February 2001 

Disciplinary Notices

Bruce Brunton (WSBA No. 1866, admitted 1965), of Bainbridge Island, has been suspended for five months, censured, and ordered to pay restitution following a stipulation approved by the Supreme Court on May 5, 2000. The discipline is based upon his entering a business transaction and conflict of interest with a client, and failure to adequately communicate with another client.

Matter 1: Mr. Brunton and his wife assisted Mrs. H, a personal friend, for several years. Mr. Brunton also assisted Mrs. H with legal matters. In the 1980s, Mr. Brunton drafted Mrs. H's will. In 1984, she requested that Mr. Brunton act as executor of her estate, and that he draft a Durable Power of Attorney naming himself as her attorney-in-fact if she became disabled. Mr. Brunton drafted these documents and Mrs. H executed them.

In 1989, Mr. Brunton referred Mrs. H to another lawyer to change her will. Although Mr. Brunton shared office space with the other lawyer, they were not associated. The other lawyer discussed with Mr. Brunton potential conflicts that could exist because Mr. Brunton drafted Mrs. H's earlier will and was named as executor. Additionally, the client now named Mr. Brunton as a residual beneficiary to one-third of her estate.

In June 1991, Mrs. H asked Mr. Brunton to draft a new will for her. She requested that Mr. Brunton remain a residual beneficiary, but he refused. At Mrs. H's request, Mr. Brunton removed himself as a beneficiary, but included his wife as a residuary beneficiary of the same one-third of Mrs. H's estate. In July 1991, a bank trust officer wrote to Mr. Brunton about the conflicts related to his participation in drafting a will that provided for a gift to his wife.

In 1991, Mr. Brunton again drafted a will for Mrs. H. He referred her to another lawyer to review the will because he was concerned about the conflict created by his wife being a beneficiary. The other lawyer read the will to Ms. H and she agreed that the will reflected her desire to give Mr. Brunton's wife a substantial gift. In June 1993, after meeting with bank employees, Mrs. H requested that Mr. Brunton reduce the size of the general bequests in her will. Mr. Brunton assumed that these changes were made to reflect the size of the anticipated estate, but he did not know the exact size of her estate. Mrs. H died on January 4, 1997. Mr. Brunton administered her estate as the executor and as the attorney for the executor. He charged the $2,728.22 administrative expenses against the general bequests and the residuary pro rata. This provided a benefit of $909.40 to Mrs. Brunton.

In 1990, Mrs. H told Mr. Brunton that she would like to sell her home to him. Mr. Brunton paid for two appraisals. The first stated the property was worth $93,000; the second, $110,000. Mr. Brunton showed both appraisals to Mrs. H. Mr. Brunton then purchased the house for less than the appraised value. The purchase and sale documents indicated that Mr. Brunton was a beneficiary under Mrs. H's will, and that the additional $40,000 that could have been added to the purchase price was agreed to be a reduction in his portion of her estate. Mr. Brunton also paid the closing costs in the sale, even though they are usually paid by the seller. Mr. Brunton fully paid the purchase price in March 1994, including a 10 percent interest rate. There is no indication that Mr. Brunton pressured Mrs. H to sell her house to him. He did not, however, advise her to seek independent advice about the documents he drafted or the conflicts of interest created by selling her house to him.

Matter 2: From 1981 through May 1997, Mr. Brunton leased office space to Mr. R. Mr. Brunton and Mr. and Mrs. R were long-time friends. In the 1980s, Mr. Brunton drafted a will and durable power of attorney for Mr. and Mrs. R. In late 1997 or early 1998, both Mr. and Mrs. R experienced health problems and asked Mr. Brunton to become more involved in their affairs. Mr. R asked Mr. Brunton to add his signature to the Rs' bank account so that Mr. Brunton could pay the Rs' bills. The form prepared by the bank teller made Mr. Brunton a co-signer and indicated the account was joint with right of survivorship. Neither Mr. Brunton nor the Rs realized that Mr. Brunton received an ownership interest in the account.

In April 1988, Mr. Brunton started to pay the Rs' bills and pick up their bank statements. Mr. Brunton provided services to Mr. R regarding medical insurance, home refinancing, medical bills and home caregivers, and met with Mr. R's accountant. Mr. Brunton did not explain his billing rate or procedure to Mr. R. He also did not keep track of all of his time. Between March 30 and July 10, 1998, Mr. Brunton billed Mr. R $4,330.50. None of the bills reflect a breakdown for the amount of time spent or for an hourly rate charged. On June 5, 1998, Mr. Brunton issued two checks to himself from Mr. and Mrs. R's account totaling $1,972, significantly depleting the available funds in the account.

Mrs. R died on June 11, 1998. Mr. Brunton paid himself for his remaining bills after Mrs. R's death. This left $174.59 in the Rs' account. Mr. R's caregiver told Mr. R about the checks Mr. Brunton had written to himself. Mr. R told the caregiver that Mr. Brunton did not have authority to pay himself from the checking account. On July 20, 1998, Mr. Brunton returned all of the money he had disbursed to himself to the Rs' checking account.

