April 2006
Disciplinary Notices
These notices of imposition of disciplinary sanctions and actions are published pursuant to Rule 3.5(d) of the Washington State Supreme Court Rules for Enforcement of Lawyer Conduct, and pursuant to the February 18, 1995, policy statement of the WSBA Board of Governors.
Pursuant to Rule for Enforcement of Lawyer Conduct 3.6(b), file materials relating to a matter concluded with an admonition may be destroyed five years after the admonition was issued. In admonition matters, it is the WSBA’s policy to remove the disciplinary notice from the Washington State Bar News website archive five years after the admonition was issued, regardless of whether the WSBA’s file materials are destroyed.
For a complete copy of any disciplinary decision, call the Washington State Disciplinary Board at 206-733-5926, leaving the case name, and your name and address.
Note: Approximately 30,000 persons are eligible to practice law in Washington state. Some of them share the same or similar names. Bar News strives to include a clarification whenever an attorney listed in the Disciplinary Notices has the same name as another WSBA member; however, all discipline reports should be read carefully for names, cities, and bar numbers.
Disbarred
Richard A. Crews (WSBA No. 27895, admitted 1998), of Portland, Oregon, was disbarred, effective August 26, 2005, by order of the Washington State Supreme Court imposing reciprocal discipline based on an order of the Oregon State Supreme Court following a default hearing. This discipline was based on his conduct between 2000 and 2004 involving neglect of client matters, failure to take steps on termination of representation to protect client interests, communicating false information to clients about the status of their matters, forgery, falsification of documents, and failure to cooperate with disciplinary investigations.
Matter 1: Mr. Crews was hired by a client to initiate a lawsuit for breach of contract, conversion, and unlawful trade practices in connection with restoration of a car. Mr. Crews commenced the lawsuit, which was dismissed in January 2001 for lack of jurisdiction over the defendant. Mr. Crews failed to inform the client of the dismissal; he instead falsely suggested to the client that the lawsuit was pending and moving towards settlement. In mid-2001, Mr. Crews prepared and provided the client with falsified settlement papers, onto which he had forged the adverse party's signature. Subsequently, the client received a notice that the adverse party had asserted a lien on the car in question and would sell it at a public auction. Thereafter, Mr. Crews falsely informed the client that the car could not be sold because the lawsuit was still pending. In 2002, Mr. Crews falsely told the client that he had seized and sold property belonging to the defendant and was waiting for the sale to be recorded before forwarding the proceeds to the client.
Matter 2: Mr. Crews was retained by a client to handle several different cases:
• In March 2002, Mr. Crews filed a wrongful-arrest lawsuit on behalf of the client. The defendants moved for summary judgment. Just before the hearing, Mr. Crews falsely informed his client that the hearing had been cancelled and that the defendants had filed a notice of appeal. Thereafter, Mr. Crews prepared and provided the client with a falsified notice of appeal, onto which he had forged the signature of the defendant's lawyer.
• The client also hired Mr. Crews to assist him in resolving a dispute with a mortgage company. In July 2003, after advising his client to stop making mortgage payments, Mr. Crews commenced a lawsuit against the mortgage company in federal district court. When the defendant threatened to foreclose on the client's property, Mr. Crews sent the client a restraining order that purportedly prohibited the foreclosure. Mr. Crews had in fact falsified the order and forged the judge's name on it.
• In mid-January 2004, Mr. Crews recommended that the client file a Chapter 7 bankruptcy proceeding. The client informed Mr. Crews that he wanted to discuss the matter in person before filing. Without authority from the client, Mr. Crews commenced a Chapter 7 proceeding on the client's behalf. In February 2004, Mr. Crews informed the client that he would be withdrawing from the representation.
Matter 3: In May 2002, a client hired Mr. Crews to represent him in a wrongful-termination claim. The client instructed Mr. Crews to file a lawsuit and provided him with funds to do so. Between October 2002 and September 2003, Mr. Crews failed to pursue the matter. He falsely told the client that the lawsuit had been filed and was moving forward. In September 2003, Mr. Crews filed the lawsuit but thereafter failed to pursue it.
