August 2006
Disciplinary Notices
These notices of imposition of disciplinary sanctions and actions are published pursuant to Rule 3.5(d) of the Washington State Supreme Court Rules for Enforcement of Lawyer Conduct, and pursuant to the February 18, 1995, policy statement of the WSBA Board of Governors.
For a complete copy of any disciplinary decision, call the Washington State Disciplinary Board at 206-733-5926, leaving the case name, and your name and address.
Note: Approximately 30,000 persons are eligible to practice law in Washington state. Some of them share the same or similar names. Bar News strives to include a clarification whenever an attorney listed in the Disciplinary Notices has the same name as another WSBA member; however, all discipline reports should be read carefully for names, cities, and bar numbers.
Disbarred
John M. Cooper (WSBA No. 22977, admitted 1993), of Spokane, was disbarred, effective March 29, 2006, by order of the Washington State Supreme Court following a default hearing. This discipline was based on his conduct between 1997 and 1999 in three matters involving multiple acts of misconduct. John M. Cooper is to be distinguished from John M. Cooper of Bainbridge Island and John G. Cooper of Seattle.
Matter 1: In October 1998, Mr. Cooper was hired by a client to probate the estate of her mother. The client paid Mr. Cooper $250 in advance legal fees. Mr. Cooper obtained an order admitting the will to probate and appointing the client as personal representative. The estate, valued at approximately $50,000, included a house that was subject to numerous creditors' claims. Mr. Cooper advised his client to give him the estate's bills to pay and to take out a mortgage on the house to raise funds to cover the bills. The client followed Mr. Cooper's advice and, in December 1998, gave him a cashier's check for $5,750. Of that amount, $750 was for additional advance legal fees and $5,000 was for Mr. Cooper to pay the estate's creditors, with any remainder to be refunded to the client. Mr. Cooper deposited the check into his trust account. Over the next month, the client called Mr. Cooper several times; Mr. Cooper repeatedly assured her that everything was fine. After a month, he stopped returning her telephone calls. Between December 1998 and February 1999, the estate's creditors began approaching the client, stating that their bills had not been paid. During this time, Mr. Cooper withdrew a portion of the client's funds from his trust account to pay the expenses of other clients and to obtain cash. In February 1999, the client and her husband confronted Mr. Cooper at his home office, where he gave them a trust account check for $3,010 as a partial refund. He also gave to the client a promissory note in the amount of $4,990, with 12 percent interest commencing that day, which represented the remaining $1,990 the client had provided him to pay the creditor's claims, the $1,000 the client had paid as advance fees, and an additional $2,000. Mr. Cooper never made any payments on the promissory note and never provided the client with an accounting. The client settled the creditors' claims by herself.
Matter 2: In June 1998, Mr. Cooper was hired by a husband and wife after the wife's sister suddenly died, leaving two minor children. The children's father was incarcerated, and the clients sought to petition for custody. The father contested the petition and, in July 1998, a guardian ad litem (GAL) was appointed. Mr. Cooper told the clients not to contact the GAL, but to wait for the GAL to contact them. Between July and December 1998, the clients waited to hear from the GAL. During this time, Mr. Cooper failed to work on the clients' case, never informed the clients that the GAL had written to him several times requesting to speak with them, and rarely returned the clients' many phone calls. The GAL eventually told Mr. Cooper that if he did not hear from the clients, he would recommend that the father get custody. Mr. Cooper did not advise the clients about this. In January 1999, the GAL called the clients and asked why they had not contacted him. He told them that a motion brought by the father's lawyer to dismiss the custody proceeding was scheduled for hearing, and he advised them to attend. Mr. Cooper never informed the clients of this hearing, never filed a response to the motion to dismiss, and arrived late for the hearing. The GAL informed the court of Mr. Cooper's behavior and explained that there was no cause to dismiss the matter. The clients hired new counsel immediately after the hearing and were awarded custody of the children.
Matter 3: Mr. Cooper represented a client in a criminal trial in January 1997 and subsequently on appeal following a conviction. Mr. Cooper failed to file an appellate brief on the client's behalf despite several notices from the Court of Appeals and the imposition of terms against Mr. Cooper. In October 1997, the client's appeal was dismissed. The matter was remanded to Superior Court, which mailed to Mr. Cooper a notice of a hearing to set the client's jail incoming date. Neither Mr. Cooper nor his client appeared at the hearing. The court issued a warrant and the client was arrested. The court later appointed another lawyer to represent the client.
