October 2001

Disciplinary Notices

Jennings P. Felix (WSBA No. 136, admitted 1948), of Seattle, has been disbarred by order of the Supreme Court effective June 19, 2001, following a hearing. The discipline is based upon his failure to promptly deliver client funds in a 1995 personal-injury case, and lack of diligence in an estate matter between 1993 and 1998.

Matter 1: In 1993, Mr. Felix agreed to represent two passengers injured in an automobile accident. Mr. Felix and the clients signed a contingent-fee agreement stating Mr. Felix would receive 33.33 percent of the gross recovery if the case settled. In November 1995, Mr. Felix received settlement checks of $17,000 for client A and $125,000 for client B. In December 1995, Mr. Felix disbursed $35,820.50 of client B's settlement to the client, $25,000 to himself, and $12,500 to his partner. In March 1996, he sent client B an additional $1,756.27 based on an error in calculating costs. In May 1996, Mr. Felix sent another $5,000 to client B and paid himself another $5,000. In June 1996, Mr. Felix paid himself $10,000 from client B's settlement. The next month, he sent the client an additional $10,000. In September 1996, Mr. Felix withdrew $8,000 from client B's settlement for himself and the client. Mr. Felix and his firm received a total of $60,500, or 48.4 percent of client B's settlement.

In December 1995, Mr. Felix sent $8,223.60 to client A and $4,800 to Mr. Felix's firm. For both clients A and B, Mr. Felix withheld funds for possible reimbursement to the insurance company, indicating that he was retaining funds in case the insurance company wanted him to pay it back. He told the clients he would try to negotiate less, and that he would keep half of the difference; however, this was not in his fee agreement. For client B, Mr. Felix withheld $31,366.55 for amounts the insurance company paid directly to health providers under the client's own PIP coverage. He also withheld an additional $17,000 for car repairs, even though the car repairs were paid by another insurance company. Mr. Felix withheld these amounts in addition to the costs and $3,303 "owed to State Farm." Mr. Felix told client B that he had received letters on these issues from the insurance company, but upon request, did not provide copies to the client.

As of the date of the hearing, no subrogation claims had been made for any amounts paid for clients A or B. At hearing, Mr. Felix testified that he believed he needed to hold back the funds in case the insurer attempted to collect those amounts from him under the hold-harmless agreement. He also testified that he could not recall any time when an insurance company had attempted to collect from him under such an agreement. The client eventually called State Farm (Insurance) and learned that the company did not intend to request reimbursement.

Matter 2: Mr. Felix drafted a will for an employee, naming himself both executor and trustee. The will was admitted to probate in March 1993. Mr. Felix never filed an inventory or made annual accountings.

In April 1997, because the file was still open, the court directed Mr. Felix to close the estate, file an explanation of why the estate had not been closed, or appear on May 29, 1997 to explain the file status. Mr. Felix did not comply with this order. He was sick during this time and obtained several continuances.

On January 14, 1998, the court appointed a guardian ad litem (GAL) for the client's son. On March 11, 1998, the court ordered that the estate assets be transferred to the GAL. Mr. Felix failed to transfer the assets. On April 10, the court removed Mr. Felix as personal representative and trustee, and entered a $65,000 judgment against him.

Mr. Felix's conduct violated RPCs 1.5(a), requiring lawyers' fees to be reasonable; 1.5(c)(1), requiring contingent fees to be in writing; 1.14(b)(4), requiring lawyers to promptly pay client funds upon request; 8.4(c), prohibiting conduct involving honesty, fraud, deceit or misrepresentation; 1.3, requiring lawyers to diligently represent their clients; and 3.4(c), requiring lawyers to comply with court orders.

Linda Eide represented the Bar Association. Kurt Bulmer represented Mr. Felix. The hearing officer was Robert Hardy.

William I. Freeman (WSBA No. 17586, admitted 1988), of Vancouver, has been disbarred by order of the Supreme Court effective June 20, 2001, following a default hearing. The discipline is based upon his failing to diligently represent and adequately communicate with multiple clients, allowing a nonlawyer to hide assets in his trust account and splitting fees with this nonlawyer, charging unreasonable fees, and failing to cooperate with the Office of Disciplinary Counsel.

