August 2002

Disciplinary Notices

Lloyd M. Jones (WSBA No. 18949, admitted 1989), of Seattle, has been disbarred by order of the Supreme Court approving a stipulation, effective May 8, 2002. The discipline is based upon his conduct involving dishonesty, fraud, and conduct prejudicial to the administration of justice between 1995 and 2001.

Mr. Jones and Ms. M met in 1995. In March 1998, Ms. M sold two condominiums for $254,000, and shortly thereafter purchased a duplex for $253,000 jointly in Ms. M's and Mr. Jones' names. In March 2000, Ms. M quit-claimed the duplex to Mr. Jones.

Between January 1995 and April 2001, checks payable to Mr. Jones totaling over $41,000 were written on Ms. M's bank account. Mr. Jones completed credit-card applications for Ms. M, and requested additional cards in his name. The cards were used for personal expenses.

In September 2000, Ms. M's son filed a petition asking for a guardian for his mother's person and estate because she suffered from blindness, short-term memory loss, and had demonstrated inability to care for herself and her affairs. In December, Ms. M executed a will, leaving all her property to Mr. Jones. On December 28, the court appointed a guardian ad litem, who interviewed Ms. M on February 5, 2001.

On February 12, Ms. M and Mr. Jones were married. Several months later, Ms. M did not understand that she was married to Mr. Jones. Mr. Jones stipulated that he married Ms. M to circumvent the guardianship process. The court subsequently invalidated this marriage. On February 20, 2001, the guardian ad litem recommended that a neutral third party be appointed guardian for Ms. M's person and estate; Partners in Care was appointed on March 6, 2001.

The order appointing a guardian also ordered Mr. Jones to disclose to the guardian, within 60 days, all transactions on behalf of or with Ms. M, and provide documentation. Mr. Jones did not disclose the transactions or provide documentation, and on May 24, 2001, the court entered an order assessing sanctions against Mr. Jones for failure to comply, and requiring him to provide the documents in three weeks. On June 19, Mr. Jones provided the guardian with some documents and signed releases for records from his bank accounts. On June 22, the court entered an order finding Mr. Jones's compliance was de minimus, and that he was attempting to hinder the guardian. The guardian and Mr. Jones subsequently agreed to a settlement approved by the court, in which Mr. Jones quit-claimed his interest in the duplex to Ms. M, agreed to entry of a judgment of $99,300, and permitted the guardian to obtain the remaining funds in a bank account in Mr. Jones's name. At the time her property was transferred to Mr. Jones, Ms. M was not competent to agree to the transfers or to understand it.

Mr. Jones's conduct violated RPCs 8.4(b), prohibiting lawyers from engaging in criminal acts that reflect adversely on lawyers' honesty or trustworthiness; 8.4(c), prohibiting lawyers from engaging in acts involving dishonesty, fraud, deceit or misrepresentation; and 8.4(d), prohibiting lawyers from engaging in conduct prejudicial to the administration of justice.

Anne Seidel represented the Bar Association. Andrew O. Carrington represented Mr. Jones.

Paul D. Edmondson (WSBA No. 3634, admitted 1971), of Yakima, has been suspended for 21 days by order of the Supreme Court approving a stipulation. The suspension was imposed retroactively effective June 30, 2000. This discipline is based upon his practicing law while his license was suspended, and failing to adequately supervise a nonlawyer assistant.

Matter 1: On June 7, 2000, Mr. Edmondson's license to practice law in Washington was suspended for nonpayment of license fees. Between June 8 and June 29, 2000, Mr. Edmondson filed pleadings, and appeared as a lawyer in Yakima District Court approximately once a week. Mr. Edmondson stated that his assistant, Ms. C, signed for, but did not give him, a February 2000 certified letter notifying him of his failure to pay license fees, and that he did not receive a June 2000 letter sent by regular mail informing him of his suspension. Mr. Edmondson states he first learned of his suspension from opposing counsel on June 30, 2000. Mr. Edmondson then immediately called the WSBA, applied for reinstatement, and paid the necessary fees. He did not practice law from June 30 until his license was reinstated on July 21, 2000.