Matter 4: In April 2003, Mr. Crews was hired by a client injured in an automobile accident. After filing a lawsuit, Mr. Crews failed to pursue the legal matter and failed to maintain adequate communication with the client. In February 2004, the court notified Mr. Crews that the lawsuit would be dismissed for failure to comply with arbitration rules. Mr. Crews neither responded to the notice nor informed his client of the pending dismissal. Beginning in early 2004, the client made numerous requests for the return of his file, to which Mr. Crews never responded.
Matter 5: In July 2003, a former client filed a complaint with the Oregon State Bar regarding Mr. Crews's conduct. Disciplinary counsel proceeded to investigate the complaint and, in December 2003, requested information. Mr. Crews failed to respond to the request. In the four above-mentioned matters, the clients filed complaints with the Oregon State Bar. Mr. Crews did not respond to disciplinary counsel's inquiries and failed to cooperate with disciplinary investigations.
Mr. Crews's conduct violated Oregon DR 1-102(A)(2), prohibiting a lawyer from committing a criminal act that reflects adversely on the lawyer's honesty, trustworthiness, or fitness to practice law; DR 1-102(A)(3), prohibiting a lawyer from engaging in conduct involving dishonesty, fraud, deceit, or misrepresentation; DR 1-103(C), requiring a lawyer who is the subject of a disciplinary investigation to respond fully and truthfully to inquiries from and comply with reasonable requests of a tribunal or other authority empowered to investigate or act upon the conduct of lawyers; DR 6-101(B), prohibiting a lawyer from neglecting a legal matter entrusted to the lawyer; DR 9-101(C)(4) requiring a lawyer to promptly pay or deliver to a client as requested by the client the funds, securities, or other properties in the possession of the lawyer which the client is entitled to receive; Washington RPC 1.15(d), requiring that a lawyer take reasonably practicable steps to protect a client's interests upon termination of representation; RPC 8.4(b), prohibiting a lawyer from committing a criminal act that reflects adversely on the lawyer's honesty, trustworthiness, or fitness as a lawyer; RPC 8.4(c), prohibiting a lawyer from engaging in conduct involving dishonesty, fraud, deceit, or misrepresentation; and RPC 8.4(d), prohibiting a lawyer from engaging in conduct that is prejudicial to the administration of justice.
Felice P. Congalton represented the Bar Association. Mr. Crews was not represented by counsel.
Disbarred
Dana P. Gelman (WSBA No. 20147, admitted 1990), of Tacoma, was disbarred, effective August 17, 2005, by order of the Washington State Supreme Court following a stipulation approved by the Disciplinary Board. This discipline was based on his conduct between 2000 and 2003 involving multiple acts of misconduct affecting personal-injury clients, improper use and disbursement of client funds in his trust account, commission of a criminal act, and failure to cooperate with a disciplinary investigation.
Between May 2001 and May 2003, Mr. Gelman engaged in the following conduct that established grounds for discipline:
• Failing to initiate a personal-injury action for a client before the expiration of the statute of limitations, resulting in loss of the client's claim.
• In four instances, falsely informing clients that funds would be withheld from their settlement proceeds to pay PIP claims, medical bills, and subrogation claims.
• In five instances, failing to maintain settlement proceeds — earmarked to pay PIP claims, medical bills, and subrogation claims — in a client trust account, and using the funds for personal and/or business purposes without the clients' knowledge, consent, or authorization.
• Responding untruthfully to a client inquiry about how the client's settlement funds had been disbursed.
• Directing his bookkeeper to make a false entry in his IOLTA account register in order to deal with a discrepancy in the account.
• On seven occasions, illegally obtaining a controlled substance with an altered prescription, in violation of RCW 69.50.403(a)(3) and/or (5).
• Failing to appear at two depositions as required by subpoenas issued by disciplinary counsel.
• Failing to produce requested records during a Bar Association audit of his IOLTA account, rendering the auditor unable to complete the audit.
At the time of his entry into the disciplinary stipulation, Mr. Gelman had paid or agreed to pay restitution to all of the affected clients.