Matter 1: In July 1994, a husband and wife retained Mr. Freeman to represent them in a real estate transaction. On October 5, 1995, the arbitrator entered a $13,089.08 award against the clients. The clients directed Mr. Freeman to file a request for trial de novo. Mr. Freeman failed to file this notice within the 20-day deadline; consequently, the award became final. Mr. Freeman agreed to pay the client's debt over time; however, the terms of the agreement were not fair to the clients. Mr. Freeman did not explain the conflict of interest or suggest that his clients obtain independent legal advice. Mr. Freeman breached the agreement and the clients paid the remaining debt.

Matter 2: In the 1990s, Ms. N operated a company that dispensed hearing aids. Ms. N also assisted clients with filling out and filing disability claims with the Department of Labor and Industries (L&I). Ms. N charged a contingent fee for this assistance and also paid referral fees for referrals of clients with hearing loss. RCW 51.48.280 prohibits kickbacks, bribes and certain representation fees relating to L&I disability claims, including hearing-loss claims. L&I investigated Ms. N for violating RCW 51.48.280, and she retained Mr. Freeman to represent her. During the investigation, Ms. N and Mr. Freeman agreed that Ms. N could deposit her client's contingent fee into Mr. Freeman's trust account to conceal that she was continuing to take these payments.

Between 1998 and 2000, Mr. Freeman and Ms. N engaged in a business venture to represent individuals with hearing loss. Ms. N advertised for clients and then referred them to Mr. Freeman. Mr. Freeman then charged the clients contingent fees between eight and 12 percent. Ms. N or her employees actually performed the work on these cases. Mr. Freeman did not provide any legal services to these clients.

Matter 3: In 1999, Mr. Freeman represented a criminal defendant arrested for violating sentencing terms and conditions. The prosecutor in the case told Mr. Freeman that he would not agree to release the client from custody. After this conversation, Mr. Freeman obtained the client's release through an ex parte order. Mr. Freeman did not tell the judge that the prosecutor objected to the release. When the prosecutor learned of the release, the court scheduled a hearing. Neither Mr. Freeman nor his client appeared at the hearing. The court ordered a warrant for the client's arrest and released the bail. The prosecutor charged the client with jumping bail. The client was arrested and later pleaded guilty to this charge.

Matter 4: In 1999, Mr. Freeman represented a client charged with theft. After arranging for interviews with two theft victims, Mr. Freeman fell asleep during his questioning. He also fell asleep during the prosecutor's interview with the client's alibi witness.

Matter 5: In December 1999, Mr. Freeman represented a client charged with driving without a valid driver's license. The client required a state-subsidized interpreter. Mr. Freeman did not appear for the trial setting conference, so the date was continued. The client and the interpreter both appeared. Neither Mr. Freeman nor the client appeared for the continued conference, and the court ordered a warrant for the client's arrest.

Matter 6: In early 2000, Mr. Freeman represented a client charged with forgery. The court agreed to supervised release with several conditions. Mr. Freeman obtained his client's signature on the release order without informing him of the conditions, and subsequently the client violated the conditions. Mr. Freeman did not appear for the client's May 16, 2000 trial, nor did he provide any explanation to the court for his absence. On May 24, 2000, Mr. Freeman was personally served with the prosecutor's motion for sanctions and an order to show cause, requiring his appearance, but Mr. Freeman did not appear. The court found him in contempt for failing to appear at the client's trial.

Matter 7: In 2000, Mr. Freeman represented a client in a domestic-violence and stalking case. The prosecutor identified two critical witnesses for the case, and explained that they could be charged with obstructing a public servant if they failed to cooperate. Mr. Freeman agreed to represent the witnesses in a claim against the police while the domestic violence case was pending. Mr. Freeman did not explain the potential conflict of interest to the three clients and did not obtain a written waiver of the conflict. Mr. Freeman fell asleep during the prosecutor's interview of the critical witnesses.

Matter 8: In 2000, Mr. Freeman represented a criminal defendant. Mr. Freeman appeared late for the first suppression hearing, submitted no pleadings or documents, and did not inform his client that he was required to attend the hearing. The court sanctioned Mr. Freeman $400, allowed him until the next day to file pleadings, and rescheduled the suppression hearing. Prior to the date of the hearing, the client was arrested on new drug charges, so the hearing was continued again. Mr. Freeman did not attend the second suppression hearing and the court sanctioned him an additional $1,000. The client was still in custody and was brought from the jail to attend the hearing. The court appointed a new lawyer to represent the client.

