April 2002

Disciplinary Notices

Norman B. Maas (WSBA No. 7380, admitted 1977), of Kenmore, has been disbarred by order of the Supreme Court effective September 20, 2001, following a hearing. The discipline is based upon his filing a frivolous claim, making false statements to a court, and obstructing another party's access to evidence between 1982 and 1996.

Mr. Maas represented his friends Mr. and Mrs. R (the Rs) in several business transactions. In 1982, Mr. R was the principal owner of a new business in need of financing. After careful analysis of the business opportunity, Mr. H, a private investor, agreed to make a $25,000 unsecured investment in the company. When the company needed more money, Mr. H. agreed to make another investment, but only if it was secured by a deed of trust on the Rs' personal residence.

In March and April 1983, Mr. H verified four pre-existing lien holders on the Rs' residence. These lien holders included a savings and loan, Norman B. Maas ($12,000), a corporation wholly owned by Maas ($4,500), and the original seller of the Rs' company. Mr. H verified the current balances and arranged for the company to assume Mr. R's personal debts, to allow more security for his own loan. Mr. Maas prepared the documentation for this transaction.

Mr. H loaned the company an additional $32,000 and believed that his loan was secured in second position, just behind the savings and loan. After this transfer, neither Mr. R nor his company received any further billings from Mr. Maas. The last billing, dated May 1, 1983, indicated a total outstanding bill of $1,307.67. The promissory note to Mr. Maas had a notation "paid-in full" written on the note. A request for reconveyance was also found, but the date was blotted out. The Maas corporation debt also indicated it had been paid in full and had a request for reconveyance. The date on this document was also unreadable.

The reconveyance deed was never executed or recorded. The hearing officer concluded that no current balance was owed by the Rs to Mr. Maas at the time of the H loan. The hearing officer found that Mr. Maas participated with the clients in providing a facade of lien holders on the Rs' property so that they could exempt their home from their bankruptcy petition. The liens also assisted the client in obtaining an advantageous settlement of Internal Revenue Service claims. Mr. Maas did not discuss his own deed of trust with Mr. H when he prepared the deeds for the company loan.

In April 1996, 17 years after the promissory note and deed of trust were executed, Mr. Maas commenced foreclosure proceedings against the Rs and Mr. H, among others. Mr. Maas asserted that he was owed almost $500,000 on the original $12,000 debt, based on 24 percent interest compounded monthly. During the lawsuit, Mr. Maas and the Rs cooperated with each other. Mr. Maas indicated that he did not maintain payment records, even though he had previously been in banking.

The hearing officer found that, in fact, at the time the foreclosure action was filed, the Rs owed no debt to Mr. Maas. During his deposition in the civil suit, Mr. Maas testified that he had a "gentleman's agreement" with his clients to put them back into a house of their choice after the foreclosure. The hearing officer also found that Mr. Maas blacked out the words "paid in full" on the promissory notes prior to producing them in the civil litigation.

Mr. Maas's conduct violated RPC 3.1, prohibiting lawyers from filing frivolous claims; RPC 8.4(c), prohibiting lawyers from engaging in conduct involving dishonesty, fraud, deceit or misrepresentation; RPC 3.3, prohibiting lawyers from knowingly making a false statement of fact or law to a tribunal; RPC 3.4, prohibiting lawyers from unlawfully obstructing another party's access to evidence; and RLD 1.1(p), prohibiting lawyers from engaging in conduct demonstrating unfitness to practice law.

Anne I. Seidel represented the Bar Association. Kurt M. Bulmer represented Mr. Maas. The hearing officer was David R. Tuell.

Anthony J. Meyers (WSBA No. 7702, admitted 1977), of Everett, has been disbarred by order of the Supreme Court effective September 20, 2001, following a hearing. The discipline is based upon his 1995 felony conviction for forgery.

In June 1994, Mr. Meyers was in Ms. N's home without her permission. Later, when he was arrested, Mr. Meyers had $450 in travelers checks belonging to Ms. N. It appeared that Ms. N's signature on the checks had been forged. Mr. Meyers had a prior 1990 conviction for aiding and abetting a false statement, and a prior 1991 conviction for forgery. On March 15, 1995, Mr. Meyers pled guilty to one count of forgery. No action was ever taken on Mr. Meyers's 1990 felony conviction. The Bar Association learned of the 1995 conviction in June 2000.

