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February 2008These notices of imposition of disciplinary sanctions and actions are published pursuant to Rule 3.5(d) of the Washington State Supreme Court Rules for Enforcement of Lawyer Conduct, and pursuant to the February 18, 1995, policy statement of the WSBA Board of Governors. For a complete copy of any disciplinary decision, call the Washington State Disciplinary Board at 206-733-5926, leaving the case name, and your name and address. CLARIFICATION: In the January 2008 Bar News disciplinary notices, it should have been noted that John L. Meader, of Camas (WSBA No. 14672, suspended for six months, effective October 18, 2007) is to be distinguished from John S. Meader of Olympia. Disbarred Lynn M. Abreu (WSBA No. 14241, admitted 1984), of Renton, was disbarred, effective November 20, 2007, by order of the Washington State Supreme Court following a default hearing. This discipline was based on conduct involving two counts of theft. In January 2006, Ms. Abreu signed as escrow agent on a standby letter of credit escrow agreement for a financial transaction between a corporation located in Turkey (Corporation A) and a corporation located in Illinois (Corporation B). The purpose of the agreement was to allow Corporation B to obtain funds needed for construction of a power plant in India through lease of a standby letter of credit. Ms. Abreu's part in the transaction was simply to receive and hold the funds transmitted to her on behalf of Corporation B in her trust account and then to transmit them, less her fee, upon Corporation A's performance of its obligations under the agreement. To fulfill its obligations under the agreement, Corporation B went to outside investors and obtained $485,000, which was then wired directly to Ms. Abreu's account. The account that Ms. Abreu provided to receive the funds was not a trust account. Under the escrow agreement, Ms. Abreu was required to return the funds to the individual investors if Corporation A did not produce a required standby letter of credit within 45 international banking days of her receipt of the funds. Corporation A did not produce the letter within the required time. In November 2007, the president of Corporation B wrote Ms. Abreu demanding that the funds be wired to the individual investors no later than the third business day following his letter. Ms. Abreu failed to return the funds. In both matters, the majority of the funds associated with the transactions were either used by Ms. Abreu and transferred to her personal account or forwarded to individuals associated with Corporation A. Neither activity was authorized in either matter by the respective escrow agreements. Ms. Abreu's actions violated various state and federal prohibitions regarding theft and fraudulent use of wire transfers (including RCW 9.56.030 and 18 U.S.C. § 1343) and deprived both Corporation B and Corporation C of needed funds. The Washington State Bar Association received grievances from Corporation C in October 2006 and from Corporation B in December 2006. Ms. Abreu avoided service in connection with these grievances and deliberately failed to cooperate with the disciplinary process. Ms. Abreu's conduct violated RPC 8.4(b), prohibiting a lawyer from committing a criminal act (here, theft) that reflects adversely on the lawyer's honesty, trustworthiness, or fitness as a lawyer in other respects; RPC 8.4(c), prohibiting a lawyer from engaging in conduct involving dishonesty, fraud, deceit, or misrepresentation; and RPC 8.4(i), prohibiting a lawyer from committing any act involving moral turpitude, or corruption, or any other act which reflects disregard for the rule of the law. Linda B. Eide represented the Bar Association. Ms. Abreu was not represented either in person or by counsel. Bertha B. Fitzer was the hearing officer. Disbarred Michael L. Doss (WSBA No. 25664, admitted 1996), of Portland, Oregon, was disbarred, effective October 4, 2007, by order of the Washington State Supreme Court following a default hearing. This discipline was based on conduct involving the practice of law while suspended. Effective August 3, 2005, Mr. Doss was suspended from the practice of law in Washington for failure to pay his license fee. In July 2005, Mr. Doss was sent a copy of the suspension order by certified mail along with a notice advising him that, inter alia, he must notify all clients of his suspension, he must serve an affidavit of compliance as required by the rules, he must cease to hold himself out as a lawyer until reinstated, and he must not practice law after the date of his suspension. At the time of his suspension, Mr. Doss had at least two active Washington clients whom he did not notify of his suspension. Mr. Doss never served an affidavit of compliance and continued to hold himself out as a lawyer licensed to practice in Washington. In November 2005, Mr. Doss signed and filed petitions for adoption, along with other related pleadings, in two Superior Court matters and noted both matters for December hearings. He delivered to the clerk two checks for filing fees, both of which were returned for insufficient funds. After the checks were returned for insufficient funds, the clerk learned that Mr. Doss was suspended and told him that he could not appear at the December hearings. Shortly thereafter, Mr. Doss wrote a letter to the WSBA that stated he "would like to immediately resign from practice," and admitted that he had never served an affidavit of compliance, had not ceased holding himself out as a lawyer licensed to practice in Washington, had engaged in the practice of law after the date