Mr. Brunton's conduct violated RPC 1.8(a), prohibiting entering a business transaction with a client, unless the transaction and terms on which the lawyer acquires the interest are fair and reasonable to the client, and are fully disclosed and transmitted in writing to the client in a manner which can be reasonably understood by the client, the client is given a reasonable opportunity to seek the advice of independent counsel, and the client consents; RPC 1.8(c), prohibiting lawyers from preparing an instrument giving the lawyer or a person related to the lawyer, as a parent, child, sibling or spouse, any substantial gift from a client, including a testamentary gift, except where the client is related to the donee; RPC 1.7(b), prohibiting lawyers from representing a client if the representation will be materially limited by the lawyer's responsibilities to another client or to a third person, or by the lawyer's own interests, unless the lawyer reasonably believes the representation will not be adversely affected and the client consents in writing after a full disclosure; RPC 1.3, requiring lawyers to diligently represent a client; RPC 1.4, requiring lawyers to keep clients reasonably informed about the status of their matters; and 1.5(b), requiring lawyers to explain fee agreements to new clients.

Jonathan Burke represented the Bar Association. David Swartling represented Mr. Brunton.

Reprimand

Arthur H. Boelter (WSBA No. 9213, admitted 1979), of Seattle, has been ordered to receive a reprimand, pursuant to a stipulation approved by the Disciplinary Board on January 12, 2000. The discipline is based upon his failure to maintain a trust account with interest payable to the Legal Foundation of Washington, depositing funds belonging to the lawyer in the trust account, and failure to maintain complete records of client funds.

In March 1996, the Bar Association auditor issued a report regarding a random audit of Mr. Boelter's trust account. The auditor found that the pooled client trust account was not an interest-bearing account, all client funds were not maintained in the trust account, and that credit card fees and other bank charges against the trust account were not being reimbursed by Mr. Boelter's firm. The firm did not reconcile its client records to the bank statements. After working with the firm and accounting for accumulated charges, $3,570 remained unidentified. The firm maintained two pooled trust accounts, and the two accounts were frequently confused. Money deposited into one account was disbursed from the other. Additionally, the firm deposited earned fees and non-legal business money into the trust accounts.

In 1998, the WSBA auditor re-examined Mr. Boetler's trust account records. The auditor found that Mr. Boelter had opened an interest-bearing trust account in May 1996, but had not paid $1,646, the estimated amount of the lost interest, to the Legal Foundation of Washington. Mr. Boelter also reimbursed his trust account for the credit card charges and other bank fees. The auditor found an accumulation of small errors in the trust account. Mr. Boelter did not reconcile his records to his bank statements on a monthly basis.

Mr. Boelter's conduct violated RPC 1.14(c)(1), requiring lawyers to maintain interest-bearing trust accounts and pay the interest to the Legal Foundation of Washington; RPC 1.14(a), requiring lawyers to deposit client funds into a trust account; and RPC 1.14(b), requiring lawyers to maintain complete records of client funds.

Linda B. Eide represented the Bar Association. Kurt Bulmer represented Mr. Boelter.

Censured

Alan Seago (WSBA No. 22574, admitted 1993), of Tacoma, has received two censures pursuant to a stipulation approved by the Disciplinary Board on January 12, 2000. This discipline is based on Mr. Seago's failure to diligently represent and keep accurate trust account records for one client, and failure to diligently represent another client.

Matter 1: In July 1995, Mr. Seago agreed to represent a client in a dissolution action. The written fee agreement provided for an hourly fee. The client signed a written settlement agreement with the opposing party and wanted to finalize the dissolution as quickly as possible. The settlement agreement included a $24,500 payment to Mr. Seago's client; $10,000 of this amount was to come from a second mortgage on the home. The client's ex-husband was not able to obtain the second mortgage and did not pay the agreed $10,000. Without consulting his client, Mr. Seago agreed to changes in the already signed settlement agreement. The changes included omitting the $24,500 judgment from the judgment summary, although retaining the obligation to pay that amount, and obligating his client to pay the shipping costs for her personal property.

In May 1997, Mr. Seago received a $14,314 check in partial payment of the client's settlement. After depositing this check into his trust account, Mr. Seago disbursed $4,020 to himself for fees and costs and $10,294 to his client. Although Mr. Seago's trust account records were not complete, the parties agreed that he failed to credit the client with $1,005 in payments she made. Mr. Seago did not respond to the client's inquiries regarding this disbursement.

Matter 2: In 1995, Mr. Seago represented a client in a criminal matter. The client pleaded guilty on three felony counts and was sentenced to 67-89 months to be served concurrently with another charge. Another lawyer (lawyer B) represented the client on the other charge.

In January 1997, the client attempted unsuccessfully to contact Mr. Seago because the client believed that his sentence had been calculated incorrectly. The client contacted lawyer B, who then wrote to Mr. Seago indicating that the client's offender score may have been incorrect. Mr. Seago did contact the client, but did not advise the client what action to take, or take any steps himself to change the sentence. Lawyer B then filed a motion requesting that the court correct the sentence. Although lawyer B's motion requested that Mr. Seago appear at the hearing, as he remained attorney of record, he did not appear. The court reduced the client's time served by 13 months.

