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January 2008These notices of imposition of disciplinary sanctions and actions are published pursuant to Rule 3.5(d) of the Washington State Supreme Court Rules for Enforcement of Lawyer Conduct, and pursuant to the February 18, 1995, policy statement of the WSBA Board of Governors. For a complete copy of any disciplinary decision, call the Washington State Disciplinary Board at 206-733-5926, leaving the case name, and your name and address. Resigned in Lieu of Disbarment William B. Knowles (WSBA No. 17211, admitted 1987), of Seattle, resigned in lieu of disbarment, effective September 20, 2007. This resignation was based on conduct in 2004 involving two felonies. William B. Knowles is to be distinguished from William F. Knowles of Seattle. In or about June or July 2004, Mr. Knowles engaged in sexually related communications over the Internet with someone he believed to be a 14-year-old girl from Portland, Oregon. Mr. Knowles arranged over the Internet to meet with this individual for the purposes of engaging in sexual activity and traveled from Seattle to Portland for this encounter. Unbeknownst to him, the person with whom he had been communicating was an FBI agent, not a 14-year-old girl. In July 2004, Mr. Knowles was arrested in Portland at the location where the meeting had been arranged. Mr. Knowles was charged with violating 18 U.S.C. § 2422(b) (Coercion and Enticement) and 18 U.S.C. § 2423(b) (Interstate Travel with the Intent to Engage in Sex with a Minor), both of which are felonies. In August 2007, a jury found him guilty on both counts. Mr. Knowles closed his law practice in July 2004 after his arrest. Two of Mr. Knowles’s remaining clients at the time had hired him to represent them in employment matters. Mr. Knowles did not perform the specified services according to his fee agreement with each client and failed to refund unearned fees to these clients after his law firm closed. A third remaining client had hired Mr. Knowles to appeal a whistleblower complaint against his employer to the Merit Systems Protection Board. During the time Mr. Knowles represented this client, the client did not receive any billing statements or any indication of the time Mr. Knowles had spent on his case or how much of the fee had been expended. Mr. Knowles’s conduct violated former RPC 1.4, requiring a lawyer to keep a client reasonably informed about the status of a matter, to promptly comply with reasonable requests for information, and to explain a matter to the extent reasonably necessary to permit the client to make informed decisions regarding the representation; former RPC 1.5(a), requiring a lawyer’s fee to be reasonable; former RPC 1.15(d), requiring a lawyer to take steps to the extent reasonably practicable to protect a client’s interests upon termination of representation; RPC 8.4(b), prohibiting a lawyer from committing a criminal act (here, coercion and enticement and interstate travel with the intent to engage in sex with a minor) that reflects adversely on the lawyer’s honesty, trustworthiness, or fitness as a lawyer in other respects; RPC 8.4(i), which prohibits a lawyer from, inter alia, committing any act which reflects disregard for the rule of law, whether the same be committed in the course of his or her conduct as a lawyer. Joanne S. Abelson represented the Bar Association. Mr. Knowles represented himself. Disbarred Shane C. Han (WSBA No. 30466, admitted 2000), of Burnaby, British Columbia, was disbarred, effective August 16, 2007, by order of the Washington State Supreme Court following a hearing. Between November 2000 and January 2003, Mr. Han engaged in the following conduct giving rise to the discipline: • Charging unreasonable fees to two clients, one of which was a “shell” corporation formed by Mr. Han and associates in order to give the impression that it was a legitimate corporation pursuing public interest lawsuits; Mr. Han’s conduct violated RPC 1.5(a), requiring that a lawyer’s fee be reasonable; RPC 3.1, prohibiting a lawyer from bringing or defending a proceeding, or asserting or controverting an issue therein, unless there is a basis in law and fact for doing so that is not frivolous; RPC 4.1, prohibiting a lawyer, in the course of representing a client, from knowingly making a false statement of material fact or law to a third person or failing to disclose a material fact when disclosure is necessary to avoid assisting in a criminal or fraudulent act by a client; RPC 5.5, prohibiting a lawyer from engaging in the unauthorized practice of law or assisting another to do so; RPC 8.4(c), prohibiting a lawyer from engaging in conduct involving dishonesty, fraud, deceit, or misrepresentation; RPC 8.4(d), prohibiting a lawyer from engaging in conduct that is prejudicial to the administration of justice; RPC 8.4(i), prohibiting a lawyer from