of his suspension, and had at least two active Washington clients whom he did not notify of his suspension. In December 2005, WSBA disciplinary counsel informed Mr. Doss that a grievance had been opened against him and requested a written response, along with copies of certain records, within three weeks. In January 2006, Mr. Doss requested a two-week extension, which he was granted. Mr. Doss has never provided a written response to the grievance and has never produced any of the records requested by disciplinary counsel. Mr. Doss's conduct violated former RPC 5.5(e), prohibiting a lawyer from engaging in the practice of law while suspended from the practice of law for any cause; RPC 8.4(b), prohibiting a lawyer from committing a criminal act (here, the unlawful practice of law) that reflects adversely on the lawyer's honesty, trustworthiness, or fitness as a lawyer in other respects; RPC 8.4(j), prohibiting willfully disobeying or violating a court order directing him or her to do or cease doing an act which he or she ought in good faith to do or forbear; and RPC 8.4(l), prohibiting a lawyer from violating a duty or sanction imposed by or under the Rules for Enforcement of Lawyer Conduct in connection with a disciplinary matter. Scott G. Busby represented the Bar Association. Mr. Doss did not appear either in person or by counsel. Disbarred Thomas Juhl (WSBA No. 24439, admitted 1994), of Seattle, was disbarred effective September 14, 2007, by order of the Washington State Supreme Court following approval of a stipulation by the Disciplinary Board. In entering into the stipulation, Mr. Juhl agreed that if the matter were to proceed to a public hearing, there was a substantial likelihood that the Bar Association would be able to prove, by a clear preponderance of the evidence, the facts and misconduct described therein (and summarized herein). This discipline was based on his conduct in two matters involving neglect of legal matters, lack of communication, and making multiple misrepresentations to clients, to other attorneys, and to the court. Matter 1: In January 2004, a client hired Mr. Juhl to pursue a lawsuit against a former employer for back wages and they entered into a contingency-fee agreement. Mr. Juhl subsequently made the following misrepresentations to the client: • Mr. Juhl told the client that he filed a lawsuit on behalf of the client and served notice on the employer, filed and prevailed on a summary judgment motion against the employer, hired a private investigator to locate and freeze several of the employer's accounts, filed and prevailed on a motion to assess daily fines against the employer, and filed and prevailed on a subsequent motion to increase the daily fine against the employer. In fact, no lawsuit was filed, no judgments were obtained, and no motions were filed or granted. Between January 2004 and July 2005, the client filed for bankruptcy. The client's bankruptcy attorney informed the client that he had to list the "recovery" as an asset in his bankruptcy schedules and that Mr. Juhl had to file an application with the bankruptcy court for approval of any attorney fees he was owed from the "recovery." Mr. Juhl provided a sworn declaration for filing with the bankruptcy court indicating that, on a recovery of $847,000, he would be owed one-third for attorney's fees. The bankruptcy court entered an order directing Mr. Juhl to transfer $110,000 to the Chapter 13 trustee and to refund the remaining balance to the client. Mr. Juhl did not transfer the money, but later gave the client a check for $490,000 that appeared to be drawn on a personal account. There were insufficient funds in the account to cover the check. At a meeting in November 2005 with the client, and later in a phone call to the client's bankruptcy lawyer and in a sworn statement to the bankruptcy court, Mr. Juhl admitted that he had never filed the client's lawsuit, had not obtained a judgment, and had not collected any money for the client. Matter 2: In 2001, Mr. Juhl agreed to represent a client in an attempt to recover post-high school education expenses for the client's children from her ex-husband. Mr. Juhl did not charge the client a fee for this work. Mr. Juhl subsequently made the following misrepresentations to the client: • Mr. Juhl told the client that he had served her ex-husband with notice of a hearing they were seeking under an order of child support for the client's children entered in 1995. In fact, no matter had been filed or served. Mr. Juhl told the client that she could have a lawyer from Maryland collect payment on the judgments (as the client's ex-husband lived in Maryland) and Mr. Juhl discussed with a Maryland lawyer subsequently hired by the client plans for a collection action against the ex-husband. Both the client and her Maryland lawyer requested certified copies of the judgments from Mr. Juhl. On one occasion, Mr. Juhl stated that he had sent the certified copies to the Maryland lawyer. In August 2005, the client went to Mr. Juhl's office, terminated his services, and requested her files. Mr. Juhl returned the files that had been given to him in 2001. The client subsequently hired another lawyer to represent her, who ascertained that no documents or judgments had been filed in the client's case after 1995. Mr. Juhl's conduct violated RPC 1.3, requiring a lawyer to act with reasonable diligence and promptness in representing a client; former RPC 1.4, requiring a lawyer to keep a client reasonably informed about the status of a matter, promptly comply with reasonable requests for information, and explain a matter to the extent reasonably necessary to permit