Mr. Cooper's conduct violated RPC 1.2(a), requiring a lawyer to abide by a client's decisions concerning the objectives of representation; RPC 1.3, requiring a lawyer to act with reasonable diligence and promptness in representing a client; RPC 1.4, requiring a lawyer to keep a client reasonably informed about the status of a matter, promptly comply with reasonable requests for information, and explain a matter to the extent reasonably necessary to permit the client to make informed decisions regarding the representation; RPC 1.5(a), requiring a lawyer's fees to be reasonable; RPC 1.14(a), requiring all funds of clients be deposited in one or more identifiable interest-bearing trust accounts and no funds belonging to the lawyer or law firm be deposited therein; RPC 1.14(b), requiring a lawyer to promptly notify a client of the receipt of his or her funds, to maintain complete records of client funds and render appropriate accounts regarding them, and to promptly pay or deliver to the client funds that the client is entitled to receive; RPC 1.15(d), requiring a lawyer to take steps to the extent reasonably practicable to protect a client's interests upon termination of representation; RPC 3.2, requiring a lawyer to make reasonable efforts to expedite litigation consistent with the interests of the client; RPC 8.4(b), prohibiting a lawyer from committing a criminal act (here, theft in the first degree) that reflects adversely on the lawyer's honesty, trustworthiness, or fitness as a lawyer in other respects; and RPC 8.4(c), prohibiting a lawyer from engaging in conduct involving dishonesty, fraud, deceit, or misrepresentation.
Marsha A. Matsumoto represented the Bar Association. Kenneth S. Kagan represented Mr. Cooper. James P. Spurgetis was the hearing officer.
Disbarred
Terry O. Forbes (WSBA No. 5626, admitted 1974), of Everett, was disbarred, effective March 29, 2006, by order of the Washington State Supreme Court following a default hearing. This discipline was based on his conduct between 2002 and 2004 in six matters involving trust-account irregularities and multiple other acts of misconduct.
Matter 1: In September 2002, Mr. Forbes wrote a check from his trust account in the amount of $39,000 payable to his legal assistant. His legal assistant was not a client, she had no funds on deposit in his trust account, and she was not entitled to the funds.
Matter 2: For a period of years, Mr. Forbes represented a client who was the adult ward in a guardianship case. In September and October 2002, Mr. Forbes received two checks totaling $168,709.78 on his client's behalf, which he deposited into his pooled client trust account. Beginning in April 2003, Mr. Forbes's trust-account balance fell below $168,000 and so remained (with the exception of a few days) until August 2004, at which time it had declined to approximately $70,500. Mr. Forbes was not entitled to remove the client's funds from his trust account. Knowing that the client's case was set for a hearing in August, Mr. Forbes closed his trust account and opened a new trust account into which he deposited the balance from the old account, supplemented by other deposits totaling approximately $97,000, which he obtained from his family. In August 2004, Mr. Forbes filed a declaration in superior court, stating that "the $168,709.75 [sic] he had received" on his client's behalf in 2002 remained available for disbursement or investment as the court might direct. Upon learning that the client's funds had been held in trust for nearly two years without interest accruing to the client's benefit, the superior court commissioner ordered that Mr. Forbes pay the $168,709.78 into the court registry by the end of the day. That afternoon, Mr. Forbes tendered to the court a check for $168.709.78 drawn on his new trust account.
Matter 3: Mr. Forbes represented a husband and wife in a child custody matter. In June 2004, the clients paid him $1,000 as costs to be paid to a guardian ad litem appointed in the case. The clients received a receipt indicating the funds would be placed in Mr. Forbes's trust account for the guardian ad litem. Mr. Forbes neither deposited the funds into his trust account nor paid them to a guardian ad litem. He did not have the clients' permission to use the money for any other purpose. Mr. Forbes never rendered an accounting to the clients for the money they paid him.
Matter 4: In December 2002, a client paid Mr. Forbes an advance fee deposit of $1,000 to represent him in a dissolution case filed by the client's wife. The fee agreement stated that Mr. Forbes's hourly rate was $175. Mr. Forbes deposited the entire amount into his business account, even though he had only spent about 90 minutes on the client's case at their initial meeting. Mr. Forbes did not file a notice of appearance on behalf of the client until January 2003, and he did not file an answer to the dissolution petition until the day before a default motion was to be heard. Shortly thereafter, the client reconciled with his wife and, in October 2003, the client requested that Mr. Forbes prepare a stipulation to dismiss the dissolution petition. Mr. Forbes took no further action in the case, did not return the client's repeated calls, did not prepare a stipulation as requested, and did not sign the stipulation proffered by opposing counsel until March 2004. After the client filed a grievance with the Bar Association, Mr. Forbes responded in writing that he had refunded $590.50 to the client in September or October 2003. Mr. Forbes had not refunded any money to the client. Mr. Forbes never earned the entire $1,000 paid to him and never provided an accounting to the client.