committing any act involving moral turpitude, or corruption, or any unjustified act of assault or other act which reflects disregard for the rule of law; and RPC 8.4(n), prohibiting a lawyer from engaging in conduct demonstrating unfitness to practice law. Debra Jo Slater and Kathleen A.T. Dassel represented the Bar Association. Mr. Han represented himself. Julian C. Dewell was the hearing officer. Disbarred Joel Santos Manalang (WSBA No. 26675, admitted 1997), of Seattle, was disbarred, effective August 15, 2007, by order of the Washington State Supreme Court following a default hearing. This discipline resulted from conduct involving money laundering, perpetration of fraud, and conflicts of interest. Mr. Manalang operated an escrow business in connection with his law practice, using his trust account for closing deposits and disbursements. In September 2003, in connection with an escrow transaction, Mr. Manalang accepted $176,600 in currency on behalf of a client for a down payment to purchase a residence. A mortgage broker, TL, made arrangements for the transaction and delivered the currency to Mr. Manalang in a shoe box. Mr. Manalang deposited the currency into his trust account and wrote a check for the down payment. Mr. Manalang knew the currency was proceeds from illegal drug transactions and he did not file a federal Form 8300, Report of Cash Payments Over $10,000, for the transaction. In May 2005, federal agents contacted Mr. Manalang and explained that the use of Form 8300 applies to law firms, escrow accounts, and real estate transactions. In late summer 2005, TL delivered several hundred thousand dollars in currency to Mr. Manalang in duffle bags in connection with another real estate purchase. Mr. Manalang did not create records regarding receipt of the currency nor deposit it into his trust account, instead storing it in his home for several weeks. Mr. Manalang knew the currency, estimated to be $600,000, was proceeds from illegal drug transactions and he did not file a federal Form 8300 regarding his receipt of the cash. Over time, Mr. Manalang returned all of the funds to TL, as no real estate transaction took place. In August 2006, Mr. Manalang pled guilty to one count of money laundering in violation of Title 18, USC §1956(a)(1)(b)(i) and (ii), which is a felony. In late 2002, the home of Mr. and Mrs. K was in foreclosure proceedings. English was a second language for them, and their primary source of income was Social Security payments. Mr. and Mrs. K located mortgage broker TL and spoke with him about getting a loan to protect their home from foreclosure. Documents were represented to Mrs. K by TL as being loan documents, but were actually sale documents transferring their residence to TL and his wife (collectively TL) for a purported purchase price of $230,000. At the time, Mr. and Mrs. K owed approximately $147,000 in two mortgage loans to their bank. Mr. Manalang handled the closing escrow. At the request of TL, Mr. Manalang prepared two sets of closing settlement statements. The first set was given to TL’s lender and provided that Mr. and Mrs. K would receive $69,050.10 from TL as a purchase payment. Mr. Manalang signed a statement dated March 23, 2003, certifying: “The Settlement Statement which I have prepared is a true and accurate account of funds received and funds disbursed or to be disbursed in this transaction.” The second set showed a line item of “Seller Contribution to Closing” of $69,000 from Mr. and Mrs. K, in essence “giving” their equity in the property to TL, and showing an amount due from the “Seller” of $823.11. Mr. Manalang disbursed the funds in accordance with the second closing statement. Mr. and Mrs. K were unable to make their required payments to TL, which they understood were loan payments, but TL denominated as rent. After TL sued Mr. and Mrs. K for unlawful detainer, they brought suit against TL and the mortgage company where he was employed, claiming violations of the Consumer Protection Act, Mortgage Broker Practices Act, and other fraudulent acts. The matter was settled in February 2006 through TL’s payment to Mr. and Mrs. K of $70,000, plus attorney’s fees, and deeding the home back to Mr. and Mrs. K. Mr. Manalang’s conduct violated RPC 1.2(d), prohibiting a lawyer from counseling a client to engage, or assisting a client, in conduct that the lawyer knows is criminal or fraudulent; RPC 1.7, prohibiting a lawyer from representing a client if the representation will be materially limited by the lawyer’s responsibilities to another client, a third person, or the lawyer’s own interests, unless the lawyer reasonably believes the representation will not adversely affect the relationship with the other client, and each client consents in writing after consultation and a full disclosure of the material facts; RPC 4.1(a), prohibiting a lawyer, in the course of representing a