These notices of imposition of disciplinary sanctions and actions are published pursuant to Rule 3.5(d) of the Washington State Supreme Court Rules for Enforcement of Lawyer Conduct, and pursuant to the February 18, 1995, policy statement of the WSBA Board of Governors. For a complete copy of any disciplinary decision, call the Washington State Disciplinary Board at 206-733-5926, leaving the case name, and your name and address.

Note: Approximately 30,000 persons are eligible to practice law in Washington state. Some of them share the same or similar names. Bar News strives to include a clarification whenever an attorney listed in the Disciplinary Notices has the same name as another WSBA member; however, all discipline reports should be read carefully for names, cities, and bar numbers.

Suspended

Todd S. Hammond (WSBA No. 32401, admitted 2002), of Salem, Oregon, was suspended for 30 days, effective October 20, 2008, by order of the Washington State Supreme Court imposing reciprocal discipline in accordance with an order of the Supreme Court of the State of Oregon. This discipline was based on conduct involving charging and collecting an illegal fee. For more information, see Oregon State Bar Bulletin (August/September 2008), available at www.osbar.org/publications/bulletin/08augsep/baractions.html#disc.

Mr. Hammond’s conduct violated Oregon’s RPC 1.5, which prohibits a lawyer from entering into an agreement for, charging, or collecting an illegal or clearly excessive fee or a clearly excessive amount for expenses.

Joanne S. Abelson represented the Bar Association. Mr. Hammond represented himself.

Suspended

Jonathan Morrison (WSBA No. 31153, admitted 2001), of Port Orchard, was suspended from the practice of law for six months, effective October 24, 2008, by order of the Washington State Supreme Court following approval of a stipulation. This discipline is based on conduct in four matters involving failure to appear for court hearings, failure to communicate with clients, providing untimely notice to the clients, and charging excessive fees.

Between March 2006 and December 2007, Mr. Morrison engaged in the following conduct:

• Repeatedly failed to appear for court hearings in two matters, resulting in multiple continuances;
• Failed to advise clients in two matters that he would not be appearing on their behalf at court hearings, or provided untimely notice to these clients that he would not be appearing; failed to advise a client in one matter of his inability to represent him diligently due to his case load; and failed to respond promptly to a client’s requests for information about her case; and
• Retained fees in three matters when he performed little work that benefited the clients in these matters.

Mr. Morrison’s conduct violated RPC 1.3, requiring a lawyer to act with reasonable diligence and promptness in representing a client; RPC 1.4, requiring a lawyer to keep a client reasonably informed about the status of a matter, promptly comply with reasonable requests for information, and explain a matter to the extent reasonably necessary to permit the client to make informed decisions regarding the representation; RPC 1.5(a), requiring a lawyer’s fee to be reasonable; RPC 1.16(d), requiring a lawyer, upon termination of representation, to take steps to the extent reasonably practicable to protect a client’s interests, such as refunding any advance payment of fee or expense that has not been earned; and RPC 8.4(d), prohibiting a lawyer from engaging in conduct that is prejudicial to the administration of justice.

Joanne S. Abelson represented the Bar Association. Mr. Morrison represented himself.

Reprimanded

James W. Kovac (WSBA No. 11498, admitted 1981), of Lynnwood, received a reprimand based on a stipulation approved by a hearing officer on August 8, 2008. This discipline is based on conduct in two matters involving failure to act with reasonable diligence, failure to communicate, charging unreasonable fees, and failure to protect a client’s interests.

Matter No. 1: Ms. “H” hired Mr. Kovac in March 2004 to represent her minor son on possible charges of weapons possession. She paid Mr. Kovac $3,000, which she understood would be held until charges were filed against her son and, if charges were not filed, Mr. Kovac would refund the money. Although Mr. Kovac ordinarily used a written fee agreement in matters such as this that provided that his fees were a “nonrefundable retainer,” he did not execute a written fee agreement with Ms. H. Mr. Kovac contacted the police department and obtained copies of the police reports and other discovery. After speaking to the police officers involved, Mr. Kovac negotiated with the prosecution, resulting in no charges being filed against Ms. H’s son. Mr. Kovac did not immediately advise Ms. H or her son that charges were not filed against him regarding weapons possession. Mr. Kovac did not refund any of the $3,000 he received from Ms. H.