Matter 9: In 2000, Mr. Freeman represented a defendant charged with unlawful possession of a controlled substance. After negotiating a plea agreement with the prosecutor, neither Mr. Freeman nor his client attended the hearing to enter the agreement with the court. Mr. Freeman also failed to appear for the client's trial date.

Matter 10: In 2000, Mr. Freeman represented a criminal defendant. Mr. Freeman failed to appear for the client's trial-readiness conference. Mr. Freeman also failed to appear at a later readiness hearing. The client appeared at this hearing and told the court that he could not reach Mr. Freeman.

Matter 11: In 2000, Mr. Freeman represented a criminal defendant. Neither Mr. Freeman nor his client appeared at the May 17, 2000 pretrial conference. The court authorized issuance of a bench warrant. The client contacted the prosecutor, who allowed the client to reschedule the conference. The client appeared at the rescheduled conference without Mr. Freeman, and the court appointed another lawyer to represent the client.

Matter 12: In 2000, Mr. Freeman agreed to represent a criminal defendant. Mr. Freeman did not appear at a required hearing, and the court issued a bench warrant for the client's arrest. The prosecutor served Mr. Freeman with a motion for sanctions and a show-cause order. Mr. Freeman did not appear and the court found him in contempt.

Matter 13: Mr. Freeman failed to respond to the Bar Association's written requests for information. He also failed to appear for his deposition after personal service of the subpoena. He did appear at a rescheduled deposition, but failed to bring the requested client files.

Mr. Freeman's conduct violated RPCs 1.3, requiring lawyers to diligently represent their clients; 1.4, requiring lawyers to promptly respond to clients' reasonable requests for information regarding the status of their matters; 3.3(f), requiring that, in ex parte proceedings, lawyers inform the tribunal of all relevant facts known to the lawyer that should be disclosed to permit the tribunal to make an informed decision, whether or not the facts are adverse; 8.4(d), prohibiting lawyers from engaging in conduct prejudicial to the administration of justice; 1.2(d), prohibiting lawyers from counseling or assisting clients in criminal or fraudulent conduct; 5.4, prohibiting lawyers from entering fee-splitting arrangements with nonlawyers; 7.2(c), prohibiting lawyers from giving anything of value to a person for recommending the lawyer's services; and 8.4(b), prohibiting committing a criminal act that reflects adversely on the lawyer's honesty, trustworthiness or fitness as a lawyer.

Jonathan Burke represented the Bar Association. Mr. Freeman represented himself. The hearing officer was Bert Markovich.

C. Alan Grider (WSBA No. 16927, admitted 1987), of Clarkston, has been disbarred by order of the Supreme Court effective May 31, 2001, following a stipulation. The discipline is based his failing to preserve client funds and entering into an unfair business transaction with a client from 1998 through 2000.

Matter 1: In October 1990, Mr. Grider established a trust for a client. The client was the grantor, and Mr. Grider and the client were named co-trustees. Mr. Grider also drafted a will for this client, naming himself as executor and trustee. The will contained a specific bequest to D.C., who was raised as the client's daughter but was never legally adopted. At the time of the client's death on May 11, 1995, the trust had $110,709.36 in assets. Mr. Grider sent monthly checks to D.C. beginning in June 1995.

In February 1998, he wrote D.C. "there should be sufficient income from the investments to keep these payments coming for many years. This I fully intend to do." D.C. did not receive any funds after September 2000. It appears that there are no remaining funds and $88,500 is missing.

Matter 2: In 1998, Mr. Grider agreed to represent a client whose husband had been killed in an automobile accident. Mr. Grider did not have a written fee agreement with the client. The court appointed the wife as personal representative of the husband's estate and also appointed a guardian ad litem (GAL) for the two children. On August 4, 1998, the insurance company issued two $77,827.59 checks, one for each child. The GAL endorsed the checks and Mr. Grider deposited them into his IOLTA trust account. On August 11, Mr. Grider withdrew $100,000 and purchased a three-month certificate of deposit in the name of "C. Alan Grider ITF and [child's name]." On August 13, Mr. Grider transferred $14,000 from the IOLTA account into his general account. Although his ledger indicates this transfer was for court-ordered fees, there were no withdrawals authorized at that time. In a declaration filed with the court, Mr. Grider stated that his fees were justified because both the insurance company and the husband's employer initially denied coverage. In fact, neither company denied coverage.

