May 2006

Discipline Notices

These notices of imposition of disciplinary sanctions and actions are published pursuant to Rule 3.5(d) of the Washington State Supreme Court Rules for Enforcement of Lawyer Conduct, and pursuant to the February 18, 1995, policy statement of the WSBA Board of Governors.

Pursuant to Rule for Enforcement of Lawyer Conduct 3.6(b), file materials relating to a matter concluded with an admonition may be destroyed five years after the admonition was issued. In admonition matters, it is the WSBA's policy to remove the disciplinary notice from the Washington State Bar News website archive five years after the admonition was issued, regardless of whether the WSBA's file materials are destroyed.

For a complete copy of any disciplinary decision, call the Washington State Disciplinary Board at 206-733-5926, leaving the case name, and your name and address.

Note: Approximately 30,000 persons are eligible to practice law in Washington state. Some of them share the same or similar names. Bar News strives to include a clarification whenever an attorney listed in the Disciplinary Notices has the same name as another WSBA member; however, all discipline reports should be read carefully for names, cities, and bar numbers.

Suspended

Christopher P. Eichhorn (WSBA No. 7427, admitted 1977), of Tacoma, was suspended for two years, effective November 7, 2005, by order of the Washington State Supreme Court following a stipulation approved by the Disciplinary Board. This discipline was based on his conduct between 1998 and 2001 involving failure to communicate with and diligently represent a client, charging an unreasonable fee, failure to expedite litigation, failure to deposit client funds into a trust account, and failure to comply with duties on suspension.

Matter 1: In July 1998, Mr. Eichhorn commenced representing a client in a dissolution of marriage matter. The client agreed to pay Mr. Eichhorn an hourly fee to be deducted from all payments received. This fee agreement was not put in writing. The client paid Mr. Eichhorn $650. Even though the fee was not fully earned, Mr. Eichhorn deposited it into his general business account.

In October 1998, a temporary order was entered prohibiting the client's husband from withdrawing approximately $30,000 in funds acquired by refinancing the family home. In mid-1999, Mr. Eichhorn and his client became aware that the husband was planning to move to Korea and that his lawyer planned to withdraw by June 1999. Mr. Eichhorn advised his client to seek a contempt order for the husband's failure to preserve the $30,000, and to do so while the husband was still represented. The client agreed and instructed Mr. Eichhorn to proceed before June 1999. Mr. Eichhorn did not file the motion until July 1999. The court ruled that the client's husband had failed to comply with the temporary order and directed the husband to deposit $30,000 into the court registry. The husband failed to account for the funds or deposit them into the court registry. The client called Mr. Eichhorn every few months. Mr. Eichhorn occasionally returned the calls and told her they should start working on her case again.

The dissolution trial was held in October 2000. After the trial, Mr. Eichhorn told the client that he would file the final dissolution paperwork by Thanksgiving 2000. When that did not happen, he told her he would finalize the dissolution by Christmas 2000. When that did not happen, the client reminded Mr. Eichhorn that she planned to remarry in April 2001; Mr. Eichhorn assured her that he would finalize her dissolution by then. The client continued to leave Mr. Eichhorn telephone messages, to which he did not respond. The client and her future husband went to Mr. Eichhorn's office in February 2001 owing to concern about the delay. In March 2001, Mr. Eichhorn filed the final paperwork with the court.

After the dissolution was final, the client, who had paid Mr. Eichhorn $4,650, requested an itemized bill. Mr. Eichhorn told her the bill was around $3,000 and agreed to send it to her in writing. Mr. Eichhorn had not maintained contemporaneous time records while working on her case, and he never sent a written bill, an itemized statement, or any refund.

