January 2007
Disciplinary Notices
These notices of imposition of disciplinary sanctions and actions are published pursuant to Rule 3.5(d) of the Washington State Supreme Court Rules for Enforcement of Lawyer Conduct, and pursuant to the February 18, 1995, policy statement of the WSBA Board of Governors.
For a complete copy of any disciplinary decision, call the Washington State Disciplinary Board at 206-733-5926, leaving the case name, and your name and address.
Note: Approximately 30,000 persons are eligible to practice law in Washington state. Some of them share the same or similar names. Bar News strives to include a clarification whenever an attorney listed in the Disciplinary Notices has the same name as another WSBA member; however, all discipline reports should be read carefully for names, cities, and bar numbers.
Disbarred
Roland T. Hunter (WSBA No. 29488, admitted 1999), of Olympia, was disbarred, effective July 21, 2006, by order of the Washington State Supreme Court following a default hearing. This discipline was based on his conduct in 2004 and 2005 involving sending sexually explicit material to a minor client, asking the minor client to engage in sexual relations with him, the crime of attempted possession of depictions of a minor engaged in sexually explicit conduct, and the crime of tampering with a witness.
In October 2004, Mr. Hunter began representing a 17-year-old client in a criminal matter. During the course of the representation, the minor client e-mailed Mr. Hunter about the status of her case. Mr. Hunter responded via e-mail, and, over time, Mr. Hunter’s e-mails to the client became sexually explicit. Among other things, Mr. Hunter asked the client to have sex with him, described different sexual acts he wanted to engage in with the client, and asked if he could take pictures and videos of the client performing sexual acts with him. Mr. Hunter also e-mailed the client sexually explicit pictures, including nude photographs of himself.
In December 2004, a police detective interviewed Mr. Hunter about the sexually explicit e-mails and photographs sent to the client. Mr. Hunter denied sending them, claiming that they had been sent by his ex-girlfriend without his knowledge or permission. Sometime later, Mr. Hunter contacted his ex-girlfriend and asked her to falsely testify that she was the one who had sent the sexually explicit e-mails and pictures. In exchange for doing so, Mr. Hunter promised to provide certain monetary benefits. In November 2005, Mr. Hunter was charged with attempted possession of depictions of a minor engaged in sexually explicit conduct (RCW 9A.28.020 and 9.68A.070), a gross misdemeanor, and tampering with a witness (RCW 9A.72.120(1) and 10.99.020), a felony. Mr. Hunter pleaded guilty to both counts.
Mr. Hunter’s conduct violated RPC 1.7(b), prohibiting a lawyer from representing a client if the representation of that client may be materially limited by the lawyer’s responsibilities to another client or to a third person, or by the lawyer’s own interests, unless the lawyer reasonably believes that the representation will not be adversely affected and the client consents in writing after a full disclosure of material facts; RPC 1.8(k), prohibiting a lawyer from having sexual relations with a current client unless a consensual sexual relationship existed between them at the time the lawyer/client relationship commenced; RPC 8.4(a), prohibiting a lawyer from attempting to violate the Rules of Professional Conduct; RPC 8.4(b), prohibiting a lawyer from committing a criminal act that reflects adversely on the lawyer’s honesty, trustworthiness, or fitness as a lawyer in other respects; and RPC 8.4(i), prohibiting a lawyer from committing any act involving moral turpitude, or any unjustified act of assault or other act which reflects disregard for the rule of law, whether the same be committed in the course of his or her conduct as a lawyer, or otherwise.
Joanne S. Abelson represented the Bar Association. Mr. Hunter did not appear in the proceeding either personally or through counsel. Vernon W. Harkins was the hearing officer.
Disbarred
Edward L. Tezak (WSBA No. 23541, admitted 1994) of Mukilteo, was disbarred, effective July 25, 2006, by order of the Washington State Supreme Court, following a default hearing. This discipline was based on his conduct in 2000 leading to his conviction of the crimes of wire fraud and money laundering.
Mr. Tezak was a principal of a purportedly tax-exempt charitable organization. He was also a director and officer of a limited liability company, which was purportedly a lender for a private development project. In May 2000, Mr. Tezak represented to various individuals that he had access to approximately $20 million in funds from a particular individual. Mr. Tezak participated in an interstate telephone call with a representative of an investment bank, during which he facilitated the issuance of a letter by that representative affirming the existence of more than $20 million in assets on deposit. In two letters dated May 11, 2000, Mr. Tezak affirmed the availability of those funds, plus $43 million in additional private financing, for investment in the development project. Mr. Tezak knew that his representations in the letters were false and fraudulent. Mr. Tezak had reason to know that one of the letters was faxed in interstate commerce.
