December 2001

Disciplinary Notices

Connie R. Arenberg, also known as Connie Fernandez (WSBA No. 20482, admitted 1991), of Chicago, Illinois, was disbarred effective March 30, 2001, by order of the Supreme Court. The discipline is based upon her September 25, 2000 disbarment in the state of Illinois, on findings that she engaged in 96 acts of misconduct in violation of 13 disciplinary rules, affecting 23 clients over a three-year period. The violations included converting thousands of dollars and neglecting her clients' cases.

Matter 1: During 1994 through 1997, Ms. Arenberg agreed to represent eight clients in actions to recover their rental security deposits. Ms. Arenberg settled the cases and deposited the clients' settlement funds into her trust account. Ms. Arenberg did not inform the clients that she received the funds, or deliver the funds to the clients. By May 22, 1997, Ms. Arenberg's client trust account balance was $2.48.

Matter 2: In 1994, Ms. Arenberg represented the renter in a forcible entry and detainer action to collect unpaid rent. On January 31, 1995, the Circuit Court of Cook County granted summary judgment against Ms. Arenberg's client in the amount of $1,777.50. On March 2, 1995, Ms. Arenberg filed a notice of appeal from the judgment. At a hearing on March 13, the client appeared pro se and stated that Ms. Arenberg had filed the notice of appeal without his permission. The court continued the hearing because Ms. Arenberg was not present. On April 24, the parties filed settlement documents, and the client began making payments on the judgment.

Matter 3: In March 1994, Ms. Arenberg agreed to represent the defendant in a complaint for forcible entry and detainer, and collection of past-due rent. In November 1995, the court entered a $26,775 judgment in favor of Ms. Arenberg's client. The judgment stated that the award of attorney's fees was continued for presentation of an attorney's-fees petition. Ms. Arenberg did not file a fee petition or take any further action to collect the judgment.

Matter 4: In June 1994, Ms. Arenberg agreed to represent the defendant in a forcible detainer and collection of unpaid rent case. In October 1995, the court entered a judgment for Ms. Arenberg's client. The court's order allowed 14 days for an attorney's-fee petition to be filed and a date set for the fee hearing. Ms. Arenberg did not appear for the hearing and the case was stricken from the docket. As of December 1998, Ms. Arenberg had taken no further action on the case.

Matter 5: On October 6, 1995, Ms. Arenberg filed a motion to vacate a summary judgment entered against her client. She failed to appear in court on the date set and the court struck the motion. On October 25, 1995, Ms. Arenberg filed a motion to vacate the order striking her prior motion. Ms. Arenberg did not inform the client of the judgment against him. The client discovered the judgment and directed Ms. Arenberg to negotiate a payment plan. The client specifically stated that he did not want to appeal the decision.

On November 2, 1995, Ms. Arenberg filed a notice of appeal and deposited with the clerk a $5,000 check drawn on her client trust account. On November 8, Ms. Arenberg's check was returned for insufficient funds. In July 1996, the appeal was dismissed for lack of jurisdiction. Ms. Arenberg told the clerk's office that she would replace the check, but she did not.

On November 18, 1996, the parties informed the judge that the matter had been settled and that the appeal should be dismissed. The clients agreed on a payment plan, and the client gave Ms. Arenberg his personal check payable to the plaintiff. In early November 1995, Ms. Arenberg had requested that her client give her two months' rent to hold in escrow pending the outcome of the appeal. The client gave Ms. Arenberg $560, which she deposited into her trust account. Ms. Arenberg did not pay rent with these funds, but on November 12, 1996, the client's balance was $24.29. Ms. Arenberg used these funds for her own purposes.

Ms. Arenberg prepared the order dismissing the appeal and specified that the $5,000 bond be returned to her, knowing she had not paid the appeal bond. The judge signed the order, and on November 22, 1996, Ms. Arenberg received and deposited a $5,118.09 check from the clerk.

Matter 6: In January 1996, Ms. Arenberg agreed to represent a client in an action to recover her security deposit. On December 6, 1996, Ms. Arenberg filed a motion for an order of default. Between September 6, 1996 and December 19, 1996, the client informed Ms. Arenberg several times, both orally and in writing, that Ms. Arenberg was no longer the client's lawyer. Ms. Arenberg did not withdraw or return the client's file to her. The court denied the motion for order of default. Ms. Arenberg did not advise her client of this order.

Additionally, Ms. Arenberg failed to cooperate with the investigation of the Illinois discipline matters and gave false testimony during the proceedings.

