July 2000

Disciplinary Notices

Brad A. Plumb (WSBA No. 20337, admitted 1991), of Spokane, has been disbarred by order of the Supreme Court effective March 27, 2000, following a hearing. The discipline is based on providing false, misleading and fraudulent information to the Employment Security Department (ESD) to obtain unemployment benefits, and making misleading statements to the court.

Matter 1: In February 1991, the City of Spokane Public Defender's Office hired Mr. Plumb as a lawyer. In November 1991, the Public Defender's Office terminated Mr. Plumb's employment for violating an office policy prohibiting representing private clients. In the same month, Mr. Plumb applied for unemployment benefits, stating that his supervisor gave no reason for terminating his employment. Mr. Plumb also told the ESD that he did not violate a company rule and that there was no final incident or reason for terminating his employment. Mr. Plumb told the ESD that he was self-employed on a commission basis. Mr. Plumb began receiving unemployment benefits the week ending November 16, 1991. On November 19, 1991, the City of Spokane protested Mr. Plumb's benefits, claiming he was ineligible because he was engaged in private practice. Mr. Plumb told the ESD that he did pro bono work only and did not receive compensation. On May 5, 1992, the ESD reinstated Mr. Plumb's benefits, based on his statements to them. Mr. Plumb received unemployment benefits until November 1992.

In June 1992, Mr. Plumb met with an ESD adjudicator. Mr. Plumb did not mention his self-employment. Between October 11, 1991 and November 4, 1991, $10,400 was deposited into Mr. Plumb's IOLTA account. Between November 5, 1991 and December 21, 1992, $50,294 was deposited into another bank account in Mr. Plumb's name. Mr. Plumb also had a TFB account, which stood for The Family Business Account. Between August 11, 1992 and December 8, 1992, $7,408.65 was deposited into this account. The hearing officer found that the source of these deposits was legal fees and that this income was not reported to ESD. The hearing officer also found that Mr. Plumb's statements that he performed pro bono work only and earned no income were false and misleading. On June 4, 1992, Mr. Plumb opened an IOLTA account at a different bank. Between June 4, 1992 and February 25, 1993, $92,217.72 was deposited into this account. The hearing officer found that the deposits made between June 1992 and November 1992, the time Mr. Plumb was receiving benefits, were not reported to the ESD. The officer found that the non-reporting constituted fraud. Mr. Plumb also opened a business for his law practice on June 4, 1992. Between June 4, 1992 and March 19, 1993, $90,019.25 was deposited into this account. The hearing officer found that the deposits made into this account were not reported to the ESD, and constituted fraud. Mr. Plumb had two other accounts into which approximately $42,000 was deposited between February and May 1992. None of these deposits was reported to the ESD. Additionally, an employee of Plumb and Associates filed a tax report indicating $5,280 in income for the third quarter of 1992. Mr. Plumb did not report to the ESD that he had a full-time employee.

On January 16, 1992, Mr. Plumb ordered a yellow pages tab ad for Brad Plumb, attorney at law, to run August 1992 through August 1993. On the application for credit, Mr. Plumb indicated that he paid $3,000 per month rent. Mr. Plumb filed suit when he was denied credit for the cost of his ad. On March 9, 1992, Mr. Plumb filed an affidavit in the lawsuit stating that the tab would be used to advertise his new law firm, and that if that did not work out, it would be used to advertise his solo practice. His affidavit also indicated that he had turned down several business opportunities, and had acquired a building, a new practice, bank accounts, phones, business cards and letterhead. Mr. Plumb did not disclose any of this information to the ESD. In September 1992, Mr. Plumb applied for a job at Spokane Community College. His application stated that he owned and managed a three-lawyer firm and worked 70 hours per week.

In December 1994, January 1995 and March 1995, Mr. Plumb had a hearing before the Employment Security Department Office of Administrative Hearings. The administrative law judge found by clear, cogent and convincing evidence that Mr. Plumb was not eligible for benefits, and had willfully and intentionally withheld information from the ESD necessary to determine his eligibility. Mr. Plumb was ordered to repay $9,600. The hearing officer found that Mr. Plumb was self-employed and earning income as a lawyer during the time he received unemployment benefits. Mr. Plumb's failure to report his self-employment status was a misrepresentation of fact.

Matter 2: On May 27, 1993, Mr. Plumb appeared at a sentencing hearing in Spokane Superior Court. The judge continued the hearing until Friday morning and asked Mr. Plumb if he was available. Mr. Plumb told the judge that he was participating in a golf tournament on Friday, Saturday and Sunday, and would not be available. The golf tournament was only on Saturday and Sunday. Mr. Plumb wanted to participate in a "skins" golf game on Friday. This was not part of the tournament.

Mr. Plumb's conduct violated RPC 8.4(c), prohibiting a lawyer from engaging in conduct involving dishonesty, fraud, deceit or misrepresentation; RPC 8.4 (b), prohibiting committing a criminal act that reflects adversely on the lawyer's honesty, trustworthiness or fitness as a lawyer in other respects; RLD 1.1(a), prohibiting acts involving moral turpitude and acts reflecting disregard for the rule of law; RPC 3.3 (a)(1), prohibiting knowingly making a false statement of material fact or law to a tribunal; RLD 1.1(c), the requirement in the Oath of Attorney that a lawyer maintain the respect due to the courts of justice and judicial officers; and RLD 1.1(p), prohibiting conduct demonstrating unfitness to practice law.

Marsha Matsumoto and Linda Eide represented the Bar Association. Mr. Plumb represented himself. The hearing officer was Charles T. Conrad.

