April 2000

Disciplinary Notices

These notices of imposition of disciplinary sanctions and actions are published pursuant to Rule 11.2(c)(4) of the Supreme Court's Rules for Lawyer Discipline, and pursuant to the February 18, 1995 policy statement of the WSBA Board of Governors.

Pursuant to Rule for Enforcement of Lawyer Conduct 3.6(b), file materials relating to a matter concluded with an admonition may be destroyed five years after the admonition was issued. In admonition matters, it is the WSBA's policy to remove the disciplinary notice from the Washington State Bar News website archive five years after the admonition was issued, regardless of whether the WSBA's file materials are destroyed.

For a complete copy of any disciplinary decision, call the Washington State Disciplinary Board at 206-733-5926, leaving the case name and your address, or electronically submit your requests at http://pro.wsba.org/forms/publicrequest.asp. A list of recent disciplinary notices is available on the WSBA Website.

Jonny Ludington Green (WSBA No. 18552, admitted 1989), of Bellevue, has been suspended for two years pursuant to a stipulation approved by the Disciplinary Board on November 29, 1999 and by the Supreme Court on January 21, 2000. The discipline is based on her depositing money paid by firm clients into her personal account.

Ms. Ludington Green was employed as a full-time contract lawyer and later as an associate with a law firm. The firm's unwritten policy, which Ms. Ludington Green was aware of, was that all client money was given to the bookkeeper to be deposited.

On at least four occasions with three clients, Ms. Ludington Green deposited the clients' checks into her personal account. Although Ms. Ludington Green believes that she documented these payments in file notes that would have been sent to the bookkeeper, none of the amounts showed up on the clients' billing statements. When the bookkeeper told Ms. Ludington Green that a client had asked about a $1,200 payment, she asked the bookkeeper if the payment could be considered as an advance. The bookkeeper and Ms. Ludington Green agreed that the money should be paid back to the firm through payroll deduction. Only $100 was actually deducted.

A firm partner wrote to Ms. Ludington Green in September 1994, asking why a client's checks had not been delivered to the bookkeeper. Ms. Ludington Green responded that she had "bonuses on the books." She offered to repay the amount if asked, and also volunteered that she had deposited another client's payments into her personal account. In February 1995, the firm asked Ms. Ludington Green to sign a $10,894.88 Confession of Judgment. Although both Ms. Ludington Green and her spouse signed the document, they refused to have their signatures acknowledged. At the time of the stipulation, Ms. Ludington Green had made no payments on the judgment. The Supreme Court order requires the judgment amount to be repaid prior to reinstatement.

Ms. Ludington Green's conduct violated RPC 1.14, requiring that client funds be deposited into a lawyer's trust account; and RPC 8.4(c), prohibiting conduct involving dishonesty, fraud, deceit or misrepresentation.

Marsha Matsumoto represented the Bar Association. Leland Ripley represented Ms. Ludington Green. The hearing officer was Timothy Esser.

George Wittemyer (WSBA No. 4498, admitted 1967), of Portland, has been ordered suspended for four months, by order of the Supreme Court of Washington, dated December 6, 1999. The Supreme Court's order of reciprocal discipline, pursuant to Rule for Lawyer Discipline (RLD) 12.6, is based on the Oregon Supreme Court's April 29, 1999 order approving a stipulation to discipline. The Court ordered the Washington suspension to run concurrently with the Oregon suspension, beginning on June 28, 1999.

From August 1989 through July 1991, Mr. Wittemyer represented Pacific Chips, a timber corporation. During this time, he served as legal counsel, secretary and registered agent. He also owned stock in Pacific Chips.

Also in 1989, Mr. Wittemyer began representing a client, Ms. X. From mid-1989 through mid-1990, he was involved in a romantic relationship with Ms. X. Pacific Chips asked Ms. X for a $300,000 business loan. Ms. X agreed to loan Pacific Chips $150,000 if Mr. Wittemyer would do the same. He agreed, but did not reduce the agreement to writing or inform Pacific Chips of his participation. Mr. Wittemyer did not advise Ms. X of the potential conflicts of interest, even though another attorney suggested this. The loan closed in December 1989. Mr. Wittemyer drafted the promissory note, UCC financing statement and security agreement, all indicating the whole $300,000 was owed to Ms. X. He told Ms. X it would look better if his interest was not disclosed. After a few interest-only payments on the loan, Pacific Chips defaulted. Mr. Wittemyer took several actions to collect the loan, including retaining a lawyer. He instructed the lawyer to bill Ms. X, but to send the bills to his office. Mr. Wittemyer drafted a lawsuit against Pacific Chips, which the lawyer filed. The lawsuit named only Ms. X. Mr. Wittemyer accepted service of the lawsuit on behalf of Pacific Chips. In July 1991, the court entered a default judgment against Pacific Chips for $300,000, plus $50,000 in punitive damages and costs and attorney's fees. Ms. X recovered her initial investment, but not her attorney's fees or interest on the loan. Mr. Wittemyer recovered approximately $25,000 of the amount he loaned Pacific Chips.

Mr. Wittemyer's actions violated Oregon DR 5-101(A), prohibiting accepting or continuing employment when the exercise of judgment on behalf of the client is or may be affected by business, property or personal interests; DR 4-104(A), prohibiting entering a business transaction with a client in which the lawyer and the client have differing interests; and DR 105(E), prohibiting representing multiple clients with conflicting interests.

Joanne Abelson represented the Bar Association. Mr. Wittemyer represented himself.

Stephen Thomas (WSBA No. 2388, admitted 1968), of Burien, has been ordered to receive a reprimand, two censures, and restitution pursuant to a stipulation for discipline approved by the Disciplinary Board on January 12, 2000. The discipline is based upon his failure to diligently represent and accurately communicate with clients.

