November 2005
Disciplinary Notices
Suspended
David A. Ambrose (WSBA No. 21764, admitted 1992), of Edgewood, was suspended for two years, effective May 16, 2005, by order of the Washington State Supreme Court following a stipulation approved by the Disciplinary Board. This discipline was based on his conduct in multiple matters involving lack of diligence, failure to apprise a client of a settlement offer, failure to abide by client decisions regarding the objectives of representation, failure to communicate with clients, failure to refund unearned fees upon termination, failure to appear for depositions and comply with discovery requests, failure to comply with court orders, unauthorized communication with a person represented by counsel, conflicts of interest, and conduct prejudicial to the administration of justice. David A. Ambrose is to be distinguished from David R. Ambrose of Portland, OR.
Matter 1: In August 2003, client A hired Mr. Ambrose to prepare a parenting plan/visitation agreement because his daughter’s mother had stopped allowing visitation. The client paid Mr. Ambrose $1,800. Shortly thereafter, the client met with Mr. Ambrose, who agreed to have the initial paperwork completed in two weeks. At the end of two weeks, Client A telephoned Mr. Ambrose, who requested an additional week to prepare the paperwork. A week later, when they met to review the papers, Client A found the documents incomplete and inaccurate in many respects. In October 2003, Client A’s daughter made some comments at school that caused the school to report the mother to Child Protective Services. When Client A told Mr. Ambrose about this, Mr. Ambrose suggested that Client A seek full custody. Client A, however, told Mr. Ambrose that he discounted the allegations and believed that the mother remained the best custodial parent; Client A reiterated his desire that Ambrose complete the parenting plan as initially requested. Between November 2003 and January 2004, Client A repeatedly telephoned Mr. Ambrose, who failed to respond. In December 2003, Client A wrote to Mr. Ambrose demanding that he finish the work or refund the $1,800. Mr. Ambrose never finished the paperwork, nor did he refund the fee.
Matter 2: Client B hired Mr. Ambrose in January 2003 to recover records allegedly taken by his business partner, M.R., following the dissolution of the partnership. In February 2003, Mr. Ambrose wrote to M.R. demanding that he return the records. Subsequently, Mr. Ambrose commenced an action against M.R. in superior court. Mr. Ambrose failed to comply with the court’s initial scheduling order. In April 2003, Mr. Ambrose failed to appear for the client’s deposition and the deposition of another witness in the case. Mr. Ambrose failed to comply with a second scheduling order entered by the court in April 2003. In mid-2003, thinking Mr. Ambrose was diligently working on his case, the client gave Mr. Ambrose an automobile valued at $2,500 for legal fees. After Mr. Ambrose demanded further payment, Client B gave him another automobile valued at $3,000.
In October 2003, in ruling on a defense motion to dismiss for failure to make discovery, the court noted that Mr. Ambrose had appeared late for the hearing, ordered Mr. Ambrose to deliver documents he said were in his car to defendant’s counsel by 10:30 a.m., and imposed a $1,500 sanction against Mr. Ambrose. Mr. Ambrose did not deliver the documents as ordered by 10:30 a.m. and did not pay the sanctions within five days as ordered. In January 2004, after finding the refusal to comply with the October 2003 order was willful or deliberate, the court dismissed Client B’s complaint without prejudice. In January 2004, a commissioner found Mr. Ambrose in contempt of court for failure to comply with the October 2003 order and fined him $150 per day until the documents in his possession were produced.
Client B hired a new lawyer. Upon review of the file, the new lawyer learned that the defendant’s lawyer had offered to settle the matter in May 2003 if both parties agreed to dismissal of all claims and to pay their own attorney fees. Mr. Ambrose had never communicated this settlement proposal to Client B. This ultimately cost Client B more than $12,000 in attorney fees assessed against him.
In March 2004, a superior court judge found that Mr. Ambrose had intentionally failed to comply with the court’s January 2004 order. The court accordingly awarded a judgment to the defendant’s attorney for $10,500 in sanctions.
Although Client B paid Mr. Ambrose more than $8,000 in cash and/or cars, Mr. Ambrose never provided Client B with any billing statements and did not provide Client B with an accounting when requested. Mr. Ambrose provided Client B with his file only after repeated requests.