Mr. Gelman's conduct violated RPC 1.3, requiring a lawyer to act with reasonable diligence and promptness in representing a client; RPC 1.14(a), requiring all funds of clients paid to a lawyer to be deposited in an interest-bearing trust account, and prohibiting funds belonging solely to the lawyer from being deposited therein; RPC 8.4(b), prohibiting a lawyer from committing a criminal act that reflects adversely on the lawyer's honesty, trustworthiness, or fitness as a lawyer in other respects; RPC 8.4(c) prohibiting a lawyer from engaging in conduct involving dishonesty, fraud, deceit, or misrepresentation; RPC 8.4(d) prohibiting a lawyer from engaging in conduct that is prejudicial to the administration of justice; RPC 8.4(i) prohibiting a lawyer from committing any act involving moral turpitude, or any unjustified act of assault or other act which reflects disregard for the rule of law; and RPC 8.4(l) prohibiting a lawyer from violating a duty or sanction imposed by or under the Rules for Enforcement of Lawyer Conduct in connection with a disciplinary matter.
Jonathan H. Burke represented the Bar Association. Brett A. Purtzer represented Mr. Gelman.
Disbarred
Donald Kronenberg (WSBA No. 13979, admitted 1984), of Seattle, was disbarred, effective August 18, 2005, by order of the Washington State Supreme Court following a hearing. This discipline was based on his conduct in 1996 involving bribing and tampering with a witness and deceiving prosecutors regarding his role in procuring the absence of the witness. For additional information, please see In re Discipline of Kronenberg, 155 Wn.2d 184, 117 P.3d 1134 (2005).
In March 1996, Mr. Kronenberg was hired by a client charged with three counts of felony rape of a child. The state's principal witness was the victim, who had been subpoenaed and was expected to testify at trial. Prior to the commencement of the trial, Mr. Kronenberg met with the witness and offered him money in exchange for not appearing in court. The discussion was couched in terms of "settling" a potential civil claim, but Mr. Kronenberg made it clear to the witness that he would have to leave the state and avoid testifying in the criminal case as part of the "settlement." Mr. Kronenberg authored a document to memorialize the witness's agreement to leave town and not testify in exchange for $6,000 and a one-way plane ticket to Tulsa, Oklahoma. The $6,000 was to be paid in two installments, with the second installment conditioned upon the witness not appearing for trial. The agreement contained a confidentiality and nondisclosure provision, which purported to prohibit the witness from disclosing the existence of the agreement or of the alleged facts that formed the basis of the agreement.
In July 1996, Mr. Kronenberg's client gave him $3,000 in cash. The next day, Mr. Kronenberg used the money to purchase a one-way plane ticket to Tulsa, which he gave to the witness along with the remaining cash. Mr. Kronenberg offered to drive the witness to the airport, but his offer was refused.
At an omnibus hearing two days later, the court ordered Mr. Kronenberg to disclose whatever information he possessed about the witness's whereabouts. Mr. Kronenberg did not provide the prosecution with any information and later instructed his secretary to not write down anything she learned about the witness's whereabouts. Mr. Kronenberg then met with prosecutors and told them that they would have to dismiss the case because they did not have a victim. He also told them that he believed the witness had left for Oklahoma, claiming that the source of his knowledge was his private investigator. Mr. Kronenberg failed to tell prosecutors that he had met with the witness in Seattle the previous week or had hand-delivered to the witness a one-way ticket to Tulsa.
Subsequently, pursuant to a court order authorizing it, the witness placed a wiretapped call to Mr. Kronenberg telling him that he was still in Seattle. Mr. Kronenberg encouraged the witness to leave town. He did not report either the conversation or his new knowledge of the witness's whereabouts to prosecutors or to the court.
Mr. Kronenberg's conduct violated RPC 8.4(a), prohibiting a lawyer from violating or attempting to violate the Rules of Professional Conduct, knowingly assisting or inducing another to do so, or doing so through the acts of another; RPC 8.4(b), prohibiting a lawyer from committing a criminal act that reflects adversely on the lawyer's honesty, trustworthiness, or fitness as a lawyer in other respects; RPC 8.4(c), prohibiting a lawyer from engaging in conduct involving dishonesty, fraud, deceit, or misrepresentation; and RPC 8.4(d), prohibiting a lawyer from engaging in conduct that is prejudicial to the administration of justice.
