September 2001

Disciplinary Notices

Thomas G. Batson (WSBA No. 20888, admitted 1991), of Seattle, has been disbarred by order of the Supreme Court effective May 31, 2001, following a stipulation. The discipline is based upon his admission that the Bar Association could prove that he knowingly converted client funds from his trust account in 2000.

Between January and August 2000, Mr. Batson removed $49,314.40 from his trust account. These funds, which did not belong to Mr. Batson, were paid to himself and others for office expenses. Between February 4 and April 10, 2000, Mr. Batson failed to disburse a client¡¦s share of settlement proceeds, telling the client that the funds had not been received. When the client found out that Mr. Batson had the funds, and then confronted him, Mr. Batson wrote him a check that was not supported by sufficient funds. Later, the client did receive the funds. Mr. Batson did not admit the allegations in the stipulation, but agreed that if the case proceeded to hearing, the Bar Association would be able to prove the allegations.

Mr. Batson¡¦s conduct violated RPCs 1.14, requiring lawyers to preserve the identity of client funds; and 8.4(c), prohibiting conduct involving dishonesty, fraud, deceit or misrepresentation.

Joy McLean represented the Bar Association. Kurt Bulmer represented Mr. Batson.

John C. Beckwith (WSBA No. 8083, admitted 1978), of Seattle, has been disbarred by order of the Supreme Court effective January 22, 2001, following a default hearing. The discipline is based upon his use of client funds to make personal investments in 1998.

In 1986, Mr. Beckwith drafted a client¡¦s will. The will established a testamentary trust. The will also provided a $1,000 testamentary gift to Mr. Beckwith¡¦s wife and $500 to his daughter. The client died in September 1986. Following probate, Mr. Beckwith transferred the estate¡¦s $387,000 in assets into the trust. In May 1988, the trustee became ill and Mr. Beckwith was appointed successor trustee. On January 6, 1990, the client¡¦s last living sibling died. The trust directed that the trustee should distribute the remaining assets to charities he believed the client would favor.

In March 1998, a firm bookkeeper discovered a February 1998 bank statement for the client¡¦s trust account. The statement included cancelled checks for Mr. Beckwith¡¦s personal dry cleaning, shopping, grocery, utility and credit-card expenses. Upon this discovery Mr. Beckwith¡¦s partner suggested that he self-report to the Bar Association. Mr. Beckwith contacted the Bar Association on March 26, 1998 and asked about resigning. He told the licensing supervisor that he was thinking of leaving the country.

On March 27, 1998, Mr. Beckwith signed the resignation form at the Bar Association office; however, the Bar Association¡¦s general counsel did not accept the resignation. On March 31, the Office of Disciplinary Counsel subpoenaed Mr. Beckwith to appear, provide testimony, and produce records regarding this client¡¦s estate. On April 6, Mr. Beckwith wrote a letter to disciplinary counsel stating that he no longer considered himself subject to Bar Association jurisdiction and that he was invoking his Fifth Amendment right against self-incrimination in declining to comply with the subpoena. Mr. Beckwith did not attend the deposition.

In May 1998, the attorney general¡¦s office received a preliminary injunction prohibiting any transfers or disposition of any trust assets and appointing a special master. Mr. Beckwith refused to cooperate with the investigation. The special master found that Mr. Beckwith used the trust funds to make high-risk investments and commingled his personal funds with the trust funds. The special master also found that on December 1, 1989, Mr. Beckwith, as trustee of the trust, loaned $20,000 in trust funds to developers of a condominium project on Bainbridge Island. The loan was secured by the undeveloped real property and memorialized by a note and profit-sharing agreement.

In late 1992, Mr. Beckwith and a friend purchased the note and profit-sharing agreement for $20,000. On January 21, 1993, Mr. Beckwith assigned the note to himself personally and to his friend. Mr. Beckwith and his friend then exchanged their note for an interest in a real-estate development partnership. They may have added an additional $10,000 of their own funds to this investment. On January 22, 1999, the court appointed a receiver for the trust funds. In March 2000, Mr. Beckwith and his friend each received $84,668 from the real-estate investment. The profit was not returned to the trust.