The court approved the children purchasing one half of a family home. The client found a suitable house, but Mr. Grider told her she could not buy it. Then, in January 1999, Mr. Grider sold her a remote, undeveloped five-acre parcel he owned with his wife and another couple. Mr. Grider sent the client to another lawyer to draft the documents. The GAL was not involved in this process and Mr. Grider specified all the terms.

In July 1999, the client met with the GAL. The client explained that she could not afford to put a home on the property and that no electricity, water or roads currently served the area. The GAL contacted Mr. Grider and suggested that he refund the children's money. In August or September 1999, Mr. Grider withdrew from the case, and another lawyer substituted as counsel for the personal representative. Mr. Grider sent a check to substituted counsel for the balance of the estate funds. Due to a shortage of funds in the trust account, Mr. Grider used other clients' funds to cover this check.

Matter 3: Mr. Grider represented a minor in a personal-injury case. The child had been severely bitten by a dog. On December 16, 1998, the court approved a $14,272.66 settlement. The court ordered that the funds be placed in a blocked account and not released prior to the child's age of majority without a court order. Mr. Grider's client ledger indicates that the child's money is still owed, but it is not in an IOLTA trust account or blocked account.

Matter 4: Mr. Grider's client ledger for an estate had a negative balance beginning April 30, 1999, and as of the stipulation date, December 20, 2000, that balance was negative $19,221.94. On June 19, 2000, Mr. Grider sent the beneficiary a statement indicating the estate balance was $43,069.05.

Mr. Grider's conduct violated RPCs 1.14, requiring lawyers to preserve client funds; 8.4(c), prohibiting lawyers from engaging in conduct involving dishonesty, fraud, misrepresentation or deceit; 1.8(a), prohibiting entering a business transaction with a client unless the terms are fair and reasonable and the client obtains independent legal advice; and 3.3(a), prohibiting misrepresentation of material facts to a tribunal.

C. Elizabeth Williams represented the Bar Association. David A. Gittins represented Mr. Grider.

Mickie E. Jarvill (WSBA No. 14049, admitted 1984), of Stanwood, has been disbarred by order of the Supreme Court effective May 31, 2001, following a default hearing. The court's order conditions Ms. Jarvill's reinstatement upon paying restitution of $505,000. The discipline is based upon her use of estate proceeds for her personal use without the knowledge or permission of the co-personal representative.

Ms. Jarvill's uncle died in January 1995. Ms. Jarvill's first cousins, who lived in Oklahoma, were the beneficiaries of his estate. The estate retained two lawyers to pursue a substantial corporate issue. During the case, one cousin asked Ms. Jarvill's opinion and advice about the lawsuit and a $600,000 settlement offer. Ms. Jarvill suggested that she should be appointed co-personal representative of her uncle's estate. Based on this suggestion, the beneficiaries petitioned the court and Ms. Jarvill was appointed co-personal representative on April 15, 1997.

Ms. Jarvill recommended that all estate funds be sent to her for safekeeping. Ms. Jarvill received $645,598 in estate funds and distributed $140,414.90. On July 27, 1999, Ms. Jarvill told her cousin that she had lost all of the estate's remaining funds in a land deal. None of the beneficiaries authorized Ms. Jarvill to use the funds for the land deal. As of the date of the findings of fact, the beneficiaries had not received any additional distributions. Ms. Jarvill sent the estate beneficiaries 22 unsecured promissory notes, totaling $632,543.21. On July 26, 1999, the court removed Ms. Jarvill as co-personal representative.

Ms. Jarvill's conduct violated RCW 9A.56.030, theft; RPCs 1.14, requiring lawyers to preserve clients' property; 8.4(c), prohibiting conduct involving dishonesty, fraud, deceit and misrepresentation; and 8.4(b), prohibiting committing a criminal act that reflects adversely on the lawyer's honesty, trustworthiness or fitness as a lawyer in other respects.

Leslie Allen represented the Bar Association. Ms. Jarvill represented herself. The hearing officer was Donald L. Logerwell.

Jeffrey A. Meehan (WSBA No. 18295, admitted 1988), of Vancouver, has been disbarred by order of the Supreme Court effective June 20, 2001, following a stipulation. The discipline is based upon his submitting documents to the bankruptcy court in 1996 that misrepresented the amount of work done.

