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May 2007These notices of imposition of disciplinary sanctions and actions are published pursuant to Rule 3.5(d) of the Washington State Supreme Court Rules for Enforcement of Lawyer Conduct, and pursuant to the February 18, 1995, policy statement of the WSBA Board of Governors. For a complete copy of any disciplinary decision, call the Washington State Disciplinary Board at 206-733-5926, leaving the case name, and your name and address. Disbarred Dennis F. Olsen (WSBA No. 22519, admitted 1993), formerly of Everett, was disbarred, effective September 19, 2006, by order of the Washington State Supreme Court following a hearing. This discipline was based on his conduct between 2000 and 2004 involving violation of state and federal tax laws, dishonesty, lack of competence, lack of diligence, failure to communicate with a client, failure to expedite litigation, and failure to cooperate with a disciplinary investigation. Matter 1: Commencing in 1999, Mr. Olsen was a principal in a succession of law firms that operated a multi-state, low-cost bankruptcy practice. The firm hired local lawyers to practice within the jurisdictions of their respective bar admissions. In 2001, after suffering financial losses in the bankruptcy venture, Mr. Olsen terminated the employment of a firm lawyer working in Portland, Oregon. The lawyer agreed to handle the firm’s Oregon cases if he had either met or provided representation to the client. When the lawyer refused to take over the representation of a client with whom he had had no contact, an argument ensued. During the argument, Mr. Olsen threatened that he would not pay taxes withheld from the lawyer’s paychecks. As a result, the lawyer filed a grievance with the Bar Association. The lawyer did not receive a 2001 W-2 within the statutory time limit. After requesting that the firm provide him a W-2 for his 2001 earnings, the lawyer belatedly received a W-2 on which the employer was identified as a defunct predecessor firm and that reflected an invalid employer tax ID number and an incorrect employer address. A second W-2 was later issued for 2001, reflecting all of the tax withholding deductions from the lawyer’s 2001 pay and the correct employer information. During the ensuing disciplinary hearing, Mr. Olsen admitted that he had not paid state or federal tax authorities the taxes withheld from the lawyer’s salary in 2000 or 2001, and that he had not refunded the withheld money to the lawyer. The funds withheld totaled at least $11,398.70. Mr. Olsen also admitted to having filed amended returns that claimed under penalty of perjury that he had paid the lawyer the full amount of his gross wages when, in fact, withholding had occurred. These additional amended returns were filed by Mr. Olsen and submitted to the Bar Association in an attempt to mislead the Bar Association in its investigation. Matter 2: On April 7, 2000, Mr. Olsen met with and agreed to represent a client in an immigration matter for a $1,500 fee. In March 2000, the Board of Immigration Appeals had affirmed an immigration judge’s denial of the client’s asylum application and issued a deportation order. The Northwest Immigrant Rights Project, which had been assisting the client through a volunteer lawyer, explained the client’s options in a letter dated March 30, 2000. The letter advised the client that although a notice of appeal to the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals had been filed, the volunteer lawyer would no longer be available to assist the client. Other options mentioned in the letter included filing a motion to reopen a previous I-485 petition (application to register permanent residence or adjust status), or a motion to reopen the asylum application. The agreed purpose for the representation was for Mr. Olsen to seek an adjustment of the client’s immigration status and to assist him in obtaining a green card. Mr. Olsen did not prepare a fee agreement or any description of his duties. At the initial meeting, the client paid Mr. Olsen $750 and gave him a copy of his file, which included copies of previously filed pro se petitions and applications, as well the March 30 letter from the Northwest Immigrant Rights Project. After undertaking the representation, Mr. Olsen did not take any steps to obtain the client’s INS file, to review the BIA legal files or any other public files, or to discern the action that needed to be undertaken prior to the expiration of the time to bring a motion to reopen. No motion to reopen was ever filed by Mr. Olsen, despite having had almost two months between the date hired and the deadline for filing the motion. In January 2000, the client