the client to make informed decisions regarding the representation; RPC 3.3(a)(1), prohibiting a lawyer from knowingly making a false statement of material fact or law to a tribunal; RPC 4.1(a), prohibiting a lawyer in the course of representing a client from knowingly making a false statement of material fact or law to a third person; RPC 8.4(b), prohibiting a lawyer from committing a criminal act (here, forgery and unlawful issuance of a bank check) that reflects adversely on the lawyer's honesty, trustworthiness, or fitness as a lawyer in other respects; RPC 8.4(c), prohibiting a lawyer from engaging in conduct involving dishonesty, fraud, deceit, or misrepresentation; RPC 8.4(d), prohibiting a lawyer from engaging in conduct that is prejudicial to the administration of justice; and RPC 8.4(i), prohibiting a lawyer from committing any act involving moral turpitude, or corruption, or other act which reflects disregard for the rule of law. M. Craig Bray represented the Bar Association. Mr. Juhl represented himself. Disbarred Gail Schwartz (WSBA No. 28994, admitted 1999), of Spokane, was disbarred, effective August 16, 2007, by order of the Washington State Supreme Court following a hearing. Between 2003 and 2005, Ms. Schwartz engaged in the following conduct giving rise to the discipline: • Represented co-defendants in criminal cases without advising them about the risks of joint representation and without obtaining written conflict waivers; Ms. Schwartz's conduct violated RPC 1.1, requiring a lawyer to provide competent representation to a client; RPC 1.2, requiring a lawyer to abide by a client's decisions about the objectives of representation and to consult with the client as to the means by which they are to be pursued; RPC 1.4, requiring a lawyer to keep a client reasonably informed about the status of a matter, to promptly comply with reasonable requests for information, and to explain a matter to the extent reasonably necessary to permit the client to make informed decisions regarding the representation; RPC 1.5(a), requiring a lawyer's fee to be reasonable; RPC 1.7, prohibiting a lawyer from representing two clients in the same matter whose interests are directly adverse; former RPC 1.14(b)(3), requiring a lawyer to maintain complete records of all funds, securities, or other properties of a client coming into the possession of the lawyer and render appropriate accounts to his or her client regarding them; RPC 1.15, governing the circumstances in which a lawyer may withdraw from representation; RPC 8.4(b), prohibiting a lawyer from committing a criminal act (here, theft) that reflects adversely on the lawyer's honesty, trustworthiness, or fitness as a lawyer in other respects; RPC 8.4(c), prohibiting a lawyer from engaging in conduct involving dishonesty, fraud, deceit, or misrepresentation; RPC 8.4(i), prohibiting a lawyer from committing any act involving moral turpitude, or corruption, or other act which reflects disregard for the rule of law; and RPC 8.4(l), prohibiting a lawyer from violating a duty imposed by or under the Rules for Enforcement of Lawyer Conduct. Francesca D'Angelo represented the Bar Association. Gail Schwartz represented herself. Paul M. Larson was the hearing officer. Suspended Daphne M. Barry (WSBA No. 30175, admitted 2000), of Spokane, was suspended for three months, effective November 21, 2007, by order of the Washington State Supreme Court following approval of a stipulation by the Disciplinary Board. This discipline is based on conduct involving dishonesty and non-cooperation with a Bar Association investigation. In June 2004, Ms. Barry commenced work as a law clerk for a law firm located in Phoenix, Arizona (Firm). Ms. Barry and the Firm had an understanding that upon her admission to the Arizona Bar she would become a construction litigation attorney with the Firm. Ms. Barry took and passed the February 2005 Arizona Bar exam; however, she did not submit an application for admission to the Arizona Bar, a prerequisite for admission, until October 2005. Between May and October 2005, Ms. Barry's supervising attorney asked her when she would be admitted to the Arizona Bar and why her admission was taking so long to process. She told him that the Arizona Bar was delaying her admission because it needed more information about her previous employers, which was untrue. In November 2005, Ms. Barry told the ethics counsel for the Firm that she had not applied for admission to the Arizona Bar until October 2005. The Firm terminated Ms. Barry's employment on November 28, 2005. The Firm filed a grievance with the Arizona Bar, who forwarded the grievance to the Washington State Bar Association (Association) because Ms. Barry had not been licensed to practice in Arizona. Between January and March 2006, the Association sent two requests for a response to the grievance using Ms. Barry's official address on record and using an alternate address. Both requests were returned as undeliverable; Ms. Barry was using her mother's and her brother's addresses in Washington while she looked for work. The Association subsequently contacted Ms. Barry by telephone and advised her that they were trying to send information to her. She provided her brother's address in Washington as a current address and received the two requests. Between April and June 2006, the Association sent to Ms. Barry letters by certified and first-class mail, and left voicemail messages, advising her that they would issue a subpoena for her deposition if she did not respond to the grievance. In June 2006, the Association received a facsimile from Ms. Barry acknowledging that she had received