Mr. Beckwith¡¦s conduct violated RPCs 8.4(b), prohibiting committing a criminal act that reflects adversely on the lawyer¡¦s honesty, trustworthiness or fitness as a lawyer in other respects; 8.4(c), prohibiting engaging in conduct prejudicial to the administration of justice; 1.8(c), prohibiting preparing an instrument giving the lawyer or a person related to the lawyer as parent, child, sibling or spouse any substantial gift from a client, including a testamentary gift, except where the client is related to the donee; and RLD 2.8, requiring lawyers to cooperate with discipline investigations.

Kevin Bank represented the Bar Association. Mr. Beckwith represented himself. The hearing officer was Jack Cullen.

Scott A. Everard (WSBA No. 20218, admitted 1990), of Spokane, has been disbarred by order of the Supreme Court effective December 12, 2000, following a default hearing. The discipline is based upon his failure to diligently represent and adequately communicate with three clients, failure to properly handle client funds, and failure to cooperate with disciplinary counsel¡¦s reasonable requests for information from 1994 through 1997.

Matter 1: Mr. Everard agreed to represent a client injured in a 1992 automobile accident. In spring 1994, Mr. Everard made a demand for underinsured motorist coverage. In August 1994, Mr. Everard obtained a $10,000 PIP payment for his client. He sent this check to the client in February 1995. The claim was never resolved because the insurance adjuster was not able to contact Mr. Everard. The adjuster tried to contact Mr. Everard several times by letter and telephone between November 1994 and August 1996 but received no response. The client also tried to contact Mr. Everard between February 1995 and April 1996 but received no response.

In June 1994, the client asked Mr. Everard to pursue a dental malpractice claim. The dentist had left a paper tooth in the client¡¦s mouth during a root canal, causing swelling and pain. The client believed that Mr. Everard had agreed to pursue this claim; however, Mr. Everard took no action on this claim. After February 1995, the client was not able to contact Mr. Everard.

On June 8, 1995, the client filed a grievance against Mr. Everard, asking the Office of Disciplinary Counsel to assist him in contacting Mr. Everard. Disciplinary counsel wrote to Mr. Everard in July, August and September 1995, but received no response. On April 16, 1996, the client terminated Mr. Everard¡¦s services and requested that he make a copy of the client¡¦s file available on April 19. On that date, the client went to Mr. Everard¡¦s office and found a note taped to the door stating that Mr. Everard did not have time to make copies of the client¡¦s file and that he could have his original pictures back if he paid for them in advance. The client then asked the Office of Disciplinary Counsel to assist him in getting his file. Despite several attempts by the client and the Office of Disciplinary Counsel, Mr. Everard did not release the client¡¦s file until March 1997.

Matter 2: Mr. Everard agreed to represent a client injured in a 1991 automobile accident. The case proceeded to mandatory arbitration in August 1995. At the hearing, Mr. Everard was sanctioned $750 for failing to file a timely arbitration brief. He paid the sanctions with a check that was returned due to insufficient funds. The arbitrator awarded Mr. Everard¡¦s client $6,294.50. Mr. Everard told the client that she had a year to appeal the arbitration award and that he would file an appeal if he could not negotiate a settlement for more than the arbitration award. Mr. Everard did not negotiate a higher amount, appeal the arbitration award, or collect the arbitration award.

In September 1995, the client saw Mr. Everard in a nightclub. He told her that he had a $10,000 check waiting for her at his office, and to call him the next day to arrange to pick it up. The client called Mr. Everard several times between September 1995 and July 1996, but was not able to contact him. In mid-July, the client retained substitute counsel, who was not able to contact Mr. Everard and learned the status of the case from opposing counsel. Opposing counsel indicated that he would not disburse the arbitration award without a substitution of counsel signed by Mr. Everard.