David M. Jacobson and Erin M. Warren represented the Bar Association at the hearing. Joanne S. Abelson represented the Bar Association on appeal. Christon C. Skinner and Kurt M. Bulmer represented Mr. Kronenberg at the hearing. Gregory M. Miller represented Mr. Kronenberg on appeal. James C. Lawrie was the hearing officer.
Suspended
Donald B. Lundahl (WSBA No. 21424, admitted 1992), of Lacey, was suspended for 90 days, effective September 19, 2005, by order of the Washington State Supreme Court following a stipulation approved by the Disciplinary Board. This discipline was based on his conduct in 2002 and 2004 involving the commission of two assaults and the violation of a court order.
In November 2002, Mr. Lundahl was charged with simple assault/domestic violence in Thurston County based on an altercation during which he kneed his daughter in the lower chest or abdominal area, pushed her to the ground, and punched her in the face several times. One of the conditions of the court's pretrial order was that Mr. Lundahl abstain from the consumption of alcohol and non-prescription drugs. In June 2004, while the charges were pending, Mr. Lundahl consumed alcohol. That same day, Mr. Lundahl got into an altercation with his son, during which he grabbed the son's throat with both hands, pushed him up against a wall, and pushed him down to the ground. Mr. Lundahl was again charged with simple assault/domestic violence. Subsequently, Mr. Lundahl entered pleas of guilty to two counts of simple assault.
Mr. Lundahl's conduct violated RPC 8.4(b), prohibiting a lawyer from committing a criminal act (here, assault) that reflects adversely on the lawyer's honesty, trustworthiness, or fitness as a lawyer in other respects; RPC 8.4(i), prohibiting a lawyer from committing any act involving any unjustified act of assault or other act that reflects disregard for the rule of law; and RPC 8.4(j), prohibiting a lawyer from willfully disobeying or violating a court order directing him or her to do or cease doing an act which he or she ought in good faith to do or forbear.
Sachia Stonefeld Powell represented the Bar Association. Leland G. Ripley represented Mr. Lundahl.
Suspended
Mary A. Nester (WSBA No. 27383, admitted 1997), of Portland, Oregon, was suspended for 30 days, effective September 1, 2005, by order of the Washington State Supreme Court imposing reciprocal discipline in accordance with an order of the Supreme Court of Oregon following a stipulation. This discipline was based on her conduct between 2001 and 2003, involving conflicts of interest and failure to respond truthfully to inquiries during the course of a disciplinary investigation.
In May 2000, Ms. Nester agreed to represent a nursing home in the defense of charges arising out of the deaths of one or more of the nursing home's residents, and in the assessment, development, and implementation of the nursing home's corporate compliance program. In April 2001, the Oregon Board of Examiners of Nursing Home Administrators (BENHA) authorized disciplinary proceedings against the client in connection with the deaths. At the time, Ms. Nester owned an interest in a health-care facility management consultant company (hereinafter Company A). With the client's permission, Ms. Nester hired Company A to provide the client with services in connection with the representation. In December 2001, the client and BENHA entered a consent order to resolve the disciplinary proceedings. The consent order required the client to retain the services of a management consulting firm to evaluate the client's management practices and submit reports to BENHA. The client selected, and BENHA approved, Company A to perform the evaluations. Ms. Nester continued to represent the client without first having obtained its consent to the continued representation after full disclosure of the potential adverse impact upon Ms. Nester's professional judgment of her ownership interest in Company A.
In May 2002, the Oregon State Bar received a complaint concerning Ms. Nester's conduct in the matter. During the investigation, Ms. Nester represented to disciplinary counsel that, before her client entered into an agreement with Company A, she had provided the client with "information orally and in writing regarding potential conflicts as well as identifying the principals of [Company A]. This included advice in writing to seek independent legal counsel . . . ." Ms. Nester had not in fact disclosed the possible self-interest conflict and had rendered no written advice to seek independent counsel. Because Ms. Nester had failed to review her file, she did not know the truth or falsity of the representations when she made them.