Matter 2: Since 1987, Mr. Edmondson employed Ms. C as a legal assistant and interpreter. In 2001 and for some time before that year, Ms. C accepted legal-fee payments from numerous prospective clients without Mr. Edmondson's knowledge. The clients believed they had retained Mr. Edmondson, but Ms. C embezzled the funds and, in some cases, provided clients with fraudulent legal documents. Mr. Edmondson relied on Ms. C to run the office while he was out of town. Her office was on a separate floor, so he was unable to directly observe her interactions with clients or potential clients. Ms. C also spoke Spanish to some clients, and Mr. Edmondson could only partially understand these conversations.

In September 2001, Mr. Edmondson received a letter from Ms. H stating that she had paid him for a dissolution in June 1998. Ms. H stated she was never able to reach Mr. Edmondson, and that his secretary told her that her court appearances had been canceled and he was too busy to see her. Mr. Edmondson immediately wrote back expressing concern and telling her he would handle the divorce or refund her money.

In November 2001, Mr. Edmondson received a complaint from Mr. and Mrs. X that in February 2001 they had paid a fee, but no work had been performed. Ms. C told Mr. Edmondson the client files and the money in them were missing. Mr. Edmondson received a third complaint in January 2002, at which time he fired Ms. C. On January 8, Mr. Edmondson filed a police report regarding Ms. C's embezzlement. Mr. Edmondson has since learned of 35 cases in which Ms. C accepted money from prospective clients without his knowledge, and converted the money to personal use. In each case, Mr. Edmondson has offered to honor the fees and perform the legal services without further compensation. In six instances, he refunded the client fees.

Mr. Edmondson's conduct violated RPCs 8.4(d) and 5.5(a), prohibiting lawyers from engaging in conduct prejudicial to the administration of justice; and 5.3, stating that lawyers are responsible for the conduct of nonlawyer assistants in violation of the RPCs.

Leslie Allen represented the Bar Association. Mr. Edmondson represented himself.

Donald B. Lundahl (WSBA No. 21424, admitted 1992), of Tacoma, has been suspended for 30 days by order of the Supreme Court approving a stipulation effective May 15, 2000. This discipline is based upon wrongful acceleration and miscalculation of his attorney's fees from 1993 to 1999.

In August 1993, Mr. C hired Mr. Lundahl to represent him in a wrongful-termination suit. Mr. C signed a contingent-fee agreement and gave Mr. Lundahl a $1,000 advance on costs; however, Mr. Lundahl did not deposit the advance in a trust account. In November or December 1993, Mr. Lundahl asked, and Mr. C orally agreed, that $850 of the advance could be applied to Mr. Lundahl's current attorney's fees. Mr. Lundahl retained two experts who required advance retainers, and Mr. C gave Mr. Lundahl $2,500 for the retainers. Mr. Lundahl's fee agreement permitted him to hire associate counsel, and in August 1994 he hired Mr. J to assist him.

The settlement took place on October 18, and Mr. C was to receive a structured settlement of $150,000 over two years. Mr. Lundahl received Mr. C's first payment of $15,000 on or about November 28, 1994. He opened a trust account for the settlement proceeds, paid approximately $5,500 in costs and expert fees, and retained the balance as part of his attorney's fees. He did not send an accounting or any of the funds to Mr. C.

In December 1994, Mr. C asked Mr. Lundahl if any money remained after expenses, stating that Mr. Lundahl told him he would send a little money but had not done so. Mr. Lundahl received the second $15,000 on or about December 28, 1994. He paid expert fees of $2,289.37 and applied the remainder to attorney's fees, using $4,000 to pay Mr. J. In late February 1995, Mr. C wrote Mr. Lundahl and asked for an accounting. In March 1995, Mr. Lundahl sent Mr. C his ledger sheet for the settlement funds and a list of the costs paid to date. The list contained some mathematical errors.

In late June 1995, Mr. Lundahl received a third check for $30,000, which he deposited into the trust account on July 10. On July 11, he removed $1,000 from the trust account, and on July 19, he transferred approximately $26,000 from the trust account into his general business account, which he used for personal bills. On the same date, he sent Mr. C two checks totaling $2,267.39 and an accounting of fund disbursements. According to the accounting, Mr. Lundahl retained $50,000 as his attorney's fees.

