June 2005

Disciplinary Notices

These notices of imposition of disciplinary sanctions and actions are published pursuant to Rule 3.5(d) of the Washington State Supreme Court Rules for Enforcement of Lawyer Conduct, and pursuant to the February 18, 1995, policy statement of the WSBA Board of Governors.

For a complete copy of any disciplinary decision, call the Washington State Disciplinary Board at 206-733-5926, leaving the case name, and your name and address.

Note: Nearly 29,000 persons are eligible to practice law in Washington state. Some of them share the same or similar names. Bar News strives to include a clarification whenever an attorney listed in the Disciplinary Notices has the same name as another WSBA member; however, all discipline reports should be read carefully for names, cities, and bar numbers.

Disbarred

Sarah Louise Hurst (WSBA No. 29489, admitted 1999), of Berks, England, was disbarred, effective December 23, 2004, by order of the Washington State Supreme Court following a stipulation approved by the Disciplinary Board. This discipline was based on her conduct between 2001 and 2003 involving unauthorized use of funds belonging to two law firms and to an organization for which she served as president and treasurer.

Between 2001 and 2004, Ms. Hurst was successively employed as an associate by two Everett law firms. While employed at both firms, Ms. Hurst deposited fees received from clients into her personal checking account rather than a firm account.

In 2002 and 2003, during her tenure as president and treasurer of a local chapter of a statewide law-related organization, Ms. Hurst issued a number of checks from the organization’s account to herself. Ms. Hurst also used the organization’s funds to purchase $1,200 in money orders payable to a personal creditor. Ms. Hurst additionally reported that a $2,000 scholarship awarded by the organization had been paid in 2003, but she did not in fact provide the funds to the recipient until 2004. Ms. Hurst did not have the organization’s authority to use its funds for her personal expenses.

Ms. Hurst’s conduct violated RPC 8.4(c), which prohibits a lawyer from engaging in conduct involving dishonesty, deceit, fraud, or misrepresentation; and RPC 8.4(n), which prohibits a lawyer from engaging in conduct demonstrating an unfitness to practice law.

Linda B. Eide represented the Bar Association. Ms. Hurst represented herself.

Disbarred

Bruce Stewart (WSBA No. 6483, admitted 1976), of Honolulu, HI, was disbarred, effective January 27, 2005, by order of the Washington State Supreme Court reciprocating discipline imposed by the Hawaii State Supreme Court, which disbarred Mr. Stewart by consent in 1987. This discipline was based on Mr. Stewart’s 1987 conviction in the state of Hawaii of two counts of rape in the first degree.

Felice Congalton represented the Bar Association. Mr. Stewart did not appear in the proceeding either personally or through counsel.

Suspended

Alfredo Lopez (WSBA No. 17502, admitted 1987), of Seattle, was suspended for 60 days, effective February 10, 2005, by order of the Washington State Supreme Court following a hearing. The discipline was based on his conduct between 1997 and 2000 involving repeated failure to file a client’s appellate brief, failure to take steps on termination of the representation to protect the client’s interests, and failure to respond as directed by an order to show cause. For additional information please see In re Discipline of Lopez, 153 Wn.2d 570, 106 P.3d 221 (2005).

Between 1996 and 1997, Mr. Lopez represented a client in the U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of Washington. The client pleaded guilty and was sentenced to 70 months imprisonment, after which the client asked Mr. Lopez to file a notice of appeal.

Mr. Lopez timely filed the notice of appeal, and the 9th Circuit set a July 29, 1997, deadline for the opening brief. Mr. Lopez failed to file the brief. On January 23, 1998, the 9th Circuit entered a notice of default instructing Mr. Lopez to correct the deficiency within 14 days and file a motion for relief from default. Mr. Lopez timely filed a motion for relief from default and an extension of time to file an opening brief until March 20, 1998, attributing his delay to an extremely busy trial schedule. The 9th Circuit granted the motion and extended the deadline to April 20, 1998. The order warned that “[a]ny further requests for extension of time for filing the opening brief are strongly disfavored.”

Mr. Lopez did not file the opening brief by April 20, 1998, and on August 13, 1998, the 9th Circuit entered an order reiterating the instructions and warnings contained in its previous notice of default. Mr. Lopez timely filed a second motion for relief from default and an extension of time requesting until September 8, 1998, to file an opening brief. Mr. Lopez’s accompanying declaration attributed the delay to an extremely busy trial schedule and recent office relocation. The 9th Circuit granted an extension to September 8, 1998. The order noted that Mr. Lopez had missed two previous deadlines and that failure to timely file the opening brief may result in his removal as counsel and may subject him to monetary sanctions. Mr. Lopez did not file the opening brief before September 8, 1998.