paid Mr. Olsen $800. Mr. Olsen completed and filed a second I-485 application and had the client pay a second I-485 penalty fee of $1,000. This second application was a useless act, since the application would not be adjudicated unless and until the client’s immigration application had been reopened by motion, and Mr. Olsen had already allowed the time to bring such a motion to pass. Additionally, the application contained several significant errors, including the incorrect assertions that the client was not married and that the client was not involved in a deportation proceeding. After filing the second I-485 application, Mr. Olsen failed to do any legal work on behalf of the client during the next eight months he represented him, and he had little or no contact with the client. The client was subsequently referred to another immigration lawyer, who accepted the case on a pro bono basis and promptly moved to reopen the asylum issue based on the fact that the client had not received effective assistance of counsel from Mr. Olsen. After reviewing the facts surrounding Mr. Olsen’s representation, INS agreed to a joint motion to reopen the earlier denial of the first I-485 application. Matter 3: During the disciplinary investigations and proceeding arising from the above-described matters, Mr. Olsen engaged in a pattern of knowingly and willfully failing to comply with Bar Association requests for information and documents and the hearing officer’s orders regarding compliance. Mr. Olsen’s conduct violated RPC 1.1, requiring a lawyer to provide competent representation to a client; RPC 1.3, requiring a lawyer to act with reasonable diligence and promptness in representing a client; RPC 1.4, requiring a lawyer to keep a client reasonably informed about the status of a matter, promptly comply with reasonable requests for information, and explain a matter to the extent reasonably necessary to permit the client to make informed decisions regarding the representation; RPC 3.2, requiring a lawyer to make reasonable efforts to expedite litigation consistent with the interest of the client; RPC 8.4(b), prohibiting a lawyer from committing a criminal act (here, violation of federal and Oregon state tax laws, and theft) that reflects adversely on the lawyer’s honesty, trustworthiness, or fitness as a lawyer in other respects; RPC 8.4(c), prohibiting a lawyer from engaging in conduct involving dishonesty, fraud, deceit, or misrepresentation; RPC 8.4(i), prohibiting a lawyer from committing any act involving moral turpitude, or corruption, or any unjustified act of assault or other act which reflects disregard for the rule of law; and RPC 8.4(l), prohibiting a lawyer from violating a duty or sanction imposed by or under the Rules for Enforcement of Lawyer Conduct (here, ELC 1.5; 5.3(e)(4); 5.5(c); 10.11(g); and 10.13(e)). Marsha A. Matsumoto and Debra J. Slater represented the Bar Association. Michael S. Cullen and Leland G. Ripley represented Mr. Olsen. Donald W. Carter was the hearing officer. Disbarred Bernie W. Potter (WSBA No. 23076, admitted 1993), of Seattle, was disbarred, effective November 13, 2006, by order of the Washington State Supreme Court following a default hearing. This discipline was based on his conduct in seven personal-injury matters. Between 2000 and 2004, Mr. Potter engaged in the following conduct that established grounds for discipline: • Converting and misappropriating client funds. Mr. Potter’s conduct violated RPC 1.3, requiring a lawyer to act with reasonable diligence and promptness in representing a client; RPC 1.4, requiring a lawyer to keep a client reasonably informed about the status of a matter, promptly comply with reasonable requests for information, and explain a matter to the extent reasonably necessary to permit the client to make informed decisions regarding the representation; RPC 1.14(a), requiring that all funds of clients paid to a lawyer or law firm be deposited into one or more identifiable interest-bearing trust accounts and no funds of the lawyer be deposited therein; RPC 1.14(b)(1), requiring a lawyer to promptly notify a client of the receipt of his or her funds, securities, or other properties; RPC 1.14(b)(3), requiring a lawyer to maintain complete records of all funds, securities, and other properties of a client coming into possession of the lawyer and render appropriate accounts to his or her client regarding them; RPC 1.14(b)(4), requiring a lawyer to promptly pay or deliver to the client as requested by a client the funds, securities, or other properties in the possession of the lawyer which the client is entitled to receive; RPC 3.3(a)(1), prohibiting a lawyer from making a false statement of material