July 2001

Disciplinary Notices

Attorney John P. Walsh (WSBA No. 12437, admitted 1984), Law Offices of John P. Walsh, is to be distinguished from John A. Walsh (WSBA No. 20603, admitted 1991), whose notice of censure was published in the June Bar News (p. 52).

Jonathan T. Zackey (WSBA No. 21657, admitted 1992), of Bellevue, has been disbarred by order of the Supreme Court effective December 12, 2000, following a default hearing. The discipline is based on his disbursing client funds to himself and others, failing to diligently represent several clients, and failing to cooperate with the Bar Association.

Matter 1: In July 1996, Mr. Zackey agreed to represent a client injured in a fall at a motel in California. Medicare paid $10,326.05 of the client's medical bills and notified Mr. Zackey of its statutory reimbursement right.

In May 1999, Mr. Zackey settled the client's claim for $50,000. He requested that the client sign a release and told him he was negotiating with the lien holders. The client signed the release, and Mr. Zackey received and deposited the settlement funds into his trust account. The same day, he wrote a $10,000 check to his general office account designated as "partial fees client v. Motel 6."

Beginning in May 1999, Mr. Zackey stopped responding to his client's requests for information. After May 25, 1999, Mr. Zackey disbursed the client's remaining funds to himself and third parties unrelated to the case. As of the date of the hearing, Mr. Zackey had not paid the client or the lien holders.

In September 1999, Mr. Zackey disbursed $1,000 from the client funds designated as "cost reimbursement." Mr. Zackey did not contemporaneously notify the client of these disbursements.

Matter 2: In 1996, Mr. Zackey agreed to represent a client injured in an auto accident. In late 1998 or early 1999, Mr. Zackey settled the client's case for $4,316. In January 1999, Mr. Zackey deposited the settlement funds into his trust account. Sometime after this date, he disbursed the funds to himself and third parties unrelated to the case. Mr. Zackey did not pay the client or the lien holders.

Matter 3: Mr. Zackey agreed to represent a client injured in an auto accident. In 1997 or 1998, Mr. Zackey settled the claim. On April 26, 1998, Mr. Zackey sent the client an accounting indicating he would disburse $25,829.61 to her and $1,992.50 to her insurance company. Mr. Zackey paid the client, but not the insurance company. As of the date of the hearing, Mr. Zackey had not paid the insurance company.

Matter 4: Mr. Zackey represented a client in a personal injury claim. The client received chiropractic treatment, and the provider notified Mr. Zackey of his lien. In May 1998, Mr. Zackey settled the client's case for $26,000. In January 1999, Mr. Zackey disbursed funds to the client, but did not pay the chiropractic lien. As of the date of the hearing, Mr. Zackey had not paid the lien and had removed the money from his trust account.

Matter 5: Mr. Zackey failed to respond to several written requests for information from disciplinary counsel. He also failed to attend a deposition after being served with a subpoena. In February 2000, disciplinary counsel filed a petition for interim suspension of Mr. Zackey's license based on his failure to provide requested trust account records and failure to account for client funds.

Matter 6: In May 1997, Mr. Zackey agreed to represent a client in a claim for injuries he sustained in an auto accident. The contingent-fee agreement indicated that Mr. Zackey would receive 33.33 percent of all amounts received by the client, less pre-existing PIP payments and medical or insurance liens. The case settled in December 1998 for $66,000. According to the fee agreement and Mahler v. Szucs, 135 Wn.2d 398 (1998), the portion of attorney's fees paid by the insurer attributable for recovery of its subrogated claim belonged to the client.

In February 1999, Mr. Zackey called the insurance company stating that he was entitled to those fees. In support of his claim Mr. Zackey sent a copy of a fee agreement purportedly between himself and the client. This fee agreement did not include the "less pre-existing PIP payments and any medical or insurance liens" language. Mr. Zackey sent $30,472.47 to the client, and notified him that he claimed $6,800 in fees and $100.32 in costs from the amount due the insurance company. Later, Mr. Zackey removed the remaining funds from his trust account.