Matter 3: In early 2003, Client C hired Mr. Ambrose to commence foreclosure proceedings arising from a $17,000 loan made to J.S., which Client C had originally expected would be repaid following the listing and sale of J.S.’s home. Mr. Ambrose did not file a foreclosure action, but instead, in March 2003, obtained from J.S. a durable power of attorney and a trust that named Mr. Ambrose as J.S.’s attorney-in-fact and trustee over all of J.S.’s property. J.S.’s only significant asset was his house; the trust made Mr. Ambrose a potential trust beneficiary. J.S. believed that if Mr. Ambrose located a buyer for the home, he could approve the offer. He did not understand that the trust documents would be recorded.
In April 2003, a potential buyer, P.L., signed a purchase and sale agreement through the listing agent for J.S.’s property, agreeing to pay $255,000 in cash at closing.
In May 2003, Mr. Ambrose recorded the trust documents as well as an option to purchase the property given by Mr. Ambrose to individuals who were his former and/or current clients. Under the terms of the option, Mr. Ambrose received $1,000 in legal fees.
During a title search in connection with P.L.’s closing, the title company discovered the recorded trust, the quit claim deed from J.S. to the trust, and the option. As a result, J.S. first learned that Mr. Ambrose had recorded the deed and that, as trustee, Mr. Ambrose had sold an option to purchase J.S.’s property. J.S.’s lawyer informed Mr. Ambrose of the P.L. offer and asked him to revoke the trust. Mr. Ambrose refused to respond. Client C instructed Mr. Ambrose to conclude the P.L. sale. Mr. Ambrose refused, and the closing date was postponed.
In July 2003, Mr. Ambrose, as trustee, filed a declaratory judgment action against J.S., P.L., and the holders of the option. Although Mr. Ambrose knew that J.S. was represented by a lawyer in the matter, he contacted J.S. directly by telephone in an effort to convince J.S. that the transaction with the option holders would be better than the P.L. offer. P.L. subsequently abandoned the offer and was dismissed from the lawsuit.
In February 2004, Client C fired Mr. Ambrose. J.S. subsequently obtained Mr. Ambrose’s removal as trustee. In September 2004, the pending declaratory action was dismissed. Once the title company received the order dismissing the case, it closed a new sale of J.S.’s property.
Matter 4: In August 2002, a husband and wife hired Mr. Ambrose to resolve a family real estate dispute. Between August 2002 and December 2003, they paid Mr. Ambrose $2,900 in fees and costs. After filing a lawsuit in March 2003, Mr. Ambrose did little or no further work. He did not respond to defendant’s discovery requests until they moved for sanctions. He canceled scheduled depositions. In April 2004, he appeared on the trial date and moved for a new judge, asserting bias. Although the motion was untimely, the judge decided not to proceed. Mr. Ambrose agreed to arbitrate the claim, but he did not take steps to do so. Mr. Ambrose did not keep his clients adequately informed about the status of the matter, and did not work on the matter after December 1, 2003. However, between December 13, 2003, and September 17, 2004, Mr. Ambrose collected an additional $2,200 in fees. Following his termination, Mr. Ambrose refused to refund any of the $2,200.
Mr. Ambrose’s conduct violated RPC 1.2(a), requiring a lawyer to abide by a client’s decisions about the objectives of representation and to consult with the client as to the means by which they are to be pursued, and requiring a lawyer to abide by a client’s decision about whether to accept an offer of settlement of a matter; RPC 1.3, requiring a lawyer to act with reasonable diligence and promptness in representing a client; RPC 1.4, requiring a lawyer to keep a client reasonably informed about the status of a matter and to explain a matter to the extent reasonably necessary to permit the client to make informed decisions; RPC 1.5, requiring that a lawyer’s fee be reasonable; RPC 1.7(b), prohibiting a lawyer from representing a client if the representation may be materially limited by the lawyer’s own interests, unless the lawyer reasonably believes the representation will not be adversely affected and the client consents in writing after a full disclosure; RPC 1.8(a), prohibiting a lawyer from entering into a business transaction with a client or knowingly acquiring an ownership, possessory, security, or other pecuniary interest adverse to a client unless the transaction and its terms are fair and reasonable and fully disclosed and transmitted in writing to the client, the client is given opportunity to seek the advice of independent counsel, and the client consents; RPC 1.8(j), prohibiting a lawyer from acquiring a proprietary interest in the cause of action or subject matter of litigation the lawyer is conducting for the client; RPC 1.15(d), requiring that a lawyer take reasonably practicable steps to protect a client’s interests upon termination of representation, including refunding any advance payment of fee that has not been earned; RPC 3.2, requiring that a lawyer make reasonable efforts to expedite litigation consistent with the interests of the client; RPC 3.4(a), prohibiting a lawyer from unlawfully obstructing another party’s access to evidence; RPC 3.4(c), prohibiting a lawyer from knowingly disobeying an obligation under the rules of a tribunal except for an open refusal based on an assertion that no valid obligation exists; RPC 3.4(d), prohibiting a lawyer from failing to make reasonably diligent effort to comply with a legally proper discovery request by an opposing party; RPC 4.2(a), prohibiting a lawyer from communicating about the subject of a representation with a party the lawyer knows to be represented by another lawyer in the matter; RPC 8.4(d), prohibiting conduct prejudicial to the administration of justice; and RPC 8.4(j) prohibiting a lawyer from willfully disobeying or violating a court order directing him or her to do or cease doing an act which he or she ought in good faith to do or forbear.