After receiving the accounting, Mr. C contacted Mr. J, who filed a motion for an accounting and for an order that all settlement funds be deposited with the court. During a deposition, Mr. Lundahl testified that he had Mr. C's oral agreement to accelerate his attorney's fees, and stated that the written fee agreement also gave him the right to accelerate fees; however, the fee agreement did not give him this right. During the deposition, Mr. Lundahl stated he was not aware of RPC1.5(c)(2), requiring a structured contingent fee to be calculated based on the present value, not the full value of the settlement. Mr. Lundahl also miscalculated the fees at 33-1/3 percent when the fee agreement entitled him to 33 percent, or $49,500. Disciplinary counsel advised Mr. Lundahl that if there was a dispute over accelerated fees, the disputed funds should be placed in the trust account, and the dispute should be solved by mediation, arbitration or litigation.

On September 19, 1995, Mr. Lundahl wrote Mr. C, stating he had miscalculated his attorney's fees and he owed Mr. C an additional $3,235.66. He stated the amount was in the trust account and he offered it as a full settlement. Mr. C did not accept the offer due to his position that Mr. Lundahl had wrongfully accelerated his fees. Mr. C ultimately received the rest of the settlement payments.

In December 1997, Mr. C and Mr. J sued Mr. Lundahl, alleging negligence, breach of fiduciary duty, conversion, breach of contract, and for quantum meruit. Mr. Lundahl counterclaimed against Mr. C for breach of contract and against Mr. J for interference with a contractual relationship. The matter was referred to mandatory arbitration, and a hearing was held on July 29 and July 31, 1998. Mr. Lundahl testified he had obtained Mr. C's oral agreement to accelerate his fees, stating that after the grievance was filed, he realized he had been wrong to accelerate his fees because he did not have a written agreement to do so.

The arbitration decision was entered on August 15, 1998. The arbitrator found that Mr. Lundahl had wrongfully accelerated his fees, and he awarded Mr. C the statutory interest rate on the fees, prejudgement interest, and attorney's fees and costs. He also awarded Mr. C the $500, which Mr. Lundahl admitted he took by mistake when he used a 33-1/3 percent calculation instead of 33 percent. The arbitrator awarded Mr. J $16,500 (less the $5,000 already received) for his work on the case. The judgment on the arbitrator's decision was entered on September 25, 1998. Mr. Lundahl paid both Mr. C and Mr. J in or near March 1999.

Mr. Lundahl's conduct violated RPCs 1.5(c)(2), requiring lawyers to calculate their contingent percentage on the present value of a settlement if part of the settlement is to be paid in the future; and 1.14(b)(4), requiring lawyers to promptly pay client funds upon request.

Leslie Allen represented the Bar Association. Mr. Lundahl represented himself.

Robert W. Huffhines Jr. (WSBA No. 11279, admitted 1980), of Kelso, received a reprimand on May 10, 2002, based on a stipulation approved by the Disciplinary Board in March 2002. This discipline is based upon his failure to act with reasonable diligence, to keep his client reasonably informed, and to provide the explanations necessary to permit the client to make informed decisions from 1996 to 2001.

In May 1997, Mr. S was sentenced to a 164-month term for second-degree murder. In June 1999, Mr. S hired Mr. Huffhines to file a petition for review, which was denied on November 2, 1999. Mr. Huffhines did not promptly inform Mr. S of the order denying review.

Mr. Huffhines then agreed to file a petition for writ of habeas corpus on Mr. S's behalf. On February 3, 2000, Mr. S's mother (Ms. S) signed a fee agreement with Mr. Huffhines and paid $2,000. On March 23, she wrote to Mr. Huffhines inquiring about his progress in the matter, and wrote again on November 29, 2000, but Mr. Huffhines did not respond. On December 12, 2000, Mr. S wrote to Mr. Huffhines expressing his frustration about the lack of communication and diligence; Mr. Huffhines did not respond. On January 15, 2001, Mr. S wrote to Mr. Huffhines requesting his file, and Mr. Huffhines did not respond.

Mr. Huffhines prepared a draft of the petition for a writ, but subsequently decided he did not have sufficient legal basis for the petition and did not finalize or file it. The filing deadline was November 2, 2000, and Mr. Huffhines took no further action before the expiration date, nor did he communicate his concerns regarding the legal basis of the petition to Mr. or Ms. S prior to the filing deadline.