Matter 7: In May 1996, Mr. Zackey agreed to represent a client in a claim for damages as a result of a fall in Ohio. In July 1996, the same client retained Mr. Zackey to represent her for injuries she sustained in a car accident. Mr. Zackey failed to file suit on either claim prior to the expiration of the statute of limitations.

Matter 8: Between May 1998 and October 1990, Mr. Zackey used approximately $82,000 in client funds from his trust account to pay his personal obligations and to pay other clients.

Mr. Zackey's conduct violated RPCs 1.1, requiring lawyers to competently represent their clients; 1.3, requiring lawyers to diligently represent their clients; 1.4, requiring lawyers to keep their clients reasonably informed of the status of their matters and to promptly comply with reasonable requests for information; 1.5(c)(1), requiring lawyers to provide written disbursal statements in contingent-fee cases, explaining the amount remitted to the client and how that amount is calculated; 1.14(b)(3), requiring lawyers to maintain complete records of all client funds and property in the lawyer's possession and provide accountings when requested; 8.4(b), prohibiting lawyers from committing criminal acts (RCW 9A.56.030) that reflect adversely on the lawyer's honesty, trustworthiness or fitness as a lawyer in other respects; and 8.4(c), prohibiting lawyers from engaging in conduct involving dishonesty, fraud, deceit or misrepresentation.

Maria Regimbal represented the Bar Association. Mr. Zackey represented himself. The hearing officer was Geoffrey G. Revelle.

Zachary A. Kinneman (WSBA No. 19443, admitted 1990), of Lakewood, has been disbarred by order of the Supreme Court effective September 1, 2000, approving a stipulation. The discipline is based on his practicing while suspended, abandoning his practice without notice to his clients, and removing client money from his trust account.

Suspension: In 1998, Mr. Kinneman failed to file the required compliance report demonstrating compliance with the Continuing Legal Education (CLE) requirements for 1995 through 1997. On February 1, 1999, The Supreme Court suspended Mr. Kinneman's license to practice law in Washington for failure to comply with the CLE requirements.

On February 17, 1999, by certified mail, disciplinary counsel notified Mr. Kinneman of his duties upon suspension including the requirement that he file an affidavit of compliance within 25 days of the suspension. Mr. Kinneman does not recall receiving this notice. As of the date of the stipulation, Mr. Kinneman had not completed the required CLE credits or filed the affidavit of compliance regarding his suspension.

At the time of his suspension, Mr. Kinneman was counsel of record for the plaintiffs in a lawsuit. Mr. Kinneman did not notify his clients, opposing counsel, or the court that his license had been suspended and that he could no longer represent them. On April 14, 1999, Mr. Kinneman signed a stipulation in the case allowing the defendants to amend their answer.

Abandonment of Practice: In early 1999, Mr. Kinneman closed his law office without providing notice to his clients, opposing counsel or courts. He allowed his phone line to be disconnected with no forwarding information, and did not provide a forwarding address to clients or the Bar Association. At this time, Mr. Kinneman represented several clients who were affected by his actions.

Matter 1: In September 1996, Mr. Kinneman agreed to represent clients in a dispute with the personal representative (PR) of their aunt's estate. The clients believed that the PR had sold a parcel of real property at below-market value. Mr. Kinneman assisted the clients in removing the PR and obtaining a $20,000 distribution of estate assets.

On September 30, 1998, Mr. Kinneman told the clients that the case was set for trial on February 15, 1999, and that he believed they could recover the entire value of the property. The clients were not able to contact Mr. Kinneman after this date.

Matter 2: In April 1998, Mr. Kinneman agreed to represent two condominium residents in a dispute with the management company. The clients believed that the management company employees had made defamatory statements about them. The clients paid a $1,000 retainer, which Mr. Kinneman agreed would cover commencing a lawsuit. Mr. Kinneman drafted a declaration based on the clients' letters, but took no further action. The clients were not able to contact Mr. Kinneman.