Mr. Meyers's conduct violated RPC 8.4(b), prohibiting lawyers from committing criminal acts that reflect adversely on the lawyer's honesty, trustworthiness, or fitness as a lawyer in other respects; RPC 8.4(c), prohibiting lawyers from engaging in conduct involving dishonesty, fraud, deceit or misrepresentation; RLD 1.1(a), prohibiting lawyers from engaging in acts of moral turpitude; and RLD 1.1(c), prohibiting lawyers from violating their oath or duties as attorneys.

Linda Eide represented the Bar Association. Mr. Meyers represented himself. The hearing officer was Lish Whitson.

Dianna Carlson (WSBA No. 13271, admitted 1983), formerly of Thurston County, has been retroactively suspended for one year by order of the Supreme Court effective May 4, 1998, following a hearing. The discipline is based upon her making knowing misrepresentation of fact to the district court in a citizen's complaint in 1997.

In January 1993, Ms. Carlson married Mr. K. They separated in February 1994 and were involved in bitter dissolution proceedings from March 1994 through May 1998. While the dissolution was pending, Ms. Carlson lived in the family home, and her mother-in-law lived in a mobile home on the same property.

In 1995, two men related to the ex-husband emerged from the mother-in-law's home and confronted Ms. Carlson in her wheelchair; she ended up on the ground. The facts regarding the incident are disputed. Either the men were retrieving a fence post that belonged to the mother-in-law and Ms. Carlson hung on, causing herself to fall, or the men assaulted Ms. Carlson. Ms. Carlson was injured and reported the incident to the Thurston County Sheriff's Office. The sherriff's office investigated, but did not recommend prosecution. Ms. Carlson complained to the sherriff about the lack of prosecution of this and other incidents. Subsequently, she met with a deputy prosecuting attorney at her home to review records. The deputy indicated that he believed there was insufficient evidence to file a criminal charge.

In 1997, Ms. Carlson contacted the prosecutor again and provided him with transcribed testimony in the civil-crime victim-compensation case that he had not previously considered. The prosecutor again met with Ms. Carlson and indicated that he still did not believe there was enough evidence to file a criminal charge.

In 1997, Ms. Carlson typed and filed a citizens complaint regarding the 1995 incident. The complaint stated: "I have not consulted with a prosecuting authority concerning this incident. . . ." On this same day, Ms. Carlson filed a petition in Thurston County Superior Court requesting a domestic-violence order of protection against one of the two men involved in the 1995 incident. Following a hearing, the court denied the request.

In April 1997, Ms. Carlson filed a petition in Thurston County Superior Court requesting an order of protection from unlawful harassment against the two men involved in the 1995 incident. As part of this petition, Ms. Carlson answered "no" to the following question: Have you ever sued the person who is harassing you in any court, or has that person ever sued you in any court?

In May 1997, Ms. Carlson amended her citizen complaint and again stated that she had not consulted with a prosecuting authority concerning the incident. The hearing officer found that Ms. Carlson made knowing misrepresentations. Ms. Carlsons's citizen complaint was denied. The judge stated: "Further, it appears this matter was investigated by law enforcement and the matter was referred to the Thurston County Prosecutors, who declined to prosecute. While that fact alone is not determinative, it is one factor to be considered as required by the rule, as well as the prosecution standards under RCW 9.94A. 440."

Ms. Carlson's conduct violated RPC 8.4(c), prohibiting lawyers from engaging in conduct involving dishonesty, fraud, deceit or misrepresentation; and RPC 8.4(d), prohibiting lawyers from engaging in conduct prejudicial to the administration of justice.

Becky Neal represented the Bar Association. Ms. Carlson represented herself. The hearing officer was J. Donald Curran.

A. Graham Greenlee (WSBA No. 890, admitted 1968), of Seattle, has been suspended for 90 days by order of the Supreme Court effective February 20, 2002, following a hearing. This discipline is based upon his failure to promptly deliver client funds in 1997.

Mr. Greenlee represented Mr. W in a personal-injury claim. In 1996, the jury returned a $7,500 verdict in favor of Mr. W. The court then awarded Mr. W $125 in attorney's fees. In April 1997, Mr. Greenlee sent Mr. W a "pay-out" letter with a copy of the fee agreement and the $7,856 check from the court. Mr. Greenlee's letter indicated that his fee was 40 percent of the jury verdict plus the costs he incurred, and that Mr. W would receive $4,000. In fact, Mr. W was entitled to $4,500 plus the $125 awarded by the court. Mr. Greenlee made a mathematical error when he calculated his 40 percent fee. Mr. W did not question the amount of the fee and endorsed and returned the check. At Mr. W's request, Mr. Greenlee sent the check to Mr. W's mother. Neither Mr. W nor his mother cashed the check.