Matter 2: Effective November 10, 1998, Mr. Eichhorn was suspended from the practice of law for 45 days following a stipulation to discipline in another matter. In December 1998, as required by the former Rules for Lawyer Discipline, Mr. Eichhorn submitted to the Bar Association an affidavit of compliance with his duties on suspension, listing clients and opposing counsel who had been notified of his suspension. Neither the above-mentioned client nor the husband's lawyer appeared on the list. Neither individual had been informed of the suspension or knew that Mr. Eichhorn was prohibited from practicing law during the 45-day period.

Mr. Eichhorn's conduct violated RPC 1.3, requiring a lawyer to act with reasonable diligence and promptness in representing a client; RPC 1.4(a), requiring a lawyer to keep a client reasonably informed about the status of a matter and promptly comply with reasonable requests for information; RPC 1.4(b), requiring a lawyer to explain a matter to the extent reasonably necessary to permit the client to make informed decisions regarding the representation; RPC 1.5(a), requiring a lawyer's fee to be reasonable; RPC 1.5(b), requiring a lawyer who has not regularly represented a client to communicate to the client the basis or rate of the fee or factors involved in determining the charges for services and the lawyer's billing practices; RPC 3.2, requiring a lawyer to make reasonable efforts to expedite litigation consistent with the interests of the client; RPC 1.14(a), requiring all funds of clients paid to a lawyer be deposited into an interest-bearing trust account; RPC 1.14(b), requiring a lawyer to maintain complete records of client funds and properties and render appropriate accounts regarding them, and to promptly pay or deliver upon request funds or properties belonging to the client; and former Rule for Lawyer Discipline 8.1(c), delineating a lawyer's duties on suspension, including the duty to notify all clients involved in litigation and the lawyer for each adverse party of the suspension and the reason therefore, and of the lawyer's consequent inability to act after the effective date of the suspension.

Marsha A. Matsumoto represented the Bar Association. Mr. Eichhorn represented himself.

Suspended

Alexander J. Higgins (WSBA No. 20868, admitted 1991), of Seattle, was suspended for two years, effective February 15, 2006, by order of the Washington State Supreme Court following a stipulation approved by the Disciplinary Board. This discipline was based on his conduct in 2002 and 2003 involving the deposit of funds belonging to his law firm into his personal bank account.

Mr. Higgins was a partner in a Seattle law firm. On 16 occasions during 2002 and 2003 Mr. Higgins received payments directly from clients for work he had performed as a firm lawyer. Instead of routing the checks into one of the firm's bank accounts, Mr. Higgins deposited the funds into a personal, individual checking account. The total amount of fees belonging to the firm that Mr. Higgins retained for himself was $4,937. In late 2003, by happenstance, a member of the firm learned about the conduct with respect to funds paid by a particular client. Mr. Higgins cooperated with the firm's ensuing investigation of the matter. The firm later accepted Mr. Higgins's resignation, effective December 31, 2003. Mr. Higgins and the firm agreed on the total amount owed and also agreed to deduct that amount from Mr. Higgins's profit share, which was adequate to cover the loss.

Mr. Higgins's conduct violated RPC 8.4(c), prohibiting lawyers from engaging in conduct involving dishonesty, fraud, deceit, or misrepresentation.

Eugene I. Annis represented the Bar Association. Kurt M. Bulmer represented Mr. Higgins.

Suspended

Paul H. King (WSBA No. 7370, admitted 1977), of Seattle, was reciprocally suspended for three years, based on an August 15, 2002, order of the U.S. District Court for the Western District of Washington suspending Mr. King from April 25, 2002, through April 25, 2005. The Washington State Supreme Court's order of reciprocal discipline, entered March 9, 2005, imposed the suspension in Washington retroactive to April 25, 2002, in accordance with the dates in the District Court's order. (Owing to a clerical error in the March 9, 2005, order, the suspension did not expire until entry of corrective order on June 7, 2005.) This discipline was based on Mr. King's conduct between 1999 and 2001 in multiple pending federal matters.