Matter 5: In September and October 2004, Mr. Forbes received from a dissolution client a total of $39,500 in marital community funds, which he deposited into his trust account. Mr. Forbes advised the client to transfer these funds to him in order to protect them from being frozen by opposing counsel and to ensure their continued availability to her. In November 2004, the client terminated Mr. Forbes's services, at which time her balance in Mr. Forbes's trust account should have been $31,500. Mr. Forbes's trust account balance was less than $19,000 at the time. Mr. Forbes did not have the client's permission to remove any portion of the $31,500 from his trust account.
Matter 6: In November 2004, Mr. Forbes borrowed $21,500 from one client and $1,300 from a second client without fully disclosing in writing to either client the risks involved in lending him money or affording them a reasonable opportunity to seek the advice of other counsel. That same day, Mr. Forbes deposited $21,760 into his trust account.
Mr. Forbes's conduct violated RPC 1.3, requiring a lawyer to act with reasonable diligence and promptness in representing a client; RPC 1.4, requiring a lawyer to keep a client reasonably informed about the status of a matter, promptly comply with reasonable requests for information, and explain a matter to the extent reasonably necessary to permit the client to make informed decisions regarding the representation; RPC 1.5(a), requiring a lawyer's fee to be reasonable; RPC 1.8(a), prohibiting a lawyer from entering into a business transaction with a client or knowingly acquiring an ownership, possessory, security, or other pecuniary interest adverse to a client unless the transaction and its terms are fair and reasonable and fully disclosed and transmitted in writing to the client, the client is given opportunity to seek the advice of independent counsel, and the client consents; RPC 1.14(a), requiring all funds of clients paid to a lawyer be deposited into an interest-bearing trust account; RPC 1.14(b), requiring a lawyer to maintain complete records of client funds and properties and render appropriate accounts regarding them, and to promptly pay or deliver upon request funds or properties belonging to the client; RPC 1.15(d), requiring a lawyer to take steps to the extent reasonably practicable to protect a client's interests upon termination of a representation; RPC 8.4(b), prohibiting a lawyer from committing a criminal act (here, theft in the first degree) that reflects adversely on the lawyer's honesty, trustworthiness, or fitness as a lawyer in other respects; RPC 8.4(c), prohibiting a lawyer from engaging in conduct involving dishonesty, fraud, deceit, or misrepresentation; and RPC 8.4(i), prohibiting a lawyer from committing any act involving moral turpitude, or corruption, or any unjustified act of assault or other act that reflects disregard for the rule of law.
Natalea Skvir represented the Bar Association. Mr. Forbes did not appear in the proceeding either personally or through counsel. Margarita V. Latsinova was the hearing officer.
Suspended
Graeme H. Strickland Jr. (WSBA No. 4977, admitted 1973), of Lake Oswego, Oregon, was suspended for one year, effective March 16, 2006, by order of the Washington State Supreme Court imposing reciprocal discipline in accordance with an order of the Supreme Court of the State of Oregon following a hearing. This discipline was based on his conduct in 2003 involving criminal convictions for improper use of the emergency reporting system, initiating a false report, and disorderly conduct.
In August 2002, Mr. Strickland learned that the city of Lake Oswego was planning to build a reservoir across the street from his home. For a time, Mr. Stickland observed the construction workers, took pictures, and recorded notes in a journal. Mr. Strickland subsequently sent several letters to the city's attorney and the city's contractor to put them "on notice" of a potential tort claim. Mr. Strickland wrote at least 10 separate letters, complaining of disturbances from the construction workers and claiming that the construction workers were "retaliating against him." In March 2003, Mr. Strickland felt vibrations in his home that he associated with the construction site. He drove his car near the construction site and parked in the middle of an intersection. A construction worker asked him to move the car because he was parked in a work zone. Rather than move his car, Mr. Strickland left it in the intersection and walked back to his home, where he dialed 911. He asked the dispatcher to send the police because he was surrounded by construction vehicles and being threatened. Mr. Strickland then returned to the intersection, and lunged at one of the construction workers. Although no physical contact occurred, Mr. Strickland fell backwards to the ground and began screaming that his back was injured. A Lake Oswego police officer arrived. Mr. Strickland told the officer that the construction worker had assaulted him and thrown him to the ground. The officer notified Mr. Strickland that making a false report is a criminal act, but Mr. Strickland persisted in his story and refused to leave. Paramedics arrived and Mr. Strickland told them that the construction worker had assaulted him. Mr. Strickland then appeared to have a seizure, stiffening and trembling. Immediately thereafter, he sat up, appeared alert, and said that he was going home. Although the attending paramedic believed that Mr. Strickland had feigned the seizure, the paramedics transported Mr. Strickland to the emergency room because he continued to state that he was in pain. There, doctors found no evidence of physical injury.