In January 2001, Mr. S and his mother filed a grievance with the Bar Association. On February 13, Mr. Huffhines wrote a letter to Ms. S expressing his regret and refunding $2,005. On April 4, Mr. Huffhines sent Mr. S his file.

Mr. Huffhines's conduct violated RPCs 1.3, requiring lawyers to act with reasonable diligence in representing clients; and 1.4(a) and (b), requiring lawyers to keep their clients reasonably informed about the status of their matters and to explain the matters to the extent reasonably necessary for clients to make informed decisions.

Douglas J. Ende represented the Bar Association. Robert W. Huffhines Jr. represented himself.

Douglas K. Earl (WSBA No. 4025, admitted 1974), of Moses Lake, received a reprimand on June 7, 2002, based on a stipulation approved by the Disciplinary Board in January 2002. This discipline is based upon his communicating ex parte with a superior court judge about an issue then pending before the judge in 1996.

From 1996 through 2000, public defender services for Grant County Superior Court were provided according to the terms of a written contract between the law firm of Earl & Earl, Inc. PS and Grant County. Mr. Earl was the administrator of the contract, and under the terms of the contract the firm could subcontract independent lawyers to provide services, but Mr. Earl must administer the contract. Mr. Earl was required to "provide for the training, supervision, monitoring and evaluation of the subcontracted attorneys."

In March 1996, Mr. L, a criminal defendant who was represented by counsel, indicated he lacked the means to pay for his defense. On March 12, 1996, Judge S appointed a public defender to represent Mr. L, and ordered private counsel to remain as co-counsel. Based on a conflict of interest, private counsel sought to remove the public defender, and to allow himself to represent Mr. L at public expense. On May 7, the court heard Mr. L's motion to pay attorney's fees and costs. On May 28, Mr. Earl filed an amicus brief stating public funds should not be used to pay private counsel.

As of June 3, 1996, the Grant County commissioners had assured Mr. Earl that he would have no contract liability if private counsel was paid from public funds. On June 20, private counsel filed a motion to disqualify and/or remove the Grant County prosecutor and Grant County public defender. On July 1, 1996, the prosecuting attorney filed a motion to determine attorney's fees.

In July 1996, Judge S was running for re-election as superior court judge. At the end of July, Mr. Earl sent the following handwritten message to the judge, written on the response form included with the campaign letter from the Committee to Re-Elect Judge S:

Judge – Until this…matter came up, I was in your corner. I cannot support you and will oppose everything until I am sure… gets nothing from public funds. When that decision is finally made, if it is, then you will be back to normal. Until then you are very w vulnerable.

(Emphasis and cross-out in original.)

Mr. Earl did not send a copy of the note to private counsel or the prosecuting attorney. Judge S received the note from the re-election committee in early August 1996, when he was still the presiding judge on Mr. L's criminal case. Subsequently, Mr. Earl apologized to Judge S for his conduct in this matter.

Mr. Earl's conduct violated RPC 3.5(b), prohibiting lawyers from communicating ex parte with a judge, juror, prospective juror or other official, except as permitted by law.

Christine Gray represented the Bar Association. Douglas Earl represented himself.

David W. Hubert (WSBA No. 16488, admitted 1986), of Veradale, received a censure on February 8, 2002, following a stipulation approved by the Disciplinary Board on November 30, 2001. This discipline is based upon his failing to supervise nonlawyer assistants, to safeguard and maintain records of client funds, and sharing legal fees with a nonlawyer from 1996 to 1998.

On March 12, 1996, Mr. Hubert and Ms. K signed an independent contractor agreement. Ms. K's company, Washington Paralegal Services, Inc. (WPSI), would act as a non-real estate closing agent, and Mr. Hubert would provide services to WPSI's clients. WPSI would obtain the client, make a preliminary determination of client needs, and draft the appropriate paperwork. Mr. Hubert then reviewed the work and gave approval or made recommendations for changes. Mr. Hubert would appear in court, if necessary, except for real estate transactions, and be paid a small fee for each matter reviewed as per the agreement.