Ms. Nester's conduct violated Oregon DR 1-103(C), requiring a lawyer who is the subject of a disciplinary investigation to respond fully and truthfully to inquiries from and comply with reasonable requests of a tribunal or other authority empowered to investigate or act upon the conduct of lawyers; and DR 5-101(A), prohibiting a lawyer, except with the consent of the client after full disclosure, from accepting or continuing employment if the exercise of the lawyer's professional judgment on behalf of the lawyer's client will be or reasonably may be affected by the lawyer's own financial, business, property, or personal interests.
Felice P. Congalton represented the Bar Association. Mary A. Nester represented herself.
Suspended
Denice L. Patrick (WSBA No. 11655, admitted 1981), of Lynnwood, was suspended for two years, effective November 23, 2005, by order of the Washington State Supreme Court following a hearing. The discipline was based on her conduct between 1992 and 1996 involving lack of diligence; failure to make reasonable efforts to expedite litigation; multiple conflicts of interest; false statements to a tribunal; false or misleading communications about her services; commission of criminal acts; conduct involving dishonesty, fraud, deceit, and misrepresentation; conduct prejudicial to the administration of justice; and statements implying an ability to influence improperly a government agency.
In December 1991, Ms. Patrick began work as a staff attorney with the Office of Hearings and Appeals (OHA) of the Social Security Administration (SSA). In September 1992, SSA approved a request by Ms. Patrick to establish a private law practice. In the request, Ms. Patrick specifically promised that she would do only pro bono bankruptcy work and a "miniscule" amount of legal work for family and friends, and that at no time would her private practice result in a conflict of interest in fact or appearance. SSA's permission for Ms. Patrick to do so was subject to 17 conditions, which included avoiding any actual conflict of interest or the appearance thereof, not knowingly instructing persons on any particular matter pending before SSA/OHA, and not performing legal work on cases involving Social Security benefits or causes of action where the United States is a party or has an interest, or any other prohibited representational activities. Ms. Patrick resigned from her job with SSA in May 1996. Prior to her departure, Ms. Patrick had expanded her private practice beyond the approved scope without notifying SSA of the change in her activities or seeking to amend her request. During the period of her employment with SSA, Ms. Patrick engaged in the following conduct that established grounds for discipline:
• Falsely stating in a Yellow Pages advertisement and falsely informing potential clients that she was a "former" SSA attorney, and falsely informing potential clients that she had successfully represented other claimants.
• Representing four individuals with claims against SSA in contravention of 18 U.S.C. §§ 203 and 205, and without providing the clients with full disclosure of the material facts or obtaining written consent from SSA and from each client.
• Representing clients in a bankruptcy proceeding in which SSA was a creditor without providing the clients with full disclosure of the material facts and obtaining written consent from SSA and from the clients.
• Representing 24 bankruptcy clients, all with debts owed to the United States, in contravention of 18 U.S.C. §§ 203 and 205.
• In order to avoid having to appear as a claimant's lawyer at an OHA hearing while still employed by OHA, falsely informing OHA that a client wanted her hearing date continued, and falsely informing the client that she had to reschedule the hearing date due to a conflicting commitment, despite knowing that the client did not want a continuance of her hearing.
• In three instances, signing and filing (and in one case postdating) Appointment of Representative forms that falsely stated she was not prohibited from representing the claimants as a current or former employee of the federal government.
• Informing undercover agents with the Office of the Inspector General of the SSA that she was a former employee of SSA and still had friends at that agency who could expedite her clients' matters and obtain more favorable results for her clients.