fact or law to a tribunal; RPC 4.1(a), prohibiting a lawyer from making a false statement of material fact or law to a third person; RPC 8.4(b), prohibiting a lawyer from committing a criminal act (here, theft and unlawful issuance of a bank check) that reflects adversely on the lawyer’s honesty, trustworthiness, or fitness as a lawyer in other respects; RPC 8.4(c), prohibiting a lawyer from engaging in conduct involving dishonesty, fraud, deceit, or misrepresentation; RPC 8.4(d), prohibiting a lawyer from engaging in conduct prejudicial to the administration of justice; and RPC 8.4(l), prohibiting a lawyer from violating a duty or sanction imposed by or under the Rules for Enforcement of Lawyer Conduct (here, ELC 1.5, 5.3(e), and 14.1). M. Craig Bray represented the Bar Association. Mr. Potter did not appear either in person or through counsel. Marc L. Silverman was the hearing officer. Suspended Richard H. Corbin (WSBA No. 26665, admitted 1997) of Everett, was suspended for two years, effective January 16, 2007, by order of the Washington State Supreme Court following a stipulation approved by the Disciplinary Board. This discipline was based on his conduct between 2004 and 2005 in three matters involving failure to communicate with clients, trust account irregularities, failure to protect a client’s interests following termination of representation, misrepresentations to clients, conduct prejudicial to the administration of justice, and non-cooperation with a disciplinary investigation. Matter 1: Mr. Corbin prepared a will for a client. The client died in 2004. The client’s daughter (Child A) provided Mr. Corbin with original documents. She told Mr. Corbin that her brother (Child B) was the estate executor and should be contacted regarding billing. Mr. Corbin agreed to do so, estimating that the probate would take about six months. Over the next few months, Child A attempted to contact Mr. Corbin. He did not respond until November 2004, when he called to say the probate had not been filed because he had not been paid. During this time, Mr. Corbin never communicated with Child B, except to send him a copy of the will. In November 2004, Child A gave Mr. Corbin a check for $1,500, which Mr. Corbin cashed. Over the next few months, Child A and Child B left numerous voicemail and e-mail messages for Mr. Corbin, but were never able to speak to him directly. In both January and April 2005, Mr. Corbin left messages on Child A’s voicemail informing her that the probate would be taken care of in a few weeks. In fact, Mr. Corbin had not filed the probate and his representations about the status of the probate were untrue. After Child B filed a grievance with the Bar Association, Mr. Corbin left him a message asking if he or his sister was the executor (something they had told him many times) and for a list of his mother’s creditors (which Child A had previously provided). Child B responded promptly and tried repeatedly to contact Mr. Corbin, but was unable to reach him. Occasionally, Mr. Corbin would leave a message stating he was working on the case and that things were progressing well. In August 2005, the Supreme Court suspended Mr. Corbin for nonpayment of dues. At that time, Mr. Corbin had still not filed the probate, nor had he refunded any legal fees or returned any original documents to Child A or Child B. Child B hired a new lawyer, who attempted to contact Mr. Corbin. Mr. Corbin failed to respond or turn over the original documents. As a result, the estate incurred additional fees because the new lawyer had to file the probate documents using duplicates attested to by witnesses of the original will. Subsequently, Mr. Corbin’s family refunded Child A and Child B the $1,500 in legal fees paid to Mr. Corbin. Matter 2: In 2004, Mr. Corbin was hired to assist a client with estate planning for her parents. In Mr. Corbin’s office, the client signed a quitclaim deed as attorney in fact for her mother, who was affected by Alzheimer’s disease, but Mr. Corbin did not record it. The client also provided Mr. Corbin with a spousal agreement signed by her parents and a durable power of attorney. In April 2005, the client’s father died and she became executor of his estate. The client tried many times to communicate with Mr. Corbin to obtain her original documents. The client subsequently hired a new lawyer, who tried to communicate multiple times with Mr. Corbin. Occasionally, Mr. Corbin would leave voicemail messages indicating that he had received the calls, but he did not return the client’s documents. The new lawyer ultimately filed a petition with the superior court seeking an order requiring Mr. Corbin to return the client’s original documents. The