Linda B. Eide represented the Bar Association. Mr. Ambrose represented himself.
Suspended
James D. Pack (WSBA No. 918, admitted 1970), of Everett, was suspended for 18 months, effective May 16, 2005, by order of the Washington State Supreme Court following a default hearing. This discipline was based on his conduct in 2003 involving lack of diligence and failure to cooperate with a disciplinary investigation, and his conduct between 1987 and 2003 involving trust account matters.
Matter 1: In September 1999, a client hired Mr. Pack to represent him in a workers’ compensation matter arising from an employment-related injury. The client sought Mr. Pack’s services to appeal a decision of the Washington Department of Labor and Industries denying the client’s claim for workers’ compensation. A series of administrative proceedings led to an appeal to the Superior Court of Snohomish County. In July 2003 the superior court entered judgment against Mr. Pack’s client and in favor of the employer. After receiving the judgment, Mr. Pack agreed to file an appeal on behalf of the client to the court of appeals. Mr. Pack failed to file a notice of appeal within 30 days of entry of judgment in superior court, as required by court rules. Because Mr. Pack missed the date for filing the appeal, the client lost the opportunity for further judicial consideration of his case.
Matter 2: In March 2003, the Bar Association opened a grievance against Mr. Pack due to his failure to file a Trust Account Declaration for 2001. In a March 6, 2003, letter to Mr. Pack, to which the Association requested a response within two weeks, the Association requested that Mr. Pack: (1) state whether he had filed a Trust Account Declaration for 2001, and if not, why not; (2) state whether he had handled client funds in his law practice in 2001; and (3) if he had handled client funds, state whether he had complied with RPC 1.14 in handling those funds. Mr. Pack did not respond to the request nor to a subsequent letter notifying him that the response was overdue and that a failure to respond would subject him to a deposition.
Between April and October 2003, the Association served Mr. Pack with multiple subpoenas duces tecum requiring him to appear for depositions and produce trust account records and information. Although Mr. Pack appeared for three depositions, he repeatedly failed to produce all the documents requested in the original request for response and in the three subsequent subpoenas duces tecum.
On July 14, 2003, Mr. Pack filed his Trust Account Declaration for 2001. This declaration was required to have been filed on February 1, 2002. Also on July 14, 2003, Mr. Pack filed his declaration for 2002. This declaration was required to have been filed on February 3, 2003.
Matter 3: On February 2, 2004, the Association’s auditor completed an examination of Mr. Pack’s IOLTA trust account, covering the period August 10, 1987, to September 1, 2003. During the period covered by the examination, Mr. Pack had failed to maintain adequate IOLTA trust account records, advanced funds of one client on behalf of another, and improperly held funds in his IOLTA trust account by failing to pay out positive client balances to clients who were entitled to receive them. As of September 2003, Mr. Pack’s IOLTA trust account was short of funds, because the bank balance was less than the total of positive client balances.
Mr. Pack’s conduct violated RPC 1.3, requiring a lawyer to act with reasonable diligence and promptness in representing a client; RPC 1.14(a), requiring a lawyer to deposit client funds into a trust account; RPC 1.14(b), requiring a lawyer to maintain complete records of all funds of a client coming into the possession of the lawyer and to promptly pay or deliver to the client as requested by the client funds in the possession of the lawyer which the client is entitled to receive; former RLD 13.5 and ELC 15.5, requiring a lawyer to complete, execute, and deliver an annual trust account declaration to the Association; and ELC 5.3(e), requiring a lawyer to promptly respond to any inquiry or request for information relevant to grievances.