Matter 1: Mr. King filed an action on behalf of a client in 1998. In December 1999, Mr. King withdrew from representing the client in the midst of settlement negotiations. At the time, Mr. King's file reflected that he had failed to respond to discovery requests, failed to assert several claims that should have been asserted, and alleged a disability claim even though plaintiff appeared not to be disabled. Mr. King did not provide his file to substituting counsel for several weeks, and not until after the client had filed a grievance with the Bar Association. Mr. King subsequently filed a motion seeking imposition of an attorney's lien in the amount of $4,581.02, even though his contingency fee agreement with the client provided that if he withdrew from representation he waived any right to fees in the matter. In denying the motion, the court found that in December 1999, Mr. King had improperly attempted to change his contingency fee arrangement with the client to an hourly fee arrangement.

Matter 2: Mr. King represented a purported plaintiff class with claims against a municipality under the First, Fourth, and Fourteenth amendments to the U.S. Constitution. In denying the motion for class certification, the court found that Mr. King had failed to make any attempt to meet the class certification requirements of Fed. R. Civ. P. 23.

Matter 3: Mr. King represented a plaintiff on a claim for damage to a truck. The court imposed a $500 sanction on Mr. King on grounds that he had made improper use of profanity in a brief and urged the court to grant relief on improper grounds. At trial in the matter, Mr. King improperly advised the jury in opening argument of settlement efforts, failed to refrain from and failed to prevent his Rule 9 intern from engaging in behavior that disrupted the courtroom, and during closing argument improperly advised the jury that he strongly disagreed with the court's jury instructions.

Matter 4: Mr. King represented a plaintiff in an action for violation of state and federal wage-and-hour laws. In July 1999, Mr. King participated in settlement conference with a magistrate judge. During a break in the conference, Mr. King was informed that the assigned judge had dismissed the case. Mr. King proceeded with the settlement conference and discussed the matter as if it were still pending, without promptly advising opposing counsel and the magistrate judge of the dismissal.

Matter 5: Mr. King represented two plaintiffs in an action under the Fair Labor Standards Act. In September 1999, Mr. King filed an amended complaint adding new claims and joining a new plaintiff, but he neither sought leave of court to file the complaint nor served the complaint on opposing counsel within 120 days of filing as required by Fed. R. Civ. P. 4. In March 2000, Mr. King filed a motion and declaration for permission to file a third amended complaint, adding new claims and joining additional plaintiffs. However, he failed to serve opposing counsel as required by Fed. R. Civ. P. 5(d). In March 2000, after expiration of the deadline for amending pleadings, Mr. King again filed a motion for permission to file an amended pleading but failed to file proof of service of the motion. In April 2000, Mr. King filed a certificate of service of the proposed amended complaint, but failed to indicate whether he had served the motion to amend, in violation of Fed. R. Civ. P. 5(d); Mr. King also submitted a proposed, unsigned order in violation of Fed. R. Civ. P. 11. In July 2000, Mr. King filed a motion of entry of judgment without noting the motion as required by Fed. R. Civ. P. 7. Mr. King also filed a motion for entry of judgment in favor of several plaintiffs who had purportedly joined in complaints that had never been served. In September 2000, Mr. King filed a summary judgment motion after the cut-off date for the filing of dispositive motions.

Matter 6: Mr. King failed to appear for a March 1999 status conference in a pending matter. In response to a show cause order, he explained that the date was not listed on his calendar. The court imposed a $250 sanction.

Matter 7: After being sanctioned in Matter 6, Mr. King engaged in attempts to manipulate the District Court's case-assignment procedures in order to avoid having cases assigned to the judge who had imposed the sanction. In five matters, Mr. King voluntarily dismissed the cases and promptly refiled them. In one of the matters, when the case was reassigned to the same judge, Mr. King again voluntarily dismissed and refiled it, even though Fed. R. Civ. P. 41(a)(1) provides that a second voluntary dismissal is a dismissal with prejudice. The judge ordered a hearing to show cause why the case should not be dismissed with prejudice. In the other cases, the assigned judges reassigned the cases to the original judge, who set a status conference in each for the same date as the show cause hearing. Mr. King failed to attend the status conferences and the show cause hearing; instead, he sent an attorney from another law office to attend on his behalf, who indicated that Mr. King had been called away on a family emergency. The judge imposed a sanction on Mr. King of $100 in each case, with the proviso that the sanction would be vacated if Mr. King provided an affidavit from a physician stating that the medical condition was an emergency that could not have safely been addressed until after the status conferences were concluded.