On July 22, 1996, the client sent a certified letter to Mr. Everard indicating that she had retained substitute counsel. The letter was returned unclaimed. Substitute counsel called Mr. Everard several times between August and October 1996, until the phone message stated that the party (Mr. Everard) would not accept incoming calls from substitute counsel¡¦s number. Substitute counsel filed a motion for an order substituting counsel. At the hearing, the judge directed that notice again be sent to Mr. Everard¡¦s business address. On the morning of the second hearing, Mr. Everard delivered the client file and signed the substitution.

Matter 3: In March 1997, Mr. Everard agreed to defend a client against charges of driving under the influence and with a suspended license. The client¡¦s case was in Whatcom County and Mr. Everard was in Spokane County. Mr. Everard told the client that he would send paperwork after the client sent him $1,000. On March 29, 1996, the client paid Mr. Everard a $1,000 cashier¡¦s check. Approximately two days prior to the hearing, Mr. Everard contacted the client, said he would put the paperwork in the mail, and told the client to attend the arraignment himself and plead not guilty. The client appeared without counsel at the arraignment and pleaded not guilty. The client did not receive any paperwork from Mr. Everard prior to the May 23 pretrial conference date. The client called Mr. Everard several times, but received no response.

On May 20, 1996, Mr. Everard called the client and indicated that he would ask the court for a continuance. On May 21 and 22, Mr. Everard told the prosecuting attorney he would be faxing a notice of appearance and sending the paperwork necessary for a continuance. Mr. Everard did not fax a notice of appearance or send any continuance documentation. The client called the court and found that Mr. Everard had not appeared or continued the conference. The client retained new counsel to appear at the pretrial conference.

On May 24, 1996, the client sent Mr. Everard a letter demanding refund of his $1,000 within 10 days. In late July or August 1996, Mr. Everard called the client, stating that he had done some work on the case and should be paid for his work. Later, Mr. Everard agreed to refund $700, but did not send this amount to the client.

In April 1997, Mr. Everard told the Office of Disciplinary Counsel that he had sent a $1,000 money order to the client and his new lawyer. His letter to disciplinary counsel included a copy of the money order. In October 1997, the client and lawyer indicated they had not received the money order. Mr. Everard then sent a money order dated October 31, 1997.

Matter 4: In June 1995, The Office of Disciplinary Counsel (ODC) sent Mr. Everard a letter suggesting that he contact his client. He did not contact the client within a reasonable time. ODC made several informal attempts to obtain a copy of the client¡¦s file. Although Mr. Everard promised to provide a copy of the file if the client paid the copying charge, neither the client nor ODC was able to contact Mr. Everard to obtain the copies and determine the cost. ODC sent Mr. Everard a request for a response to the client¡¦s grievance, but Mr. Everard did not respond to this request. Mr. Everard did not claim the certified letter from ODC informing him that if he did not respond within 10 days he would be liable for the costs of his deposition.

Mr. Everard¡¦s conduct violated RPCs 1.3, requiring lawyers to diligently represent their clients; 1.4, requiring lawyers to promptly comply with clients¡¦ reasonable requests for information about their matters; 1.14(b)(4), requiring lawyers to promptly deliver client funds upon request; 1.15(d), requiring lawyers to take reasonable steps to protect clients¡¦ interests upon withdrawal from representation; 8.4(d), prohibiting conduct prejudicial to the administration of justice; 1.5, requiring lawyers¡¦ fees to be reasonable; and RLD 2.8, requiring lawyers to promptly and reasonably respond to disciplinary counsel¡¦s requests for information in disciplinary investigations.

Leslie Allen represented the Bar Association. Frank Conklin and Mr. Everard acted as co-counsel. The hearing officer was Timothy Esser.