Mr. Hubert established a trust account for WPSI to hold funds in escrow during real estate closings and granted Ms. K signatory rights. Mr. Hubert allowed WPSI to perform the accounting for the trust account, reconciling it each month. Mr. Hubert did not supervise this accounting.

In April 1997, without Mr. Hubert's knowledge, Ms. K signed a wire-transfer services agreement with Seafirst, authorizing her, not Mr. Hubert, to request and verify wire transfers on the trust account.

Between September 1997 and September 1998, Ms. K embezzled in excess of $275,000 from the trust account through wire transfers to other banks. On September 11, 1998, Mr. Hubert learned of the possible embezzlement through an anonymous letter, and by September 16, 1998 Mr. Hubert had determined that WPSI had embezzled money from the trust account. He immediately removed Ms. K from the account.

On September 25, 1998, Mr. Hubert wrote to all affected clients and informed them of the situation. Mr. Hubert provided his insurance company and policy number to the clients, along with the name of the FBI agent in charge. Mr. Hubert's insurance covered all claims.

Mr. Hubert's conduct violated RPCs 5.3, requiring lawyers to supervise nonlawyer assistants; 1.14, requiring lawyers to safeguard client funds, maintain complete records of funds, and promptly deliver funds they are entitled to receive to clients; and 5.4(a), prohibiting lawyers from sharing legal fees with nonlawyers.

Sachia Stonefeld Powell represented the Bar Association. J. Donald Curran represented Mr. Hubert.

Peter M. Lukevich (WSBA No. 18979, admitted 1989), of Seattle, received a censure on March 28, 2002, following a hearing. This discipline is based upon his failure to explain a matter to his client to the extent necessary for the client to make informed decisions, and failure to act with diligence and promptness from 1996 to 1999.

On May 31, 1996, Ms. P retained Mr. Lukevich to represent her in an employment claim against the Municipal Court of Seattle. Ms. P and Mr. Lukevich entered a contingency-fee agreement with a $5,000 nonrefundable retainer.

Prior to hiring Mr. Lukevich, another lawyer represented Ms. P and filed a lawsuit on her behalf, alleging wages owed and gender discrimination. The case proceeded to a bench trial in 1995, but was declared a mistrial when a witness was found to be a close acquaintance. The trial was rescheduled for June 1997. Ms. P informed Mr. Lukevich that she wanted a jury trial, and Mr. Lukevich agreed to file a jury demand, but did not do so.

In March and April 1997, Ms. P left messages for Mr. Lukevich inquiring about her case status, but he did not respond in a timely manner. Shortly before June 1997, one of Ms. P's experts suffered a stroke, and Mr. Lukevich asked for a continuance, which the court denied. With Ms. P, Mr. Lukevich discussed going to trial without the expert, or dismissing and refiling the lawsuit. Mr. Lukevich advised Ms. P she had additional time under the statute of limitations to refile, though the three-year statute of limitations had expired. Ms. P agreed to dismiss and refile.

On June 5, 1997, Mr. Lukevich filed a motion and stipulation of the parties for voluntary nonsuit, and the suit was dismissed. On August 13, 1997, Mr. Lukevich refiled the lawsuit and trial was set for January 1999. Ms. P asked Mr. Lukevich to file an amended complaint to include incidents of retaliation after the initial lawsuit, to file a jury demand, and to depose witnesses regarding her retaliation claims. Mr. Lukevich agreed to do all three, but did not do so. Ms. P specifically asked Mr. Lukevich to depose Court Administrator K because he was very ill and was unlikely to survive until the time of trial. Mr. Lukevich agreed, but he did not depose Mr. K before his death in December 1998.

Ms. P wrote to Mr. Lukevich at least six times between February and November 1998, and repeatedly made calls expressing her concerns regarding his representation and requesting information. Mr. Lukevich did not respond in a timely manner and did not provide complete responses. In response to one message on October 19, 1998, Mr. Lukevich assured Ms. P everything was under control.

On October 22, 1998, the city filed a motion for summary judgment, arguing in part that Ms. P's claims were barred by the three-year statute of limitations. On October 26, Mr. Lukevich left a message for Ms. P assuring her he would work on the motion. Concerned that Mr. Lukevich was not attending to her case, Ms. P hired attorney Ms. R. Ms. P asked Mr. Lukevich to work with Ms. R, but he did not respond.