On February 10, 1998, Mr. Greenlee issued a replacement check at Mr. W's request. Mr. Greenlee maintained Mr. W's money in his IOLTA account during the time between the first and second checks. Mr. W did not question the amount of the fee at this time, but he did contact another lawyer. The other lawyer requested an accounting of the "settlement." Mr. Greenlee requested Mr. W to sign a letter verifying that he had not received the earlier "pay-out" letter. Before responding to this letter, Mr. W's new lawyer filed a grievance with the Bar Association. Mr. Greenlee did not respond to disciplinary counsel's requests that he respond to the allegations in the grievance.

In September 2000, disciplinary counsel served Mr. Greenlee with a subpoena duces tecum for a deposition. Mr. Greenlee failed to attend the deposition and produce the required documents. In November 2000, Mr. Greenlee refunded $500 to the client for his miscalculation on attorney's fees.

Mr. Greenlee's conduct violated RPC 1.14(b)(4), requiring lawyers to promptly deliver client funds when requested; and RLD 2.8, requiring lawyers to promptly comply with disciplinary counsel's requests for information relating to grievances.

Jean McElroy and C. Elizabeth Williams represented the Bar Association. Mr. Greenlee represented himself.

Joveliano C. Trinidad (WSBA No. 27144, admitted 1997), of Seattle, has been suspended for one year by order of the Supreme Court approving a stipulation effective January 2, 2002. The discipline is based upon his closing his law office in late 2000 without taking steps to protect his clients' interests.

Matter 1: Ms. S, who had been injured in an auto accident, retained Mr. Trinidad in October 1997 to represent her in a personal-injury case. In March 1998, Ms. S told Mr. Trinidad she had completed treatment and was ready to settle her claim. Mr. Trinidad worked on damage calculations, but did not complete the case. In June 1999, after several unanswered phone calls, Ms. S paid a surprise visit to Mr. Trinidad's office; they discussed the approaching statute of limitations. In August 1999, Mr. Trinidad filed a lawsuit on the client's behalf in King County Superior Court. In April 2000, the court dismissed the lawsuit because Mr. Trinidad did not attend a required status conference. The statute of limitations expired, and Mr. Trinidad did not inform the client that her lawsuit had been dismissed.

Matter 2: In summer 1999, Mr. Trinidad agreed to represent Mr. E, who was injured in an auto accident, in a personal-injury claim. In January 2000, Mr. Trinidad filed a lawsuit in King County Superior Court. In August 2000, the court dismissed the suit because Mr. Trinidad failed to comply with the case scheduling order. By the time the case was dismissed, the statute of limitations had expired. In January 2001, the client learned that Mr. Trinidad's office telephone was disconnected. The client also visited the courthouse and learned for the first time that his lawsuit had been dismissed.

Matter 3: Mr. Trinidad represented Ms. L in a personal-injury claim that was set for arbitration in September 1999. Mr. Trinidad failed to file the client's pre-hearing statement and did not appear for the arbitration hearing. The arbitrator dismissed the case. By the time the case was dismissed, the statute of limitations had expired.

Mr. Trinidad's conduct violated RPC 1.3, requiring lawyers to diligently represent their clients; RPC 1.4, requiring lawyers to keep clients informed of the status of their cases; and RPC 1.15, requiring lawyers to take steps, to the extent reasonably practicable, to protect clients' interests when representation is terminated.

Linda Eide represented the Bar Association. Mr. Trinidad represented himself.

Diane Marie Ward Turk (WSBA No. 16456, admitted 1986), of Seattle, has been suspended for six months by order of the Supreme Court effective February 12, 2002, following a hearing. The discipline is based upon her telephone harassment of a bank employee in 2000.

On October 7, 2000, Ms. M, a bank employee, received a voicemail message from Ms. Turk about bank statements. The voice mail stated: "I want you to please let [J] know that I'd like to receive those statements by the end of the week at the latest. If I don't I will make a trip out there with a gun to shoot either you or [J] right between the eyes and I mean it. I'll blow your head off. I want my statements. Goodbye." The hearing officer found that Ms. Turk made the statement with the intent to harass, intimidate, torment or embarrass Ms. M. The police found a gun in Ms. Turk's residence. Ms. M obtained a restraining order against Ms. Turk and the bank hired guards to protect the two employees. On February 12, 2001, Ms. Turk pled guilty and was convicted on one count of telephone harassment under RCW 9.61.230(3)(b), a class-C felony.