Matter 8: Mr. King submitted a declaration of a third party in support of a motion for an award of attorney fees. As a result of its own investigation, the court discovered that Mr. King had signed the declarant's name on the declaration without advising the court of this fact. There was no indication on the document that Mr. King was signing for the declarant. During oral argument on an order to show cause, Mr. King acknowledged that he was not familiar with 28 U.S.C. § 1746, permitting the filing of a declaration in lieu of an affidavit, and he claimed he believed it was appropriate to execute and submit a declaration on another's behalf without disclosing the fact that the true declarant had not signed. In July 2000, the court imposed a $1,000 sanction on Mr. King.

Matter 9: Three days after a discovery cut-off had passed in a pending matter, having conducted no discovery, Mr. King filed a motion to extend the discovery deadline. In denying the motion, the court additionally noted that Mr. King had failed to conduct a mediation by the court-ordered deadline. Three weeks after the mediation deadline, Mr. King filed a motion to appoint a mediator, which was denied. On the day of the deadline for filing dispositive motions, Mr. King filed a summary judgment motion without a supporting memorandum. Several weeks later, Mr. King filed a memorandum in support of the motion and intermittently filed supporting declarations. In May 2000, the court denied the motion, noting that Mr. King had violated the court's local rules. Two and one half weeks before trial, Mr. King attended a pretrial conference at which he agreed to waive his client's jury demand. During the conference, Mr. King appeared unfamiliar with the case and could not provide an estimate of the potential value of the case. As a result, the court, on its own motion, rescheduled the trial and extended the deadline for mediation and dispositive motions.

Matter 10: Mr. King commenced an action on behalf of a client in May 1999. In March 2000, the judge ordered plaintiff to pay $1,600 as partial compensation for defendant's attorney fees incurred as a result of plaintiff's prolonged, unexcused, and unjustified failure to make discovery. The plaintiff was subsequently found in contempt for failing to pay the sanctions, and the judge ordered Mr. King to pay an additional $3,095 to defendant.

Mr. King's conduct violated RPC 1.1, requiring that a lawyer provide competent representation to a client; RPC 1.3, requiring that a lawyer act with reasonable diligence and promptness; RPC 3.1, prohibiting a lawyer form bringing or defending a proceeding, or asserting or controverting an issue therein, unless there is a good faith basis for doing so that is not frivolous; RPC 3.2, requiring that a lawyer make reasonable efforts to expedite litigation consistent with the interests of the client; RPC 3.4(d), requiring a lawyer to make a reasonably diligent effort to comply with a legally proper discovery request; RPC 3.4(e), prohibiting a lawyer from alluding to any matter that the lawyer does not reasonably believe is relevant or that will not be supported by admissible evidence, or from asserting personal knowledge of facts in issue; RPC 3.4(f), prohibiting a lawyer from stating a personal opinion regarding the justness of a cause in trial; RPC 3.5(c), prohibiting a lawyer from engaging in conduct intended to disrupt a tribunal; RPC 8.4(c), prohibiting conduct involving dishonesty, deceit, fraud, or misrepresentation; and RPC 8.4(d), prohibiting conduct prejudicial to the administration of justice.

Leslie Ching Allen represented the Bar Association. John R. Scannell represented Mr. King.

Suspended

Richard F. Lancefield (WSBA No. 2796, admitted 1969), of Portland, Oregon, was suspended for 60 days, effective November 23, 2005, by order of the Washington State Supreme Court imposing reciprocal discipline in accordance with an order of the Supreme Court of Oregon following a stipulation. This discipline was based on his conduct in 2004 involving trust-account irregularities.

