutor with a request to remit settlement funds. The deputy prosecutor replied that the offer had been withdrawn in March 2004 and that he would no longer honor the settlement proposal.

Mr. Hilton’s conduct violated RPC 1.2(a), requiring a lawyer to abide by a client’s decisions concerning the objectives of representation and consult with the client as to the means by which they are to be pursued, and to abide by a client’s decision whether to accept an offer of settlement of a matter; RPC 1.3, requiring a lawyer to act with reasonable diligence and promptness in representing a client; RPC 1.4, requiring a lawyer to keep a client reasonably informed about the status of a matter, promptly comply with reasonable requests for information, and explain a matter to the extent reasonably necessary to permit the client to make informed decisions regarding the representation; RPC 1.5(c)(1), requiring that a contingent fee be in writing; RPC 3.2, requiring a lawyer to make reasonable efforts to expedite litigation consistent with the interests of the client; RPC 8.4(a), prohibiting a lawyer from attempting to violate the Rules of Professional Conduct; RPC 8.4(c), prohibiting a lawyer from engaging in conduct involving dishonesty, fraud, deceit, or misrepresentation; and RPC 8.4(d), prohibiting a lawyer from engaging in conduct that is prejudicial to the administration of justice.
 
M. Craig Bray and Debra J. Slater represented the Bar Association. Mr. Hilton represented himself. William J. Murphy was the hearing officer.

Suspended

Stephen B. Blanchard (WSBA No. 12294, admitted 1982), of Edmonds, was suspended for six months, effective October 12, 2006, by order of the Washington State Supreme Court following a hearing. This discipline was based on his conduct in two matters involving lack of diligence, failure to communicate with clients, trust account irregularities, failure to refund unearned fees, and failure to cooperate with disciplinary investigations.

Matter 1: In January 1997, a married couple [Mr. and Mrs. W] hired Mr. Blanchard to help them collect on $187,592.87 in loans owed to them by one of Mrs. W’s sons. The loans were consolidated into a single promissory note secured by deeds of trust on three pieces of property. In 1996, the son had filed Chapter 7 bankruptcy and had failed to make payments on the promissory note. Through the bankruptcy, two of the properties were sold, while the third property [Lot A] remained part of the bankruptcy estate.

Mr. Blanchard told the clients that he would charge an hourly fee for the collection matter. At the end of January, Mr. Blanchard sent Mr. W a $1,578.92 bill for fees relating to a prior representation. Mr. W sent Mr. Blanchard a check for $1,500, which contained the handwritten note “Advance on Legal Service.” Mr. Blanchard deposited the check into his general account, not his trust account. At the end of February 1997, Mr. Blanchard sent Mr. W a $229.71 bill for additional fees.

In October 1998, Mr. Blanchard requested $1,000 from Mr. and Mrs. W so that he could seek authorization for the sale of Lot A. Mr. Blanchard received the check and deposited it into his general account, but he did not pursue the foreclosure on Lot A.

In April 1999, Mr. W died. Mrs. W and her other son met with Mr. Blanchard in August 1999, during which she requested paperwork regarding the money her husband had paid to Mr. Blanchard. Mr. Blanchard said he would send an accounting. He did not provide an accounting or any paperwork regarding the money paid, and he had no further contact with Mrs. W.

Between 1999 and 2001, Mrs. W’s son wrote five letters to Mr. Blanchard requesting an accounting and a refund. Mr. Blanchard received all five letters, but failed to respond or provide an accounting or refund. Mr. Blanchard did not have any records to demonstrate that he earned the $770.29 difference that was paid in October 1998 in excess of the $229.71 billed. In March 2001, Mrs. W’s son’s bankruptcy closed and Lot A was distributed back to him. Subsequently, another lawyer assisted Mrs. W in foreclosing the deed of trust.

In December 2001, Mrs. W filed a grievance with the Bar Association and was referred to fee arbitration. Mr. Blanchard failed to respond to Mrs. W’s fee arbitration petition, and she renewed the grievance in November 2002. Mr. Blanchard did not respond to the grievance until served with a subpoena duces tecum.