Ms. Arenberg's conduct violated Illinois Rules of Professional Conduct 1.1(a), 1.2(a), 1.2(f)(1), 1.3, 1.4(a), 1.4(b), 1.15(b), 1.16(a) (4), 116(d), 3.2, 8.1(a)(2), 8.4(a)(5) and Illinois Supreme Court Rule 771.

Felice Congalton represented the Bar Association. Ms. Arenberg represented herself.

Richard S. Twiss (WSBA No. 3020, admitted 1970), of Seattle, was disbarred effective June 8, 2001, by order of the Supreme Court, following a stipulation. The discipline is based upon misrepresentations he made in 1991 and 1992 in a business deal.

Mr. Twiss and Mr. Wheeler were business partners in two boxing-promotion businesses named Wheeler and Associates, Inc. (W&A) and Wheeler China, Inc. In February 1991, a Chinese company (CX) contacted Mr. Wheeler to arrange a boxing competition in China. CX and W&A signed an agreement to put on a boxing competition in China. Mr. Wheeler conducted most of the business with CX. Mr. Twiss obtained most of his information from Mr. Wheeler. Mr. Wheeler read portions of the correspondence to Mr. Twiss. Over a three-month period, CX paid W&A $3.1 million, which Mr. Wheeler deposited into his personal checking account. On December 31, 1991, $700,000 of this money was wired to boxer George Foreman, but he did not sign to participate in the event.

In March 1992, Mr. Wheeler and Mr. Twiss traveled to China to meet with CX. W&A signed a new agreement with CX during this trip. Mr. Wheeler excluded Mr. Twiss from many of the meetings. During this time, Mr. Twiss was suffering from alcoholism and depression. Because Mr. Twiss did not have much to do, he was drinking more than usual. In March 1992, while still in China, Mr. Twiss, at Mr. Wheeler's direction, signed the names of two boxing managers to boxing service agreements. Mr. Twiss testified that, based on information he obtained from Mr. Wheeler, he believed that the life of Mr. G (the CX representative) would be in danger if Mr. Twiss did not sign the boxing managers' names to the contracts.

Also in 1992, Mr. Wheeler wrote a letter to CX stating that W&A had advanced $1.8 million to the two boxers involved in the above agreements. Mr. Twiss repeated this statement to representatives of the China Agricultural Bank, which was lending money to CX for the boxing event. In fact, there were no valid agreements and W&A had not paid any advances. In May 1992, Mr. Wheeler stated falsely that the two boxing services contracts were canceled and that the $2.4 million advanced to the fighters was forfeited, because W&A and CX had not rescheduled the boxing match. Mr. G testified that Mr. Twiss repeated these statements. Mr. Twiss testified that he believed that the misrepresentations were made to allow Mr. G to get money out of China, because his life was in danger.

In April and May 1992, CX wired W&A $3.1 million. On June 13, 1992, Mr. Wheeler transferred $98,000 to Mr. Twiss's personal bank account. In August 1992, Mr. Twiss drafted a letter of credit on Seafirst Bank Private Banking stationery using the fictitious name Martin A. Oakley in the signature block. Mr. Wheeler signed this letter and presented it to CX, indicating it was a sample.

On August 24, 1992, Mr. Wheeler and Mr. Twiss split the remaining funds received from CX. Mr. Wheeler arranged for a boxing promotion firm to handle the logistics of the October 17, 1992 fight. One of the boxers reported an injury several weeks before the fight, and the fight did not take place.

The boxing event never occurred, and W&A did not return any of the funds advanced by CX. CX filed a lawsuit against W&A, Mr. Twiss and Mr. Wheeler individually for return of the funds advanced. Following a jury verdict, the Honorable Thomas S. Zilly awarded CX $2,519,803 jointly and severally against Mr. Wheeler and Mr. Twiss.

In October 1997, Mr. Twiss began receiving treatment for his alcoholism and depression. Mr. Twiss has complied with all treatment recommendations since that time. During the hearing, Mr. Twiss's treatment provider testified that his alcoholism significantly contibuted to his error in judgment.

Mr. Twiss's conduct violated RPC 8.4(c), prohibiting conduct involving dishonesty, fraud, deceit or misrepresentation; and 8.4(a), prohibiting knowingly assisting another person in violating the RPCs.

Linda Eide represented the Bar Association. Louis D. Peterson and Michael S. Wampold represented Mr. Twiss.