Ms. Patrick's conduct violated RPC 1.3, requiring a lawyer to act with reasonable diligence and promptness in representing a client; RPC 1.7(b), prohibiting a lawyer from representing a client if the representation of that client may be materially limited by the lawyer's responsibilities to another client or to a third person or by the lawyer's own interests, unless the lawyer reasonably believes the representation will not be adversely affected and the client consents in writing after a full disclosure of material facts; RPC 3.2, requiring a lawyer to make reasonable efforts to expedite litigation consistent with the interests of the client; RPC 3.3(a)(1), prohibiting a lawyer from making a false statement of material fact or law to a tribunal; RPC 7.1, prohibiting a lawyer from making a false or misleading communication about the lawyer or the lawyer's services; RPC 8.4(a), prohibiting a lawyer from violating or attempting to violate the Rules of Professional Conduct; RPC 8.4(b), prohibiting a lawyer from committing a criminal act (here, violations of 18 U.S.C. §§ 203 and 205) that reflects adversely on the lawyer's honesty, trustworthiness, or fitness as a lawyer in other respects; RPC 8.4(c), prohibiting a lawyer from engaging in conduct involving dishonesty, fraud, deceit, or misrepresentation; RPC 8.4(d), prohibiting a lawyer from engaging in conduct that is prejudicial to the administration of justice; and 8.4(e), prohibiting a lawyer from stating or implying an ability to influence improperly a government agency or official.
Sachia Stonefeld Powell represented the Bar Association. Leland G. Ripley represented Ms. Patrick. Lish Whitson was the hearing officer.
Suspended
Irving M. Rosenberg (WSBA No. 21754, admitted 1992), of Liberty Lake, was suspended for 60 days, effective November 7, 2005, by order of the Washington State Supreme Court following a hearing. This discipline was based on his conduct in 2002 involving the alteration of a court order.
Commencing in June 2002, Mr. Rosenberg represented a client in a dissolution of marriage proceeding pending in superior court. Following a June 7, 2002, hearing on a motion for temporary orders, Mr. Rosenberg and opposing counsel adjourned to counsel table to conform standard-form orders to the judge's ruling. The judge signed the orders, believing that they conformed to his oral ruling. The judge then handed the signed documents to Mr. Rosenberg. Mr. Rosenberg told opposing counsel that he would copy the documents at his office and would return the originals and copies to the courtroom by 1:30 p.m. At his office, Mr. Rosenberg reviewed the documents and noticed the temporary restraining order was inconsistent with the judge's oral ruling in a number of respects. Mr. Rosenberg altered the order to reflect his understanding of the court's ruling. After realizing that some of his changes were erroneous and endeavoring to correct the mistaken changes, Mr. Rosenberg concluded that he would have to speak to opposing counsel about the situation, and he set the documents behind his desk. Later in the day, opposing counsel called Mr. Rosenberg's office to inquire about the whereabouts of the documents. Late on June 7, 2002, a member of Mr. Rosenberg's office staff took the papers to the courthouse, filed the originals, and gave copies to opposing counsel. Mr. Rosenberg did not contact opposing counsel or the judge to advise them that he had altered the order. Opposing counsel noticed the alterations and brought the situation to the attention of the judge, who promptly sought an explanation from Mr. Rosenberg. Mr. Rosenberg admitted that he had altered the signed order, explaining that he had intended to conform its provisions to those orally ordered by the court.
Mr. Rosenberg's conduct violated RPC 8.4(d), prohibiting lawyers from engaging in conduct that is prejudicial to the administration of justice.
Linda B. Eide represented the Bar Association. Joseph J. Ganz represented Mr. Rosenberg. Michael L. Lewis was the hearing officer.
Reprimanded
F. Michael Misner (WSBA No. 5742, admitted 1974), of Gig Harbor, was ordered to receive a reprimand on July 27, 2005, following a stipulation approved by a hearing officer. This discipline was based on his conduct in 2003 involving the making of a false statement of material fact to a third person.
In November 2001, Mr. Misner began representing a client who had been seriously injured in an automobile accident. The fee agreement provided for a 40 percent contingent fee, with costs to be deducted after payment of the attorney's fee. In March 2003, Mr. Misner requested information from the Washington State Department of Social and Health Services (DSHS) about the amount of medical benefits paid on behalf of his client. DSHS notified Mr. Misner that it asserted a lien in the amount of $56,695.45 and enclosed a copy of the statement of lien. By letter, with a copy of the fee agreement enclosed, Mr. Misner asked to discuss the possibility of DSHS reducing its lien. DSHS responded that it would not waive or compromise its lien.