Matter 2: In August 2002, a client hired Mr. Blanchard to represent him in a dissolution action. The client informed Mr. Blanchard that he wished the dissolution to move along as quickly as possible. The primary issue was the division of the parties’ property. Mr. Blanchard and the client agreed that Mr. Blanchard would charge an hourly fee of $175 per hour. No written fee agreement was executed. The client paid Mr. Blanchard an initial $750.
 
At the end of August, Mr. Blanchard had the client sign dissolution pleadings he had prepared. On the same day, Mr. Blanchard filed the summons and petition for dissolution. However, the petition did not contain the client’s signature. Mr. Blanchard never filed a petition that was signed by the client.

The lawyer representing the opposing party informed Mr. Blanchard that her client would not accept service of the summons and petition and that he needed to properly serve her client. Between October and December 2002, the opposing attorney sent Mr. Blanchard three letters reminding Mr. Blanchard that her client had yet to be served. Mr. Blanchard’s client repeatedly informed Mr. Blanchard that he wanted the case to move forward quickly and that he would not put up with stalling tactics. The client also repeatedly asked Mr. Blanchard to take action to secure personal items that remained in the opposing party’s possession. Mr. Blanchard did not serve the opposing party and did not file a motion for the return of his client’s personal property.

Around October 2002, Mr. Blanchard requested $1,500 from the client without providing a billing statement. The client, thinking the money was for the costs of a deposition of the opposing party, provided the sum to Mr. Blanchard, who deposited the payment into his general account. Mr. Blanchard attempted to schedule the deposition, but opposing counsel would not allow her client to be deposed until the summons and petition had been properly served. When the deposition was canceled, Mr. Blanchard’s client learned for the first time that the summons and petition had never been served.

After hiring a new lawyer, the client also learned that the petition for dissolution was unsigned and invalid. In January 2003, the client sent a letter to Mr. Blanchard informing him that he no longer wished to use his services and requesting a refund. Although Mr. Blanchard originally indicated that he would give the client a refund, he later informed him that he would not refund any money. The client filed a grievance with the Bar Association. Because Mr. Blanchard failed to respond, disciplinary counsel was obliged to issue a subpoenas duces tecum in order to obtain the requested information.

Mr. Blanchard’s conduct violated RPC 1.3, requiring a lawyer to act with reasonable diligence and promptness in representing a client; RPC 1.4, requiring a lawyer to keep a client reasonably informed about the status of a matter, promptly comply with reasonable requests for information, and explain a matter to the extent reasonably necessary to permit the client to make informed decisions regarding the representation; RPC 1.5(a), requiring a lawyer’s fee to be reasonable; RPC 1.14(a), requiring that all funds of clients paid to a lawyer or law firm, including advances for costs and expenses, be deposited in one or more identifiable interest-bearing trust accounts and that no funds belonging to the lawyer or law firm be deposited therein; RPC 1.14(b), requiring a lawyer to promptly notify a client of the receipt of his or her properties, identify and label client property on receipt and put it in a safe deposit box or other place of safekeeping as soon as possible; maintain complete records of all client property coming into the lawyer’s possession, and promptly pay or deliver to the client property in the lawyer’s possession which the client is entitled to receive; RPC 1.15(d); requiring a lawyer to take steps to the extent reasonably practicable to protect a client’s interests; RPC 3.2, requiring a lawyer to make reasonable efforts to expedite litigation consistent with the interests of the client; and RPC 8.4(l), prohibiting a lawyer from violating a duty or sanction imposed by or under the Rules for Enforcement of Lawyer Conduct [here, ELC 1.5 and 5.3].

Natalea Skvir and Marsha A. Matsumoto represented the Bar Association. Kurt M. Bulmer represented Mr. Blanchard. Robert Hardy was the hearing officer.

