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January 2002Disciplinary NoticesThese notices of imposition of disciplinary sanctions and actions are published pursuant to Rule 11.2(c)(4) of the Supreme Court's Rules for Lawyer Discipline, and pursuant to the February 18, 1995 policy statement of the WSBA Board of Governors. For a complete copy of any disciplinary decision, call the Washington State Disciplinary Board at 206-733-5926, leaving the case name and your address, or electronically submit your requests at http://pro.wsba.org/forms/publicrequest.asp. A list of recent disciplinary notices is available on the WSBA Website. CorrectionsIn the December 2001 issue of Bar News, Michael K. Tasker's suspension was listed incorrectly as six months; in fact, Mr. Tasker's suspension was two years (p. 45). In the Lawyers' Fund for Client Protection 2001 Annual Report (p. 42), Kenneth R. Mitchell was listed as disbarred; in fact, Mr. Mitchell was suspended. We apologize for these errors. DisbarredRosalynn D. Guillen (WSBA No. 22872, admitted 1993), of Seattle, has been disbarred by order of the Supreme Court approving a stipulation, effective August 30, 2001. The discipline is based upon her misuse of client funds between 1997 and 1999. In 1997, Ms. Guillen settled a client's personal-injury case for $72,000. The client received $50,000 from the settlement and asked Ms. Guillen to hold the funds in trust for her. In October 1997, Ms. Guillen deposited the client's funds in a trust account. Between November 1997 and October 1998, Ms. Guillen improperly withdrew the client's funds from the trust account to pay her own business and personal expenses. By October 31, 1998, the trust account balance was $85.42, with no funds paid to the client or the client's previous lawyer. During this time period, Ms. Guillen deposited earned fees into the trust account and disbursed the funds directly to pay her personal expenses. Ms. Guillen commingled her own funds with the trust-account funds to avoid garnishment from an unpaid judgment against her. In March 1998, the client's previous lawyer learned of the settlement and filed a $9,000 attorney's lien. Following a May 2000 arbitration, the previous lawyer obtained a judgment against the client for $5,398.25, which the client paid. On June 4, 1998, Ms. Guillen notified the client that the client's funds were not immediately available, but that they would earn 8.5 percent interest. In August 1999, the client notified Ms. Guillen that she wanted her funds disbursed to fund a real estate purchase. At this time, there were no funds remaining in the trust account. In January 2000, Ms. Guillen arranged for $50,000 to be deposited into the client's bank account. Ms. Guillen has agreed to pay the client interest on her money, to reimburse her for the fees the client paid her previous lawyer, and has made monthly payments to the client. Ms. Guillen's conduct violated RPCs 1.14, requiring lawyers to preserve the identity of client funds, prohibiting commingling lawyers' funds with client funds, and requiring that substantial client funds be placed in an interest-bearing account with interest accruing to the client; and 8.4(c), prohibiting conduct involving dishonesty, fraud, deceit or misrepresentation. Randy Beitel represented the Bar Association. Anthony Savage represented Ms. Guillen. The hearing officer was Lawrence R. Mills. SuspendedSantiago E. Juarez (WSBA No. 5686, admitted 1974), of New Mexico, has been suspended for 18 months by order of the Supreme Court effective June 14, 2001, following a hearing. This discipline is based on his failure to diligently represent a client, failure to comply with duties on suspension, and misrepresentations regarding a payment plan from 1993 through 1995. For further information, please see the Court's opinion filed June 14, 2001. Matter 1: In October 1993, Mr. Juarez began representing a client in a criminal appeal. Due to a delay in filing of the transcripts, Mr. Juarez did not file the client's opening brief within the time set by the court. Between June 14, 1994 and March 1, 1995, Mr. Juarez failed to file the client's opening brief. Mr. Juarez requested several extensions, many of which were filed after the due date of the brief. During this time, the court twice threatened to dismiss the client's appeal. By March 1995, Mr. Juarez's license had been suspended, so he sent the client's file to a lawyer in California, but did not notify the court of his suspension. When the court learned of the suspension, it appointed the Washington Appellate Defenders Association (WADA) to represent the client. WADA contacted Mr. Juarez for the file and transcripts, but did not receive them. After filing a motion to compel the transfer of the transcripts and for sanctions, Mr. Juarez arranged for the California lawyer to deliver the files and transcripts. The files were in disarray and the court ordered a $150 sanction. Mr. Juarez did not pay the sanction prior to WADA's dissolution. In October 1994, the Supreme Court decided a case that materially affected Mr. Juarez's client's conviction; however, Mr. Juarez took no action on this case. In August 1995, the client's family retained new counsel, who negotiated with the prosecutor based on the October 1994 Supreme Court decision. The client pleaded guilty to a lesser offense, the conspiracy charge was dismissed, and the client was released from prison. Matter 2: In December 1994, Mr. Juarez stipulated to a suspension. The Supreme Court approved the stipulation on February 15, 1995. RLD 8.3 requires that within 25 days of the effective date of the suspension, lawyers file an affidavit stating to clients and courts that they have fully complied with the rules requiring notice of their suspension. Mr. Juarez failed to file this affidavit within the required 25 days. Matter 3: The February 1995 suspension order contained a condition on Mr. Juarez's reinstatement. The Court required Mr. Juarez to enter a payment plan with the WSBA to reimburse the Lawyers' Fund for Client Protection (LFCP) for payment made to one of Mr. Juarez's clients. On February 26, 1996, Mr. Juarez paid $706.54 and asked that his license be reinstated after he paid the $1,000 balance. On February 27, Mr. Juarez