a copy of the grievance and the Association's request for response. Ms. Barry never responded to the grievance. The Association issued a subpoena duces tecum. The process server attempted to serve Ms. Barry five separate times at the Washington address she had provided as her physical home address, but was unable to locate and serve her. Ms. Barry's conduct violated RPC 8.4(c), prohibiting a lawyer from engaging in conduct involving dishonesty, fraud, deceit, or misrepresentation; and Rules for Enforcement of Lawyer Conduct (ELC) 5.3(f)(3), making a lawyer's failure to cooperate fully and promptly with an investigation as required by the rules grounds for discipline. Leslie C. Allen represented the Bar Association. Ms. Barry represented herself. Suspended David R. Hellenthal (WSBA No. 18311, admitted 1988), of Spokane, was suspended for 18 months, effective September 6, 2007, by order of the Washington State Supreme Court following approval of a stipulation by the Disciplinary Board. Upon meeting conditions for reinstatement, the suspension is to be followed by a three-year period of probation. This discipline was based on conduct in three matters involving failure to abide by a client's objectives for representation; lack of communication; charging unreasonable fees; conflicts of interest; prohibited transactions; improper conduct with a disabled client; and conduct involving dishonesty, fraud, deceit, or misrepresentation. Matter 1: In October 2004, Mr. Hellenthal was hired by a client with a disability who was concerned about the potential effect of a recent inheritance on his continued eligibility for government benefits. Mr. Hellenthal deposited the client's inheritance proceeds into his trust account. Between November 2004 and January 2005, Mr. Hellenthal transferred a total of $33,000 out of trust as legal fees. Mr. Hellenthal prepared a trust instrument by which he would inherit the client's trust assets if the client died without a will. Mr. Hellenthal knew the client did not have a will and did not consult with the client about any conflicts of interest. The trust prepared by Mr. Hellenthal did not comply with the Medicaid regulations for a qualified special needs trust, and could have subjected the client to several years of ineligibility for Medicaid benefits as a penalty or been rejected by the Department of Social and Health Services (DSHS). The client did not understand the trust nor its potential negative ramifications and risks for him. In January 2005, the client hired a new lawyer who removed Mr. Hellenthal as trustee, hired a professional trustee, drafted a will for the client, and sought court approval for the trust. The client's new lawyer requested that Mr. Hellenthal reduce the $33,000 in attorney's fees. Mr. Hellenthal refunded a portion of the fees, retaining $7,130.87 for his services. Other Spokane-area lawyers charge $1,000 to $3,500 for the creation of a special needs trust. Matter 2: In March 2004, Mr. Hellenthal was hired to assist a married couple in qualifying the husband for Medicaid. The couple had been in a serious automobile accident in July 2003, which left the husband with a traumatic brain injury and physical impairments. Mr. Hellenthal did not meet with either client and never spoke to the husband. Mr. Hellenthal advised that the husband and wife should legally separate before applying for Medicaid. The wife agreed to have Mr. Hellenthal represent both herself and her husband. Mr. Hellenthal was aware of the client husband's extreme disabilities due to the accident. All communication with the clients was by telephone with either the wife or the wife's mother, who ran an adult-care home in which the husband resided. Mr. Hellenthal did not consult with the couple about any potential conflicts of interest, or the implications of common representation, and did not obtain any written conflict waivers. He prepared and filed for the couple legal documents that awarded the wife all of her husband's assets and all rights for any claims of damages from third parties as a result of the accident. The legal documents included a durable power of attorney which made the wife and her mother the attorneys-in-fact for the husband. Mr. Hellenthal did not inform the court in the pleadings of the husband's mental status. In June 2004, Mr. Hellenthal disbursed to the wife approximately $78,000 of funds obtained in recovery with respect to the couple's automobile accident. Meanwhile, marital difficulties arose between the husband and wife. The children of the husband subsequently retrieved him from the adult-care home and took him to see a new lawyer, who revoked the durable power of attorney. The husband eventually hired another lawyer to set aside the legal separation, recoup the husband's money, and begin dissolution proceedings. Matter 3: Mr. Hellenthal provided estate-planning services for a couple in 1994 and again in 2002. Among other things, he prepared a power of attorney making the wife the attorney-in-fact for her husband. In 2003, the husband suffered a stroke and was hospitalized. Mr. Hellenthal never spoke to the husband after his stroke. Mr. Hellenthal was informed that they were considering a nursing home for the husband. He suggested to the wife that the couple obtain a legal separation to qualify for Medicaid, even though the couple had substantial assets to pay for his care. The wife did not understand why Mr. Hellenthal wanted her to separate from her husband, but signed for her and her husband all the legal separation documents sent to her by Mr. Hellenthal. These documents awarded the wife all the couple's assets. In July 2003, the