In spring 1992, Mr. Thomas agreed to represent a client in a wrongful garnishment matter. A credit reporting company issued an inaccurate credit report, causing the client's garnishment. Mr. Thomas prepared and filed the lawsuit in King County Superior Court. The case scheduling order set the trial date as September 26, 1994. Mr. Thomas did not notify his client of the trial date. In August 1994, the defendant tendered a settlement check to Mr. Thomas. Even though Mr. Thomas's client did not agree to the settlement, he retained the check. Mr. Thomas did not prepare or appear for trial. Since neither party appeared for trial, the case was dismissed the following day. Based on inaccurate information from Mr. Thomas, the client believed that the lawsuit was still pending. In fall 1995, the client contacted the court and discovered that the case had been dismissed. The client was not able to find another lawyer to pursue his case.

In 1996, Mr. Thomas agreed to represent the wife in a dissolution action. In August 1996, he obtained temporary orders that did not address two of his clients' concerns — payment of medical bills and dental costs. In February 1998, the client met with her husband to try to resolve the case because she believed that Mr. Thomas was not making any progress. Later that month, opposing counsel sent Mr. Thomas proposed final pleadings. Mr. Thomas approved the pleadings for entry without consulting his client. Mr. Thomas believed that the proposed orders were consistent with his client's objectives. The client learned that she was divorced in a phone call from her ex-husband. The client obtained new counsel who resolved the case with increased child support and medical payments.

Matter 3: In August 1997, Mr. Thomas agreed to represent grandparents in a case to obtain care and custody of their three-year-old granddaughter. The child's father was incarcerated and the mother had experienced intermittent drug dependence. Mr. Thomas prepared a guardianship agreement providing that the grandparents would have physical custody and control of the child, and the mother would have visitation, so long as she remained drug free. The parties signed this agreement in September 1997. In December 1997, the grandparents asked Mr. Thomas to obtain permanent custody of the child for them. Mr. Thomas prepared pleadings, which both parties signed. He also prepared a nonparental custody petition. He never filed these documents. Based on inaccurate information from Mr. Thomas, the clients believed that the petition had been filed. The clients retained new counsel who completed the case.

Mr. Thomas' conduct violated RPC 1.3, requiring lawyers to act with reasonable diligence and promptness in representing a client; RPC 1.2, requiring a lawyer to abide by a client's decisions concerning the objectives of representation; RPC 3.2, requiring a lawyer to make reasonable efforts to expedite litigation consistent with the interests of the client; RPC 1.4, requiring lawyers to keep clients reasonably informed about the status of their matters; and RPC 8.4(c), prohibiting conduct involving dishonesty, fraud, deceit or misrepresentation.

Maria Regimbal represented the Bar Association. Leland Ripley represented Mr. Thomas.

Carole Sureau (WSBA No. 21909, admitted 1992), of Snohomish County, has been ordered censured pursuant to a stipulation approved by the Disciplinary Board on December 10, 1997. This discipline is based on Ms. Sureau's practicing law prior to being admitted to practice in Washington, and conflicts of interest.

Ms. Sureau and her husband moved to Washington from California, where Ms. Sureau was admitted to practice in 1987. Mr. Sureau's daughter lived in Washington. Mr. Sureau's mother, Ms. E, was transferred to a Washington convalescent center while Mr. and Mrs. Sureau lived in California. The daughter signed a promissory note for convalescent care for Ms. E, because she lived close to the center. The daughter believed that the care would be paid for either by insurance or sale of Ms. E's home. In May 1992, the convalescent center sued the daughter. The daughter contacted Ms. Sureau in California for advice about the lawsuit. Ms. Sureau advised the daughter and provided form pleadings for the daughter's use. The daughter typed her answer on Ms. Sureau's computer. Ms. Sureau advised the daughter to implead Ms. E's insurance company, which the daughter did. These pleadings were filed July 9, 1992. On July 30, 1992, Ms. Sureau sent a copy of the pleadings to the New York State Insurance Department for service of process. The letterhead identified Ms. Sureau as a lawyer and listed her Washington address. Ms. Sureau was admitted to practice in Washington on November 5, 1992.

In early 1993, Ms. Sureau told the daughter that she planned to stop representing her, and in March the daughter retained new counsel. After this, Ms. E and Mr. Sureau were added to the lawsuit. Ms. Sureau appeared for Ms. E and her husband in the lawsuit. She filed an answer that included a claim for contribution, reimbursement and indemnity against the daughter. The daughter filed a motion to disqualify Ms. Sureau from representing Ms. E and Mr. Sureau. Ms. Sureau opposed the motion, stating that she should be allowed to remain in the case to protect her own financial interest. The court disqualified her.

Ms. Sureau's conduct violated RPC 5.5, prohibiting practicing law in a jurisdiction where doing so violated the regulation of the legal profession in that jurisdiction; RPC 1.9(a), prohibiting a lawyer who has formerly represented a client in a matter from representing another person in the same or a substantially related matter in which that person's interests are materially adverse to the interests of the former client, unless the former client consents in writing after consultation and a full disclosure of the material facts; and RPC 1.7(b), prohibiting a lawyer from representing a client if the representation of that client may be materially limited by the lawyer's responsibilities to another client or by the lawyer's own interests.

Julie Shankland represented the Bar Association. Ms. Sureau represented herself.

Nondisciplinary Actions

Interim Suspension

Michael K. Tasker (WSBA N0. 12426, admitted 1974), of Bellingham, was ordered suspended from the practice of law pending the outcome of disciplinary proceedings by Supreme Court order entered October 12, 1999.

Interim suspension is pursuant to RLD Title 3 and is not a disciplinary sanction.

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