Leslie Clay Terry, III (WSBA No. 8593, admitted 1978), of Bellevue, has been suspended for 18 months, following a stipulation, by order of the Supreme Court dated March 24, 2000. The discipline is based upon his continuing to practice law while his license was suspended, failing to notify the courts his clients and opposing counsel of his suspensions, and failing to diligently represent a client.

On June 6, 1997, the Supreme Court suspended Mr. Terry's license to practice law for failure to pay his Bar Association dues. The court reinstated Mr. Terry on August 22, 1997. On September 4, 1997, the Supreme Court again suspended Mr. Terry's license to practice law for failure to submit evidence that he satisfied the required continuing legal education hours. The Supreme Court reinstated Mr. Terry's license on March 31, 1998.

Matter 1: On October 3, 1997, Mr. Terry filed a Notice of Appearance in Bainbridge Island Municipal Court. The court administrator discovered that Mr. Terry's license was suspended and contacted his office. Mr. Terry's office told the court that Mr. Terry had been reinstated, and provided a letter from the U.S. District Court verifying his status. This letter pertained to his resolved nonpayment of dues suspension, not the ongoing CLE suspension. On October 7, 1997, Mr. Terry filed an amended Notice of Appearance signed by another lawyer, naming both himself and the other lawyer as "attorneys for defendant."

Matter 2: In August 1994, Mr. Terry settled a client's personal injury suit. However, he continued to represent her in a claim for underinsured motorist benefits from her insurer. Mr. Terry did not withdraw from this matter, notify his client of either of his suspensions, or return her client file to her. Mr. Terry also failed to return the client's phone calls. The client learned in February 1998 that Mr. Terry's license was suspended. In July 1999, when the case remained unresolved, the client requested in writing that Mr. Terry deliver her client file to her. As of December 6, 1999, the client had not received her file.

Matter 3: While his license was suspended, Mr. Terry represented an employer involved in a wage dispute with an employee. Mr. Terry called the employee and told him that he would receive the bulk of the money he was requesting from the employer. When the employee received much less than he requested, he threatened to sue the employer. During his suspension, Mr. Terry wrote two letters to the employee on letterhead identifying him as a lawyer. The letters also stated that Mr. Terry was counsel for the employer.

Matter 4: Mr. Terry represented a client who owned and operated a dry-cleaning business. The court entered a default judgment in a lawsuit filed against the dry cleaner for damages. While his license was suspended, Mr. Terry wrote a letter to a third party allegedly responsible for the damages. The third party paid a portion of the judgment. The plaintiff then wrote a letter stating that if she did not receive the balance of the judgment, she would begin supplemental proceedings. The client was served with an order to appear for supplemental proceedings. The opposing counsel agreed to continue the supplemental proceedings at Mr. Terry's request. Mr. Terry filed a motion to set aside the default judgment. Mr. Terry also requested that the presiding judge continue the supplemental proceedings until the motion to set aside the default could be heard. Mr. Terry told the judge that he was holding his client's funds in his trust account. The presiding judge did continue the supplemental proceedings. The court denied the motion to set aside the default judgment, ordered that the funds in Mr. Terry's trust account be released, the supplemental proceedings go forward, and that Mr. Terry pay $300 in attorney's fees for bringing his motion. Mr. Terry did not notify either of the judges involved in these proceedings that his license was suspended.

Matter 5: At the time he was suspended, Mr. Terry was representing a client in a criminal proceeding. The client was charged with two counts of second-degree assault. Mr. Terry did not withdraw or inform the client, the court or the prosecutor of his suspension. Trial in this case was set for March 2, 1998. Although Mr. Terry's license was suspended, he appeared for trial. The judge learned of his suspension and continued the trial date. The court also held subsequent hearings to appoint new counsel.

Matter 6: At the time he was suspended, Mr. Terry was representing a client charged with first-degree kidnapping and attempted first-degree murder. Mr. Terry did not withdraw or inform his client, the court or the prosecutor of his suspension. While his license was suspended, Mr. Terry represented the client during a five-day jury trial. After the jury returned a not-guilty plea on one charge and a hung jury mistrial had been declared on the second charge, the prosecutor learned of Mr. Terry's suspension. The prosecutor informed the trial judge of Mr. Terry's status.

Matter 7: At the time he was suspended, Mr. Terry represented three defendants in a civil lawsuit. He did not withdraw or notify his clients, the court or opposing counsel that his license had been suspended. Mr. Terry represented the clients in depositions, negotiations and a five-day bench trial while his license was suspended.

Matter 8: At the time he was suspended, Mr. Terry represented two defendants in a civil lawsuit. He did not withdraw or notify his clients, the court or opposing counsel that his license had been suspended. Mr. Terry represented the clients in depositions and mediation while his license was suspended. On March 10, 1998, Mr. Terry told opposing counsel that his license had just been suspended. On March 11, 1998, another lawyer appeared for the clients. Mr. Terry did not file a notice of withdrawal, and resumed active representation of the client when his license was reinstated.

Mr. Terry's conduct violated RPC 1.15(a)(1), requiring a lawyer to terminate client representation if continuing representation violates the RPCs or other laws; RPC 5.5(a), prohibiting practicing law in a jurisdiction where doing so violates the regulations of the legal profession in that jurisdiction; RPC 8.4(d), prohibiting conduct prejudicial to the administration of justice; RPC 1.3, requiring lawyers to diligently represent their clients; RPC 1.4, requiring lawyers to keep clients reasonably informed about the status of their matters; RLD 1.1(l), prohibiting practicing law while suspended from law practice; RLD 8.2, requiring lawyers to discontinue practicing when their license is suspended; and RLD 8.1(a)(1), requiring lawyers to notify clients, courts and opposing counsel of the suspension of their licenses.

Disciplinary Counsel Douglas Ende represented the Bar Association. D. Michael Tomkins represented Mr. Terry. The hearing officer was Michael Kight.

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