In October 2004, Ms. H’s son was charged with a DUI offense. She contacted Mr. Kovac, who agreed to represent her son in the DUI matter for $2,500, which Ms. H paid. At that time, Mr. Kovac also informed Ms. H that no charges were ever filed against her son in the gun matter. After receiving the $2,500, Mr. Kovac communicated directly with Ms. H’s son concerning his case and court dates. Mr. Kovac did not keep Ms. H fully informed about the status of her son’s DUI matter. Following an administrative hearing to contest the suspension of the son’s driver’s license resulting from being cited for DUI, notice of the son’s driver’s license suspension, as well as when and how he could reinstate his driving privileges, was mailed by the Department of Licensing directly to Ms. H’s son’s home address. Mr. Kovac did not immediately inform Ms. H or her son when the license was suspended, when the suspension period ended, or that her son could pay a fine and apply for reinstatement of his license.

In February 2005, Ms. H’s daughter was charged with a DUI offense. Ms. H paid an additional $2,500 to Mr. Kovac to represent her daughter on the DUI offense. Mr. Kovac communicated directly with Ms. H’s daughter concerning her case and court dates. Despite inquiries from Ms. H, Mr. Kovac did not keep Ms. H fully informed about the status of her daughter’s case.

In April 2005, Ms. H’s son was involved in a minor car accident and charged with driving without a license. Ms. H contacted Mr. Kovac concerning her son’s driving without a license charge. At that time, Mr. Kovac informed her of the suspension of her son’s license and of his failure to advise her that the suspension period had ended. Mr. Kovac agreed to represent her son without charge on the driving-without-a-license charge. He communicated directly with Ms. H’s son concerning his case and court dates; however, he did not keep Ms. H fully informed of the status of her son’s matter despite repeated requests from Ms. H. In July 2005, Mr. Kovac resolved the case by negotiating a plea to the reduced charge of negligent driving first-degree and Ms. H’s son was sentenced, thereby completing the case.

In August 2005, Mr. Kovac notified Ms. H that he had been suspended from the practice of law for nonpayment of dues because his check for licensing had bounced. He told her that he would arrange for other attorneys to cover her daughter's and son’s cases until he was reinstated. In September 2005, Ms. H’s daughter waited in court for approximately five hours regarding a hearing to consider an agreement Mr. Kovac negotiated to continue the DUI matter, but no attorney appeared for her. Mr. Kovac arranged for a public defender (Lawyer D) to continue the hearing, and a continuance was granted. After Mr. Kovac arranged for another attorney (Lawyer E) to appear on Ms. H’s daughter’s DUI case, Ms. H then hired Lawyer E, who completed her daughter’s case and followed up on Ms. H’s son’s case for $1,500. In October 2005, Mr. Kovac was reinstated to the practice of law. In January 2007, Mr. Kovac agreed to refund Ms. H the agreed sum of $4,500. He paid Ms. H $975 in April 2007, and an additional $4,000 in June 2008, which accounts for interest in the delay of paying the agreed sum of $4,500.

Matter No. 2: In August 2000, Mr. “P” was charged with a DUI offense. A defense motion for deferred prosecution was granted, subject to completion of various conditions, with probation review set for September 2005. In January 2005, Mr. P engaged Mr. Kovac to represent him in a subsequent proceeding related to his original offense, paying him $1,500. Mr. Kovac opened a file on Mr. P’s matter, but misplaced the file and never followed up with Mr. P. In August 2005, Mr. Kovac was suspended from the practice of law for nonpayment of dues. Mr. Kovac believes he sent the required notices of his suspension to all clients, but it appears that Mr. P did not get the notice that Mr. Kovac had been suspended from the practice of law. In September 2005, a review hearing was set in connection with an order for probation regarding Mr. P’s DUI matter. Mr. P telephoned Mr. Kovac’s office repeatedly, but Mr. Kovac did not respond to Mr. P’s calls. Mr. P hired another lawyer to complete the matter because Mr. Kovac did not respond to his telephone calls. In September 2006, Mr. Kovac sent a letter to Mr. P returning the $1,500 previously paid.