Prior to July 2004, Mr. Lancefield established a lawyer trust account in Oregon. Mr. Lancefield deposited client funds into the trust account. Mr. Lancefield used the trust account to pay personal, business, and client obligations. Mr. Lancefield did not make or maintain records reflecting deposits, withdrawals, or disbursements of client funds in his trust account, nor did he keep track of his time for purposes of charging or accounting to clients except as it may have been reflected in his client files. Accordingly, Mr. Lancefield did not know with any precision when he had earned funds in the trust account or how much he had earned.

On July 27, 2004, Mr. Lancefield issued a check from the trust account when there were insufficient funds in the account. The bank honored the check, thereby drawing on the funds of one or more of Mr. Lancefield's clients without authorization. After the overdraft, the account had a negative balance of $10.23, which Mr. Lancefield rectified following notification. There was no assertion in the Oregon disciplinary proceeding that Mr. Lancefield's conduct resulted in actual injury to a client.

Mr. Lancefield's conduct violated Oregon DR 9-101(A), requiring that all funds of clients paid to a lawyer or law firm be deposited and maintained in one or more identifiable trust accounts and that no funds belonging to the lawyer be deposited therein; and DR 9-101(C)(3) requiring that a lawyer maintain complete records of all funds, securities, and other properties of a client coming into the possession of the lawyer and render appropriate accounts to the lawyer's client regarding them.

Felice P. Congalton represented the Bar Association. Mr. Lancefield represented himself.

Suspended

Roger B. Madison Jr. (WSBA No. 15338, admitted 1985), of Issaquah, was suspended for six months, effective January 30, 2006, by order of the Washington State Supreme Court following a stipulation approved by the Disciplinary Board. This discipline was based on Mr. Madison's conduct involving the use of illegal means to aid in discovery in his civil case against a former girlfriend.

Mr. Madison sued a former girlfriend to recover an expensive ring. In an attempt to discover what happened to the ring, Mr. Madison deciphered the former girlfriend's computer password, accessed her e-mail account, read and deleted e-mails sent to her, and copied her e-mail address book. Mr. Madison was charged with computer trespass in the second degree, but prosecutors agreed to dismiss the charge after Mr. Madison and his former girlfriend reached a civil misdemeanor compromise and Mr. Madison agreed to cooperate in the investigation of and prosecution of, another crime allegedly committed by Mr. Madison's paralegal, in which Mr. Madison was not implicated.

Mr. Madison's conduct violated RPC 8.4(d), prohibiting a lawyer from engaging in conduct that is prejudicial to the administration of justice.

M. Craig Bray and Linda B. Eide represented the Bar Association. Mr. Madison represented himself.

Suspended

Ralph L. Perkins (WSBA No. 11666, admitted 1981), formerly of Okanogan, was suspended from the practice of law for two years, effective September 16, 2005, by order of the Washington State Supreme Court following a stipulation approved by the Disciplinary Board. This discipline was based on his conduct in 2003 involving commission of an act reflecting a disregard for the rule of law.

In August, 2003, Mr. Perkins was charged in U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of Washington with the Class C felony offense of Possession of Child Pornography in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 2252A(a)(5)(B), based on his possession of images of child pornography that he obtained via the Internet. In October 2003, Mr. Perkins entered a plea of guilty to and was convicted of the charged offense.

Mr. Perkins's conduct violated RPC 8.4(i), prohibiting a lawyer from committing, inter alia, any act which reflects disregard for the rule of law, whether the same be committed in the course of his or her conduct as a lawyer, or otherwise, and whether the same constitutes a felony or misdemeanor or not.

Anne I. Seidel represented the Bar Association. Mr. Perkins represented himself.