Mr. Seago's conduct violated RPC 1.4, requiring lawyers to keep clients reasonably informed about the status of their cases; RPC 1.3, requiring lawyers to diligently represent their clients; and RPC 1.14(b), requiring lawyers to maintain complete records of client funds and property, and to promptly pay the funds to the client upon request.

Christine Gray represented the Bar Association. Mr. Seago represented himself.

Michael G. Sandona (WSBA No. 8983, admitted 1979), of King County, has received two censures following a stipulation approved by the Disciplinary Board on November 29, 1999. This discipline is based on his failure to diligently represent and adequately communicate with several clients during 1996 and 1997.

In 1996 and 1997, Mr. Sandona was employed by the Brouner and Associates law firm. The following clients retained Brouner and Associates (the firm) to represent them, and Mr. Sandona was assigned to their cases.

Matter 1: In May 1996, a client retained the firm to represent him in a residential placement and child support matter. On October 3, 1996, the court ruled on several issues, including residential placement. Mr. Sandona met with the client prior to filing the orders with the court. The client asked Mr. Sandona to file the orders so that the case could continue. Mr. Sandona did not file the orders and did not return his client's phone calls. In December 1996, the client retained another lawyer.

Matter 2: In April 1996, a client retained the firm to represent him in a dissolution action. Mr. Sandona was assigned to this case in late November 1996. On December 18, 1996, Mr. Sandona failed to appear at a temporary child support hearing; the court lowered the amount of child support the client received. The firm received notice of the hearing the day before the case was transferred to Mr. Sandona. Mr. Sandona indicated that the prior lawyer in his firm did not inform him of the hearing date. Also, the client was not informed of the hearing date. In December 1996 and January 1997, Mr. Sandona failed to answer telephone calls from his client. Also in January 1997, the CASA (court-appointed special advocate) investigator attempted to reach Mr. Sandona by phone to set up a settlement conference. Mr. Sandona did not return the investigator's calls. On January 30, 1997, Mr. Sandona withdrew from the case.

Matter 3: In August 1996, a client retained the firm to represent him in an action for modification of a parenting plan and child support. In October 1996, Mr. Sandona and opposing counsel reached an impasse in choosing a guardian ad litem. Although the client requested that the case move forward quickly, Mr. Sandona waited approximately nine weeks before asking the court to resolve this issue. In January 1997, Mr. Sandona failed to timely confirm a court hearing, causing a several-week delay in the case. In late 1996 and early 1997, the client was not able to reach Mr. Sandona by telephone. On March 10, 1997, Mr. Sandona withdrew from the case.

Matter 4: In November 1996, a client retained the firm to represent her in a dissolution and child residential placement matter. Mr. Sandona failed to timely respond to the dissolution petition. On December 11, 1996, Mr. Sandona failed to appear for a hearing on temporary orders. The court postponed the hearing until the next day. This hearing also involved a request for protection orders. Mr. Sandona submitted only his client's uncorroborated affidavit. Mr. Sandona withdrew from this representation on December 23, 1996.

Matter 5: In January 1997, a client retained the firm to represent her in a dissolution matter. Due to a miscommunication with another lawyer in the firm, Mr. Sandona failed to appear on February 14, 1997 for a hearing on a restraining order, but he did appear on February 21, 1997, the date he believed the hearing was scheduled. When he discovered his mistake, he took no corrective action. Mr. Sandona did not file an answer on behalf of his client until two weeks after a motion for default had been filed. In May 1997, the client retained new counsel.

Matter 6: In April 1997, a client retained the firm to represent him in a dissolution and residential placement case. On May 6, 1997, Mr. Sandona filed a summons and petition for dissolution for the client. On June 11, 1997, Mr. Sandona failed to appear at a hearing for a temporary parenting plan. The client did appear at the hearing and informed the court that he wished to represent himself.

Matter 7: In February 1997, a client retained the firm to represent her in a child support matter. Mr. Sandona filed a petition for child support modification based on a substantial change in childcare expenses. However, when the expected change in childcare expenses did not occur, Mr. Sandona agreed to a dismissal of the action. Mr. Sandona did not provide his client with a copy of the order of dismissal or communicate adequately with her about this order.

Mr. Sandona's conduct violated RPC 1.3, requiring lawyers to diligently represent their clients; and RPC 1.4, requiring lawyers to keep clients reasonably informed about the status of their cases and to promptly comply with reasonable requests for information.

Christine Gray represented the Bar Association. Mr. Sandona represented himself.

Nondisciplinary Notices

Jonathan T. Zackey (WSBA No. 21657, admitted 1992), of Seattle, was ordered suspended from the practice of law pending the outcome of disciplinary proceedings by Supreme Court order entered March 20, 2000.

Interim suspension is pursuant to RLD Title 3 and is not a disciplinary sanction.

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