Following a mediation, the case settled for $50,000 in April 2003. Mr. Misner advised DSHS of the settlement and again requested that DSHS waive or reduce its lien. DSHS refused to do so. Mr. Misner determined that there would be no money left for his client if the DSHS lien, together with his costs and fees, were deducted from the settlement proceeds. Mr. Misner told the client that he would waive $21,821.98 in costs that Mr. Misner had advanced. Additionally, in May 2003, Mr. Misner prepared and had his client sign a new agreement providing for a 75 percent contingent fee. Mr. Misner did not intend to charge a 75 percent fee. The purpose of the new agreement was to prevent DSHS from satisfying any part of its lien against the settlement proceeds, so that the client would receive a portion of the funds. In response to a September 2003 DSHS inquiry about the status of the case, Mr. Misner informed DSHS by letter that the case had been settled for $50,000, and he enclosed a copy of the May 2003 fee agreement along with a list of costs and expenses. In the letter, Mr. Misner asked for written confirmation that DSHS would waive its lien. DSHS again declined to waive or alter its lien.
Prior to entry into the disciplinary stipulation, Mr. Misner paid DSHS the share of the settlement proceeds to which it was entitled under the original 40 percent fee agreement. Mr. Misner took no fee so that his client would receive a share of the settlement proceeds.
Mr. Misner's conduct violated RPC 4.1(a), prohibiting a lawyer in the course of representing a client from knowingly making a false statement of material fact or law to a third person.
Scott G. Busby represented the Bar Association. Leland G. Ripley represented Mr. Misner. Gregory J. Rosen was the hearing officer.
Reprimanded
Alan F. Hall (WSBA No. 1505, admitted 1974), of Edmonds, was ordered to receive a reprimand on January 27, 2005, following a hearing. This discipline was based on his conduct between 1998 and 2001 involving failure to communicate with a client, failure to provide competent representation, failure to act with diligence, asserting a claim for fees to the court without a basis for doing so that was not frivolous, failure to adequately supervise the work of an APR 9 legal intern, and charging unreasonable fees.
Mr. Hall was retained by a client to recover unpaid pension benefits and to enforce the ex-husband's continuing financial obligation to his client under a Snohomish County divorce decree. In January 1998, Mr. Hall entered into a written fee agreement with the client, capping legal fees at $500, and requiring monthly bills to the client. In January 1998, Mr. Hall wrote to the client's ex-husband regarding payments, but took no further action until March 2000. During this time, Mr. Hall did not communicate with his client to keep her informed about the case. Mr. Hall sent the client's first monthly invoice in June of 2000, following a request from the client. The $2,467.97 invoice greatly exceeded the $500 cap without any prior notice to the client.
In March 2000, Mr. Hall filed a motion seeking to hold his client's ex-husband in contempt for nonpayment. The motion was prepared and sent out for filing by a legal intern working under Mr. Hall's instructions. On May 15, 2000, Mr. Hall and his legal intern appeared before a pro tem court commissioner, who signed an order of contempt and a $6,400 judgment. In the proposed order, Mr. Hall had requested attorney's fees of $3,000 and costs of $1,500, which he indicated to the commissioner based on fees and costs actually incurred. Actual combined fees and costs did not exceed $2,500. The commissioner reduced Mr. Hall's fee award because it included undocumented estimates of prospective costs and fees for which he could not verify at that juncture.
Following the hearing, Mr. Hall directed the legal intern to prepare paperwork for the enforcement of the judgment, including a Qualified Domestic Relations Order (QDRO). Mr. Hall's legal intern had limited experience in domestic-relations law and judgment collections. In June 2000, Mr. Hall asked the commissioner to sign an ex-parte order approving the QDRO prepared by his intern. After the order was signed and entered by the court, Mr. Hall directed his intern to collect upon the QDRO and forward the order to the retirement office of the client's ex-husband's company for disposition. The QDRO was rejected by the company's retirement office as failing to comply with the company retirement plan. In June 2001, Mr. Hall and his legal intern prepared an amended QDRO using the guidelines sent by the retirement office, which was qualified by the retirement plan's administrator and resulted in monthly payments remitted to Mr. Hall's client.