Suspended

Jeffrey G. Poole (WSBA No. 15578, admitted 1986), of Seattle, was suspended for six months, effective January 14, 2006, by order of the Washington State Supreme Court following a hearing. This discipline was based on his conduct in 2001 involving failure to provide an accurate accounting to a client regarding distribution of funds and misrepresentations in the preparation and backdating of an invoice. For additional information, please see In re Discipline of Poole, 156 Wn.2d 196, 125 P.3d 954 (2006).

Starting in 1999, Mr. Poole represented a client with a claim against a corporation for failure to pay for services performed. Following a trial, the superior court ruled in the client's favor. The defendant subsequently paid the judgment balance to Mr. Poole's law firm, which applied the funds in part towards unpaid legal fees and disbursed the remainder to the client. Mr. Poole's office failed to credit the client's account with a $27,675.35 fee payment, instead crediting the account with only a $20,000 payment. Consequently, from February 2001 onward, invoices sent to the client reflected an amount owing of approximately $16,000, which was $7,675.35 in excess of the actual balance. To satisfy the outstanding legal fees, Mr. Poole and the client agreed that the client would work off the remaining balance by performing trench work on a parcel of real property owned by Mr. Poole's limited liability company. Mr. Poole believed that the project would cost no more than $4,500, but he never conveyed that belief to the client.

In May 2001, after the client completed the trench work, he faxed Mr. Poole an invoice for $26,547.98. Deducting the $16,094.43, which the client believed to be the outstanding balance owing, and $500 that Mr. Poole had paid for costs, the client alleged that Mr. Poole owed him $9,953.55 for the completed work. The client also alleged that Mr. Poole was wrongfully withholding a portion of the client's judgment award in his trust account. Unable to resolve the dispute with Mr. Poole, the client recorded a mechanic's lien against Mr. Poole's property for failure to pay for services performed. Mr. Poole filed a motion for order to show cause to declare the mechanic's lien frivolous, asserting that the client had been paid in full when Mr. Poole wrote off the balance owing. The client hired a lawyer to respond to the motion. According to Mr. Poole, at this point he discovered the accounting errors, which he attributed to his bookkeeper. Mr. Poole faxed the lawyer several documents, including an invoice dated May 28, 2001, indicating that a credit had been applied on that date to the client's outstanding balance and that, accordingly, the balance owing was zero. In fact, Mr. Poole had created and then backdated an invoice in October 2001 to appear to be an invoice created in May 2001. Mr. Poole and the client's new lawyer subsequently negotiated a settlement agreement in which Mr. Poole agreed that his firm would pay the client $7,675.35 plus interest, attorney fees, and costs in exchange for the client's release of the lien against the property and a mutual release of all other claims. When Mr. Poole failed to pay in accordance with the settlement agreement, the client commenced a lawsuit. Ultimately, Mr. Poole's firm paid the client $7,675.35 plus interest and between $25,000 and $29,000 for attorney fees and costs.

Mr. Poole's conduct violated RPC 1.14(b)(3), requiring a lawyer to maintain complete records of all funds, securities, and other properties of a client coming into the possession of the lawyer and render appropriate accounts to his or her client regarding them; RPC 3.4(b), prohibiting a lawyer from falsifying evidence; and RPC 8.4(c), prohibiting a lawyer from engaging in conduct involving dishonesty, fraud, deceit or misrepresentation.

Michael D. Hunsinger and Christine Gray represented the Bar Association. Kurt M. Bulmer represented Mr. Poole. Mary H. Wechsler was the hearing officer.

Reprimanded

Timothy P. Coogan (WSBA No. 16508, admitted 1986), of Tacoma, was ordered to receive a reprimand on September 29, 2005, following a stipulation approved by a hearing officer. This discipline was based on his conduct involving lack of diligence, failure to communicate with a client, and failure to refund an unearned fee.