Michael K. Tasker (WSBA No.12426, admitted 1982), of Bellingham, was suspended for two years effective December 21, 2000, by order of the Supreme Court following a hearing. This discipline is based on his misuse of client funds in his trust account in 1993 and 1994. For additional information, see the Supreme Court opinion published at 141 Wn.2d 557, 9 P.3d 822 (2000).

In June 1992, Mr. Tasker's ex-wife obtained a $41,063.24 judgment against him for back-due child-support payments. The amount due increased later in 1992 to between $50,000 and $70,000. Mr. Tasker's business and personal accounts were garnished to pay his support obligation. From May 1993 through May 1994, Mr. Tasker allowed earned income to accumulate in his trust account. He paid all of his business and personal bills from this commingled account. Mr. Tasker admitted that the purpose of the commingling was to avoid garnishment of his personal and business funds by the Office of Support Enforcement. The hearing officer found that Mr. Tasker did not intend to permanently deprive his clients of any funds. The balance of the trust account sometimes fell below that attributable to client funds, but no client permanently lost funds. During this year, the trust account balance was up to $30,000 below what it should have been. On several occasions, the trust account was overdrawn, although no checks were returned. The hearing officer found that Mr. Tasker knew that he was using his clients' funds to meet his personal financial obligations.

The Court noted that during this time, Mr. Tasker suffered dramatic personal "woes," including the dissolution of his law partnership and his marriage, loss of his mother, placement of his father in a nursing home, two automobile accidents with severe personal injuries, trial and retrial of a financially and emotionally draining murder case, and a change in primary residential placement of his children. The Court also noted that during the delay in prosecuting this case, Mr. Tasker remedied the problems with his trust account.

Mr. Tasker's conduct violated RPCs 1.14, requiring lawyers to protect and account for client's funds; 8.4(c), prohibiting conduct involving dishonesty, fraud, deceit, or misrepresentation; 1.5, requiring lawyers to provide accurate billings to clients; 1.4, requiring lawyers to keep clients reasonably informed of the status of the matters; 1.7, requiring lawyers to avoid representing clients whose interests are directly adverse; 1.3, requiring lawyers to diligently represent their clients; 3.3(a), prohibiting lawyers from knowingly making false statements of material fact to a tribunal; and 5.3, requiring lawyers to make reasonable efforts to supervise nonlawyer assistants.

Joanne Abelson and Jean McElroy represented the Bar Association. Rita L. Bender represented Mr. Tasker. The hearing officer was Timothy H. Esser.

Stephen R. Powell (WSBA No. 7727, admitted 1977), of Mill Creek, has been suspended for one year, effective March 27, 2001, by order of the Supreme Court, following a default hearing. This discipline is based on his failure to diligently represent three clients from 1993 through 1998.

Matter 1: In 1981, Mr. Powell agreed to represent a two-year-old minor in a personal-injury claim. The child fell through a stairway railing at an apartment complex. In 1986, Mr. Powell filed a lawsuit in King County Superior Court. On May 10, 1993, the court entered an order directing the plaintiff to move for default or note the matter for trial within 60 days, or the matter would be dismissed with prejudice. Mr. Powell did not file anything in response to the court's order. On October 26, 1993, the clerk entered a dismissal in the case. Mr. Powell did not advise the client or her mother that the case had been dismissed. In 1997, the clients learned from the court file that the case had been dismissed. By this time, the child had turned 18 and the statute of limitations of her own claim was running.

Matter 2: In November 1997, Mr. Powell filed a notice of appeal of the Board of Industrial Appeals denial of his client's Labor and Industries claim. The court issued a scheduling order at the time the case was filed. Mr. Powell requested a continuance of the trial date, which the court granted. Mr. Powell did not obtain a new trial date, and the clerk dismissed the case on December 1, 1998, with prejudice. In October 1999, the client learned that his case had been dismissed. The client requested that Mr. Powell return his file. As of the date of the hearing, Mr. Powell had not returned the client's file.

Matter 3: In 1998, Mr. Powell agreed to look over a client's workers' compensation and employment claims. Mr. Powell told the client he would review her file and let her know in a week if he would take her case. He also told her that the statue of limitations was about to run out on her employment-discrimination claim. Mr. Powell never contacted the client again. The client left several messages for Mr. Powell over the next four weeks, but he did not return her calls. In August 1998, the client requested that Mr. Powell return her file. Mr. Powell returned the file in February 1999, when he delivered it to the Bar Association.

Matter 4: Mr. Powell did not respond to Disciplinary Counsel's requests for information regarding these matters.