Mr. Kovac’s conduct violated former RPC 1.3, requiring that a lawyer act with reasonable diligence and promptness in representing a client; former RPC 1.4, requiring a lawyer to keep a client reasonably informed about the status of a matter, to promptly comply with reasonable requests for information, and to explain a matter to the extent reasonably necessary to permit the client to make informed decisions regarding the representation; former RPC 1.5(a), requiring a lawyer’s fee to be reasonable; and former RPC 1.15(d), requiring a lawyer to protect clients’ interests upon the lawyer’s withdrawal from representation.

Randy V. Beitel and Nancy Bickford Miller represented the Bar Association. Kurt M. Bulmer represented Mr. Kovac. Kelby D. Fletcher was the hearing officer.

Reprimanded

Barbara E. Varon (WSBA No. 17041, admitted 1987), of Bellevue, received a reprimand based on a stipulation approved by a hearing officer on August 6, 2008. This discipline is based on conduct involving failure to obtain a client’s consent regarding limiting her representation, lack of communication, and failure to confirm a client’s termination of services prior to withdrawal of representation.

In December 2004, Ms. Varon was hired by a client to represent her in a dissolution proceeding. The dissolution was contested and the client felt she needed an aggressive, experienced lawyer. Ms. Varon’s telephone book advertisement stated that she was aggressive; specialized in dissolutions, both contested and uncontested; and had 19 years’ experience. The client relied on those representations in hiring Ms. Varon.

On June 14, 2005, a settlement conference took place. No settlement was reached and the case was scheduled to go to trial on August 29, 2005. Immediately after the settlement conference, Ms. Varon telephoned a friend of the client with whom Ms. Varon was authorized to communicate about the case. Ms. Varon informed the client’s friend that no settlement had been reached and the client’s case was therefore likely to go to trial. Ms. Varon told the client’s friend that she had limited dissolution trial experience and that she was going to withdraw from the case. Ms. Varon asked the client’s friend to communicate this information to the client.

On or about June 15 and 16, 2005, the client telephoned Ms. Varon three times and left messages to return her calls. Ms. Varon did not return the client’s telephone calls. Based on what Ms. Varon perceived to be the hostile nature of the client’s telephone messages, Ms. Varon formed the belief that the attorney-client relationship had broken down.

On or about June 20, 2005, Ms. Varon received a letter faxed from the client expressing her dissatisfaction with Ms. Varon’s representation and asking for her money back. However, the letter did not specifically state that she was terminating Ms. Varon’s services or ask Ms. Varon to no longer represent her. Over the course of the representation, the client had paid Ms. Varon approximately $13,000 in attorney’s fees. In response to the client’s letter, Ms. Varon faxed a letter to the client advising the client that she needed “an experienced trial attorney” and that she does “not feel as qualified as an attorney who routinely does trials.” Included with the letter to the client was Ms. Varon’s Notice of Intent to Withdraw, effective July 5, 2005, approximately six weeks before the trial date. Opposing counsel filed objections to Ms. Varon’s withdrawal, based on the need to protect discovery that had been provided to her. In response, Ms. Varon filed a Motion and Declaration for Order Permitting Withdrawal that stated the client had discontinued her services and that Ms. Varon was withdrawing at the client’s request. On July 25, 2005, Ms. Varon’s motion to withdraw was granted.

Ms. Varon’s conduct violated RPC 1.2(c), allowing a lawyer to limit the scope of her representation if the limitation is reasonable and the client consents after consultation; RPC 1.3, requiring a lawyer to act with reasonable diligence and promptness in representing a client; and former RPC 1.4(b), requiring a lawyer to explain a matter to the extent reasonably necessary to permit the client to make informed decisions regarding the representation.