court issued a citation for Mr. Corbin to appear at a show cause hearing. Mr. Corbin did not appear. The court issued a second citation directing Mr. Corbin to appear at a hearing with the documents and show cause why he should not be required to pay the client’s legal fees. Mr. Corbin did not appear. The court found Mr. Corbin in contempt and issued a bench warrant. The client’s new lawyer proceeded with the probate based on the available documentation, resulting in additional expense to the client. The Bar Association subsequently obtained the client’s file and provided it to her, at which time the bench warrant was quashed. Mr. Corbin entered into a stipulated judgment to pay the client $8,803.15 in restitution. Mr. Corbin satisfied the judgment. Matter 3: In April 2004, clients hired Mr. Corbin to file an offer and compromise with the IRS because they owed back taxes. They paid Mr. Corbin $1,500. Over the next 18 months, the clients repeatedly tried to reach Mr. Corbin by phone, in person, and through letters. Mr. Corbin responded only once, stating he had family problems and would attend to their case promptly. Because Mr. Corbin failed to take any action on the clients’ behalf, the IRS began garnishing one of the client’s monthly Social Security disability payments. The clients needed original papers in Mr. Corbin’s possession in order to address the garnishment issue, but they were unable to retrieve them from him. The clients eventually hired a tax professional, who wrote to Mr. Corbin to request the client file and a refund of the fee. Mr. Corbin did not respond. The Bar Association subsequently obtained the file and provided it to the clients. Mr. Corbin’s family refunded the $1,500 fee. After failing to promptly respond to the grievances that arose out of the above-described matters and failing to appear at a deposition as required by subpoena, Mr. Corbin was suspended by the Supreme Court for failure to cooperate with the disciplinary investigation. Mr. Corbin’s conduct violated RPC 1.3, requiring a lawyer to act with reasonable diligence and promptness in representing a client; RPC 1.4(a), requiring a lawyer to keep a client reasonably informed about the status of a matter and promptly comply with reasonable requests for information; RPC 1.4(b), requiring a lawyer to explain a matter to the extent reasonably necessary to permit the client to make informed decisions regarding the representation; RPC 1.14(b)(3), requiring a lawyer to maintain complete records of all funds, securities, and other properties of a client coming into the possession of the lawyer and render appropriate accounts to his or her client regarding them; RPC 1.15(d), requiring a lawyer to take steps to the extent reasonably practicable to protect a client’s interests, such as, inter alia, surrendering papers and property to which the client is entitled; RPC 8.4(c), prohibiting a lawyer from engaging in conduct involving dishonesty, fraud, deceit, or misrepresentation; RPC 8.4(d), prohibiting a lawyer from engaging in conduct that is prejudicial to the administration of justice; and RPC 8.4(l), prohibiting a lawyer from violating a duty or sanction imposed by or under the Rules for Enforcement of Lawyer Conduct in connection with a disciplinary matter (here, ELC 5.3(e)). Joanne S. Abelson represented the Bar Association. Leland G. Ripley represented Mr. Corbin. Suspended F. Dale Jurdy (WSBA No. 16030, admitted 1986), of Spokane, was suspended from the practice of law for 18 months, effective September 21, 2006, by order of the Washington State Supreme Court following a default hearing. This discipline was based on his conduct involving violations of the Uniform Controlled Substances Act. In September 2005, Mr. Jurdy pleaded guilty in Spokane County Superior Court to three counts of possession of a controlled substance (cocaine) in violation of RCW 69.50.4013(1). Mr. Jurdy’s conduct violated RPC 8.4(b), prohibiting a lawyer from committing a criminal act that reflects adversely on the lawyer’s honesty, trustworthiness, or fitness as a lawyer in other respects; RPC 8.4(d), prohibiting a lawyer from engaging in conduct that is prejudicial to the administration of justice; and RPC 8.4(i), prohibiting a lawyer from committing any act involving moral turpitude, or corruption, or any unjustified act of assault or other act which reflects disregard for the rule of law, whether the same be committed in the course of his or her conduct as a lawyer, or otherwise, and whether the same constitutes a felony or misdemeanor or not. Nancy Bickford Miller represented the Bar Association. Mr. Jurdy did not appear either in person or through counsel. Michael J. Pettit was the