Prior to his making false representations concerning the availability of funding for the development project, Mr. Tezak had entered into an agreement to be paid $250,000 by the developer for up to five verifications of financing that he would provide. Pursuant to that agreement, and based on the verification of funds that Mr. Tezak performed, the private developer paid Mr. Tezak $50,000 for his services in the form of a cashier’s check payable to Mr. Tezak’s charitable organization. Thereafter, Mr. Tezak deposited the cashier’s check into his brother’s bank account in Montana and later directed the funds to be transferred to the bank account of the charitable organization, which was also located in Montana. From that account, Mr. Tezak withdrew and used the funds for a variety of personal purposes knowing that the funds were derived from an underlying wire-fraud scheme and that the transaction was designed for the purpose of concealing the nature, location, source, and/or ownership of the funds.
In May 2005, Mr. Tezak pled guilty as charged in federal court to the crimes of wire fraud, in violation of 18 U.S.C. §§ 1343 and 2, and money laundering, in violation of 18 U.S.C. §§ 1956(a)(1)(B) and 1956(a)(1)(A)(ii).
Mr. Tezak’s conduct violated RPC 8.4(b), prohibiting a lawyer from committing a criminal act that reflects adversely on the lawyer’s honesty, trustworthiness, or fitness as a lawyer in other respects; RPC 8.4(c), prohibiting a lawyer from engaging in conduct involving dishonesty, fraud, deceit, or misrepresentation; and RPC 8.4(i), prohibiting a lawyer from committing any act involving moral turpitude, or corruption, or any unjustified act of assault or other act which reflects disregard for the rule of law, whether the same be committed in the course of his or her conduct as a lawyer, or otherwise.
Marsha A. Matsumoto represented the Bar Association. Mr. Tezak did not appear either in person or through counsel. Catherine L. Moore was the hearing officer.
Suspended
Christopher P. Bartow (WSBA No. 29559, admitted 1999), of Ellensburg, was suspended for six months, effective June 9, 2006, by order of the Washington State Supreme Court, following a stipulation. This discipline was based on his conduct in 2004 involving the crime of third-degree assault.
In October 2004, Mr. Bartow was charged by information in Snohomish County Superior Court with the felony of third-degree assault in violation of RCW 9A.36.031(1)(g) (assault on a law enforcement officer or other employee of a law enforcement agency who was performing his or her official duties at the time of the assault). In November 2004, a jury convicted Mr. Bartow as charged.
Mr. Bartow’s conduct violated RPC 8.4(b), prohibiting a lawyer from committing a criminal act that reflects adversely on the lawyer’s honesty, trustworthiness, or fitness as a lawyer in other respects; RPC 8.4(d), prohibiting a lawyer from engaging in conduct that is prejudicial to the administration of justice; and RPC 8.4(i), prohibiting a lawyer from committing any act involving moral turpitude, or corruption, or any unjustified act of assault or other act which reflects disregard for the rule of law, whether the same be committed in the course of his or her conduct as a lawyer, or otherwise.
Linda B. Eide represented the Bar Association. Mr. Bartow represented himself.
Suspended
Leanne M. Bowker (WSBA No. 16737, admitted 1987), of Portland, Oregon, was suspended for 30 days, effective May 9, 2006, by order of the Washington State Supreme Court imposing reciprocal discipline based on an order of the Supreme Court of the State of Oregon following a stipulation. This discipline was based on her conduct in 2004 and 2005 involving conflicts of interest and disclosure of confidential information.
In 2004, Ms. Bowker was engaged to represent the lender in a loan transaction. The borrower in the transaction was Ms. Bowker’s former client in an estate-planning matter. The lender was the mother of the former client. Ms. Bowker believed that she was representing only the lender. However, based upon Ms. Bowker’s prior lawyer-client relationship with the borrower, meetings she had had with the borrower regarding the loan, and other circumstances, the borrower had a reasonable expectation that Ms. Bowker was representing the borrower in the matter. Ms. Bowker prepared a promissory note secured by a trust deed granting the lender an interest in the borrower’s home. The borrower subsequently executed a different promissory note prepared by another lawyer.
In July 2005, Ms. Bowker met with both the borrower and lender regarding problems that had arisen in connection with the loan. Ms. Bowker undertook to represent the lender in collecting the loaned funds from the borrower without obtaining the informed consent of the former client. In connection with her collection efforts, Ms. Bowker, at the lender’s instruction and despite objection by the borrower, sent the borrower’s brother a copy of the draft promissory note and trust deed she had prepared in 2004.