In a letter dated September 25, 1998, another lawyer informed Mr. Lopez that he had been hired to represent the client on appeal. He requested the file and enclosed an authorization for release of legal information signed by the client. Mr. Lopez transferred the file to the new lawyer on September 29, 1998, and by letter requested that the new lawyer immediately inform the 9th Circuit of his retention. The new lawyer did not file a notice of appearance or a notice of substitution at that time. Mr. Lopez took no steps to ensure that he was no longer deemed counsel of record in the 9th Circuit or to ensure that the new lawyer had appeared on the client’s behalf.

On March 10, 2000, no opening brief having been filed, the 9th Circuit issued an order to show cause requiring Mr. Lopez, within 10 days, to show cause in writing why he should not be sanctioned in an amount not less than $500 for failing to comply with the court’s rules and orders. Shortly after Mr. Lopez received the order to show cause, his assistant called the 9th Circuit to inform the court that Mr. Lopez was no longer the attorney of record. In May 2000, upon receiving further correspondence from the court referring to him as the client’s “retained counsel,” Mr. Lopez instructed his assistant to draft a letter to the court explaining that he had been discharged and the entire file had been provided to another lawyer.

On May 25, 2000, the client’s subsequent lawyer filed a notice of appearance and a declaration requesting an amended briefing schedule. The 9th Circuit issued an order granting the request for an amended briefing schedule and stated the court’s order to show cause regarding sanctions against Mr. Lopez would be resolved separately.

On June 28, 2000, the 9th Circuit entered an order finding that Mr. Lopez had failed to respond to its March 10, 2000, order to show cause and imposing a $500 sanction. Mr. Lopez timely paid the sanction and filed a motion for reconsideration, which was denied. Ultimately, the 9th Circuit affirmed the client’s sentence.

Mr. Lopez’s conduct violated RPC 1.3, requiring a lawyer to act with reasonable diligence in representing a client; RPC 1.15(d), requiring that a lawyer take reasonably practicable steps to protect a client’s interests upon termination of representation; RPC 3.2, requiring a lawyer to make reasonable efforts to expedite litigation consistent with the interest of the client; and former Rule for Lawyer Discipline 1.1(b), prohibiting a lawyer from willfully disobeying or violating a court order.

Douglas J. Ende represented the Bar Association. Kurt M. Bulmer represented Mr. Lopez. Waldo F. Stone was the hearing officer.

Reprimanded

Gerald G. Burke (WSBA No. 17773, admitted 1988), of Tacoma, was ordered to receive reprimand on September 24, 2004, following a hearing. This discipline was based on his conduct in 1995 involving the communication of incorrect information to a client about the amount of fees owed. (Mr. Burke is to be distinguished from Jerry L. Burk of Yakima.)

Commencing in December 1992, Mr. Burke represented clients in a lawsuit alleging employment discrimination. The fee agreement required payment of an initial $10,000 fee to commence the representation. The agreement specified a $125-per-hour rate of compensation for attorney fees, but further specified that payment of any attorney fees incurred beyond $10,000 was contingent on Mr. Burke obtaining a monetary recovery in the lawsuit. In addition to paying the $10,000, over the course of the representation the clients advanced sums to Mr. Burke to be disbursed for costs, which he deposited into his trust account.

In August 1995, Mr. Burke wrote the clients stating that the $10,000 fee had been fully expended and additional fees and costs were continuing. He further stated that, although the initial $10,000 had been earned, he was continuing to work on the case in anticipation of all legal fees being paid. He indicated that a total of $19,355.90 in attorney fees and costs had been expended, enclosed a document titled “Time Account” indicating that he had accrued $18,587.50 in attorney fees and $768.40 in costs, and he asked the clients to meet with him in order to “reach some agreement as to how the outstanding balance will be addressed.” Neither the letter nor the Time Account reflected any offset for the client’s prior payments nor did either credit the clients with amounts held in Mr. Burke’s trust account. The clients interpreted Mr. Burke’s letter as a request for payment of additional attorney fees that were not then due under the fee agreement.

When the clients failed to meet with him, Mr. Burke terminated the representation and withdrew. Approximately one year later, the clients obtained a new lawyer, who settled their claim in March 1998.

Mr. Burke’s conduct violated RPC 1.4, requiring a lawyer to keep a client reasonably informed about the status of a matter and to explain a matter to the extent reasonably necessary to permit the client to make informed decisions.

Douglas J. Ende and Joy B. McLean represented the Bar Association. Mr. Burke represented himself. Teena M. Killian was the hearing officer.