Ms. Turk's conduct violated RPC 8.4(b), prohibiting lawyers from committing criminal acts that reflect adversely on the lawyer's honesty, trustworthiness or fitness as a lawyer in other respects; and RLD 1.1(a), prohibiting lawyers from committing acts reflecting a disregard for the rule of law.

Anne I. Seidel represented the Bar Association. Ms. Turk represented herself. The hearing officer was Douglas S. Dunham.

Robert J. Verzani (WSBA No. 4415, admitted 1958), of Federal Way, has been suspended for 60 days by order of the Supreme Court effective February 15, 2002, following a hearing. The discipline is based upon his failure to abide by a client's decisions regarding the objectives of the representation, and failure to communicate properly with that client in 1998 and 1999.

Mr. Verzani began representing Mr. R in 1995. Mr. R's construction company was involved in a construction contract dispute with the Washington State Department of Corrections. Another contractor for the department project alleged that Mr. R's company's work was deficient, leading to deductions in the contract payments due Mr. R.

In October 1995, Mr. Verzani filed a notice of claim for Mr. R against the department. In January 1996, Mr. Verzani filed a lawsuit on the client's behalf. In March 1996, the general contractor offered to settle the lawsuit. Mr. Verzani conveyed the offer to his client, but the client rejected the offer. Mr. Verzani counseled the client that there was a substantial likelihood that the client would not prevail in his claim. The client rejected this settlement amount three times.

In October 1997, the case was transferred to mandatory arbitration. The case was scheduled for arbitration on April 8, 1998. Two days prior to the arbitration, the defendants again made a settlement offer. Although this offer was for the same amount as the previous offers, Mr. Verzani accepted the offer and agreed to dismiss the lawsuit. He did not communicate this offer to his clients or obtain their authority to settle the case.

At the time Mr. Verzani accepted the settlement offer, he believed that it was in his client's financial best interest to accept the settlement. Additionally, he was not prepared to conduct the arbitration hearing. When the client learned of the settlement, he indicated he did not approve and wanted the case re-opened. Mr. Verzani told the client the lawsuit had already been dismissed. The client received and cashed the settlement check and filed a grievance against Mr. Verzani. Mr. Verzani refunded all of the fees and costs to the client.

Mr. Verzani's conduct violated RPC 1.2, requiring lawyers to abide by a client's decisions concerning the objectives of representation; and RPC 1.4, requiring lawyers to keep clients reasonably informed about the status of their cases.

Douglas Ende represented the Bar Association. Leland Ripley represented Mr. Verzani. The hearing officer was David B. Condon.

Byron D. Coney (WSBA No. 367, admitted 1955), of Seattle, has received a reprimand, following a hearing. The discipline is based upon his failure to comply with his client's decisions concerning the scope of representation in 1997.

Between 1993 and 1997, Mr. Coney had a romantic relationship with Ms. R. During this time, Mr. Coney represented Ms. R on various legal matters.

In July 1995, Ms. R sold real property on Vashon Island. Six months after the sale, the purchasers sued Ms. R and her real estate brokerage, alleging that they had misrepresented the adequacy of the water supply available from the property's well. Mr. Coney appeared for Ms. R and the real estate company. He told Ms. R that he would not charge her fees, but that if they prevailed, he would seek fees from the purchasers. In May 1997, Ms. R obtained new counsel. New counsel billed Ms. R and she paid the bills. In July, the trial court found for Ms. R in the lawsuit and ordered the purchasers to pay Ms. R's attorney's fees and costs.

In July 1997, Mr. Coney re-associated as counsel for Ms. R for the limited purpose of presenting a claim for attorney's fees. In August, Mr. Coney filed a claim for $22,500 in attorney's fees and $9,410 in costs. The costs included $8,800 in CR 11 sanctions Mr. Coney paid in connection with a court-ordered dismissal of a third-party defamation case Mr. Coney filed against some of the purchaser's neighbors. Ms. R's new counsel and the purchaser's counsel continued to negotiate the amount of attorney's fees and did not include Mr. Coney in the negotiations. Mr. Coney sent a fax to Ms. R's new counsel stating that he would not authorize settling his attorney's fees for less than the full amount without his prior written consent.

In August 1997, the parties settled the attorney's fees for $40,000. Ms. R's new counsel's fees were approximately $26,000, and costs for an expert were under $10,000. New counsel sent a letter to Mr. Coney regarding the settlement, indicating that any matters about earlier attorney's fees were between Ms. R and Mr. Coney, and would not involve new counsel.