Kevin M. Bank represented the Bar Association. Mr. Pack did not appear in the proceeding either personally or through counsel. William H. Nielsen was the hearing officer.
Suspended
Vicki L. Walser (WSBA No. 25536, admitted 1995), of Valencia, CA, was suspended for two years, effective May 16, 2005, by order of the Washington State Supreme Court following a stipulation approved by the Disciplinary Board. This discipline was based on her conduct between 2001 and 2003 involving assistance to nonlawyers in the unauthorized practice of law, sharing legal fees with nonlawyers, failure to explain matters to the extent reasonably necessary for clients to make informed decisions regarding representation, lack of diligence, and conflicts of interest.
In the fall of 2001, while working as a contract attorney for a Bellevue law firm, Ms. Walser became affiliated with an entity involved in marketing estate-planning products (hereinafter SELS). SELS sold annuities and other insurance products. SELS sought Ms. Walser’s services to assist in the preparation of “living trust packages” (LTPs) for SELS clients.
Ms. Walser began drafting between one and four LTPs per month for clients obtained through SELS. After an SELS nonlawyer agent sold an LTP to a client, the agent would forward a completed “estate planning questionnaire” to Ms. Walser. The information received from the agents included the client’s name, asset information, choice of trustees and/or beneficiaries, an engagement letter, and a check for Ms. Walser’s services. The SELS agents were not supervised by Ms. Walser or any other licensed Washington lawyer when making sales of LTPs to clients. After receiving the information, Ms. Walser would review the information and draft an LTP using an electronic template. In most instances, Ms. Walser would have a brief telephone conversation with the client to verify factual information. Following her preparation of a draft LTP, Ms. Walser would deliver the draft LTP to SELS, which in turn would deliver the LTP to the client for signature and notarization. Ms. Walser usually did not accompany the SELS agent who delivered the LTP to the client, nor did she usually inquire of SELS as to what happened when the SELS agent delivered the trust document to the client. Ms. Walser never obtained copies of a client’s executed LTP from SELS after delivery.
In one instance, in 2001, an SELS agent sold three LTPs and an annuity to a 76-year-old client. The agent collected a check for $900 made out to Ms. Walser’s firm for preparation of LTPs for the client and two of her adult sons. The agent also collected two checks totaling $6,285 made out to SELS and a related entity for “legal fees and services,” even though SELS and its related entities employed no lawyers. Ms. Walser received the $900 check and drafted LTPs for the client and the client’s two sons. The LTPs included “pour over” wills to capture assets not transferred to the living trust at the date of death. When drafting the LTP, Ms. Walser spoke with the client on the phone for several minutes to verify factual information on the estate-planning questionnaire. Ms. Walser never discussed with the client whether the LTP she had purchased was the most suitable and/or economical estate-planning option for the client’s particular needs. Ms. Walser e-mailed the draft LTPs to SELS. The SELS agent delivered the LTPs to the client. Ms. Walser did not accompany the agent on the delivery visit. The agent notarized the LTP documents prepared for the client but failed to have the client’s execution of the pour-over will witnessed by two persons, with the result that the pour-over will was legally invalid. The agent never delivered the trusts directly to the client’s two sons, and they never executed their LTPs.
In May 2003, Ms. Walser was deposed by the Washington State Office of the Attorney General as part of its investigation of SELS and its related entities for violation of consumer-protection laws. During the deposition, Ms. Walser asserted that she was present on at least one occasion where she witnessed an SELS agent providing legal advice to an SELS client. Ms. Walser terminated her affiliation with SELS several months after the deposition.
Ms. Walser’s conduct violated RPC 1.3, requiring a lawyer to act with reasonable diligence and promptness in representing a client; RPC 1.4(b), requiring a lawyer to explain a matter to the extent reasonably necessary to permit the client to make informed decisions regarding the representation; RPC 1.7(b), prohibiting a lawyer from representing a client if the representation may be materially limited by the lawyer’s own interests, unless the lawyer reasonably believes the representation will not be adversely affected and the client consents in writing after a full disclosure; RPC 5.4(a), prohibiting a lawyer from sharing legal fees with a nonlawyer; and RPC 5.5(b), prohibiting a lawyer from assisting a person who is not a member of the Bar in the performance of activity that constitutes the unauthorized practice of law.