husband was found to be "gravely disabled" based on a diagnosis of longstanding dementia that had been worsened by the stroke, and was involuntarily transferred to a psychiatric ward. At about the same time the wife informed Mr. Hellenthal that her husband was in a psychiatric ward, she received a fee agreement stating that Mr. Hellenthal had "explained to their satisfaction the advantages and disadvantages of common representation…." Mr. Hellenthal had never explained the fee agreement to the wife and never told her there might be a conflict with his representing both her and her husband. Mr. Hellenthal filed the legal separation papers in Superior Court. The pleadings did not inform the court of the husband's mental status. Mr. Hellenthal had the wife sign quit claim deeds on various properties and began transferring assets into the wife's name. Approximately $1.6 million of assets were transferred, all while the husband was involuntarily detained in a psychiatric ward. The husband died shortly thereafter. Mr. Hellenthal's conduct violated RPC 1.2(a), requiring a lawyer to abide by a client's decisions concerning the objectives of representation and consult with the client as to the means by which they are to be pursued; RPC 1.4, requiring a lawyer to keep a client reasonably informed about the status of a matter, promptly comply with reasonable requests for information, and explain a matter to the extent reasonably necessary to permit the client to make informed decisions regarding the representation; RPC 1.5(a), requiring a lawyer's fee to be reasonable; RPC 1.7(a) and (b), prohibiting a lawyer from representing a client if the representation of that client is directly adverse to another client, or materially limited by the lawyer's responsibilities to another client or to a third person, unless the lawyer reasonably believes the representation will not adversely affect the relationship with the other client and each client consents in writing after consultation and a full disclosure of the material facts; RPC 1.8(c), prohibiting a lawyer, in representing a client in a matter, from preparing an instrument giving the lawyer or a person related to the lawyer as parent, child, sibling, or spouse, any substantial gift from a client, including a testamentary gift, except where the client is related to the donee; former RPC 1.13, requiring a lawyer to determine whether a client's ability to make adequately considered decisions in connection with the representation is impaired because of minority, mental disability, or for some other reason; and RPC 8.4(c), prohibiting a lawyer from engaging in conduct involving dishonesty, fraud, deceit, or misrepresentation. Joanne S. Abelson and Natalea Skvir represented the Bar Association. Mr. Hellenthal represented himself. Suspended Andrew Mankowski (WSBA No. 22999, admitted 1993), of Glendale, Arizona, was suspended for six months, effective August 17, 2007, by order of the Washington State Supreme Court imposing reciprocal discipline in accordance with an order by the Supreme Court of the State of Arizona. This discipline was based on conduct involving the unauthorized practice of law and non-cooperation in a bar association investigation. For more information, see the State Bar of Arizona's Arizona Attorney (September 2007), available at: www.myazbar.org/azattorney/pdf_articles/0907lawreg.pdf. Mr. Mankowski's conduct violated Arizona Revised Statutes (Ariz.R.S.Ct.) Rule 42, Arizona Rules of Professional Conduct ER 5.5, prohibiting a lawyer from practicing law in a jurisdiction in violation of the regulation of the legal profession of that jurisdiction or assisting another in doing so; ER 8.1(b), prohibiting a lawyer, in connection with a disciplinary matter, from knowingly failing to respond to a lawful demand for information from disciplinary authority; Ariz.R.S.Ct. Rule 31(c), stating that no member who is currently suspended or on disability inactive status and no former member who has been disbarred shall practice law in this state or represent in any way that he or she may practice law in this state; and Ariz.R.S.Ct. Rule 53(f), stating that the failure to furnish information or respond promptly to any inquiry or request from bar counsel, a hearing officer, the Board, the commission, or this court, made pursuant to these rules for information relevant to complaints, grievances, or matters under investigation concerning the conduct of a lawyer, or failure to assert the ground for refusing to do so, constitutes grounds for discipline. Felice P. Congalton represented the Bar Association. Mr. Mankowski represented himself. Suspended Elizabeth B. Matthews (WSBA No. 8777, admitted 1978), of Monroe, Louisiana, was suspended for three years and one day, effective August 17, 2007, by order of the Washington State Supreme Court imposing reciprocal discipline in accordance with an order from the Supreme Court of the State of Colorado. This discipline was based on conduct in nine client matters involving neglect of legal matters, failure to communicate with clients, failure to protect client interests, disobedience of an obligation under the rules of a tribunal, and assisting in the unauthorized practice of law. For more information, see The Colorado Lawyer (September 2005), available at www.cobar.org/tcl. Elizabeth B. Matthews is to be distinguished from Elizabeth D. Mathews of Seattle. Ms. Matthew's conduct violated Colorado RPC 1.3, requiring a lawyer to act with reasonable diligence and promptness in representing a client and prohibiting a lawyer from neglecting a legal matter entrusted to that lawyer; Colorado RPC 1.4(a), requiring a lawyer