Matter 3: In September 1997, Mr. Kinneman agreed to represent a client who was one of several defendants in a real property case. The plaintiff's case had settled, but there was a cross-claim pending against Mr. Kinneman's client

On June 12, 1998, the court entered a judgment against the client on the cross-claim. Mr. Kinneman agreed to appeal the judgment. A month later, the client had not heard from Mr. Kinneman and was unable to contact him. The client's lawyer in another matter did contact Mr. Kinneman, and he told her that he had filed the appeal and would send copies of the documents. Mr. Kinneman did not file the appeal and the time period for filing expired. The judgment creditor aggressively pursued collecting the judgment, and the client was forced to file a petition for relief in bankruptcy.

Matter 4: In August 1997, Mr. Kinneman agreed to represent a residential construction company in a suit to enforce a claim of lien against a property owner. The construction company had performed remodeling work for the homeowner and had not been paid. In August 1997, Mr. Kinneman filed the lien, and his client notified him that he had misspelled the lien holder's name. Mr. Kinneman stated that he had refiled the lien under the correct name and had served the lien by certified mail. On October 8, 1997, the last day to file the lien, the client contacted Mr. Kinneman to verify that the lien had been properly filed. Mr. Kinneman did not respond to the client's inquiry. In November 1997, the client retained new counsel. Because Mr. Kinneman could not establish that the homeowners had received the lien, the client agreed to settle his claim for less than the value of the original lien.

Matter 5: In June 1997, Mr. Kinneman agreed to act as closing and escrow agent in a mortgage refinance transaction. Mr. Kinneman properly disbursed the loan fee and proceeds, but failed to pay off three prior mortgage lenders or obtain reconveyances of the prior deeds of trust. Mr. Kinneman did not account for approximately $125,000 of the funds. He used approximately $30,000 of these funds to pay his personal debts. It appears that, contrary to the escrow instructions, Mr. Kinneman disbursed the remaining funds to an unrelated third party.

Believing that the underlying mortgage had been paid off, the property owner stopped paying the monthly payments on the original loans. The prior mortgage lenders commenced trustee's foreclosure proceedings on the properties involved. The property owner lost one property in nonjudicial foreclosure proceedings and stopped the remaining proceedings by filing for bankruptcy relief.

Matter 6: Mr. Kinneman failed to cooperate with the Bar Association's investigation of these matters. He did not respond to written requests for information pursuant to RLD 2.8 in several matters. He also failed to comply with a subpoena duces tecum issued by disciplinary counsel.

Mr. Kinneman's conduct violated RPCs 8.4(c), prohibiting lawyers from engaging in conduct involving dishonesty, deceit, fraud or misrepresentation; 1.15(a)(1), requiring lawyers to withdraw from matters if the representation will result in a violation of the Rules of Professional Conduct (RPCs); 5.5(a), prohibiting lawyers from practicing in jurisdictions where doing so violates the regulation of the legal profession in that jurisdiction; 8.4(d), prohibiting lawyers from engaging in conduct prejudicial to the administration of justice; 1.3, requiring lawyers to act with reasonable diligence and promptness in representing clients; 1.4, requiring lawyers to keep clients reasonably informed of the status of their matters and to comply with reasonable requests for information; 1.5, requiring lawyers to charge reasonable fees for representation; 1.15(d), requiring lawyers to take steps to the extent reasonably practicable to protect a client's interests when withdrawing from representation; 1.14, requiring lawyers to preserve the identity of client funds or property in the lawyer's possession; RLDs 8.1(a), requiring suspended lawyers to notify their clients and others of their suspension; 8.2, requiring suspended lawyers to discontinue practicing; and 8.3, requiring suspended lawyers to file an affidavit indicating compliance with the duties upon suspension within 25 days of the suspension.