Ms. Bowker’s conduct violated Oregon DR 5-105(E), prohibiting a lawyer from representing multiple current clients in any matters when such representation would result in an actual or likely conflict; Oregon RPC 1.9(a), prohibiting a lawyer who has formerly represented a client in a matter from thereafter representing another person in the same or a substantially related matter in which that person’s interests are materially adverse to the interests of the former client unless each affected client gives informed consent, confirmed in writing; and Oregon RPC 1.9(c)(2), prohibiting a lawyer who has formerly represented a client in a matter or whose present or former firm has formerly represented a client in a matter from thereafter revealing information relating to the representation except as the Rules would permit or require with respect to a client.
Felice P. Congalton represented the Bar Association. Peter R. Jarvis represented Ms. Bowker.
Suspended
Mark E. Lehinger (WSBA No. 15544, admitted 1985), of Spokane, was suspended for one year, effective upon his return to active status, by order of the Washington State Supreme Court following a hearing. This discipline was based on his conduct between 2003 and 2005 involving practicing law while suspended, failure to inform clients of his suspension, and making false statements in connection with a disciplinary investigation.
In August 2003, Mr. Lehinger received notice from the Washington State Bar Association that he had been suspended from the practice of law for failure to pay licensing fees. In September 2003, believing the statute of limitations applicable to the claim would soon expire, Mr. Lehinger filed a summons and complaint for damages in Spokane County District Court, signing the complaint as “Attorney for the Plaintiffs.” Mr. Lehinger did not inform his putative clients of his suspension.
In October 2003, the Bar Association informed Mr. Lehinger that a grievance had been opened and requested his written response to the allegation that he practiced law while suspended. Mr. Lehinger’s response included the following statements: “I filed the summons and complaint, even though I had not yet heard back from the Bar Association concerning my reinstatement. Subsequently, I learned that the check I sent in payment of the dues and penalty did not clear . . . .” These statements were false. The Bar Association had informed Mr. Lehinger the day before he filed the summons and complaint that his license would not be reinstated because his check had been returned for “NSF.” That day, a WSBA employee had informed Mr. Lehinger by telephone that he was required to make payment by cashier’s check or money order and could not do so by credit card. After paying his license fees in December 2003, Mr. Lehinger was reinstated to active status. Mr. Lehinger has subsequently changed his status with the WSBA to inactive.
Mr. Lehinger’s conduct violated RPC 1.4, requiring a lawyer to keep a client reasonably informed about the status of a matter, to promptly comply with reasonable requests for information, and to explain a matter to the extent reasonably necessary to permit the client to make informed decisions regarding the representation; RPC 5.5(e), prohibiting a lawyer from engaging in the practice of law while on inactive status, or while suspended from the practice of law for any cause; RPC 8.4(c), prohibiting a lawyer from engaging in conduct involving dishonesty, fraud, deceit, or misrepresentation; and RPC 8.4(l), prohibiting a lawyer from violating a duty or sanction imposed by or under the Rules for Enforcement of Lawyer Conduct in connection with a disciplinary matter.
Marsha A. Matsumoto and M. Craig Bray represented the Bar Association. Mr. Lehinger represented himself. David L. Broom was the hearing officer.
Suspended
Jeffrey L. Needle (WSBA No. 6346, admitted 1975) of Seattle, was suspended for 60 days, effective July 26, 2006, by order of the Washington State Supreme Court, following a hearing. This discipline was based on his conduct in 2002 involving use of means that had no substantial purpose other than to embarrass or burden a third person, commission of the crime of fourth-degree assault, conduct prejudicial to the administration of justice, and violation of the oath of attorney.
In October 2002, Mr. Needle was attending a deposition on behalf of the plaintiff in a wrongful-termination action. Prior to the deposition, there had been an atmosphere of disagreement between Mr. Needle and the lawyer representing the defendant. The deposition had been ordered following a motion to compel, opposed by Mr. Needle. At the commencement of the deposition and in its early stages, Mr. Needle appeared irritated and angry. At times during the deposition, the witness sobbed and cried. As the deposition progressed, Mr. Needle became more hostile and angry, raising his voice. Just over halfway through the deposition, Mr. Needle began to criticize the defendant’s lawyer and call her names in an unprofessional manner. Mr. Needle characterized the defendant’s lawyer as “a disgrace” and “a total ass.” When the defendant’s lawyer advised Mr. Needle to start acting like a civilized person, Mr. Needle told her that she did not deserve civilized treatment.