In 1996, Mr. Meehan's firm represented a Chapter 7 bankruptcy trustee. Mr. Meehan, an experienced bankruptcy attorney, was the primary attorney of record. As required by the bankruptcy code, Mr. Meehan submitted fee applications to the court for his compensation. The fee applications falsely represented to the court that work done by word processors and clerks was done by paralegals and paralegal assistants. Mr. Meehan edited the word-processor time records and changed some of their entries, for example, "transcribe" to "draft," "finalize" or "analyze." The law firm received interim fees and costs of $62,616.89. A creditor filed an objection to the final fee application, alleging work performed by word processors was misrepresented as paralegal work. The bankruptcy court held two evidentiary hearings and entered a finding that Mr. Meehan knew that word-processor work was not compensable and, therefore, made a conscious decision to request compensation for services that were not compensable.

Mr. Meehan's conduct violated RPCs 3.3(a), prohibiting making false statements of material fact or offering false evidence to a tribunal; 3.4(b), prohibiting falsifying evidence; and 8.4(d), prohibiting engaging in conduct that is prejudicial to the administration of justice.

Jonathan Burke represented the Bar Association. Christopher Hardman represented Mr. Meehan.

Brian E. Nelson (WSBA No. 15363, admitted 1985), of Spokane, has been disbarred by order of the Supreme Court effective May 1, 2001, following a stipulation. The discipline is based his failure to properly preserve client funds. (Note: Mr. Nelson is to be distinguished from Brian C. Nelson of London, England.)

In July 1996, Mr. Nelson agreed to represent a client injured in an automobile accident in Idaho. The client signed a contingent-fee agreement providing a one-third fee in the event of settlement or judgment. Mr. Nelson appeared pro hac vice in Idaho and filed a lawsuit against multiple defendants. A month prior to the date set for jury trial, Mr. Nelson settled with some defendants for $7,000.

On December 2, 1999, the client endorsed the settlement checks, and Mr. Nelson told the client that he would take a $1,000 fee and write her a check for the balance prior to Christmas. The client called Mr. Nelson several times during December and January asking why she had not yet received her check. Mr. Nelson offered several explanations for the delay.

On January 10, 2000, he told the client that he had mailed the check on December 24 and had confirmed with his bank that it had been paid; however, Mr. Nelson's bank records established that he did not write a check to the client on that date. On January 12, Mr. Nelson delivered a $6,000 check drawn on his trust account to the client. Mr. Nelson's trust account contained insufficient funds to cover the check until a January 12 wire transfer from his brother occurred.

Mr. Nelson's conduct violated RPCs 1.14(a), requiring lawyers to promptly deliver clients' funds when requested; and 8.3(c), prohibiting conduct involving dishonesty, fraud, deceit or misrepresentation.

Douglas Ende represented the Bar Association. Gregory S. Zoro represented Mr. Nelson.

Valentino J. Panizzut (WSBA No. 23074, admitted 1993), of North Carolina, has been disbarred by order of the Supreme Court effective June 20, 2001, following a stipulation. The discipline is based upon dishonest conduct, failing to properly preserve client funds, and charging an excessive fee in 1995 through 1998.

Matter 1: In 1995, Mr. Panizzut agreed to work for a law firm. His compensation was based on a percentage of the fees from the cases assigned to him, with a larger percentage if he brought the case into the office. The firm policy required Mr. Panizzut to advise his employer of client matters he opened, so that a client number and ledger could be prepared. Mr. Panizzut was required to deposit all client funds into the firm trust account.

In March 1999, the employer terminated Mr. Panizzut and reviewed his client files. During this review, the employer discovered at least 17 client files in which Mr. Panizzut had kept fees for himself, while the clients believed that the money would be applied to their fee obligation to the firm. Mr. Panizzut admitted keeping some of the fees, but disputed others, and returned $9,004.82 to the firm.

Matter 2: In 1996, Mr. Panizzut agreed to represent a client in a Labor and Industries (L&I) claim. In October 1997, L&I awarded the client $22,725.47. L&I mailed two checks totaling $6,156.88 to Mr. Panizzut in October and November 1997. The checks were made out to the client and Mr. Panizzut. Mr. Panizzut signed both his and the client's name and deposited the checks into a separate trust account he established. He did not inform the client that he had received the funds and retained them as his fee. This amount is higher than the statutorily allowed fee in these cases.