On November 9, 1998, Mr. Lukevich and Ms. R filed separate responses to the motion for summary judgment. Ms. R's response included a request for continuance based on Mr. Lukevich's alleged inadequate representation. On November 16, the court granted the continuance. On November 22, Mr. Lukevich wrote to Ms. R, stating he intended to withdraw from representation. On November 23, Ms. P wrote to Mr. Lukevich requesting a refund of $5,000 in attorney's fees; however, Mr. Lukevich did not refund her fees. On November 30, Mr. Lukevich filed a notice of withdrawal and substitution of counsel. On May 24, 1999, the court issued an order partially granting the motion for summary judgment, and dismissed with prejudice all of Ms. P's claims based on acts prior to August 13, 1994. The lawsuit was settled in June 1999.

Mr. Lukevich's conduct violated RPCs 1.3 and 1.4(b), requiring lawyers to act with diligence and explain matters to the extent reasonably necessary to permit clients to make informed decisions; 1.4(a), requiring lawyers to keep clients reasonably informed about the status of their matters and to promptly comply with reasonable requests for information; and 1.2, 1.3 and 3.2, requiring lawyers to abide by clients' decisions regarding the objectives of representation, act with diligence, and expedite litigation.

Marsha Matsumoto represented the Bar Association. Mr. Lukevich represented himself. The hearing officer was Lawrence Mills.

Richard L. Jones (WSBA No. 12904, admitted 1982), of Bellevue, received a censure on June 10, 2002, following a stipulation approved by the Disciplinary Board on May 8, 2002. This discipline is based upon his failure to maintain adequate records regarding client funds coming into his possession, and the commingling of his personal funds with client funds in his trust account in 2000. (Note: Richard L. Jones is to be distinguished from Richard A. Jones of Seattle, WSBA No. 7671; Richard B. Jones of Port Orchard, WSBA No. 4613; and Richard F. Jones of Olympia, WSBA No. 1460.)

On or about December 7, 2000, Mr. Jones' IOLTA account became overdrawn, resulting in a notice to the Bar Association. In the course of the investigation, the auditor examined Mr. Jones' records for the timeframe January 1998 to March 2001. In January 1998, Mr. Jones' trust account was with Wells Fargo. In March 2000, he closed the Wells Fargo account and opened a Key Bank account. In November 2000, he opened a First Mutual account, but did not close the Key Bank account until March 2001.

The auditor found that the manual check register for the Wells Fargo account was missing some transactions, manual deposit books were missing some deposit slips, and manual check registers and deposit books were not reconciled to monthly bank statements or client ledgers. Mr. Jones' bookkeeper maintained a check register in QuickBooks; however, no client accounts were maintained in the QuickBooks records, thus Mr. Jones was unable to produce client ledgers. The QuickBooks registers were not reconciled to the bank statements until the end of 2000, and because of undetected errors, the QuickBooks registers and the manual registers did not agree.

Client ledgers were kept in Timeslips; however, not all clients were included. The Timeslips system was not reconciled to either the manual check register or the QuickBooks register. Mr. Jones used Timeslips to estimate client balances prior to disbursements by manually comparing the most recent Timeslips billing with the manual check register and deposit books, which resulted in disbursing more funds than some clients had. Statements for the accounts were maintained but were not used to reconcile the accounts.

This recordkeeping system resulted in trust account shortages without Mr. Jones' knowledge. As of February 2001, the account balance was $3,351.45 less than it should have been, a shortage that had developed over a period of time. The auditor could not specifically identify the transactions that caused the shortage. Mr. Jones learned of the shortage from the overdraft notice; however, he was unable to determine the exact amount. After the auditor's determination, Mr. Jones restored the shortage in February 2001.

Mr. Jones' conduct violated RPCs 1.14(a), requiring lawyers to keep client funds in a trust account; and 1.14(b)(3), requiring lawyers to maintain complete records of client funds in their possession.

Randy Beitel represented the Bar Association. Kurt Bulmer represented Mr. Jones.