hearing officer. Suspended Richard W. Swanson (WSBA No. 4777, admitted 1972), of Marysville, was suspended for three months, effective January 16, 2007, by order of the Washington State Supreme Court following a stipulation approved by the Disciplinary Board. This discipline was based on his conduct in 2004 and 2005 involving lack of diligence, failure to communicate with a client, and failure to expedite litigation. Richard W. Swanson is to be distinguished from Richard S. Swanson of Des Moines. Mr. Swanson was hired by a client to represent her in connection with related claims against one party for slander and against another party for sexual harassment. Mr. Swanson agreed to handle both matters on a contingent-fee basis. In June 2002, Mr. Swanson commenced the lawsuit for slander. He and the lawyer for the opposing party engaged in settlement negotiations. At one point, they believed they had reached a settlement, but the client changed her mind on some of the terms and, consequently, the matter was not settled. Mr. Swanson sought to resolve the matter through arbitration. The dates of the arbitration were continued several times. After the parties failed to effectuate a settlement and the arbitration was continued, Mr. Swanson did not diligently pursue the client’s claim. In March 2004, Mr. Swanson received a notice of dismissal for want of prosecution issued by the court clerk indicating that the case would be dismissed unless action was taken within 30 days. Mr. Swanson prepared an application to continue the matter as pending so that the case would not be dismissed, but he neglected to timely file the application within the 30-day deadline. His client’s lawsuit was dismissed. Mr. Swanson was informed about the dismissal, but he took no corrective action or measures to vacate the dismissal or refile the lawsuit. He did not inform his client that her lawsuit was dismissed. In July 2004, Mr. Swanson commenced a sexual harassment lawsuit on behalf of the same client against a business and its principal owner. Unbeknownst to Mr. Swanson, the business was owned and operated by a limited liability company (LLC). Mr. Swanson failed to diligently ascertain the correct corporate entity to sue when he filed the lawsuit. In October 2004, Mr. Swanson received a “confidential investigation report” identifying the LLC as the business’s owner, but he negligently failed to take action to add the LLC as a party to the lawsuit. After commencing the lawsuit against the business and its principal owner, Mr. Swanson failed to diligently pursue his client’s claim and did not conduct any discovery against the defendants. In December 2004, Mr. Swanson sent the client a copy of a letter from the defendant’s lawyer that included statements referencing the dismissed slander case. The client sent several letters to Mr. Swanson asking him to explain these statements, but her inquiries were disregarded. In May 2005, the client was deposed by the defendants. During the deposition, the defendants’ lawyer asked the client about the reason the slander lawsuit was dismissed. At that time, Mr. Swanson informed his client that her slander lawsuit had been “dropped” and that he would explain it to her after the deposition. Mr. Swanson later avoided his client and did not explain what had happened. After the deposition, the client repeatedly attempted to reach Mr. Swanson by telephone and letter to inquire about both the slander and the sexual harassment lawsuits. Mr. Swanson did not respond to her messages or to her letters. In June 2005, the defendants made an offer to settle the lawsuit for $5,000, which Mr. Swanson forwarded to his client. In July, the defendants filed a summary judgment motion, arguing that (1) the owner did not have personal knowledge of the sexual harassment, and (2) the client did not sue the correct entity by suing the business and could not pierce the corporate veil to establish liability against the owner personally. Mr. Swanson did not timely and diligently respond to the motion. He obtained a continuance, but was required to pay an $850 sanction. Mr. Swanson paid the sanction personally. Mr. Swanson subsequently filed a response to the summary judgment motion, but it was inadequate because it did not include any supporting declarations. In August 2005, the client sent Mr. Swanson a letter inquiring about settling the case and whether to make a counteroffer. Mr. Swanson received the letter but did not reply to it. In September, the court granted summary judgment and dismissed the client’s lawsuit. A few days later, the client wrote a letter to Mr. Swanson directing him to accept the $5,000 offer from the defendants. The client then contacted