Kevin M. Bank represented the Bar Association. Ms. Walser represented herself.
Reprimanded
Mark T. Higgins (WSBA No. 8346, admitted 1978), of Seattle, was ordered to receive a reprimand on March 7, 2005, following a stipulation approved by a hearing officer. This discipline was based on his conduct in 2002 involving a conflict of interest.
In 1993, a client (hereinafter M.M.) hired Mr. Higgins to represent her in the business aspects of a dissolution of marriage proceeding. M.M.’s spouse (hereinafter L.M.), represented himself pro se during most of the proceeding. The primary asset of the marriage was an interest in a closely held corporation. It was determined that the best way for the parties to maximize the value of the primary asset was to continue to own it and divide the profits. M.M. did not trust L.M. to operate and manage the business without a monitor.
In December 1994, the parties executed a property settlement agreement that provided L.M. would control and manage the day-to-day operations of the corporation. The property agreement included a provision allowing the removal of L.M. for, among other things, “theft or embezzlement or drug and alcohol abuse which makes [L.M.] unable to properly manage the business.” Under the terms of the property agreement, M.M. and L.M. comprised the board of directors of the corporation. The property agreement also provided that the corporation would pay Mr. Higgins’s outstanding legal fees for representing M.M. in the dissolution proceeding.
Subsequently, the parties and Mr. Higgins discussed the possibility of Mr. Higgins acting as the corporation’s lawyer on various legal matters. Mr. Higgins was aware of potential conflicts of interest if he simultaneously represented M.M. and the corporation, but he believed he could help monitor L.M.’s operation of the business and assist in resolving disputes that might arise between L.M. and M.M. relating to operation of the corporation.
Mr. Higgins drafted a letter to address potential and actual conflicts of interests in simultaneously representing the corporation and M.M. The letter, which purported to disclose the potential conflicts of interest and the advantages and risks involved, was signed by M.M. and L.M. in March 1995. The letter failed, however, to identify or disclose many of the potential conflicts of interests and risks and did not include a waiver of future conflicts. It specifically did not discuss the actual or potential conflicts that would ensue if Mr. Higgins simultaneously represented M.M. and the corporation in the event that M.M. sought to remove L.M. from control of the business pursuant to the property agreement. It also failed to identify Mr. Higgins’s potential conflict of interest in being the corporation’s lawyer while also being a significant creditor of the corporation for unpaid legal fees.
In 2002, Mr. Higgins was informed that L.M. was allegedly misappropriating or mishandling corporate funds, and he also became aware that the corporation was experiencing other financial problems that threatened its future viability and profitability. Mr. Higgins instigated a legal action to remove L.M. from control and management of the business pursuant to the property agreement. He arranged for M.M. and the corporation to be represented by himself and another lawyer. The fee agreement provided that the corporation would be obligated to pay attorney fees in the matter. L.M. signed the fee agreement on behalf of the corporation, notwithstanding that she had no authority at the time to manage or bind the corporation to such an agreement. Because he incorrectly believed the prior conflicts letter permitted the representation, Mr. Higgins did not inform M.M. or the corporation of potential conflicts regarding his joint representation of them in the removal action, nor did he obtain written consent to potential or actual conflicts of interest.
Under the terms of the fee agreement, Mr. Higgins and another lawyer hired by Mr. Higgins were to be paid fees substantially in excess of their standard hourly rates, an arrangement designed to compensate the lawyers for the risk that the corporation might not be able to pay for the legal services. The agreement also provided that certain legal fees relating to the removal action had priority over payment of outstanding fees owed to other third-party professionals. Mr. Higgins did not obtain proper authority from the corporation or L.M. to represent the corporation in the removal action or to obligate the corporation to pay legal fees for the removal action.
The removal action was eventually resolved through an arbitration that resulted in L.M.’s removal from management and control of the business owing to his embezzlement from the corporation. Neither M.M. nor the corporation could afford to pay the legal fees incurred in connection with the removal action. Ultimately, L.M. and M.M. sought bankruptcy protection and the corporation ceased business.
Mr. Higgins’s conduct violated RPC 1.7(a) and (b), prohibiting a lawyer from representing a client if the representation of that client will be directly adverse to another client, or if the representation may be materially limited by the lawyer’s responsibilities to another client or to a third person, or the lawyer’s own interests, unless the lawyer reasonably believes the representation will not be adversely affected and the client consents in writing after a full disclosure; and RPC 1.2(a), requiring a lawyer to abide by a client’s decisions about the objectives of representation and to consult with the client as to the means by which they are to be pursued.