Douglas Ende represented the Bar Association. Mr. Kinneman represented himself.

Donald B. Kronenberg (WSBA No.13979, admitted 1984), of Seattle, has been suspended for six months effective March 1, 2001, by order of the Supreme Court dated November 30, 2000. This discipline is based on his charging an unreasonable fee and failing to properly account for client funds in one matter, and engaging in conduct prejudicial to the administration of justice and filing a frivolous claim in another.

Matter 1: On August 18, 1987, Mr. Kronenberg agreed to collect back-due child support for a client on a contingent-fee basis. The fee agreement stated that Mr. Kronenberg would receive 50 percent of all sums recovered before the deduction of advanced costs and expenses. In October 1987, Mr. Kronenberg also agreed to represent the client in a custody modification matter on an hourly fee basis. The client moved several times during the representation, at times living in Nevada and at other times, California. The client's sister always lived in Federal Way, and Mr. Kronenberg knew or should have known that he could contact the client through her sister, since Mr. Kronenberg met with the sister at the beginning of the representation.

On January 15, 1988, Mr. Kronenberg obtained a $27,868 judgment for back support. He immediately began garnishing the debtor's wages and, in October 1988, received a $1,164 check. He notified the client that he had received the check and indicated he would apply the amount to his fees. Mr. Kronenberg received six additional garnishment checks totaling $7,196.93. He deposited these checks into his general business account instead of his client trust account. He did not send the client copies of these checks or the garnishment pleadings. Mr. Kronenberg did not send the client any bills reflecting the amounts collected in the garnishments. Mr. Kronenberg applied all of the amounts collected on the judgment to his fees, without the client's permission.

In December 1989, the custody matter settled with the father agreeing to enter into a voluntary $500 per month wage assignment, with $400 per month allocated to back support and $100 as current support.

In January 1990, Mr. Kronenberg received a $500 payment on the wage assignment. He kept the $400 back-due child support portion and mailed the $100 payment to the client. The check was returned because the client had moved. Mr. Kronenberg asked his staff to look in the phone book for the client's new address, and then applied the $100 to his fees when he could not locate her. He did not attempt to contact her sister to find a current address.

From August 1987 through October 1988, Mr. Kronenberg sent the client a combined monthly statement for both matters. On November 15, 1988, he set up a separate internal billing statement for the back-support matter, which reflected that the client owed him $14,215.68 (50 percent of the judgment amount), less the $1,163.09 already received. Each month he generated a new internal billing reflecting a larger balance due from the client for garnishment costs, or a smaller balance reflecting garnishment payments, charging the client a compounded interest rate of up to 1.6 percent on the "unpaid balance."

In 1992, the client learned of the additional garnishments after looking at the court file. When she confronted Mr. Kronenberg, he first denied receiving any funds, and then stated that he was entitled to keep all of the funds until he had collected 50 percent of the judgment amount.

Matter 2: In November 1990, Mr. Kronenberg agreed to assist a client whose claim had been denied by the Crime Victims' Compensation Program administered by the Department of Labor and Industries (L&I). The client had been involved in a shooting in Seattle in 1989. On August 15, 1990, L&I awarded the client $15,000 on his claim, to be paid in two or three installments. In October 1991, L& I sent $8,987.52 to Mr. Kronenberg. Mr. Kronenberg kept one third, plus costs, and forwarded $5,901.58 to the client.

Later that month, the client contacted L& I directly and asked to pick up the balance of his award at their office in Olympia. L&I agreed, so long as the client provided a handwritten note stating that Mr. Kronenberg no longer represented him. The client wrote the note and included a statement that he was relocating in approximately two weeks to the Midwest. The client's father, who lived near the L&I office, delivered the note and picked up the $6,012.48 payment. Mr. Kronenberg did not receive his one-third fee from this portion of the payment.