client, from knowingly making a false statement of material fact or law to a third person; RPC 8.4(b), prohibiting a lawyer from committing a criminal act that reflects adversely on the lawyer’s honesty, trustworthiness, or fitness as a lawyer in other respects; RPC 8.4(c), prohibiting a lawyer from engaging in conduct involving dishonesty, fraud, deceit, or misrepresentation; RPC 8.4(d), prohibiting a lawyer from engaging in conduct that is prejudicial to the administration of justice; and RPC 8.4(i), prohibiting a lawyer from committing any act involving moral turpitude, or corruption, or any unjustified act of assault or other act which reflects disregard for the rule of law. Nancy B. Miller represented the Bar Association. Mr. Manalang did not appear either in person or through counsel. Octavia Y. Hathaway was the hearing officer. Disbarred Dale L. Raugust (WSBA No. 6904, admitted 1976), of Spokane Valley, was disbarred, effective July 18, 2007, by order of the Washington State Supreme Court following approval of a stipulation by the Disciplinary Board. This discipline was based on conduct involving false claims made during an investigation in order to avoid disciplinary action. In January 2004, Mr. Raugust agreed to prepare, file, and serve a response to a petition for dissolution that had been served on his client. It was understood that the response would be filed as a pro se pleading and that Mr. Raugust would not appear in the proceeding on the client’s behalf. Mr. Raugust prepared a response, but the client did not come to Mr. Raugust’s office to sign the response. Thus, the response was not timely filed and served. In February, an order of default was entered. In October 2005, the client filed a grievance alleging that Mr. Raugust failed to inform him that he needed to come to his office to sign the response to the petition. In Mr. Raugust’s written response to the grievance, he claimed that after preparing the response to the petition for dissolution, he instructed his assistant to telephone the client on a daily basis to notify him that he needed to come to the office to sign the response. He also included with his response a copy of a letter dated February 9, 2004, that he claimed to have sent to the client. In fact, Mr. Raugust created the letter in October 2005. In January 2006, Disciplinary Counsel sent a request to Mr. Raugust for (1) the address and telephone number of his assistant; (2) a detailed description of the procedures used in attempting to contact the client; and (3) a copy of Mr. Raugust’s client file. In a written response in February, Mr. Raugust described certain office procedures that he claimed to have had in place at the time he prepared the client’s response to the petition for dissolution and repeated the claim that he had sent a letter to the client. Mr. Raugust provided a copy of what he claimed was his entire client file. That file contained another copy of the letter dated February 9, 2004, that Mr. Raugust claimed to have sent to the client. In February 2006, the Bar Association investigator interviewed Mr. Raugust at his office. When asked about office procedures, Mr. Raugust showed the investigator an “Employee Handbook of Office Procedures” and directed her attention to Section 2.D under the heading “Receptionist’s Job Duties.” This section described a procedure for contacting clients who need to sign documents. Mr. Raugust told the investigator that this section had been in his “Employee Handbook of Office Procedures” since February 2001, when in fact it was created by Mr. Raugust a few days before the interview and in anticipation of that interview. Mr. Raugust’s conduct violated RPC 8.4(c), prohibiting a lawyer from engaging in conduct involving dishonesty, fraud, deceit, or misrepresentation; RPC 8.4(d), prohibiting a lawyer from engaging in conduct that is prejudicial to the administration of justice; and RPC 8.4(l), prohibiting a lawyer from violating a duty or sanction imposed by or under the Rules for Enforcement of Lawyer Conduct in connection with a disciplinary matter. Scott G. Busby represented the Bar Association. Mr. Raugust represented himself. Disbarred Tracy Montgomery Shier (WSBA No. 12827, admitted 1982), of Seattle, was disbarred, effective October 4, 2007, by order of the Washington State Supreme Court following a hearing by the Disciplinary Board. Between February 1999 and July 2003, Mr. Shier engaged in the following conduct which gave rise to the discipline: • Disbursed approximately $59,953 from a charitable remainder trust, of which Mr. Shier was trustee, and converted the funds for his own use; Mr. Shier’s conduct violated former RPC 1.14(a), requiring that all funds of clients paid to a lawyer or law firm, including advances for costs and expenses, be deposited in one or more identifiable interest-bearing trust accounts maintained as set forth in the