After the deposition was concluded, Mr. Needle confronted the defendant’s lawyer in the deposition conference room. Mr. Needle approached the defendant’s lawyer in a hostile manner and raised his voice. He came within six to eight inches of her face and body and yelled unprofessional remarks, frightening both her and the court reporter. As Mr. Needle continued to push towards her, the defendant’s lawyer placed her left hand on the front of Mr. Needle’s right shoulder area, thereby attempting to restrain Mr. Needle’s motion toward her as she was being backed up against the conference room table. She asked Mr. Needle several times to “leave” or “just to leave.” Mr. Needle persisted, continuing his unprofessional verbal comments to her. Once or twice, Mr. Needle told the defendant’s lawyer to remove her hand from him. When she failed to do so, Mr. Needle struck her on the left side of her face with his palm. Mr. Needle then turned and departed.
Mr. Needle was subsequently arrested and charged with fourth-degree assault. The criminal matter was resolved pursuant to an agreement to continue the case for dismissal. In the wrongful-termination action, the superior court judge removed Mr. Needle as legal counsel and held Mr. Needle personally responsible for attorney’s fees and costs incurred in connection with the motion. Following the incident, the defendant’s lawyer experienced swelling, redness, bruising, and pain to the left side of her face. The day after the incident, the defendant’s lawyer went to see a physician and was sent to a radiologist for a CT scan, incurring medical expenses of $1,277.54.
Mr. Needle’s conduct violated RPC 4.4, prohibiting a lawyer, in representing a client, from using means that have no substantial purpose other than to embarrass, delay, or burden a third person; RPC 8.4(b), prohibiting a lawyer from committing a criminal act (in this case, assault) that reflects adversely on the lawyer’s honesty, trustworthiness or fitness as a lawyer in other respects; RPC 8.4(d), prohibiting a lawyer from engaging in conduct that is prejudicial to the administration of justice; and RPC 8.4(k), prohibiting a lawyer from violating his or her oath as an attorney.
Debra J. Slater represented the Bar Association. James E. Lobsenz represented Mr. Needle. Julian C. Dewell was the hearing officer.
Suspended
Clayton C. Patrick (WSBA No. 10298, admitted 1972) of Portland, Oregon, was suspended for 30 days by order of the Washington State Supreme Court imposing reciprocal discipline in accordance with an order of the Supreme Court of the State of Oregon following a stipulation. This discipline is based on his conduct in 1997 involving conflicts of interest.
Mr. Patrick was close friends with an individual who had formed a trust that produced income by making loans. In two instances, Mr. Patrick referred potential borrowers to the trust and actively facilitated loan transactions from the trust by performing a number of legal services on behalf of each of the participants in the transaction.
In one matter, Mr. Patrick negotiated and secured the loan on a friend’s behalf and signed the promissory note as a guarantor. Mr. Patrick did not recognize that his judgment as a lawyer could have been affected by his own interests as guarantor of the loan and failed to make appropriate disclosures and obtain the borrower’s consent to the continued representation. Mr. Patrick also acquired a special power of attorney from the lender to allow him to conduct business on the lender’s behalf and to close the transaction in the lender’s absence.
In a second matter, Mr. Patrick represented a client in negotiating, securing, and facilitating a loan from the trust. Mr. Patrick also reviewed draft documents in connection with the transaction sent to him by the lender and was aware that the lender was looking to him to ensure that the trust’s interests were protected.
Mr. Patrick’s conduct violated Oregon DR 5-101(A), prohibiting a lawyer, except with the consent of the client after full disclosure, from accepting or continuing employment if the exercise of the lawyer’s professional judgment on behalf of the lawyer’s client will be or reasonably may be affected by the lawyer’s own financial business, property, or personal interests; and DR 5-105(E), permitting a lawyer to represent multiple current clients in instances otherwise prohibited when such representation would not result in an actual conflict and when each client consents to the multiple representation after full disclosure.
Felice P. Congalton represented the Bar Association. Mr. Patrick represented himself.
Reprimanded
Michael R. Karber (WSBA No. 24044, admitted 1994), of Tempe, Arizona, was ordered to receive two reprimands on May 22, 2006, following a stipulation approved by a hearing officer. This discipline was based on his conduct involving failure to put a contingent-fee agreement in writing and trust-account irregularities.