Mr. Powell's conduct violated RPCs 1.3, requiring lawyers to diligently represent their clients; 3.2, requiring lawyers to expedite a client's litigation; 1.4, requiring lawyers to keep clients reasonably informed of the status of their matters; 1.15(d), requiring lawyers to take steps to the extent reasonably practicable to protect a client's interests upon withdrawal; and RLD 2.8, requiring lawyers to promptly comply with requests for information from disciplinary counsel.

Lawrence R. Schwerin represented the Bar Association. Mr. Powell represented himself. The hearing officer was Kimberly A. Boyce.

Robert G. Maslan (WSBA No.1213, admitted 1966), of Seattle, was suspended for six months, effective February 5, 2001,by order of the Court following a default hearing. This discipline is based on his failure to diligently represent and communicate with a client.

In early 1993, the Pierce County Superior Court admitted Mr. H's will to probate and appointed MH as personal representative (PR) of the estate. On July 26, 1993, counsel for the estate appointed Mr. Maslan as co-counsel and indicated that counsel was beginning a sabbatical effective August 1, 1993. Mr. Maslan and the client did not have an agreement regarding Mr. Maslan's fees. At the time Mr. Maslan took over this estate, several creditor claims were pending. In June 1993, the PR sold two parcels of real estate. The purchaser defaulted on the payments for one parcel. The purchaser and the PR were not able to resolve the default, so Mr. Maslan took steps to initiate foreclosure. Mr. Maslan twice directed the escrow agent to send him fees for his role in the forfeiture. Mr. Maslan did no further work on the estate until July 1995, when he filed a notice of withdrawal. Mr. Maslan indicated that until he was paid for his work, he had no obligation to complete the estate or communicate with the client. Mr. Maslan's conduct did not harm any creditors, the client or the beneficiary. Mr. Maslan also failed to respond to requests for information from disciplinary counsel.

Mr. Maslan's conduct violated RPCs 1.3, requiring lawyers to diligently represent their clients; 1.4(a), requiring lawyers to keep client's reasonably informed of the status of their matters; and RLD 2.8(a), requiring lawyers to promptly comply with requests for information from disciplinary counsel.

William J. Rush represented the Bar Association. Mr. Maslan represented himself. The hearing officer was Preston L. Johnson.

LeAnne L. Koliha (WSBA No.18366, admitted 1988), of Bothell, was suspended for one year, pursuant to RLD 12.6, by order of the Supreme Court dated March 12, 2001. The discipline is based upon discipline imposed by the Supreme Court of Oregon for practicing law while her license was suspended.

On July 6, 1993, Ms. Koliha was suspended from the practice of law in Oregon. In 1995, while she was suspended, Ms. Koliha represented a client in a guardianship petition. She filed a petition to block accounts with the Oregon Circuit Court in Grant County. Ms. Koliha also corresponded with opposing counsel on this issue, representing herself as an active member of the Oregon State Bar.

On September 20, 1996, the Oregon Disciplinary Counsel's office requested a response from Ms. Koliha. She failed to respond to their request.

Ms. Koliha's conduct violated ORS 9.160, prohibiting practicing law without a valid license; and DR 1103, requiring lawyers to cooperate with the Bar's investigation.

Leslie Allen represented the Bar Association. Ms. Koliha represented herself.

Michael E. Jones (WSBA No. 331, admitted 1971), of Mountlake Terrace, has been suspended for 60 days, following a stipulation approved by order of the Supreme Court dated April 30, 2001. The suspension began May 10, 2001. This discipline is based on his failure to respond to a request for response from disciplinary counsel in 2000. (Note: Michael E. Jones is to be distinguished from Michael R. Jones of Boise, Idaho.)

In April 2000, a client filed a grievance against Mr. Jones. In May 2000, disciplinary counsel mailed Mr. Jones a request for response to the grievance. Mr. Jones did not respond or contact the Bar Association. In July 2000, disciplinary counsel served a subpoena for Mr. Jones to appear for a deposition and requested that he bring documents related to the grievance. Mr. Jones failed to appear for his deposition or provide the documents. In September, disciplinary counsel notified Mr. Jones that he would seek review committee authority to file a petition for interim suspension. Mr. Jones did not respond. The review committee authorized disciplinary counsel to seek interim suspension.

On November 8, 2000, disciplinary counsel filed a petition for interim suspension. After the Supreme Court issued an order to show cause, requiring Mr. Jones to appear and show cause why he should not be suspended, Mr. Jones retained counsel, Kurt Bulmer. Mr. Bulmer filed a response to the show-cause order, filed a response to the grievance, and paid all outstanding costs on Mr. Jones's behalf. Disciplinary counsel moved to withdraw its petition for interim suspension. In February 2001, Mr. Jones stipulated to a suspension for his failure to respond to the Bar Association.