After Mr. Kronenberg learned that the payment had been made to the client directly, he contacted the father. Mr. Kronenberg told the father that he must pay for Mr. Kronenberg's lost fee. When the father objected, Mr. Kronenberg filed a lawsuit naming both the client and the father as respondents. Mr. Kronenberg also obtained a prejudgment writ of attachment on the father's home.

Mr. Kronenberg stated in his declaration justifying the writ that the client, in conjunction with the father, had removed or were about to remove property from the state. Although Mr. Kronenberg admitted that the only basis for this statement was the son's note, he refused to agree to remove the writ of attachment. The father paid $992, half the amount of the claim, to obtain a release of the writ. After the payment, Mr. Kronenberg did not take steps to dismiss the matter.

Mr. Kronenberg's conduct violated RPCs 1.4, requiring lawyers to keep their clients informed of the status of their matters and to explain matters to the extent reasonably necessary for clients to make informed decisions; 1.14, requiring lawyers to deposit client funds into their trust accounts; 1.5, requiring lawyers' fees to be reasonable and to explain the basis for the fee to the client; 8.4(c), prohibiting lawyers from engaging in conduct involving dishonesty, fraud, deceit or misrepresentation; 3.1, prohibiting lawyers from bringing proceedings unless there is a nonfrivolous basis for doing so; 3.3, prohibiting knowingly making a false statement of material fact to a tribunal; and 8.4(d), prohibiting lawyers from engaging in conduct prejudicial to the administration of justice.

Joy McLean represented the Bar Association. Rita Bender represented Mr. Kronenberg. The hearing officer was Andrew K. Dolan.

Lowell K. Halverson (WSBA No. 1518, admitted 1968), of Mercer Island, has been suspended for one year by order of the Supreme Court, following a hearing. The Court issued the certificate of finality in the case on July 7, 2000. For additional information, please see the published Supreme Court opinion. The suspension began on May 22, 2000 pursuant to an order allowing the suspension to begin while the case was pending. The discipline is based on Mr. Halverson's consensual sexual relationship with his client during her dissolution case and his failure to explain the potential conflicts to the client.

Mr. Halverson had consensual sexual relationships with six female clients over a period of more than 10 years. During this time, Mr. Halverson was married. The most recent relationship began in 1991. The client worked in Mr. Halverson's office in 1990, and retained him to represent her in a marriage dissolution action in May 1991. Mr. Halverson filed the dissolution petition in June 1991, and the client moved out of her husband's house in July.

The same month, the client confided to Mr. Halverson that she was attracted to him. Shortly after that, following a successful court hearing, Mr. Halverson took the client to an art exhibit and then to a restaurant, where they discussed the ground rules for a potential relationship. Mr. Halverson stated that his wife could not find out and that he could not have a relationship with the client's children. Mr. Halverson told the client that if these rules were followed, their relationship would not affect her pending divorce. He did not explain to the client the possible effects on her pending divorce if their relationship was discovered. Mr. Halverson had a sexual relationship with his client for the next six months.

On January 1, 1992, Mr. Halverson's wife, who was also his office manager, discovered the affair. Within a few days, Mr. Halverson withdrew from the client's case. He temporarily moved out of his home and continued his relationship with the client, but in mid-February, told the client that he was returning to his wife, and the client retained new counsel to complete her divorce. In October 1994, the client filed a civil suit against Mr. Halverson. The civil suit settled in 1995 for a substantial sum and was sealed by agreement. The client's husband sued and received half of the settlement.

Mr. Halverson's conduct violated RPCs 1.4(b), requiring lawyers to explain matters to the extent reasonably necessary to permit their clients to make informed decisions regarding representation; 1.7(b), prohibiting lawyers from representing a client if the representation may be materially limited by the lawyer's responsibilities to another client, a third person or the lawyer's own interests, unless the lawyer reasonably believes the representation will not be adversely affected and the client consents in writing after consultation and a full disclosure of the material facts; and 2.1, requiring lawyers to exercise independent professional judgment in representing clients.