to keep a client reasonably informed about the status of a matter, to promptly comply with reasonable requests for information, and to explain a matter to the extent reasonably necessary to permit the client to make informed decisions regarding the representation; Colorado RPC 1.16(d), requiring that, upon termination of representation, a lawyer take steps to the extent reasonably practicable to protect a client's interests; Colorado RPC 3.4(c), prohibiting a lawyer from knowingly disobeying an obligation under the rules of a tribunal except for an open refusal based on an assertion that no valid obligation exists; and Colorado RPC 5.5(a), prohibiting a lawyer from practicing law in a jurisdiction where doing so violates the regulations of the legal profession in that jurisdiction. Felice P. Congalton represented the Bar Association. Ms. Matthews represented herself. Suspended Cynthia A. Montgomery (WSBA No. 17875, admitted 1988), of Spokane, was suspended for six months, effective October 19, 2007, by order of the Washington State Supreme Court imposing reciprocal discipline in accordance with an order of the Supreme Court of the State of Colorado following approval of a stipulation. This discipline was based on conduct in a dissolution matter involving failure to timely serve interrogatories and requests for protective orders, improper withdrawal of client funds from a retainer before work had been performed, and failure to provide billing statements to the client. For more information, see the Colorado Supreme Court Summary, under September 2007, for Montgomery, Conditional Admission, 07PDJ035, 08-22-07, at www.coloradosupremecourt.us/pdj/pdj.htm. Ms. Montgomery's conduct violated Colorado RPC 1.3, requiring a lawyer to act with reasonable diligence and promptness in representing a client; Colorado RPC 1.4, requiring a lawyer to keep a client reasonably informed about the status of a matter, to promptly comply with reasonable requests for information, and to explain a matter to the extent reasonably necessary to permit the client to make informed decisions regarding the representation; Colorado RPC 1.15(a) requiring a lawyer, in connection with a representation, to hold property of clients or third persons that is in an attorney's possession separate from the attorney's own property and governing the maintenance and recordkeeping of the client's or third persons' funds; Colorado RPC 1.15(c), requiring a lawyer, when in possession of property in which both the lawyer and another person claim interests, to keep the property separate until there is an accounting and severance of their interests; Colorado RPC 1.15(f), describing the required bank accounts that every attorney in private practice in the state of Colorado must maintain; and Colorado RPC 8.4(c), making it professional misconduct for a lawyer to engage in conduct involving dishonesty, fraud, deceit, or misrepresentation. Felice P. Congalton represented the Bar Association. Ms. Montgomery represented herself. Suspended Craig Stilwill (WSBA No. 17740, admitted 1988), of Kennewick, was suspended for three months, effective July 18, 2007, by order of the Washington State Supreme Court following approval of a stipulation by the Disciplinary Board. This discipline was based on conduct involving failure to take any action in a client matter, lack of communication, trust account irregularities, failure to return client funds when requested to do so by the client, and failure to file a trust account declaration. In January 2003, Mr. Stilwill was hired by a client to research and prepare for him, if possible, an expungement of a criminal conviction. Mr. Stilwill received $750 by check for his fee, which he did not deposit into his trust account. On several occasions in the winter of 2003, the client asked Mr. Stilwill about the status of the matter. Mr. Stilwill started the research and compiled information, but did not communicate the results of his efforts to the client and completed no work that benefited the client. In March, Mr. Stilwill closed his law practice and began to work as a court commissioner. When closing down his office, Mr. Stilwill did not inform his client that he would no longer be able to represent him. The client continued to call Mr. Stilwill to find out the status of his case. The client never heard back from Mr. Stilwill and, eventually, the telephone number for Mr. Stilwill's office was disconnected. In approximately May 2004, the client sent a letter to Mr. Stilwill by certified mail asking for an accounting or a refund. Mr. Stilwill subsequently telephoned the client and told him he was leaving town and would check his files when he returned and refund his fee to him. Mr. Stilwill did not provide an accounting or refund to the client. The client wrote to Mr. Stilwill again in April 2005, with no response. The client filed a grievance with the Bar Association in May. When Mr. Stilwill closed his trust account in August 2005, he had no trust account records to document the ownership of the balance he removed from his trust account. In a letter to the Bar Association, Mr. Stilwill stated that "[w]ith the exception of $37.00 (which was part of the initial deposit to open the account), I cannot inform you as to the source of the funds in the account…. However, I am confident that I was the owner of the balance of the money and had not billed for it yet." The $699.95 that Mr. Stilwill removed from his trust account in August 2005 had been in the trust account since at least January 2002. From approximately April 2003, when he closed his practice, until August 2005, when he closed his trust