rules and that no funds belonging to the lawyer or law firm be deposited therein; former RPC 1.14(b)(3), requiring a lawyer to maintain complete records of all funds, securities, and other properties of a client coming into the possession of the lawyer and render appropriate accounts to his or her client regarding them; former RPC 1.14(d), stating that escrow and other funds held by a lawyer incident to the closing of any real estate or personal property transaction are client funds subject to this rule regardless of whether the lawyer, law firm, or the parties view the funds as belonging to the clients or non-clients; RPC 8.4(b), prohibiting a lawyer from committing a criminal act (here, theft) that reflects adversely on the lawyer's honesty, trustworthiness, or fitness as a lawyer in other respects; RPC 8.4(c), prohibiting a lawyer from engaging in conduct involving dishonesty, fraud, deceit, or misrepresentation; and RPC 8.4(i), prohibiting a lawyer from committing any act involving moral turpitude, or corruption, or any unjustified act of assault or other act which reflects disregard for the rule of law. Francesca D’Angelo represented the Bar Association. Leland G. Ripley represented Mr. Shier. David A. Summers was the hearing officer. Disbarred Darin H. Spang (WSBA No. 30359, admitted 2000), of Selah, was disbarred, effective August 15, 2007, by order of the Washington State Supreme Court following a hearing. This discipline was based on conduct between October 2004 and July 2005 in two matters involving lack of diligence, misappropriation of funds, and misrepresentation. In October 2004, Mr. Spang agreed to represent a client in a municipal court matter. Mr. Spang did not execute a written fee agreement with the client, but asked her to pay him in cash. The client paid Mr. Spang $250 in cash, which he deposited into his law firm’s general account and wrote a “Receipt for Funds.” Mr. Spang filed a notice of appearance on behalf of the client and made at least five court appearances with the client. At some or all of those appearances, the client made additional cash payments for legal services. Mr. Spang appropriated the funds for his own use instead of paying them over to the firm. In April and July 2005, the client made cash payments to Mr. Spang’s associate and legal assistant, who each gave the cash to Mr. Spang. In both instances, Mr. Spang appropriated the cash payments for his own use instead of paying them over to the firm. In May 2005, Mr. Spang agreed to prepare and file a motion on behalf of a client to bifurcate a bankruptcy into two separate cases and to convert the client’s bankruptcy case into a Chapter 7 bankruptcy. Mr. Spang did not execute a written fee agreement with the client, but asked her to pay him in cash. Between June and July 2005, the client made several cash payments to Mr. Spang at his request for legal services and expenses “for filing fees and amendments.” Mr. Spang appropriated these funds for his own use instead of paying them over to the firm or paying filing fees. In July, the firm terminated Mr. Spang’s employment. Other than a notice of appearance, Mr. Spang had filed nothing in the client’s bankruptcy case and never refunded any of the money the client had paid to him. Scott G. Busby represented the Bar Association. Mr. Spang represented himself. Erik S. Bakke Sr. was the hearing officer. Suspended Michael A. Cartelli (WSBA No. 19710, admitted 1990), of Arcadia, California, was suspended for 90 days, effective July 6, 2007, by order of the Washington State Supreme Court imposing reciprocal discipline in accordance with an order of the Supreme Court of the State of California following approval of a stipulation. This discipline is based on conduct involving failure to promptly disburse settlement proceeds. For more information, see California Bar Journal (August 2007), available at www.calbar.org. Mr. Cartelli’s conduct violated California Rules of Professional Conduct, Rule 4-100(B)(4), which requires an attorney to promptly pay or deliver, as requested by the client, any funds, securities, or other properties in the possession of the member which the client is entitled to receive. Felice P. Congalton represented the Bar Association. Mr. Cartelli represented himself. Suspended John L. Meader (WSBA No. 14672, admitted 1984), of Camas, was suspended for six months, effective October 18, 2007, by order of the Washington State Supreme Court following approval of a stipulation by the Disciplinary Board. This discipline resulted from conduct involving the filing of improper attorney liens. Between January 2004 and July 2005, to secure payment of attorney fees owed by clients in six different dissolution matters, Mr. Meader filed notices of attorney’s liens against the real property of clients, of clients and their spouses, and of third persons in violation of RCW 60.40.010. By filing