Mr. Swanson’s office and spoke to his legal assistant, who informed her about the dismissal of the case. Mr. Swanson’s conduct violated RPC 1.3, requiring a lawyer to act with reasonable diligence and promptness in representing a client; RPC 1.4(a), requiring a lawyer to keep a client reasonably informed about the status of a matter and promptly comply with reasonable requests for information; RPC 1.4(b), requiring a lawyer to explain a matter to the extent reasonably necessary to permit the client to make informed decisions regarding the representation; and RPC 3.2, requiring a lawyer to make reasonable efforts to expedite litigation consistent with the interests of the client. Jonathan H. Burke represented the Bar Association. Mr. Swanson represented himself. Andrekita Silva was the hearing officer. Suspended Sandra M. Zupanski (WSBA No. 23508, admitted 1994), of Seattle, was suspended for three years, effective November 14, 2006, by order of the Washington State Supreme Court following a stipulation approved by the Disciplinary Board. This discipline was based on her conduct between 1996 and 2005 involving trust-account irregularities, misrepresentations to clients, false statements in connection with a disciplinary investigation, and failure to cooperate with a disciplinary investigation. From July 1996 through August 2005, Ms. Zupanski maintained an IOLTA trust account and was solely responsible for maintaining her trust-account records. During this period, Ms. Zupanski used only a handwritten check register to keep track of trust-account funds and did not record all the transactions in the register. Many of the recorded transactions were incomplete, did not indicate a client matter, or were illegible. Ms. Zupanski wrote approximately 230 checks to herself with no client referenced on either the check or the check register. For most of this time period, Ms. Zupanski did not keep a running balance on her check register. She did not maintain client ledgers, did not reconcile her IOLTA checkbook register to the bank statements, and kept only some of the bank statements she received for her trust account. On approximately 46 separate occasions, Ms. Zupanski deposited her own funds into the trust account. She either deposited into the trust account or failed to promptly remove approximately $85,475 in earned fees. For a substantial period of time, Ms. Zupanski did not have any bank accounts other than her trust account. Ms. Zupanski repeatedly used the trust account to pay for personal expenses and arranged for automatic monthly deductions for personal expenses. Between 1999 and 2005, Ms. Zupanski represented a client in connection with a Labor and Industries (L&I) claim. The agreed-upon fee entitled Ms. Zupanski to 10 percent of each time-loss payment. The remaining 90 percent of each time-loss payment belonged to the client. Ms. Zupanski failed to pay the client his share in a timely fashion and did not pay the client his share of 16 L&I payments, totaling $10,157.01. Between September 2001 and August 2002, Ms. Zupanski indicated on the client’s checks a time-loss period earlier than that of the most recent L&I check she had received. In August 2002, Ms. Zupanski was over two months behind in her payments to the client and, in a letter, made misrepresentations to the client about the status of the funds in her possession. Between 1998 and 2000, Ms. Zupanski settled personal-injury matters for three clients. Settlement statements in each matter reflected that funds would be withheld to reimburse third-party creditors. The checks Ms. Zupanski sent to the third parties were for amounts less than what was listed on the settlement statements. Ms. Zupanski did not pay the clients in each of these matters the full difference between the amount reflected in the settlement statements and the amount actually paid to the third party. In a statement submitted to the Bar Association, Ms. Zupanski falsely stated that she had used non-trust-account funds to reimburse one of the clients for the difference between the amount withheld and the amount paid to the third party. In August 2005, the Bar Association deposed Ms. Zupanski in connection with a trust-account overdraft notice. Ms. Zupanski did not timely provide all the information or documents requested by disciplinary counsel. Ms. Zupanski’s conduct violated RPC 1.4(b), requiring a lawyer to explain a matter to the extent reasonably necessary to permit the client to make informed decisions regarding the representation; RPC 1.14(a), requiring that all funds of clients paid to a lawyer or law firm, including advances for costs and expenses, be deposited in one or more identifiable interest-bearing trust