Mr. Karber represented a client in a lawsuit to recover for damage to the client’s pond. The client had been previously represented by another lawyer in the matter. Mr. Karber and the client agreed to a 25 percent contingent fee with a cash advance of $4,000. Although Mr. Karber was aware of the requirement that agreements for contingent fees be in writing, he neglected to put the contingent-fee agreement in writing. In April 2004, the matter settled at mediation when two insurance carriers agreed to pay $25,000 each. As part of the mediation, the client agreed to give her previous lawyer a lien of $1,500 on the settlement proceeds. An environmental expert involved in the matter agreed to limit her charges to $13,000, provided that the remaining balance of $9,000 would be paid out of the proceeds of the settlement. Mr. Karber agreed to reduce his fees if necessary to ensure there would be sufficient funds to repair the client’s pond. At the time, Mr. Karber believed the repairs could be accomplished for a sum that would allow him to collect the full 25 percent contingency fee of $12,500.
Mr. Karber deposited the first $25,000 check into his trust account. Mr. Karber paid the environmental expert $9,000, and, with the client’s consent, he withdrew an additional $1,000 as a fee advance. The second $25,000 check was sent directly to the client. Out of the $15,000 remaining in the trust account, Mr. Karber was entitled to the remainder of his fee, which could have been up to $7,500. However, the exact amount of Mr. Karber’s fee was indeterminate until the cost of repairing the client’s pond was determined. Mr. Karber intended to assist his client in getting the work contracted. Owing to a medical condition, Mr. Karber’s ability to assist his client was impaired at the time. This, coupled with the unavailability of the environmental expert during this period, led to a failure to obtain a contractor to do the work.
Although he was not able to determine the amount of additional fee to which he was entitled, Mr. Karber made a series of disbursements to himself between April and June 2004, totaling $8,100. Mr. Karber did not maintain individual client ledgers or a check register for his trust account, other than carbon copies of the check stubs. Consequently, Mr. Karber had no running balance of his client’s funds apart from periodic bank statements. Due to his medical condition and the inadequacy of his records, Mr. Karber was not aware that he had taken $600 more than the maximum of fees to which he could have become entitled.
In late June 2004, Mr. Karber left the area to seek medical treatment. In November 2004, he relocated to Arizona. Feeling remorse for his inability to assist his client in arranging for the pond repairs, Mr. Karber decided he would refund the client all of her fees absent the $5,000 advances. To accomplish this, Mr. Karber deposited $8,100 of his own funds into his trust account, representing the $7,500 of his fee that he was forgoing and the $600 excess fee disbursement he had taken. Mr. Karber subsequently issued a $13,500 check to the client, retaining $1,500 in his trust account pending resolution of an apparent dispute between his client and her previous lawyer over a $1,500 lien.
Mr. Karber’s conduct violated RPC 1.5(c)(1), requiring that a contingent-fee agreement be in writing; RPC 1.14(a), requiring that all funds of clients paid to a lawyer or law firm, including advances for costs and expenses, be deposited in one or more identifiable interest-bearing trust accounts and that no funds belonging to the lawyer or law firm be deposited therein; and RPC 1.14(b)(3), requiring a lawyer to maintain complete records of all funds, securities, and other property of a client coming into the possession of a lawyer and render appropriate accounts to his or her client regarding them.
Randy V. Beitel represented the Bar Association. Mr. Karber represented himself. David B. Condon was the hearing officer.
Admonished
Carleton F. Knappe (WSBA No. 5697, admitted 1974) of Snohomish, was ordered to receive an admonition on April 23, 2004, by order of a review committee of the Disciplinary Board. This discipline was based on his conduct in 2002 involving communication with an individual known to be represented by counsel.
Mr. Knappe agreed to assist a client in transferring property to an estate. The personal representative wrote a letter to the client referring to an estate attorney. Mr. Knappe learned the name of the estate attorney from the court pleadings. He called the estate attorney, but did not receive a return call. Mr. Knappe sent property transfer papers directly to the personal representative. The estate attorney wrote Mr. Knappe a letter asking that Mr. Knappe not contact his client directly.
Mr. Knappe’s conduct violated RPC 4.2, prohibiting a lawyer, in representing a client, from communicating about the subject of the representation with a party the lawyer knows to be represented by another lawyer in the matter, unless the lawyer has the consent of the other lawyer or is authorized by law to do so.
Joanne S. Abelson represented the Bar Association. Mr. Knappe represented himself.
Non-Disciplinary Notices
Brian M. Keith (WSBA No. 14404, admitted 1984), of San Diego, California, was suspended pending the outcome of disciplinary proceedings pursuant to ELC 7.1, effective November 6, 2006, by an order of the Washington State Supreme Court. This is not a disciplinary action.
Stephen J. Plowman (WSBA No. 21823, admitted 1992), of Bellevue, was suspended pending the outcome of disciplinary proceedings pursuant to ELC 7.1, effective November 2, 2006, by an order of the Washington State Supreme Court. This is not a disciplinary action.