Andrea Darvas represented the Bar Association. David Allen represented Mr. Halverson. The hearing officer was William H. Broughton.

Hugh J. Kelly (WSBA No. 14616, admitted 1984), of Spokane, has been suspended for two years effective December 11, 2000, by order of the Supreme Court, approving a stipulation. The discipline is based on his failure to diligently represent several clients.

Matter 1: On May 29, 1998, Mr. Kelly met with a client regarding a child support modification. The client paid Mr. Kelly $120 for a filing fee and a $750 advance fee deposit. Although Mr. Kelly indicated that the $750 fee was nonrefundable, there was no written fee agreement, and the client reasonably expected that the unearned fee would be returned. After discussing with the client that the court may not have jurisdiction, Mr. Kelly filed a petition for modification of child support.

On September 18, 1998, the client received copies of the filed pleadings and provided names of process servers in Nevada, where the father lived. Mr. Kelly did not arrange for service on the father, and took no further action on the client's case. The client asked that Mr. Kelly return her original paperwork and her $750 advance fee deposit. As of the date of the stipulation, Mr. Kelly had not met her request.

Matter 2: On April 30, 1996, Mr. Kelly agreed to represent the mother in a parenting-plan modification. The client paid Mr. Kelly $500; he told her that the total fee would be $300 to $500, and that he would return any excess fees. The client signed the petition on May 30, 1996, and Mr. Kelly filed it on August 22, 1996. Mr. Kelly did not serve the father with the petition.

In August 1997, the client met with Mr. Kelly to discuss the case, and asked for copies of associated documents, filings and correspondence, along with an itemized billing. As of the date of the stipulation, Mr. Kelly had not provided copies of these documents to the client.

On April 5, 1998, the client sent Mr. Kelly a certified letter asking him to resolve the case by June 30, 1998, or return her fee. Mr. Kelly signed for the letter, but did not respond to the client's request. Mr. Kelly took no further action on the client's case.

Matter 3: On April 11, 1997, a client retained Mr. Kelly to represent her juvenile son in a criminal matter. The son had been convicted of robbery and sentenced to two years in jail. The client requested that Mr. Kelly file a motion for reconsideration of the sentence, and paid Mr. Kelly a $3,000 advance fee deposit. In June, Mr. Kelly told the client he had filed the paperwork and that the next court date was June 20, 1997 at 3:00 p.m. In fact, Mr. Kelly had not filed any paperwork and there was no court date set.

On June 19, 1997, Mr. Kelly told the client that the hearing had been postponed until June 27, 1997. The client again contacted Mr. Kelly the day prior to the hearing. This time, Mr. Kelly told the client the hearing had been continued to July 4, 1997. When the client pointed out that this was a holiday, Mr. Kelly told her he would get back to her. After this, Mr. Kelly did not return the clients' calls. Mr. Kelly did not file any pleadings, schedule any court dates, or return any of the client's advance fee deposit.

Matter 4: On May 29, 1997, the mother and grandparents of a child retained Mr. Kelly to modify residential placement and visitation with the child. The grandparents paid Mr. Kelly $2,000 and emphasized that they needed this work done quickly because they wanted to arrange visitation before a July 4, 1997 family trip. Mr. Kelly did not file a notice of appearance, a petition, or any pleadings in this matter. In October 1997, he refunded the client's $2,000.

Matter 5: In February or March 1996, Mr. Kelly agreed to represent the wife in a marriage dissolution action. The parties reached agreement in May 1997. Mr. Kelly was responsible for drafting the final pleadings, which he did not do. Opposing counsel drafted the pleadings and arranged for all the parties to sign them. Mr. Kelly received the signed pleadings on November 24, 1997, and filed them on January 20, 1998. Mr. Kelly did not notify his client that he filed final pleadings, or provide her copies.