Suspended

Donald B. Kronenberg (WSBA No. 13979, admitted 1984), of Seattle, was suspended for two years, effective May 12, 2006, by order of the Washington State Supreme Court following a stipulation approved by the Disciplinary Board. This discipline was based on Mr. Kronenberg’s conduct in 1996 involving a conflict of interest and refusal to refund the unearned portion of a fee. The stipulation incorporated by reference of the facts set forth in Cotton v. Kronenberg, 111 Wn. App. 258, 44 P.3d 878 (2002). Mr. Kronenberg was previously disbarred by Supreme Court order effective August 18, 2005. See In re Discipline of Kronenberg, 155 Wn.2d 184, 117 P.3d 1134 (2005).

In March 1996, Mr. Kronenberg was hired by a client charged with three counts of felony rape of a child. The client signed a fee agreement prepared by Mr. Kronenberg which provided that attorney fees would be charged at the rate of $140 per hour. At the time, the client signed a statutory warranty deed granting a parcel of real property to Mr. Kronenberg. The client also transferred to Mr. Kronenberg title to a mobile home located on the property. A few days later, the client signed another agreement prepared by Mr. Kronenberg. The second agreement set forth the terms of a “nonrefundable fee” for defense against the child rape charges. The agreement estimated that fees “could be anywhere from $10,000 to $30,000.” The agreement further provided for the transfer of the realty and mobile home to Mr. Kronenberg in full satisfaction of all fees earned in the case. Within a week, Mr. Kronenberg recorded the deed, and within months he sold the property for $42,000.

In July 1996, the trial court granted a motion by prosecutors to have Mr. Kronenberg removed from the case based on allegations of witness tampering. Thereafter, new counsel for the client negotiated a plea and sentence recommendation. As a result of these negotiations, no criminal charges went to trial.

After Mr. Kronenberg’s dismissal, the client requested a refund of the unearned balance of the fees generated by the sale of the realty and mobile home. Mr. Kronenberg denied the request.

Mr. Kronenberg’s conduct violated RPC 1.5(a) requiring that a lawyer’s fee be reasonable; RPC 1.8(a), prohibiting a lawyer from entering into a business transaction with a client or knowingly acquiring an ownership, possessory, security or other pecuniary interest adverse to a client unless the transaction and terms on which the lawyer acquires the interest are fair and reasonable to the client and are fully disclosed and transmitted in writing to the client in a manner which can be reasonably understood by the client, the client is given a reasonable opportunity to seek the advice of independent counsel in the transaction, and the client consents thereto; and RPC 1.15(d), requiring that a lawyer take steps to the extent reasonably practicable to protect a client’s interests upon termination of representation, such as, inter alia, refunding any advance payment of fee that has not been earned.

Joanne S. Abelson represented the Bar Association. Mr. Kronenberg represented himself. Kimberly A. Boyce was the hearing officer.

Reprimanded

Robert L. Hayes (WSBA No. 21239, admitted 1991), of Tacoma, was ordered to receive a reprimand on September 29, 2006, following a hearing. This discipline was based on his conduct in 2003 involving a conflict of interest.

In May 2003, a Washington resident died intestate leaving three adult children:  Child A, Child B, and Child C.  The three children had grown up in the same neighborhood with Mr. Hayes, and Child A had maintained contact with Mr. Hayes after high school.  To save money, the siblings initially did not retain the services of a lawyer to help them prepare court papers or assist them with the administration of the estate.  On May 21, a superior court commissioner appointed Child B, who had no prior experience administering an estate, to be the administrator. Soon after that, Child A began calling and writing to Child B, demanding a full accounting and requiring her to perform services.

In June 2003, Child A telephoned Mr. Hayes and asked Mr. Hayes to assist both him and Child C by reviewing the superior court probate file and intervening with Child B to require her to provide an accounting. In a letter confirming the telephone call, Child A informed Mr. Hayes that both he and Child C decided they needed Mr. Hayes’s “help and assistance” in dealing with Child B. Child A enclosed a personal check in the amount of $250. Child A signed the letter as “your friend, although now I guess client.” Mr. Hayes went to the courthouse, reviewed the probate file, and confirmed by telephone with Child A that he had received the check for $250. Mr. Hayes reported to Child A that there had been no new activity in the court file since the probate documents were filed in May. Mr. Hayes then wrote a letter to Child B on behalf of Child A requesting a full accounting of the estate assets, a copy of a power of attorney the decedent had executed to Child B before her death, and information about transactions under the power of attorney. At the end of June, Child B wrote to her two siblings and included some receipts and summaries of their mother’s assets. She also forwarded to them a letter that she had sent to Mr. Hayes asking him to represent her as administrator of the estate.