C. Allen Grider (WSBA No. 16927, admitted 1987), of Clarkston, has been disbarred by order of the Supreme Court effective May 31, 2001, following a stipulation. The discipline is based upon his failing to preserve client funds and entering into an unfair business transaction with a client from 1998 through 2000.

Matter 1: In 1998, Mr. Grider agreed to represent a client whose husband had been killed in an automobile accident. Mr. Grider did not have a written fee agreement with the client. The court appointed the wife as personal representative of the husband¡¦s estate and also appointed a guardian ad litem (GAL) for the two children. On August 4, 1998, the insurance company issued two $77,827.59 checks, one for each child. The GAL endorsed the checks and Mr. Grider deposited them into his IOLTA trust account. On August 11, Mr. Grider withdrew $100,000 and purchased a three-month certificate of deposit in the name of "C. Alan Grider ITF and [child¡¦s name]." On August 13, Mr. Grider transferred $14,000 from the IOLTA account into his general account. Although his ledger indicates this transfer was for court-ordered fees, there were no withdrawals authorized at that time. In a declaration filed with the court, Mr. Grider stated that his fees were justified because both the insurance company and the husband¡¦s employer initially denied coverage. In fact, neither company denied coverage.

The court approved the children purchasing one half of a family home. The client found a suitable house, but Mr. Grider told her she could not buy it. In January 1999, Mr. Grider sold her a remote, undeveloped five-acre parcel he owned with his wife and another couple. Mr. Grider sent the client to another lawyer to draft the documents. The GAL was not involved in this process and Mr. Grider specified all the terms. In July 1999, the client met with the GAL. The client explained that she could not afford to put a home on the property and that no electricity, water or roads currently served the area. The GAL contacted Mr. Grider and suggested that he refund the children¡¦s money. In August or September 1999, Mr. Grider withdrew from the case, and another lawyer substituted as counsel for the personal representative. Mr. Grider sent a check to substituted counsel for the balance of the estate funds. Due to a shortage of funds in the trust account, Mr. Grider used other client funds to cover this check.

Matter 2: In October 1990, Mr. Grider established a trust for a client. The client was the grantor and Mr. Grider and the client were named co-trustees. Mr. Grider also drafted a will for this client, naming himself as executor and trustee. The will contained a specific bequest to D.C., who was raised as the client¡¦s daughter but was never legally adopted. At the time of the client¡¦s death on May 11, 1995, the trust had $110,709.36 in assets. Mr. Grider sent monthly checks to D.C. beginning in June 1995. In February 1998, he wrote D.C. "there should be sufficient income from the investments to keep these payments coming for many years. This I fully intend to do." D.C. did not receive any funds after September 2000. It appears that there are no remaining funds and $88,500 is missing.

Matter 3: Mr. Grider represented a minor in a personal-injury case. The child had been severely bitten by a dog. On December 16, 1998, the court approved a $14,272.66 settlement. The court ordered that the funds be placed in a blocked account and not released prior to the child¡¦s age of majority without a court order. Mr. Grider¡¦s client ledger indicates that the child¡¦s money is still owed, but it is not in an IOLTA trust account or blocked account.

Matter 4: Mr. Grider¡¦s client ledger for an estate had a negative balance beginning April 30, 1999, and as of the stipulation date, December 20, 2000, that balance was negative $19,221.94. On June 19, 2000, Mr. Grider sent the beneficiary a statement indicating the estate balance was $43,069.05.

Mr. Grider¡¦s conduct violated RPCs 1.14, requiring lawyers to preserve client funds; 8.4(c), prohibiting lawyers from engaging in conduct involving dishonesty, fraud, misrepresentation or deceit; 1.8(a), prohibiting entering a business transaction with a client unless the terms are fair and reasonable and the client obtains independent legal advice; and 3.3(a), prohibiting misrepresentation of material facts to a tribunal.