Matter 6: Mr. Kelly agreed to represent the wife in a marriage dissolution matter. The client paid a $1,000 advance fee deposit, and Mr. Kelly told her he billed at $75 per hour. From July 1995 though 1997, Mr. Kelly canceled several appointments with the client and rarely returned her phone calls. In August 1997, just prior to the start of a hearing, Mr. Kelly notified the client of his intent to withdraw. Mr. Kelly did not provide copies of the client's file to the client or her new attorney. Mr. Kelly did not return the client's $1,000 fee.

Matter 7: On April 15, 1999, Mr. Kelly met with a client who had been sued for back-due child support. A hearing was scheduled for May 19, 1999. On April 22, the client contacted Mr. Kelly, who scheduled a phone conference with her for the next day, which Mr. Kelly later cancelled. On April 29, 1999, the client's husband went to Mr. Kelly's home and asked for his wife's money back. Mr. Kelly told the client's husband he had not contacted him because Mr. Kelly's family had been sick. The client indicated that she wanted to settle the case and sent a written settlement proposal to Mr. Kelly.

On May 22, 1999, the client spoke to her ex-husband and reached agreement. On May 25, the client left a message for Mr. Kelly indicating that she had reached an agreement with the opposing party and wanted him to contact her. Mr. Kelly did not contact his client. On June 22, 1999, the client retrieved the original paperwork from Mr. Kelly's home. Mr. Kelly refused to refund the fee, stating that he had spent a lot of time on the case and would send the client a bill. Mr. Kelly never sent a bill or returned any part of the $500 fee the client paid.

Matter 8: Mr. Kelly failed to respond to written requests for information regarding these matters sent to him by disciplinary counsel. In October 1997, disciplinary counsel notified Mr. Kelly by certified mail that if he did not respond within 10 days, he would be responsible for the costs of his deposition. Mr. Kelly did not respond to this letter, and disciplinary counsel scheduled his deposition and continued the date at his request. Mr. Kelly attended the deposition, but refused to address several of the grievances and failed to produce subpoenaed documents.

Mr. Kelly's conduct violated RPCs 1.5(a), requiring lawyers to charge reasonable fees for their services; 1.14(b)(3) and (4), requiring lawyers to maintain complete records of client funds and promptly pay or deliver unearned advance fee deposits to clients; 1.15(d), requiring lawyers to take reasonable steps to protect clients' interests when lawyers withdraw from representation; 1.4(a), requiring lawyers to keep clients informed about the status of their cases and promptly comply with reasonable requests for information; 1.3 and 3.2, requiring lawyers to diligently represent clients and expedite litigation; 8.4(c), prohibiting lawyers from engaging in conduct involving misrepresentation; and RLD 2.8, requiring lawyers to cooperate with requests for information related to grievances or other matters concerning a lawyer's conduct.

Becky Neal represented the Bar Association. Mr. Kelly represented himself.

James R. McLees (WSBA No. 2785, admitted 1993), of Sumner, has received a reprimand based on a stipulation approved by the Disciplinary Board on November 17, 2000. The discipline is based upon his failure to diligently represent a client.

In July 1996, Mr. McLees agreed to represent a client in a claim against her insurance agent for misrepresentation of coverage. The client believed she had purchased a particular medical insurance policy, made a claim, and was told that she did not have the coverage she thought she had. Mr. McLees incorrectly determined that a six-year statute of limitations for breach of contract applied to this claim. Mr. McLees did not respond to his client's calls between July 1996 and August 1997.

In August 1997, the client retained another lawyer. The new lawyer determined that the three-year statute of limitations applied to the claim of the agent's negligence. The three-year statute of limitations expired while Mr. McLees was handling the client's case. Mr. McLees suffered health problems during this time and did not inform the client that these problems prevented him from attending to her case. Mr. McLees agreed to pay the client $3,000 plus interest as part of the stipulation.

Mr. McLees's conduct violated RPCs 1.3, requiring lawyers to diligently represent clients; and 1.1, requiring lawyers to provide competent representation.

Val Tollefson represented the Bar Association. Kurt Bulmer represented Mr. McLees.

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