Douglas Ende represented the Bar Association. Kurt Bulmer represented Mr. Jones.

Roger A. Castelda (WSBA No. 5571, admitted 1974), of Tonasket, received a censure pursuant to a stipulation approved by the Disciplinary Board on March 27, 2001. This discipline is based on his 1999 conflict of interest and advice violating a court order in one client matter.

In 1993, Mr. Castelda represented Ms. A, the wife in a marriage dissolution. During the dissolution, he defended Ms. A against accusations of alcohol abuse. Ms. A had two alcohol evaluations, with results reported to Mr. Castelda. Later, Ms. A remarried.

In November 1999, Mr. Castelda's firm agreed to represent Ms. A's husband in a civil protection matter filed by Ms. A, and in a related criminal matter. The husband was charged with fourth-degree assault, obstruction of a law enforcement officer and interference with reporting of a domestic-violence matter. On November 10, 1999, the district court entered a no-contact order in the criminal case, preventing the husband from going to the family home. On the same day, Ms. A obtained a temporary civil protection order also preventing the husband from going to the family home. The civil order was set for hearing on November 22, 1999.

On November 18, 1999, at the Castelda firm's request, the court entered an agreed order modifying the criminal no contact order to allow the husband to go to the family home, so long as the wife was not home. On the same day, Mr. Castelda gave the husband a copy of the modified order in the criminal case and advised him to return home and change the locks. The client spent the night at the family home and changed the locks, in violation of the civil-protection order. The next day, Mr. Castelda filed a declaration regarding Ms. A's alcohol abuse in the civil-protection matter.

Mr. Castelda's conduct violated RPCs 8.4(d), prohibiting conduct prejudicial to the administration of justice; and 1.9, prohibiting using confidences or secrets relating to representation to the disadvantage of a former client.

Becky Neal represented the Bar Association. R. John Sloan represented Mr. Castelda.

Denise C. George (WSBA No. 10749, admitted 1980), of Bellingham, received a censure following a hearing. This discipline is based on Ms. George's failure to diligently represent and communicate with a client from 1995 through 1997.

In January 1995, Ms. George agreed to represent the mother in a parenting plan and child-support modification. The client had primary residential placement of her two daughters. In December 1994, the 16-year-old daughter had temporarily gone to live with the father. The father filed a petition to modify the parenting plan to award him primary residential placement of the daughter and to terminate his child-support obligation. Ms. George appeared in the case in February 1995, met with her client in March, and accepted one telephone call in June. In September 1995, the client wrote Ms. George asking about the status of her case, and indicating she was in financial distress because she had not received child support. Ms. George did not respond to this letter.

In October 1995, Ms. George filed a note for the motion docket, scheduling a hearing on support arrearages for November 1, 1995. She did not file a motion with the notice, so there was no hearing. On January 5, 1996, Ms. George did file a motion to determine support arrearages and the court set a fact-finding hearing. On January 16, the client spoke to another lawyer in Ms. George's office, Mr. R. Mr. R's notes of the conversation indicate that the client said she did not want primary residential placement of the child, but needed the child support.

On March 5, 1996, the court entered an order signed by Mr. R indicating that the parties agreed to change the child's residential placement to the father, and to reserve the child-support arrearage issue for a later date. The client did not receive a copy of this order. On April 1, the client wrote another letter to Ms. George indicating she would not agree to give up primary residential placement for the child and needed the back-due child support. Ms. George did not respond to this letter or take any action to resolve the child-support issue. On April 15, 1996, the child turned 18. The client wrote another letter on March 13, 1997. On June 14, 1997, after receiving no response to her letter, the client filed a grievance.

Ms. George's conduct violated RPCs 1.4(a), requiring lawyers to keep clients reasonably informed of the status of their cases; 1.3, requiring lawyers to diligently represent their clients; and 1.2(a), requiring lawyers to abide by their clients' decisions concerning the objectives of the representation.

C. Elizabeth Williams represented the Bar Association. Ms. George represented herself.

John M. Cooper (WSBA No. 22977, admitted 1993), of College Place, was ordered suspended from the practice of law pending the outcome of disciplinary proceedings by Supreme Court order entered June 8, 2001. (Note: Mr. Cooper is to be distinguished from John Gordon Cooper of Seattle.)

Interim suspension is pursuant to RLD Title 3 and is not a disciplinary sanction.

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