agreed in writing to pay the balance on or before March 27. The agreement stated that failure to comply with the terms of the agreement would be "evidence of dishonesty, deceit or misrepresentation in connection with his reinstatement and that such conduct may subject him to disciplinary action pursuant to RLD 1.8(f)." Later, during a phone call with Disciplinary Counsel, Mr. Juarez agreed to send his payment by April 8; however, his license had been reinstated on March 6. Mr. Juarez failed to make the promised payment until May 10, 1996, in part based on financial restraints. In the interim, the WSBA initiated a grievance against Mr. Juarez based on his failure to pay. Mr. Juarez did not promptly respond to Disciplinary Counsel's request for a response to the grievance. Mr. Juarez misrepresented his ability to pay the $1,000 balance, both in the original agreement and in his oral promise to pay by April 8, 1996. Mr. Juarez's conduct violated RPCs 8.4(c), prohibiting conduct involving dishonesty, deceit or misrepresentation; 1.3, requiring lawyers to diligently represent their clients; 1.15(d), requiring lawyers to protect clients' interests upon the lawyer's withdrawal from representation; and RLDs 8.3, requiring suspended lawyers to file an affidavit of compliance within 25 days of the effective date of suspension; 2.8(a), requiring lawyers to promptly comply with requests for information in disciplinary investigations; 8.1(a)(4), requiring suspended lawyers to provide files to clients or substituted counsel, upon request; and 8.1(a)(2), requiring lawyers to notify the court of their suspension and inability to act. Maureen Devlin and Christine Gray represented the Bar Association at hearing, and Jonathan Burke, on appeal. Leland Ripley represented Mr. Juarez. The hearing officer was Kelby D. Fletcher. ReprimandTheodore D. Silva (WSBA No. 8190, admitted 1978), of Renton, has received three reprimands based on a stipulation approved by the Disciplinary Board in March 2001. The discipline is based upon his failure to diligently represent three clients, failure to protect clients' interests upon withdrawal, and failure to pay court-ordered sanctions between 1994 and 1997. Matter 1: In February 1994, Mr. Silva agreed to represent a client in a claim against Seafirst. Mr. Silva filed a lawsuit on June 27, 1995, and extended a written settlement offer on December 22, 1995. Seafirst rejected the settlement offer and the client indicated that she wanted to pursue arbitration or a trial. Without advising the client, Mr. Silva determined that she should take a voluntary nonsuit and refile her case in district court. Mr. Silva filed the motion on April 2, 1996, and the motion was granted. Because Mr. Silva improperly drafted the motion and order, the court granted a dismissal with prejudice; Mr. Silva did not inform the client that the court had dismissed her case. In July 1996, the client requested that Mr. Silva subpoena records, but Mr. Silva did not respond. On November 20, 1996, Mr. Silva filed the client's lawsuit in district court. Seafirst's counsel filed a motion to dismiss and for sanctions based on the superior-court dismissal with prejudice. The court granted the motion and imposed $815 in sanctions, which Mr. Silva paid. Matter 2: In June 1994, a husband and wife retained Mr. Silva and another lawyer to represent them in a case against a hospital. Mr. Silva asked the clients for $500 in advance costs to have an expert review their case. Mr. Silva later advised the clients he was prepared to go forward, and sent them a contingent-fee agreement. Mr. Silva filed an administrative tort claim and then a civil suit in superior court; he did not serve the summons of complaint on the defendants. Mr. Silva failed to follow the case schedule, and the court issued an order requiring him to appear. In January 1997, the clients filed a grievance against Mr. Silva and contacted another lawyer. Mr. Silva did not provide the clients' file to the other lawyer. The clients wrote Mr. Silva indicating they understood that he would attend the court hearing; however, Mr. Silva failed to attend. The special master imposed $50 sanctions on Mr. Silva and continued the hearing, contingent on the case being in compliance with the scheduling order. Mr. Silva again failed to attend to the hearing, and the case was dismissed with prejudice in March 1997. The statute of limitations had expired on June 24, 1996, and Mr. Silva did not inform his clients that the case had been dismissed. On June 12, 1997, Mr. Silva forwarded the clients' file to the new counsel. Matter 3: In July 1994, Mr. Silva agreed to represent a client against the client's insurance company. Mr. Silva contacted the company and obtained medical records. In August 1994, an insurance representative told Mr. Silva that the company was suspicious of the client's claim. Mr. Silva told the client that the company was considering a fraud investigation, but assured the client that he would file a lawsuit. In November 1994, following an IME (independent medical exam), a doctor concluded that the client's condition was "most probably the result of the accident." The client told Mr. Silva that he wanted to proceed with his claim. After the IME, Mr. Silva did little or no work on the client's case. In November 1996, the client wrote to Mr. Silva, reminding him of the statute of limitations and Mr. Silva's promise to file a lawsuit. The statute of limitations expired on the claim and Mr. Silva did not file suit. Mr. Silva's conduct violated RPCs 1.3, requiring lawyers to diligently represent their clients; 3.2, requiring lawyers to make reasonable efforts to expedite litigation; 1.4, requiring lawyers to keep clients informed of the status of their matters and to explain matters to the extent necessary to permit clients to make informed decisions; 3.4(c), prohibiting lawyers from knowingly disobeying an obligation under the rules of a tribunal; and 1.15, requiring lawyers to protect clients' interests after withdrawing from representation, including delivering files to the client or substitute counsel upon request. Timothy J. Parker represented the Bar Association. Leland Ripley represented Mr. Silva.
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