Mr. Coogan represented a client in a reckless-driving case. The client paid Mr. Coogan a $1,000 fee, which was described in the fee agreement as "fully earned non-refundable." During this time period, Mr. Coogan suffered from health problems and was briefly hospitalized. Because his condition was incorrectly diagnosed, Mr. Coogan believed he would recover shortly and be able to represent the client. However, he failed to explain this to the client. At three pre-trial hearings in the client's case, Mr. Coogan arranged for contract lawyers to appear and request continuances. During the representation, the client called and left messages, but he was unable to reach Mr. Coogan, who did not personally return the client's phone calls. After four months, the client hired other counsel and requested a refund of the $1,000 fee paid to Mr. Coogan. Mr. Coogan refunded $250 at that time. Approximately six months after a grievance was filed against him by the client, and over a year after the representation ended, Mr. Coogan refunded the remaining $750.

Mr. Coogan's conduct violated RPC 1.3, requiring a lawyer to act with reasonable diligence and promptness in representing a client; RPC 1.4, requiring a lawyer to keep a client reasonably informed about the status of a matter, to promptly comply with reasonable requests for information, and to explain a matter to the extent reasonably necessary to permit the client to make informed decisions regarding the representation; RPC 1.5(a), requiring a lawyer's fee to be reasonable; and RPC 1.15(d), requiring a lawyer to take steps to the extent reasonably practicable to protect a client's interests upon termination of the representation, including refunding any advance fee payment that has not been earned.

Anne I. Seidel represented the Bar Association. Mr. Coogan represented himself. David B. Condon was the hearing officer.

Reprimanded

L. Eugene Hanson (WSBA No. 3418, admitted 1968), of Goldendale, was ordered to receive a reprimand on October 18, 2005, following a stipulation approved by a hearing officer. This discipline was based on his conduct between 1997 and 2005 involving lack of diligence, failure to communicate with a client, and trust-account irregularities.

In 1996, Mr. Hanson was hired to handle a real estate matter involving a client seeking assistance with a parcel of property located in White Salmon. At the time, Mr. Hanson maintained offices in both White Salmon and Goldendale. He agreed to take the necessary probate action to establish clear title to the property. Between 1996 and 1997, Mr. Hanson actively worked on the matter, but activity was interrupted in early 1997 when out-of-state witnesses failed to sign and return necessary affidavits.

Later in 1997, Mr. Hanson closed his White Salmon office, consolidating it into the Goldendale office. At that time, the client's file was misplaced with closed files from the White Salmon office. Mr. Hanson took no further action in the case until after the client filed a disciplinary grievance in November 2002. In the interim, the client repeatedly called Mr. Hanson to inquire about the status of the matter. Although Mr. Hanson spoke to the client on some of these occasions, he did not locate the file, take further action on the matter, or properly advise the client as to the status of the matter. After the disciplinary grievance was filed, Mr. Hanson made a thorough search for the missing file and eventually located it. He filed a probate action in March 2003, and concluded the estate in October 2005 by establishing his client's ownership of the property.

Prior to the closure of Mr. Hanson's White Salmon office, $970 of the client's funds were being held in Mr. Hanson's White Salmon trust account. In September 1997, Mr. Hanson transferred the balance of the White Salmon trust account into his Goldendale trust account, including the client's $970. Although Mr. Hanson closed out the client's White Salmon ledger, he failed to open a new client ledger for her in the records of his Goldendale trust account. He has never provided the client with a final accounting of the balance of her trust account funds.

Mr. Hanson subsequently became aware that his combined trust account had an excess of funds. He consulted with his former bookkeeper to determine the reason for the discrepancy. They were unable to ascertain the reason for the excess but suspected that it was related to accounts acquired when Mr. Hanson had assumed the practice of a retiring lawyer. Mr. Hanson drew down the balance of the account so that the bank balance corresponded with what he believed were the client balances. As part of the investigation into the client's grievance, Mr. Hanson agreed to cooperate with an examination of his trust accounts. The WSBA auditor found that the reconciled bank balance exceeded the check register balance by $121.26 (reflecting a series of addition errors), that the client ledger accounts exceeded the reconciled bank balance by $1,793, that there were 20 client ledger accounts (totaling $1,965.93) that appeared to be inactive, and that failing to reconcile the client accounts with the reconciled bank balance had contributed to the account discrepancies. The auditor recommended, among other things, that Mr. Hanson restore the $1,793 to his trust account and seek to locate the clients to whom the $1,965.93 belong. Mr. Hanson agreed to comply with the auditor's recommendations.