account, Mr. Stilwill did not maintain complete trust account records and did not reconcile his trust account ledger cards to his trust account statement. The Bar Association had been unable to identify the ownership of the funds in Mr. Stilwill's trust account at the time he closed it. No clients complained about missing funds or funds Mr. Stilwill should have been holding in their behalf. Former Rule 13.5(a) of the Rules for Lawyer Discipline (RLD) required each active lawyer to complete, execute, and deliver to the Bar Association a trust account declaration annually. In 2002, the deadline for filing the trust account declaration was February 1, 2002. Mr. Stilwill did not file a trust account declaration in 2002. The Bar Association sent him letters in May and June reminding him of his obligation to file the declaration, regardless of whether he had a trust account. Mr. Stilwill did not respond to these letters. Mr. Stilwill's conduct violated RPC 1.3, requiring a lawyer to act with reasonable diligence and promptness in representing a client; RPC 1.4, requiring a lawyer to keep a client reasonably informed about the status of a matter, to promptly comply with reasonable requests for information, and to explain a matter to the extent reasonably necessary to permit the client to make informed decisions regarding the representation; former RPC 1.14(a), requiring all funds of clients paid to a lawyer or law firm be deposited in one or more identifiable interest-bearing trust accounts and no funds belonging to the lawyer or law firm be deposited therein; former RPC 1.14(b)(3), requiring a lawyer to maintain complete records of all funds, securities, and other properties of a client promptly upon receipt; former RPC 1.14(b)(4), requiring a lawyer to promptly pay or deliver to the client as requested by a client the funds, securities, or other properties in the possession of the lawyer which the client is entitled to receive; and former RLD 13.5(a), requiring a lawyer to file a trust account declaration with the Bar Association. Joanne S. Abelson represented the Bar Association. Mr. Stilwill represented himself. Reprimanded Paul D. Jacobson (WSBA No. 26939, admitted 1997), of Redmond, was ordered to receive a reprimand on February 5, 2007, following approval of a stipulation by a hearing officer. This discipline was based on conduct in 2004 involving lack of diligence, failure to communicate, and failure to properly supervise a nonlawyer employee. Beginning in January 2004, Mr. Jacobson began representing a client in various matters, including a criminal case. The criminal matter came to trial in July, resulting in a hung jury. In October, after a second trial, the client was convicted of the criminal charges and sentenced to 400 months in prison. At some point prior to sentencing, Mr. Jacobson had a discussion with the client about how the client's assets and property should be handled in the event of his incarceration. Mr. Jacobson was instructed by the client to assist the client's girlfriend in removing and safeguarding the personal property located at a house they shared in Monroe. They also discussed liquidating some of the property. Mr. Jacobson did not clarify with the client who would be taking custody of the property or how the liquidation would be accomplished. The client maintains that he did not specifically authorize Mr. Jacobson to liquidate his property. At the time of the two trials in 2004, the client was separated from his wife and she had filed for dissolution proceedings. Mr. Jacobson began representing the client in the dissolution proceeding in October 2004. In the dissolution proceeding, the client's wife was claiming a share of the community assets, including items stored at the Monroe house. Mr. Jacobson sent his paralegal and some of her family members to assist the client's girlfriend in moving the client's personal property from the Monroe house to a storage facility. Mr. Jacobson paid his paralegal and her family members for providing these services. Mr. Jacobson did not provide his paralegal with any specific instructions to inventory, label, or otherwise account for the client's property. Neither Mr. Jacobson, nor his paralegal, nor anyone else from Mr. Jacobson's office ever prepared an inventory or any other accounting of the property that was removed from the Monroe house. Sometime in October, Mr. Jacobson, his paralegal, and the client's girlfriend visited the storage facility and Mr. Jacobson noticed there were some items not appropriate for storage. Following the visit, Mr. Jacobson advised his paralegal and the client's girlfriend that they should remove the items and store them "someplace else." Subsequently, without further instructions from Mr. Jacobson, his paralegal removed the items and took them to her residence. Mr. Jacobson was aware that his paralegal was storing some of the client's items at her residence, because he saw them there when he picked her up at her residence on one or more occasions. In October, without Mr. Jacobson's knowledge, his paralegal sold some of the client's property. She received a total of $440, which she retained. One of the items she sold, a Gibson-brand electric guitar, was worth considerably more than the $300 she received for it. In late October or November, Mr. Jacobson noticed that some of the property was missing and asked his paralegal about the missing items. She admitted she had sold them. Mr. Jacobson gave his paralegal funds to repurchase the items, but she was unable to purchase back the Gibson electric guitar. Sometime in October 2004, Mr. Jacobson took another of the client's guitars, from either