the liens, Mr. Meader engaged in the following conduct which gave rise to the discipline: • Violated the order of the Clark County Superior Court prohibiting the encumbrance of a client’s property, thereby impeding the dissolution proceedings; Mr. Meader’s conduct violated former RPC 1.8(j), prohibiting a lawyer from acquiring a proprietary interest in the cause of action or subject matter of litigation the lawyer is conducting for a client, except that the lawyer may acquire a lien granted by law to secure the lawyer’s fees and expenses and contract with a client for a reasonable contingent fee in a civil case; RPC 3.4(c), prohibiting a lawyer from knowingly disobeying an obligation under the rules of a tribunal; former RPC 4.4, prohibiting a lawyer in the course of representing a client from using means that have no substantial purpose other than to embarrass, delay, or burden a third person; and RPC 8.4(d), prohibiting a lawyer from engaging in conduct that is prejudicial to the administration of justice. Kathleen A.T. Dassel represented the Bar Association. Mr. Meader represented himself. Suspended John A. Walsh (WSBA No. 20603, admitted 1991), of Bellevue, was suspended for eight months, effective July 18, 2007, by order of the Washington State Supreme Court following approval of a stipulation by the Disciplinary Board. This discipline was based on conduct involving lack of communication, charging unreasonable fees, and conflicts of interest. John A. Walsh is to be distinguished from John P. Walsh of Seattle. Matter 1. In August 2004, Mr. Walsh was hired to represent a client who had been booked into jail on suspicion of violating a no-contact order. The client’s father gave Mr. Walsh his credit card number, to which Mr. Walsh charged his $5,000 fee. Mr. Walsh did not tell the client’s father that the fee was non-refundable or that there would be additional fees should the case go to trial. Mr. Walsh never attempted to communicate with the client about his fee or billing practices. When Mr. Walsh learned that no charges had been filed and that the client would be released from jail, Mr. Walsh met with the client’s father at the courthouse and had him sign a written fee agreement providing that the $5,000 paid was a “retainer” and “non-refundable fee earned upon receipt.” In the course of the representation, Mr. Walsh answered phone calls from the client’s family, but never met with the client and spoke with him only once, which was by telephone. During that one phone call, the client requested that Mr. Walsh assist him in getting the no-contact order with his wife lifted. Mr. Walsh advised the client to stay away from his wife, but made no attempt to get the order lifted. No further work was done on the case. Mr. Walsh refused to refund any part of the $5,000 fee. Matter 2. In July 2004, a client hired Mr. Walsh to represent her following an altercation with her husband on a U.S. military base. Mr. Walsh told the client that he would represent her for $2,000. In October 2004, the client was charged in U.S. District Court with a misdemeanor assault for scratching her husband. By the time the charge was filed, the client’s husband had been deployed to Iraq. In a written statement he made before his deployment, the client’s husband stated that the scratches he incurred were “purely accidental.” The morning of the client’s arraignment in December 2004, Mr. Walsh provided her with a written fee agreement indicating that the $2,000 he had already received was a “non-refundable fee earned upon receipt.” The terms of the fee agreement, which had not been communicated to the client prior to that day, also indicated that additional fees would be necessary should the case go to trial. The client signed the agreement before going into the courtroom. Mr. Walsh advised the client of her options. He did not include dismissal as an option. When she informed him that she wished to get the matter resolved quickly, Mr. Walsh did not explain to her the government’s speedy trial limitation or the evidentiary problems that existed in the case. The client pleaded guilty at arraignment rather than setting the case for trial. The court appointed the federal public defender to represent the client in post-conviction proceedings, and she filed a stipulated motion with the assistant United States attorney to vacate the judgment and dismiss the charges. Matter 3. In August 2005, an individual charged with a Hit and Run Unattended hired Mr. Walsh to represent him. The client’s mother delivered to Mr. Walsh a check from her son for $900 to cover the representation. Just before leaving his office, Mr. Walsh had the client’s mother sign a fee agreement that provided for a $4,000 “non-refundable fee earned upon receipt” on a line above the words “Third Party/Guarantor.” In September 2005, while in court with Mr. Walsh’s associate, the client