Debra J. Slater represented the Bar Association. Steven R. Loitz represented Ms. Varon. Sidney Stillerman Royer was the hearing officer.

Admonished

Sean P. Cecil (WSBA No. 37575, admitted 2006), of Federal Way, received an admonition based on a stipulation approved by the Disciplinary Board on October 6, 2008. This discipline is based on conduct involving failure to communicate and conduct prejudicial to the administration of justice.

On December 13, 2007, Mr. Cecil engaged in intimate relations with a municipal court judge (Judge H). On December 14, 2007, Mr. Cecil appeared before Judge H for the municipal court video calendar. He represented two clients before Judge H that day. He failed to inform his clients of his relationship with Judge H or explain to them that this might affect their case. On December 17, 2007, Mr. Cecil again appeared before Judge H on six separate matters. He did not inform his clients of his relationship with Judge H or explain to them that this might affect their case. Later that same day, Mr. Cecil learned that Judge H had made their intimate relationship public. As a result, the presiding judge appointed new counsel for the clients Mr. Cecil represented before Judge H on December 14 and 17, 2007, and the chief prosecutor conducted a review of the same cases. It was found that Mr. Cecil’s relationship with Judge H did not impact his clients.

Mr. Cecil’s conduct violated RPC 1.4, requiring a lawyer to promptly inform the client of any decision or circumstance with respect to which the client’s informed consent is required by these rules, to reasonably consult with the client about the means by which the client’s objectives are to be accomplished, to keep the client reasonably informed about the status of the matter, to promptly comply with reasonable requests for information, to consult with the client about any relevant limitation on the lawyer’s conduct when the lawyer knows that the client expects assistance not permitted by the Rules of Professional Conduct or other law, and to explain a matter to the extent reasonably necessary to permit the client to make informed decisions regarding the representation; and RPC 8.4(d), prohibiting a lawyer from engaging in conduct that is prejudicial to the administration of justice.

Debra J. Slater represented the Bar Association. Mr. Cecil represented himself.

Admonished

William M. Hanbey (WSBA No. 7829, admitted 1977), of Olympia, received an admonition by order of a review committee of the Disciplinary Board on August 7, 2008. This discipline is based on conduct involving failure to diligently represent a client and failure to communicate.

In October 2006, Mr. Hanbey agreed to represent a client in an employment claim. In October 2006, Mr. Hanbey filed a notice of appeal. He also wrote a letter and attended a meeting with the client, but did not speak with her or return her calls after January 2007.

In April 2007, Mr. Hanbey received written notice of the September 2007 hearing date. The notice also included an August 24, 2007, deadline for submitting documents to be used at the hearing. Mr. Hanbey did not obtain or file any documents prior to the deadline. On August 22 and 23, 2007, the client called Mr. Hanbey to ask whether he was going to submit any documentary evidence to support her claim, but she could not reach him. She asked for a continuance of the hearing and retained new counsel.

Mr. Hanbey’s conduct violated RPC 1.3, requiring a lawyer to act with reasonable diligence and promptness in representing a client; and RPC 1.4, requiring a lawyer to reasonably consult with the client about the means by which the client’s objectives are to be accomplished, keep the client reasonably informed about the status of the matter, promptly comply with reasonable requests for information, and explain a matter to the extent reasonably necessary to permit the client to make informed decisions regarding the representation.

Natalea Skvir represented the Bar Association. Mr. Hanbey represented himself.

Non-Disciplinary Notice

Suspended Pending the Outcome of Disciplinary Proceedings

Shane O. Nees (WSBA No. 29944, admitted 2000), of Fairfield, was suspended pending the outcome of disciplinary proceedings, pursuant to ELC 7.2(a)(3), effective November 19, 2008, by order of the Washington State Supreme Court. This is not a disciplinary sanction.

Suspended Pending the Outcome of Disciplinary Proceedings

Richard L. Pope (WSBA No. 21118, admitted 1991), of Bellevue, was suspended pending the outcome of disciplinary proceedings, pursuant to ELC 7.3, effective November 25, 2008, by order of the Washington State Supreme Court. This is not a disciplinary sanction.