Jonathan H. Burke represented the Bar Association. Kurt M. Bulmer represented Mr. Higgins. James M. Danielson was the hearing officer.
Reprimanded
James M. Womack (WSBA No. 22161, admitted 1992), of Seattle, was ordered to receive a reprimand on March 22, 2005, following a stipulation approved by a hearing officer. This discipline was based on his conduct in 2003 involving the charging of an unreasonable fee and a conflict of interest.
Commencing in June 2003, Mr. Womack and a lawyer in another firm represented a client in a federal criminal matter. The client entered into a fee agreement drafted by the other lawyer. Mr. Womack did not sign the agreement but he was aware of its terms. The agreement was entitled “flat fee agreement.” The agreement stated that the client agreed to hire Mr. Womack and co-counsel for a flat fee that was “earned upon receipt,” but it did not describe the fee as nonrefundable. The specified fee was an initial $5,000 for services up to trial, and an additional $10,000 for services for a bench trial and sentencing, or an additional $15,000 for services for a jury trial and sentencing, due within a week of the client’s election to proceed to trial. The client paid the other lawyer $5,000, and the other lawyer gave Mr. Womack half of that sum.
In July 2003, the client rejected a plea offer presented by the prosecuting attorney and elected to proceed to trial. Mr. Womack and co-counsel presented the client with a second fee agreement, which required a $15,000 “nonrefundable” fee and stated that the fee was nonrefundable “in the event the matter is resolved prior to, on the date of, or during trial.” Unlike the first fee agreement, which specified that the $15,000 was the fee for services at trial, under the terms of the second fee agreement the $15,000 also included pretrial work. The client received no additional consideration in the second fee agreement. A handwritten notation on the agreement indicated that it modified the earlier fee agreement. Although Mr. Womack’s representation of the client may have been materially limited by his own interests in having the first fee agreement modified by the second fee agreement, Mr. Womack did not consult with the client regarding a potential conflict of interest, did not obtain the client’s consent in writing to a potential conflict of interest, did not fully disclose in writing all the terms of the transaction (including the fact that he was already contractually obligated to provide all pretrial services for $5,000), and did not provide the client with a reasonable opportunity to seek the advice of independent counsel prior to signing the second fee agreement.
The client signed the second fee agreement and subsequently paid Mr. Womack and co-counsel an additional $15,000. In September 2003, the client fired Mr. Womack and co-counsel and hired another lawyer, who assisted the client in resolving the case by plea agreement. After the filing of a formal disciplinary complaint against him and in accordance with the terms of the stipulation to discipline, Mr. Womack refunded his share of the fee to the client.
Mr. Womack’s conduct violated RPC 1.5(a), requiring that a lawyer’s fee be reasonable; RPC 1.7(b), prohibiting a lawyer from representing a client if the representation of that client may be materially limited by the lawyer’s own interests, unless the lawyer reasonably believes the representation will not be adversely affected and the client consents in writing after a full disclosure; and RPC 1.8(a), prohibiting a lawyer from entering into a business transaction with a client or knowingly acquiring an ownership, possessory, security, or other pecuniary interest adverse to a client unless the transaction and its terms are fair and reasonable and fully disclosed and transmitted in writing to the client, the client is given opportunity to seek the advice of independent counsel, and the client consents.
Anne I. Seidel represented the Bar Association. Leland G. Ripley represented Mr. Womack. William S. Bailey was the hearing officer.
Nondisciplinary Notices
Suspended Pending Conclusion of Supplemental Proceedings
James E. Freeley (WSBA No. 11251, admitted 1980), of Olympia, was suspended pending the conclusion of supplemental proceedings, pursuant to ELC 7.3 and 8.3(e), effective August 31, 2005, by an order of the Washington State Supreme Court. This is not a disciplinary action.
Suspended Pending Conclusion of Supplemental Proceedings
Bernie W. Potter (WSBA No. 23076, admitted 1993), of Seattle, was suspended pending the conclusion of supplemental proceedings, pursuant to ELC 7.3 and 8.3(e), effective August 31, 2005, by an order of the Washington State Supreme Court. This is not a disciplinary action.