signed the fee agreement on a line above the word “client.” Neither the client nor his mother was given a copy of the fee agreement. Mr. Walsh never consulted with the client about obligating the client’s mother to pay his legal fee, and the client never agreed to such an arrangement. In November 2005, Mr. Walsh telephoned the client’s mother several times to demand that she pay her son’s legal fee and threatened to sue her if she did not. Shortly thereafter, Mr. Walsh signed a complaint form alleging Breach of Contract against the client’s mother and caused the complaint to be served on her, although the complaint was never filed. Mr. Walsh’s conduct violated RPC 1.4(b), requiring a lawyer to explain a matter to the extent reasonably necessary to permit the client to make informed decisions regarding the representation; RPC 1.5(a), requiring that a lawyer’s fee be reasonable; RPC 1.5(b), requiring that when a lawyer has not regularly represented a client, or if the fee agreement is substantially different than that previously used by the parties, the basis or rate of the fee or factors involved in determining the charges for legal services and the lawyer’s billing practices shall be communicated to the client, preferably in writing, before or within a reasonable time after commencing the representation; RPC 1.8 (f)(1), prohibiting a lawyer from accepting compensation for representing a client from one other than the client unless (1) the client consents after consultation; (2) there is no interference with the lawyer’s independence of professional judgment or with the client-lawyer relationship; and (3) information relating to the representation of the client is protected as required by the rules. Robert B. Gould and Scott G. Busby represented the Bar Association. Kurt M. Bulmer represented Mr. Walsh. Lee Grochmal was the hearing officer. Suspended Daniel S. Wittenberg (WSBA No. 36518, admitted 2005), of Denver, Colorado, was suspended for 90 days by order of the Washington State Supreme Court imposing reciprocal discipline in accordance with an order of the Supreme Court of the State of Colorado following approval of a stipulation. This discipline was based on conduct involving the submission of a false expense report. For more information, see the Colorado Supreme Court Summary Wittenberg, Conditional Admission (under June 2007) available at www.coloradosupremecourt.com/pdj/pdj.htm. Mr. Wittenberg violated Colorado’s RPC 8.4(c), stating that it is professional misconduct for a lawyer to engage in conduct involving dishonesty, fraud, deceit, or misrepresentation. Felice P. Congalton represented the Bar Association. Mr. Wittenberg represented himself. Reprimanded Palmer A. Hoovestal (WSBA No. 19575, admitted 1990), of Helena, Montana, was ordered to receive a reprimand, entered August 7, 2007, by order of the Washington State Supreme Court imposing reciprocal discipline in accordance with an order of the Supreme Court of the State of Montana. This discipline was based on conduct in 2003 that involved making misrepresentations to a tribunal and falsifying evidence in a matter. For more information, see Montana Lawyer, Discipline (June 2007), available at www.montanabar.org. Mr. Hoovestal’s conduct violated Montana RPC 3.3, requiring a lawyer to act with candor toward the tribunal; Montana RPC 3.4(b), prohibiting a lawyer from falsifying evidence, counseling or assisting a witness to testify falsely, or offering an inducement to a witness that is prohibited by law; Montana RPC 4.1(a), prohibiting a lawyer, in the course of representing a client, from making a false statement of material fact or law to a third person; Montana RPC 8.1, prohibiting a lawyer in connection with a disciplinary matter from knowingly making a false statement of material fact or failing to disclose a fact necessary to correct a misapprehension known by the person to have arisen in the matter; and Montana RPC 8.4, making it professional misconduct for a lawyer to violate or attempt to violate the Rules of Professional Conduct or to induce another to do so; to commit a criminal act that reflects adversely on the lawyer’s honesty, trustworthiness, or fitness as a lawyer in other respects; to engage in conduct involving dishonesty, fraud, deceit, or misrepresentation; to engage in conduct that is prejudicial to the administration of justice; to state or imply an ability to influence improperly a government agency or official or achieve results by means that violate the Rules of Professional Conduct or other law; or to knowingly assist a judge or judicial official in conduct that is a violation of applicable code of judicial conduct or other law. Felice P. Congalton represented the Bar Association. Mr. Hoovestal represented himself. Reprimanded Charles A. Kimbrough (WSBA No. 134, admitted 1965), of Bellevue, was ordered to receive four reprimands on