In July 2003, Child A and Mr. Hayes talked by phone. At Mr. Hayes’s direction, Child A confirmed in writing that the $250 check was “an advance prepayment . . . for legal representation of the estate of [the decedent] where [Child B] is the Administrator.” That same month, Mr. Hayes and Child B entered into a written fee agreement which referenced the $250 as a “retainer fee paid . . . in advance.” In July 2003, Child A wrote to Mr. Hayes and thanked him for helping Child B as administrator of the estate. In August, Child A wrote to Child B that he was “glad that [Mr. Hayes] is helping you.” Child A was aware that Mr. Hayes was no longer his personal lawyer but was performing legal services on behalf of Child B as the estate administrator. By these actions, Child A expressly agreed and consented to Mr. Hayes’s representation of Child B as administrator.

Two months later, Child A wrote Child B a letter stating that she was being unfair and had still not provided a full accounting of the estate assets to him.  He also filed a pro se petition to remove Child B as administrator of the estate. Mr. Hayes, on behalf of Child B, filed a declaration in opposition to the petition. In November 2003, the court commissioner ordered the appointment of a substitute independent administrator.

In December, Mr. Hayes signed a fee agreement and filed a notice of appearance to represent Child B “in her individual capacity as an heir to her mother’s estate.” Child A never consented to Mr. Hayes’s representation of Child B in her individual capacity as heir.

In January 2004, Child A wrote to Mr. Hayes asking him for a refund of the $250 he had sent him in June 2003. Child A stated that Mr. Hayes’s bill to the estate indicated that he had only spent one hour drafting the letter to Child B on Child A’s behalf, and therefore Mr. Hayes should only be entitled to receive $90 (his hourly fee). Mr. Hayes responded that he did not owe him a $160 refund and that the $250 payment had been credited equally among the three heirs to the estate. Child A filed a motion in the probate proceeding in which he raised the issue of Mr. Hayes’s representation of Child B by stating that he and Child C would not release or waive Mr. Hayes’s potential conflict of interest arising from his representation of Child B individually in the probate matter.

In January 2004, the commissioner appointed a new personal representative. An order approving final account and a decree of distribution were filed in March 2005. As part of the distribution, Child A was refunded the $250 fee paid to Mr. Hayes.

Mr. Hayes’s conduct violated RPC 1.9(a), prohibiting a lawyer from representing another person in the same or a substantially related matter in which that person’s interests are materially adverse to the interests of the former client unless the former client consents in writing after consultation and a full disclosure of the material facts.

Kevin M. Bank represented the Bar Association. Mr. Hayes represented himself. Stephen J. Henderson was the hearing officer.

Reprimanded

John C. Moore (WSBA No. 21880, admitted 1992), of Lake Oswego, Oregon, received a reprimand, effective October 27, 2006, by order of the Washington State Supreme Court imposing reciprocal discipline in accordance with an order of the Supreme Court of the State of Oregon following a stipulation. This discipline was based on his conduct in 2005 involving use of a notary stamp to attest and verify a signature in violation of the requirements of Oregon’s notary statute. For more information, see Oregon State Bar Bulletin, Discipline (July 2006), available at www.osbar.org/publications/bulletin/archive.html. Mr. Moore is to be distinguished from John S. Moore Jr. of Yakima, John A. Moore Jr. of Yakima, John C. Moore of Seattle, and John D. Moore of Hong Kong.

Mr. Moore’s conduct violated Oregon RPC 3.3(a)(5), prohibiting a lawyer from knowingly engaging in illegal conduct or conduct contrary to the Rules of Professional Conduct.

Felice P. Congalton represented the Bar Association. Mr. Moore did not appear either in person or through counsel.