Mr. Hanson's conduct violated RPC 1.3, requiring a lawyer to act with reasonable diligence and promptness in representing a client; RPC 1.4(a), requiring a lawyer to keep a client reasonably informed about the status of a matter and promptly comply with reasonable requests for information; RPC 1.14(a), requiring a lawyer to deposit all client funds into one or more identifiable interest-bearing trust accounts; and RPC 1.14(b)(3), requiring a lawyer to maintain complete records of all funds, securities, and other properties of a client coming into the lawyer's possession and render appropriate accounts to the client regarding them.

Randy V. Beitel represented the Bar Association. Mr. Hanson represented himself. David A. Thorner was the hearing officer.

Reprimanded

Margaret A. Milnes (WSBA No. 15200, admitted 1985), of Talent, Oregon, was ordered to receive a reprimand on October 11, 2005, following a hearing. This discipline was based on her conduct in 2003 and 2004 involving lack of diligence and failure to adequately communicate with a client.

Ms. Milnes was hired by a guardian to represent a client in a discrimination case under a contingent fee arrangement. In July 2003, the case settled for $1,500, plus $750 for appointment of a guardian ad litem to approve the settlement. Ms. Milnes then moved to Oregon, but did not advise the client's guardian of the move or provide the adverse party's lawyer with her Oregon mailing address. In October 2003, Ms. Milnes sent the client's guardian an e-mail saying that she was behind on approving the settlement stipulation and that a guardian ad litem needed to be appointed. A guardian ad litem was appointed in late October 2003, but the guardian ad litem had trouble reaching Ms. Milnes, as did the lawyer for the adverse party. Ms. Milnes subsequently telephoned the client's guardian to tell her that another lawyer would complete the settlement, but she provided no contact information for this other lawyer or for herself, nor did she arrange for other counsel to represent the client. In February 2004, the client's guardian attempted to visit Ms. Milnes at her Washington office but discovered that it was closed with no forwarding address. The client's settlement was not finalized until March 2005.

Ms. Milnes's conduct violated RPC 1.3, requiring a lawyer to act with reasonable diligence and promptness in representing a client; and RPC 1.4(a), requiring a lawyer to keep a client reasonably informed about the status of a matter and to promptly comply with reasonable requests for information.

Nancy B. Miller represented the Bar Association. Ms. Milnes represented herself. Robert Hardy was the hearing officer.

Admonished

Matthew J. Rusnak (WSBA No. 28671, admitted 1998), of Vaughn, was admonished by a review committee of the Disciplinary Board. The admonition was based on his conduct in 2004 involving failure to communicate with a client.

Mr. Rusnak represented a client who was sentenced in a criminal matter in May 2004. Mr. Rusnak failed to send to the client a copy of the judgment and sentence until January 2005, after a grievance was filed.

Mr. Rusnak's conduct violated RPC 1.4(a), requiring a lawyer to keep a client reasonably informed about the status of a matter.

Fuchsia C. Dulan represented the Bar Association. Leland G. Ripley represented Mr. Rusnak.

Non-Disciplinary Notice

Suspended Pending Outcome of Disciplinary Proceedings

F. Dale Jurdy (WSBA No. 16030, admitted 1986), of Spokane, was suspended pending the outcome of disciplinary proceedings, pursuant to ELC 7.1, effective March 16, 2006, by an order of the Washington State Supreme Court. This is not a disciplinary action.