the storage unit or from his paralegal's residence, intending to show it to his son's Boy Scout group. Mr. Jacobson kept the guitar in the trunk of his car for several weeks, but did not show it to the Boy Scout group. In November, Mr. Jacobson returned the guitar to his client's brother. In December, Mr. Jacobson terminated his paralegal's employment. Mr. Jacobson's conduct violated RPC 1.3, requiring a lawyer to act with reasonable promptness in representing a client; former RPC 1.4(b), requiring a lawyer to explain a matter to the extent reasonably necessary to permit the client to make informed decisions regarding representation; and RPC 5.3(b), requiring a lawyer having direct supervisory authority over a nonlawyer to make reasonable efforts to ensure that the person's conduct is compatible with the professional obligations of the lawyer. Kevin M. Bank represented the Bar Association. Leland G. Ripley represented Mr. Jacobson. Gregory J. Wall was the hearing officer. Reprimanded F. Lawrence Taylor Jr. (WSBA No. 3329, admitted 1971), of Renton, received a reprimand on September 19, 2007, following approval of a stipulation by a hearing officer. This discipline was based on conduct involving unreasonable fees and improper use of attorney's liens. Mr. Taylor's practice consists mostly of plaintiff personal injury, and many of his clients are from Russia and the Ukraine. When clients hire him, Mr. Taylor has them execute a fee agreement written in English. If the client speaks little or no English, clients meet with one of Mr. Taylor's Russian-speaking or Ukrainian-speaking staff to ensure that they understand the agreement. Prior to March 2007, the fee agreement provided that in the event the client discharges the attorney or the attorney withdraws for cause, the client would agree to pay reasonable compensation for services rendered which would be calculated as "not less than the time expended, or the agreed upon contingency percentage of the last offer received whichever is more…. [C]lient understands that when attorney has been able to obtain the receipt of an offer, attorney has substantially performed the contingency herein." Mr. Taylor asserts that he never enforced this provision in his fee agreement. In November 2004, Mr. Taylor terminated a bilingual paralegal. This paralegal later did contract work for a Bellevue law firm. Approximately 30 of Mr. Taylor's clients transferred their cases to the Bellevue firm. Shortly thereafter, Mr. Taylor sent some of these former clients a "Bill for Services Rendered" (bill). He included with the bill a "Notice of Attorney Lien" (notice), which indicated that a lien had already been recorded with the King County Recorder's Office by Mr. Taylor. Several of the bills included charges for preparing and sending out copies of the notice and, in one or more instances, the client whose real property could have been affected by the lien did not learn about Mr. Taylor's intention to file an attorney's lien until after he sent the client the notice. Mr. Taylor filed at least 20 such notices, ranging between $509.39 and $16,665.12, with the King County Recorder's Office. The notices were entered into the Recorder's Office public record. Mr. Taylor asserts that he filed the liens because there was no agreement to apportion fees between himself and the firm, who had assumed representation of the clients. In the fall of 2005, one of Mr. Taylor's former clients tried to refinance his home. The former client states that he was told by his mortgage broker that Mr. Taylor's lien would need to be satisfied from any loan proceeds received by the client in the refinance. The client asserts that because he disputed the amount claimed by Mr. Taylor, he was not willing to pay the lien and, as a result, he decided not to proceed with the refinance. The client maintains that he lost the opportunity to obtain a particularly favorable rate, and that it would cost him more to refinance now. Mr. Taylor subsequently released all his attorney's liens for the relevant clients and changed his fee agreement to remove the language regarding the contingency being substantially performed based on receipt of an offer by the opposing party. Mr. Taylor's conduct violated RPC 1.2(a), requiring a lawyer to abide by a client's decisions concerning the objectives of representation and consult with the client as to the means by which they are to be pursued; RPC 1.5(a), requiring a lawyer's fee to be reasonable; and RPC 8.4(d), prohibiting a lawyer from engaging in conduct that is prejudicial to the administration of justice. Kevin M. Bank represented the Bar Association. Mr. Taylor represented himself. David W. Wiley was the hearing officer. Non-Disciplinary Notices Transferred to Disability Inactive Status Robert W. Huffhines (WSBA No. 11279, admitted 1980), of Kelso, was by stipulation transferred to disability inactive status, effective November 16, 2007. This is not a disciplinary action. Suspended Pending the Outcome of Disciplinary Proceedings Thomas P. Sughrua (WSBA No. 14117, admitted 1984), of Seattle, was suspended pending the outcome of disciplinary proceedings, pursuant to ELC 7.4, effective December 12, 2007, by order of the Washington State Supreme Court. This is not a disciplinary action. Suspended Pending the Outcome of Disciplinary Proceedings Jonathan D. Sweigert (WSBA No. 20781, admitted 1991), of Kirkland, was suspended pending the outcome of disciplinary proceedings, pursuant to ELC 7.2(a)(3), effective December 6, 2007, by order of the Washington State Supreme Court. This is not a disciplinary action.
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