Melvin L. Kleweno Jr. (WSBA No. 3602, admitted 1960), of Kent, received a censure following a stipulation approved by the Disciplinary Board on March 8, 2002. This discipline is based upon his failure to avoid conflicts of interest in the 1990s.

Mr. Kleweno and three other lawyers owned TIMCO, a general partnership. These lawyers were also partners in a law firm. In the late 1960s, TIMCO purchased "lot six," a parcel of land adjoining three other parcels already owned by TIMCO. An alleyway provided access to the four lots, including the law firm's offices. The alleyway was located along the boundary between lots six and seven; another family owned lot seven.

From 1975 through 1984, Mr. G leased lot six from TIMCO for a Mexican restaurant. In 1976, Mr. Kleweno began representing Mr. G and the restaurant. In the late 1970s, Mr. G purchased the restaurant from the other partial owner. Mr. Kleweno assisted with the sale, incorporated the business, and acted as corporate counsel. In 1984, Mr. G purchased lot six from TIMCO. The law firm prepared the sales documents, handled the closing, and represented TIMCO in the sale. Although Mr. G knew that the law firm partners owned TIMCO, no one formally disclosed to him that the law firm represented TIMCO. Mr. Kleweno executed the deed of trust, statutory warranty deed, and right of first refusal. None of the sale documents included an express reservation of easement for use of the alleyway. No one explained to Mr. G that allowing others to use the alleyway could affect his ownership of that portion of his parcel. After the sale, the law firm's clients continued to use the alleyway to access the office. Mr. Kleweno continued to represent Mr. G until 1995, when a dispute developed regarding the alleyway.

In the late 1980s, the law firm moved its offices and leased the building to a daycare, which increased the amount of traffic using the alleyway. In January 1995, Mr. G delivered a letter to the law firm complaining about the increased traffic. The law firm responded that the alleyway was a prescriptive easement, and in October 1995, TIMCO and the daycare commenced a lawsuit against Mr. G. to establish the prescriptive easement. The court ruled that the alleyway was a prescriptive easement based on the required use during the daycare's tenancy and for years before.

Mr. Kleweno's conduct violated DR5-104(A), prohibiting a law firm from entering a business transaction with a client unless the client consents after a full disclosure (the misconduct here occurred prior to the adoption of the Rules of Professional Conduct); and RPC 1.7(a) and (b), prohibiting a lawyer from representing a client if the representation may be materially limited by the lawyer's responsibilities to another client or the lawyer's own interests, unless the client consents in writing after a full consultation.

Michael Gendler and Jonathan Burke represented the Bar Association. Kurt Bulmer represented Mr. Kleweno.

Cheng Wang (WSBA No. 27218, admitted 1997), formerly of Seattle, received a censure following a stipulation approved by the Disciplinary Board on May 8, 2002. This discipline is based upon his practicing law in 2000 while his license was suspended.

Mr. Wang's license to practice law in Washington was suspended on June 7, 2000. On that same day, the Supreme Court mailed Mr. Wang notice of the suspension. Mr. Wang indicated that he did not receive this notice or the previous notices regarding his suspension. He stated that he first learned of his license suspension in April 2001 when he contacted the WSBA regarding admission to the Massachusetts Bar. On May 4, the WSBA notified Mr. Wang of the necessary steps to reinstate his license. He completed those steps and was reinstated to inactive status on July 13, 2001. While completing an application to change to active status, Mr. Wang disclosed that he may have practiced law during his suspension, when he was employed as an associate in Seattle, New York and Massachusetts. Mr. Wang had not notified the WSBA of his address changes. As of October 2001, Mr. Wang was working in Shanghai, China.

Mr. Wang's conduct violated RPC 5.5(a), prohibiting lawyers from engaging in the unauthorized practice of law; and RLD 8.2(a), requiring lawyers to discontinue practice upon suspension of their license to practice.

Douglas Ende represented the Bar Association. Mr. Wang represented himself.

Thomas D. Dinwiddie (WSBA No. 6790 admitted 1976), of Tacoma, received a censure following a stipulation approved by the Disciplinary Board on May 8, 2002. This discipline is based upon his failure to avoid a conflict of interest in a criminal representation in 2000.