C. Elizabeth Williams represented the Bar Association. David A. Gittins represented Mr. Grider.

Randall Keys (WSBA No. 15929, admitted 1986), of Bremerton, has been disbarred by order of the Supreme Court effective May 22, 2001, following a default hearing. The discipline is based upon his engaging in a consensual sexual relationship with a client and denying that relationship under oath.

In 1995, the Kitsap County Superior Court assigned a law firm to represent a client charged with second-degree assault. The firm assigned the case to Mr. Keys. The client, who had a history of being battered by her husband, allegedly shot a handgun in the husband¡¦s general direction.

In May or June 1995, while preparing for trial, Mr. Keys and the client entered a consensual sexual relationship. Mr. Keys delivered handwritten, intimate notes and gifts to the client, and offered to assist her in ending her marriage after the criminal case was concluded. During their relationship, Mr. Keys advised the client to accept a plea agreement to third-degree assault. The client received a sentence giving her credit for time served, requiring community service, and placing her on probation for one year. Mr. Keys represented the client at all court hearings. The client believed that the plea would end the case.

During the probation, the client realized that she had not fully understood the consequences of her plea agreement and had followed Mr. Keys¡¦ advice because of their personal relationship. On July 10, 1996, the client wrote to the court asking to withdraw her guilty plea. The court appointed a new lawyer and held a hearing on the client¡¦s request to withdraw her guilty plea. At the hearing, Mr. Keys denied under oath that he had a sexual relationship with the client or that he wrote the 10 intimate notes to the client. The court granted the client¡¦s motion.

Mr. Keys¡¦ conduct violated RPCs 1.7(b), prohibiting representing a client if the representation may be materially limited by the lawyer¡¦s own interests, unless the lawyer reasonably believes that the representation will not be adversely affected and the client consents in writing after full disclosure; 8.4(c), prohibiting conduct involving dishonesty, fraud, deceit or misrepresentation; 8.4(d), prohibiting engaging in conduct prejudicial to the administration of justice; and RLD 1.1(a), prohibiting conduct reflecting disregard for the rule of law.

Harold Vhugen represented the Bar Association. Mr. Keys represented himself. The hearing officer was Stew Cogan.

Michael A. McKean (WSBA No. 4438, admitted 1971), of Seattle, has been disbarred by order of the Supreme Court effective May 31, 2001, following a hearing. The discipline is based upon his pleading guilty to six felonies reflecting adversely on his honesty, trustworthiness or fitness as a lawyer.

In 1973, Mr. McKean became a general partner with Mr. W in a large number of federally subsidized housing projects. There were many limited partners with investments in these projects. When Mr. W was removed as general partner for failing to fulfill his duties, Mr. McKean took over these responsibilities in addition to his previous responsibilities. Mr. McKean used the project funds to remodel his home and for other personal expenses. He also paid out project funds before the projects were completed, and used his personal funds to start or pay construction expenses, which he later reimbursed to himself. He operated in a manner intended to complete the projects without regard to legal requirements. During a federal investigation of Mr. W, Mr. McKean¡¦s conduct was discovered.

On March 3, 1998, Mr. McKean pleaded guilty to bank fraud, making a false request for a loan advance, making a false cost certificate, accepting an unlawful payment from a bank, presenting a forged cashier¡¦s check, and filing a false tax return. On June 5, 1998, the court sentenced Mr. McKean to 21 months at the federal camp at Sheridan, Oregon, three years¡¦ probation, and $300,000 restitution.

Mr. McKean¡¦s conduct violated RLD 1.1(a), prohibiting committing an act involving moral turpitude, dishonesty or corruption; RPCs 8.4(b), prohibiting committing a criminal act that reflects adversely on the lawyer¡¦s honesty, trustworthiness or fitness as a lawyer in other respects; and 8.4(c), prohibiting engaging in conduct involving dishonesty, fraud, deceit or misrepresentation.

Richard M. Clinton represented the Bar Association. Mr. McKean represented himself. The hearing officer was Edward LeRoy Dunkerly. ƒn

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