In December 1997, Mr. Panizzut sent the client $1,011.86 he received from L&I. In August 1998, Mr. Panizzut sent a letter to L&I withdrawing an appeal, requesting a lump-sum payment, and changing the mailing address to his own address. On September 23, 1998, Mr. Panizzut deposited the $15,556.73 lump-sum payment into his trust account. When the client called to ask about her funds, Mr. Panizzut did not tell her he had received the payment. Instead, he offered to loan her money. In March 1999, the client contacted L&I and found out about the payment. She contacted the employer, who confronted and terminated Mr. Panizzut. In October 1999, the court set reasonable attorney's fees in the case at $0.00. The employer notified Mr. Panizzut of this finding in December 1999.

Matter 3: In 1996, Mr. Panizzut agreed to represent a client in an L&I matter. In 1997, he represented the same client in a criminal matter. In October 1998, the client signed a power of attorney, so that Mr. Panizzut could handle some of his affairs while he was incarcerated. Mr. Panizzut arranged for the client's pension checks to be deposited into Mr. Panizzut's trust account; the pension fund directly deposited $1,532 into this trust account. Mr. Panizzut removed $766 without the client's permission. The pension fund learned that Mr. Panizzut had left the area and reversed the last two monthly deposits. Mr. Panizzut also opened checking and savings accounts in the client's name. Mr. Panizzut transferred $1,108 from the client's savings account to his personal checking account without authorization. The source of this money was not established.

Mr. Panizzut's conduct violated RPCs 8.4(c), prohibiting dishonest conduct; 1.14(a), requiring lawyers to preserve clients' funds and to pay these funds promptly upon request; and 1.5(a), requiring lawyers' fees to be reasonable.

Joanne Abelson represented the Bar Association. Mr. Panizzut represented himself.

Louis A. Ferreira (WSBA No. 20646, admitted 1991), of Vancouver, received a censure pursuant to a stipulation approved by the Disciplinary Board on April 13, 2001. This discipline is based on Mr. Ferreira's failure to avoid conflicts of interest and failure to keep his clients informed of all settlement offers in 1996 and 1997.

In 1993, Mr. and Mrs. G and Mr. L purchased neighboring undeveloped lots in Seattle. The developers and the engineering consultant allegedly told the Gs and Mr. L that their lots did not contain fill; however, both lots contained fill, which increased the construction costs. Both the Gs and Mr. L also had problems with the builders.

In June 1996, the Gs retained Mr. Ferreira to represent them in claims against the developers, consultants and builders. Mr. Ferreira filed two lawsuits for the Gs in summer 1996. He also met with Mr. L and added him as a plaintiff in the lawsuits. There was a dispute between Mr. L and Mr. Ferreira about whether Mr. L had a claim against the consultant. Mr. Ferreira also agreed to represent Mr. B, another neighbor, who had a claim only against the developers. Mr. G told Mr. Ferreira that Mr. G would pay Mr. Ferreira's bill and collect a contribution from his neighbors Mr. L. and Mr. B. Mr. Ferreira did not obtain a written waiver of conflict of interest from any of these clients. He also did not discuss with them how any proceeds would be disbursed or divided.

In December 1996, Mr. Ferreira obtained a default judgment against the builder. The builder stopped doing business and the clients did not recover any damages. In November 1997, the builder agreed to settle the claims by tendering the amount remaining on its bond. Mr. Ferreira prepared a stipulation that paid the entire bond proceed, $2,751.15, to the Gs. Mr. L received a copy of the stipulation and did not indicate that he disagreed. During this time, Mr. L was periodically incapacitated for health reasons; however, Mr. Ferreira did not know about the incapacity.

On December 15, 1997, the court exonerated the bond and Mr. Ferreira disbursed the proceeds to the Gs without notifying Mr. L that he had received the funds.

Mr. Ferriera's conduct violated RPCs 1.7(b), prohibiting representing clients whose interests conflict; 1.8(g), prohibiting lawyers from making an aggregate settlement without involving all clients in the settlement; and 1.2(a), requiring lawyers to abide by clients' decisions whether to accept a settlement offer.

Jonathan Burke represented the Bar Association. Mark Fucile represented Mr. Ferriera.

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