In December 2000, Mr. Dinwiddie agreed to represent two criminal co-defendants in a burglary-and-assault matter. Mr. Dinwiddie met with each defendant and explored whether they would blame each other, determining that the two co-defendants would not be adverse to each other. Mr. Dinwiddie also engaged a private investigator to interview the co-defendants and issue a report to Mr. Dinwiddie regarding a possible conflict of interest. The investigator reported no conflict in representing both defendants. Mr. Dinwiddie then obtained a written waiver of conflict from each of the co-defendants. The extent of Mr. Dinwiddie's disclosure regarding the conflicts prior to obtaining his clients' signatures on the waivers was disputed.

At the December 14 hearing, the prosecutor objected to the joint representation, because one defendant had a criminal record and the other did not. A Pierce County Superior Court judge disqualified Mr. Dinwiddie from further representation of either defendant. Over the next weekend Mr. Dinwiddie worked on an emergency appeal of his disqualification. On Monday, December 18, 2000, both defendants notified Mr. Dinwiddie that they would seek separate counsel and asked that he refund their fees. Mr. Dinwiddie refunded each client $1,100 from the $5,000 paid. The statement sent to the clients included 19.5 hours spent on the disqualification appeal and $422 paid to the private investigator.

Mr. Dinwiddie's conduct violated RPCs 1.4(b), requiring lawyers to explain matters to the extent necessary for clients to make an informed decision; 1.7, prohibiting lawyers from representing two clients with adverse interests, unless the clients waive the conflict in writing after full disclosure; and 1.5, requiring lawyers' fees to be reasonable.

Nancy Miller represented the Bar Association. Kurt Bulmer represented Mr. Dinwiddie.

Andrew L. Benjamin (WSBA No. 15223, admitted 1985), of Seattle, received a censure on June 20, 2002, following a stipulation approved by the Disciplinary Board on May 8, 2002. This discipline is based upon his failure to timely file a lawsuit, to communicate with his client regarding the statute of limitations, and to advise his client to seek independent counsel regarding a revised fee agreement between 1995 and 1998.

On March 10, 1995, Ms. M was rear-ended, causing minor damage to the car and personal injury to Ms. M. On April 30, Ms. M went to Mr. Benjamin for legal advice about her case, and he advised her that the case was probably worth $2,000 to $3,000. Ms. M decided to reject a prior settlement offer from the insurance company. Throughout 1996, Ms. M received physical-therapy treatments for injuries related to the accident. Ms. M mailed letters to Mr. Benjamin on December 14, 1996 and May 23, 1997, asking when her medical bills would be paid. Mr. Benjamin did not respond to the letters.

On January 20, 1997, Ms. M called Mr. Benjamin's office and he did not contact her in response. On March 3, Mr. Benjamin wrote to one health-care provider regarding payment of Ms. M's bills from any settlement. In April 1997, the insurance company wrote to say that the $500 settlement offer was still open. On May 19, Mr. Benjamin responded that after his client completed treatment they would present a settlement demand. After learning that the insurance company would not negotiate the $500 offer, Mr. Benjamin stated that he notified Ms. M that he would not be pursuing her claim; however, Ms. M disputes this assertion.

On June 29, 1998, Mr. Benjamin informed Ms. M that the statute of limitations had expired in March 1998. Mr. Benjamin set up an appointment for July 1, 1998 to discuss the client's unpaid medical bills and the expired statute of limitations. During this appointment, Mr. Benjamin asked Ms. M and her husband to sign a revised fee agreement and release. The agreement purported to obligate Mr. Benjamin to pursue payment of Ms. M's medical bills under her insurance policies, and to release Mr. Benjamin from liability for having missed the statute of limitations. Ms. M and her husband signed the revised agreement during the meeting. They did not have independent representation either before or when they signed the agreement prospectively limiting Mr. Benjamin's liability for malpractice. Mr. Benjamin asserts he orally advised them at the meeting that they were entitled to such representation. Ms. M and her husband dispute this assertion.

Mr. Benjamin's conduct violated RPCs 1.3, requiring lawyers to act with reasonable diligence; and 1.4, requiring lawyers not to make agreements limiting the lawyer's liability to a client unless the client has independent counsel.

Anthony Butler represented the Bar Association. Kurt Bulmer represented Mr. Benjamin.