In connection with these events, Mr. Strickland was charged with and convicted by a jury of three misdemeanors in Lake Oswego Municipal Court: violation of ORS 165.570, improper use of emergency reporting system; ORS 162.375, initiating a false report; and ORS 166.025, disorderly conduct.
Mr. Strickland's conduct violated Oregon DR 1-102(A)(2), prohibiting a lawyer from committing a criminal act that reflects adversely on the lawyer's honesty, trustworthiness, or fitness to practice law; and DR 1-102(A)(3), prohibiting a lawyer from engaging in conduct involving dishonesty, fraud, deceit, or misrepresentation.
Felice P. Congalton represented the Bar Association. Mr. Strickland represented himself.
Suspended
Neil W. Jackson (WSBA No. 32574, admitted 2002), of Portland, Oregon, was suspended for 60 days, effective March 10, 2006, by order of the Washington State Supreme Court imposing reciprocal discipline in accordance with an order of the Supreme Court of the State of Oregon following a stipulation. This discipline was based on his conduct between 1997 and 2004 involving improper withdrawal, neglect of a legal matter, failure to account for client funds, and failure to properly deliver client property.
Mr. Jackson was hired by a client to represent her in a personal-injury matter. In March 1997, Mr. Jackson filed a complaint on behalf of the client. The court entered an order transferring the action to arbitration. Mr. Jackson requested that the client deliver $1,100 for costs incurred and to be incurred in the action, which he received in October 1997 and deposited into his lawyer trust account. In October 1997, Mr. Jackson withdrew $630.22 for expenses and costs incurred. In November 1997, the court issued a notice of pending dismissal of the action. The court dismissed the case in December 1997 and sent a copy of the judgment of dismissal to Mr. Jackson.
Between October 1997 and October 2001, Mr. Jackson failed to respond to the client's telephone calls and letters, failed to provide the client with written communications from the opposing party's counsel and other persons, failed to respond to inquiries and requests from the opposing counsel, failed to provide the client with a copy of the court's notice of pending dismissal and judgment of dismissal of the action, failed to take action to reinstate the case, failed to notify the client that he was taking no action and was no longer representing or pursuing her interests, failed to monitor the client's case, and failed to take action to protect the client's interests. In October 2001, the client hired a new lawyer, who requested a copy of the documents contained in Mr. Jackson's file. Mr. Jackson did not deliver the documents until March 2002, after the new lawyer had made additional requests. Until June 2004, Mr. Jackson failed to deliver the unused balance of the client's funds and failed to account for those funds.
Mr. Jackson's conduct violated Oregon DR 2-110(A)(2), prohibiting a lawyer from withdrawing from employment until the lawyer has taken reasonable steps to avoid foreseeable prejudice to the rights of the lawyer's client, including giving due notice to the lawyer's client, allowing time for employment of other counsel, delivering to the client all papers and property to which the client is entitled, and complying with applicable laws and rules; DR 6-101(B), prohibiting a lawyer from neglecting a legal matter entrusted to the lawyer; DR 9-101(C)(3), requiring a lawyer or law firm to maintain complete records of all funds, securities, and other properties of a client coming into the possession of the lawyer and render appropriate accounts to the lawyer's client regarding them; and DR 9-101(C)(4), requiring a lawyer to promptly pay or deliver to a client as requested by the client the funds, securities, or other properties in the possession of the lawyer that the client is entitled to receive.
Felice P. Congalton represented the Bar Association. Mr. Jackson represented himself.
Non-Disciplinary Notice
Suspended Pending Outcome of Disciplinary Proceedings
Paul Hernandez (WSBA No. 21015, admitted 1991), of Seattle, was suspended from the practice of law pending the outcome of disciplinary proceedings, pursuant to ELC 7.2(a)(3), effective May 25, 2006, by an order of the Washington State Supreme Court. This is not a disciplinary action.