Mr. Hall's conduct violated RPC 1.1, requiring a lawyer to provide competent representation to a client; RPC 1.3, requiring a lawyer to act with reasonable diligence and promptness in representing a client; RPC 1.4(a), requiring a lawyer to keep a client reasonably informed about the status of a matter and to promptly comply with reasonable requests for information; RPC 1.4(b), requiring a lawyer to explain a matter to the extent reasonably necessary to permit the client to make informed decisions regarding the representation; RPC 1.5(a); requiring a lawyer's fee to be reasonable; RPC 3.1, prohibiting a lawyer from bringing or defending a proceeding, or asserting or controverting an issue therein, unless there is a basis for doing so that is not frivolous; RPC 3.2, requiring a lawyer to make reasonable efforts to expedite litigation consistent with the interests of the client; APR 9(d)(1), requiring the supervising lawyer or another lawyer from the same office to direct, supervise, and review all of the work of the legal intern and to assume personal professional responsibility for any work undertaken by the legal intern while under the lawyers' supervision, and APR 9(d)(5), in which a supervising lawyer's failure to provide adequate supervision or to comply with the duties set forth in APR 9(d) are grounds for disciplinary action.
Raymond S. Weber represented the Bar Association. Joseph J. Ganz represented Mr. Hall. David W. Wiley was the hearing officer.
Admonished
Mary H. McIntosh (WSBA No. 12744, admitted 1982), of Mount Vernon, was admonished by a review committee of the Disciplinary Board. The admonition was based upon her conduct in 2004 involving improper notarization of a document. Mary H. McIntosh is to be distinguished from Mary Ann McIntosh of Wenatchee.
In 2004, Ms. McIntosh represented a personal representative of a decedent's estate. Following a court hearing concerning disputed creditors' claims, the parties agreed to a settlement; opposing counsel drafted the agreement, which required that all signatures on the agreement be notarized. One of the parties, a creditor of the estate, did not appear in Ms. McIntosh's office to sign the agreement. Ms. McIntosh telephoned the party, who indicated that she would agree to the settlement. Ms. McIntosh then notarized what purported to be the party's signature. Ms. McIntosh's attestation stated that the party personally appeared before her to acknowledge her signature on the agreement, but that had not occurred.
Ms. McIntosh's conduct violated RPC 8.4(c), prohibiting a lawyer from engaging in conduct involving dishonesty, fraud, deceit, or misrepresentation; and RPC 8.4(d), prohibiting a lawyer from engaging in conduct that is prejudicial to the administration of justice.
Scott G. Busby represented the Bar Association. Ms. McIntosh represented herself.
Nondisciplinary Notices
Suspended Pending Outcome of Disciplinary Proceedings
Richard H. Corbin (WSBA No. 26665, admitted 1997), of Everett, was suspended pending the outcome of disciplinary proceedings, pursuant to ELC 7.2(a)(3), effective October 4, 2005, by an order of the Washington State Supreme Court. This is not a disciplinary action.
Suspended Pending Outcome of Disciplinary Proceedings
Roland Hunter (WSBA No. 29488, admitted 1999), of Olympia, was suspended pending the outcome of disciplinary proceedings, pursuant to ELC 7.1, effective December 1, 2005, by an order of the Washington State Supreme Court. This is not a disciplinary action.
Suspended Pending Outcome of Disciplinary Proceedings
Dennis F. Olsen (WSBA No. 22519, admitted 1993), of Everett, was suspended pending the outcome of disciplinary proceedings, pursuant to ELC 7.2(a)(2), effective November 10, 2005, by an order of the Washington State Supreme Court. This is not a disciplinary action. Dennis F. Olsen is to be distinguished from Dennis E. Olson of Kenmore.
Suspended Pending Outcome of Disciplinary Proceedings
Gail Schwartz (WSBA No. 28994, admitted 1999), of Spokane, was suspended pending the outcome of disciplinary proceedings, pursuant to ELC 7.2(a)(3), effective December 1, 2005, by an order of the Washington State Supreme Court. This is not a disciplinary action.