In August 1997, the trial court entered the judgment and dismissed the entire lawsuit. When Mr. Coney, who had been out of town, returned and learned of the judgment, he filed a motion to alter and amend judgment of dismissal. This motion asked the court to re-open the case to enter an award of attorney's fees to him; however, Mr. Coney did not ask his client's permission to re-open the case. New counsel wrote a letter to Mr. Coney asking him to withdraw the motion, pointing out that the client would incur additional attorney's fees. Ms. R signed a declaration opposing the motion; however, Mr. Coney proceeded.

The hearing officer found that Mr. Coney had a conflict of interest with his client at the time he pursued this motion to amend. The court dismissed Mr. Coney's motion and awarded Ms. R $1,200 in fees against him. Mr. Coney filed a notice of appeal of the decision without his client's consent. The Court of Appeals dismissed the case on a motion on the merits, stating that the appeal was "frivolous in every sense." The court commissioner awarded the client attorney's fees on appeal.

In November 1998, Ms. R filed a civil suit against Mr. Coney to dissolve a trust established during their relationship. Mr. Coney counterclaimed for his attorney's fees in the real estate litigation. Mr. Coney also filed a third-party claim against Ms. R's new counsel for attorney's fees in the real estate matter. On April 9, 2000, Ms. R filed a grievance against Mr. Coney. On April 10, Mr. Coney and Ms. R settled their lawsuit.

Mr. Coney's conduct violated RPCs 3.1, prohibiting lawyers from filing frivolous claims; 1.2(a), requiring lawyers to abide by their client's decisions concerning the scope of representation; and 1.7(b), prohibiting lawyers from representing a client if the representation is materially limited by the lawyer's own interests.

Linda Eide and Michael D. Hunsinger represented the Bar Association. Mr. Coney represented himself. The hearing officer was Andrea A. Darvas.

Carolyn A. Elsey (WSBA No. 23626, admitted 1994), of Tacoma, has received a reprimand, following a hearing. The discipline is based upon her knowingly making a false statement of material fact to a third party.

In 1996, the Pierce County Superior Court appointed Ms. Elsey to serve as guardian ad litem (GAL) for a child. The child lived with the mother in Spokane, and the father lived in Tacoma. In November 1996, an expert determined that the mother suffered from Munchausen's Syndrome by Proxy (MSBP), a disease in which the caregiver feigns or produces illness in the child. The expert also believed that the mother might flee when confronted with the diagnosis. Ms. Elsey notified the father's attorney of her intention to bring a motion seeking to transfer primary residential placement to the father. Ms. Elsey did not notify the mother because of the fear that she would flee with the child. Ms. Elsey set the motion for November 12, 1996.

On October 31, 1996, a Spokane attorney filed a notice of appearance on the mother's behalf. He did not mail this notice to Ms. Elsey until November 6, 1996. On November 5, the mother's lawyer left phone messages for both Ms. Elsey and the father's attorney. Although the content of the message was disputed, both Ms. Elsey and the father's attorney thought that the mother's attorney was still considering whether to actually appear in the case. Ms. Elsey received the mother's lawyer's notice of appearance on Saturday, November 10, 1996. She opened the envelope and date-stamped the cover letter, but did not read the contents. It was Veteran's Day weekend and Ms. Elsey planned on reviewing her mail after the weekend. Ms. Elsey and the father's attorney appeared in court on Tuesday, November 12, 1996, and the commissioner signed an order transferring primary residential placement to the father.

The pleadings and orders state that the mother was pro se. The father's counsel informed the court that a lawyer was considering representing the mother, but had not received a notice of appearance. The father flew to Spokane and obtained custody of the child. By the end of the case, MSBP was no longer an issue, and primary residential placement was returned to the mother. The hearing officer found that although Ms. Elsey may not have known that the mother was represented, it was negligent for her to have received and date-stamped the notice without reading the contents prior to the hearing.

Ms. Elsey's conduct negligently violated RPC 8.4(c), prohibiting lawyers from engaging in misrepresentations.

John L. Messina and Joanne Abelson represented the Bar Association. Kurt M. Bulmer represented Ms. Elsey. The hearing officer was Peter Matty.

Nondisciplinary Notices

Interim Suspension

Matthew J. Dever (WSBA No. 24193, admitted 1994), of Puyallup, was ordered suspended from the practice of law pending the outcome of disciplinary proceedings by Supreme Court order entered January 30, 2002.

Interim suspension is pursuant to RLD Title 3 and is not a disciplinary sanction.