accounts and that no funds belonging to the lawyer or law firm be deposited therein; RPC 1.14(b)(1), requiring a lawyer to promptly notify a client of the receipt of his or her funds, securities, or other properties; RPC 1.14(b)(3), requiring a lawyer to maintain complete records of all funds, securities, and other properties of a client coming into the possession of the lawyer and render appropriate accounts to his or her client regarding them; RPC 1.14(b)(4), requiring a lawyer to promptly pay or deliver to the client as requested by a client the funds, securities, or other properties to which the client is entitled to receive, RPC 8.4(c), prohibiting a lawyer from engaging in conduct involving dishonesty, fraud, deceit, or misrepresentation; and RPC 8.4(l), prohibiting a lawyer from violating a duty or sanction imposed by or under the Rules for Enforcement of Lawyer Conduct in connection with a disciplinary matter (here, ELC 5.3). Anne I. Seidel represented the Bar Association. Leland G. Ripley represented Ms. Zupanski. Reprimanded Mary L. Fenili (WSBA No. 13725, admitted 1983), of Denver, Colorado, was ordered to receive a reprimand on September 14, 2006, by the Washington State Supreme Court imposing reciprocal discipline in accordance with an order of the Supreme Court of the State of Colorado. This discipline was based on her 2006 misdemeanor conviction in Colorado of first-degree official misconduct. For more information, see The Colorado Lawyer, Vol. 35, No. 9, Summaries of Disciplinary Opinions (September 2006), available at www.cobar.org/tcl/tcl_articles.cfm?ArticleID=4746. Ms. Fenili’s conduct violated Colorado RPC 8.4(b), prohibiting a lawyer from committing a criminal act that reflects adversely on the lawyer’s honesty, trustworthiness, or fitness as a lawyer in other respects. Felice P. Congalton represented the Bar Association. Ms. Fenili was not represented by counsel. Reprimanded Joe Wickersham (WSBA No. 18816, admitted 1989), of Renton, was ordered to receive a reprimand on September 21, 2006, following a stipulation approved by a hearing officer. This discipline was based on his conduct in 2005 involving an unreasonable fee and a prohibited division of fee. In January 2005, Mr. Wickersham agreed to represent a defendant in three criminal cases pending in municipal court. Mr. Wickersham was hired by the defendant’s father, who signed a fee agreement indicating that Mr. Wickersham was to be paid a total of $5,000 for the representation. The defendant’s father paid $1,500 that day. The fee agreement indicated the remaining $3,500 was to be paid within 30 days and included the following relevant paragraphs: 1. The Client hires the Attorney [Law Office of Joe Wickersham] and have [sic] entered into a contract wherein the Client has agreed to pay the attorney $5,000 for Des Moines DV charges – 3. If the case proceeds to Jury/Bench Trial, including the preparation and appearing at court on day of trial, an additional fee of $350.00 per hour will be charged . . . . Enclosed is a check in the amount of $500.00 for your representation of [defendant’s] three Des Moines DV matters. The surrogate lawyer was unaware of the specifics of the fee agreement between Mr. Wickersham and the defendant’s father. She understood that she was representing the defendant up to trial for $500 and could bill him for additional fees if a case went to trial. Mr. Wickersham never spoke with the defendant and the defendant’s father about this arrangement, did not assume joint responsibility for representation of the defendant, and did not perform any duties on the defendant’s behalf. Nonetheless, Mr. Wickersham kept $1,000 of the original fee payment. Mr. Wickersham’s office sought payment of the remaining $3,500 from the defendant’s father by sending him monthly amount-due notices. Mr. Wickersham was not aware that his staff was sending these bills. The surrogate lawyer continued to represent the defendant until June 2005, when another lawyer substituted for her. Subsequently, a public defender was appointed to represent the defendant. Mr. Wickersham’s conduct violated RPC 1.5(a), requiring that a lawyer’s fee be reasonable; and RPC 1.5(e)(2), allowing a division of fees between lawyers who are not in the same firm to be made only if the division is in proportion to the services provided by each lawyer or, by written agreement with the client, each lawyer assumes joint responsibility for the representation, the client is advised of and does not object to the participation of all the lawyers involved, and the total fee is reasonable. M. Craig Bray represented the Bar Association. Mr. Wickersham represented himself. William J. Murphy was the hearing officer. |