January 10, 2007, by order of the hearing officer. This discipline was based on conduct involving lack of diligence in a client matter, failure to communicate, misrepresentations to a client, and non-cooperation in a Bar Association investigation. Between 1999 and 2005, Mr. Kimbrough engaged in the following conduct while representing a client in an employment discrimination matter: • Negligently failing to provide the opposing party’s counsel with a signed settlement and release agreement, and failing to finalize a settlement with the opposing party before the case was dismissed; Mr. Kimbrough’s conduct violated RPC 1.3, requiring a lawyer to act with reasonable diligence and promptness in representing a client; former RPC 1.4(a), requiring a lawyer to keep a client reasonably informed about the status of a matter and promptly comply with reasonable requests for information; RPC 8.4(c), prohibiting a lawyer from engaging in conduct involving dishonesty, fraud, deceit, or misrepresentation; and RPC 8.4(l), prohibiting a lawyer from violating a duty or sanction imposed by or under the Rules for Enforcement of Lawyer Conduct in connection with a disciplinary matter (here, ELC 5.3(e)). Michael D. Hunsinger represented the Bar Association. Leland G. Ripley represented Mr. Kimbrough. William S. Bailey was the hearing officer. Reprimanded Patrick J. Leahy (WSBA No. 10912, admitted 1980), of Tacoma, was ordered to receive a reprimand on September 12, 2007, following a stipulation approved by a hearing officer. This discipline was based on conduct in 2006 involving deceptive conduct. In July 2006, Mr. Leahy called the home of an individual (KB) who had been in an automobile accident while driving her parents’ car. Mr. Leahy asked for KB, identified himself as Patrick Leahy, and said he was a representative of her parents’ insurer. In fact, Mr. Leahy represented the driver of the other car involved in the accident. Mr. Leahy also told KB that he had some documents he wanted to deliver the next day and asked when would be a good time to have them delivered. The documents to which he was referring were a summons and complaint instituting a lawsuit against KB and her parents based on the accident. KB asked Mr. Leahy to hold on and got her mother. At that point, KB’s mother knew Mr. Leahy was not an agent of the insurance company, that he represented the other driver in the auto accident involving her daughter, that negotiations had broken down, and that they might be sued. She questioned Mr. Leahy about his identity. He again identified himself as Patrick Leahy from their insurer and asked whether anyone would be home the next day to receive some documents. KB’s mother asked Mr. Leahy about his relationship to the documents, to which he eventually answered by stating that he was working with a process server. When asked if he was a lawyer, Mr. Leahy said no. Mr. Leahy eventually hung up. KB and her parents were served with a summons and complaint by a process server in late August 2006. Mr. Leahy’s conduct violated RPC 4.1(a), prohibiting a lawyer, in the course of representing a client, from knowingly making a false statement of material fact or law to a third person; and RPC 8.4(c), prohibiting a lawyer from engaging in conduct involving dishonesty, fraud, deceit, or misrepresentation. Joanne S. Abelson represented the Bar Association. Leland G. Ripley represented Mr. Leahy. William S. Bailey was the hearing officer. David M. Simmonds (WSBA No. 6994, admitted 1976), of Redmond, was ordered to receive a reprimand on June 15, 2007, following approval of a stipulation by a hearing officer. This discipline is based on conduct involving dishonesty, fraud, deceit, or misrepresentation. In 1999, Mr. Simmonds bought a diamond ring and setting for $118,300. With Mr. Simmonds’s knowledge and agreement, the Bellevue jeweler used an Ohio address for “shipment” on the receipt to avoid payment of sales tax of $10,410.40, but the jewelry was not shipped out of state. Mr. Simmonds sued the jeweler in 2002, after he received a report indicating that the diamond was of an inferior grade. The suit was dismissed with prejudice in August 2004 and Mr. Simmonds appealed the Superior Court decision. In September 2005, during oral argument, an appellate judge asked whether Mr. Simmonds had reported the failure to pay tax to the Bar Association or made any subsequent payment of tax to the State Department of Revenue after the 1999 purchase. Mr. Simmonds paid tax to the Department of Revenue and reported nonpayment of sales tax to the Bar Association on September 29, 2005. Mr. Simmonds’s conduct violated former RPC 8.4(c), prohibiting a lawyer from engaging in conduct involving dishonesty, fraud, deceit, or misrepresentation. Nancy B. Miller represented the Bar Association. Mr. Simmonds represented himself.
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