May 2009
Disciplinary Notices
These notices of imposition of disciplinary sanctions and actions are published pursuant to Rule 3.5(d) of the Washington State Supreme Court Rules for Enforcement of Lawyer Conduct, and pursuant to the February 18, 1995, policy statement of the WSBA Board of Governors. For a complete copy of any disciplinary decision, call the Washington State Disciplinary Board at 206-733-5926, leaving the case name, and your name and address.
NOTE: Approximately 30,000 persons are eligible to practice law in Washington state. Some of them share the same or similar names. Bar News strives to include a clarification whenever an attorney listed in the Disciplinary Notices has the same name as another WSBA member; however, all discipline reports should be read carefully for names, cities, and bar numbers.
Disbarred
Darrell W. Marshall (WSBA No. 21600, admitted 1992), of SeaTac, was disbarred, effective November 12, 2008, by order of the Washington State Supreme Court following a default hearing by the Disciplinary Board. This discipline is based on conduct involving repeated violations of criminal laws, failure to act with reasonable diligence, failure to communicate, charging unreasonable fees, failure to refund unearned fees, and failure to cooperate in a disciplinary investigation.
Criminal-Law-Related Conduct: From the period of June 2002 to December 2006, Mr. Marshall was repeatedly involved in criminal proceedings in various district and municipal courts. In June 2002, he was charged with driving under the influence, hit-and-run with property damage, and assault in violation of the Seattle Municipal Code. Mr. Marshall was found guilty on all three counts. The court sentenced him to a 60-day suspended sentence and placed Mr. Marshall on probation, the conditions of which required that he maintain law-abiding behavior and that he have no alcohol- or drug-related violations. Mr. Marshall was twice sentenced to serve jail time for violating these terms. In July 2003, he was charged with violations of RCW 46.61.502 (driving under the influence) and RCW 46.20.342 (driving with a suspended license). In April 2004, Mr. Marshall pleaded guilty and was sentenced to 365 days in jail with 331 days suspended, the conditions of which required that he maintain law-abiding behavior and that he have no alcohol- or drug-related violations.
During the next two years, Mr. Marshall failed to comply with the probation conditions, and the court issued at least four bench warrants for failure to comply and/or appear. In October 2005, Mr. Marshall was charged with violating the Seattle Municipal Code by giving false information to a police officer who had stopped him for suspicion of possessing an open container of alcohol. The charge was later amended to obstructing an officer. Mr. Marshall pleaded guilty and was sentenced to a 24-month suspended sentence and four days in jail with credit for time served. The conditions of the suspension required that he maintain law-abiding behavior and that he have no alcohol- or drug-related violations. In April 2006, Mr. Marshall failed to appear for a review hearing, and a warrant was issued for his arrest. On April 10, 2006, the court revoked three days of the suspended sentence and sentenced him to jail, with credit for time served. In December 2005, Mr. Marshall was charged with violating the Seattle Municipal Code for theft, attempted assault, and false reporting in connection with an incident in which he attempted to shoplift three bottles of wine. Mr. Marshall pleaded guilty to false reporting, and the other charges were dismissed. The court sentenced him to a 24-month suspended sentence and 185 days in jail to run concurrent with any other holds and with credit for time served. In June 2006, Mr. Marshall was charged with violating RCW 9A.88.010 based on an incident in which he removed his clothes in a public park. Mr. Marshall represented himself in this proceeding. He failed to appear for trial on December 5, 2006, as ordered by the court on October 17, 2006. The court issued a warrant for Mr. Marshall’s arrest, which is outstanding.
Client-Representation Conduct: A client hired Mr. Marshall to represent him in a criminal matter and paid Mr. Marshall $800 in three separate installments. Mr. Marshall did not discuss the case with the client, did not provide an accounting of his fees, did not return telephone calls, and did not appear for the readiness hearing. The client appeared without counsel and the court appointed new counsel. Mr. Marshall did not refund the fees.
Failure to Cooperate in Disciplinary Investigation: The Association opened a grievance against Mr. Marshall on September 20, 2006. Disciplinary counsel sent a letter to Mr. Marshall’s address on file with the Association requesting a response to the grievance. The letter was returned as undeliverable. The Association sent a second letter on October 25, 2006, to a new address on file with the Association. This letter was not returned. Mr. Marshall did not respond to the letter. On November 28, 2006, disciplinary counsel sent a 10-day letter by certified mail, seeking a response by December 11, 2006. The letter was returned with a notation that Mr. Marshall had moved and left no forwarding address. Mr. Marshall did not respond to the grievance. The Association’s investigator attempted to make personal contact with Mr. Marshall by seeking him at several addresses on file with the Association and by contacting members of Mr. Marshall’s family. Each attempted contact was unsuccessful. The Association filed a Formal Complaint and Notice to Answer on November 30, 2007. As of the date of the Formal Complaint, all efforts to locate Mr. Marshall had failed.
Mr. Marshall’s conduct violated RPC 1.3, requiring a lawyer to act with reasonable diligence and promptness in representing a client; RPC 1.4, requiring a lawyer to keep a client reasonably informed about the status of a matter; former RPC 8.4(i), prohibiting a lawyer from committing any act which reflects disregard for the rule of law; former RPC 8.4(j), prohibiting a lawyer from willfully disobeying or violating a court order directing him or her to do or cease doing an act which he or she ought in good faith to do or forbear; RPC 8.4(l), prohibiting a lawyer from violating a duty imposed by or under the Rules for Enforcement of Lawyer Conduct (here, ELC 5.3(e)) in connection with a disciplinary matter; RPC 1.16(d), requiring a lawyer, upon termination of representation, to take steps to the extent reasonably practicable to protect a client’s interests, such as refunding any advance payment of fee or expense that has not been earned or incurred.
Joanne S. Abelson represented the Bar Association. Mr. Marshall did not appear either in person or through counsel. Bertha B. Fitzer was the hearing officer.
Suspended
Noel Lerner (WSBA No. 29978, admitted 2000), of Enumclaw, was suspended for six months, effective May 23, 2008, by order of the Washington State Supreme Court. This discipline is based on conduct in two matters involving lack of competent representation, failure to communicate, failure to act with reasonable diligence and make reasonable efforts to expedite litigation, false statements to a tribunal, trust-account irregularities, failure to take steps reasonably necessary to protect clients’ interests, and violations of a court order.
Matter No. 1: Ms. W and her first husband were married in Washington and had four children before dissolving their marriage in another state. Although the children lived with Ms. W at first, she later remarried and lived out of state while the children eventually returned to Washington with her ex-husband. He obtained a default judgment against Ms. W in a Washington court, requiring her to pay a substantial amount of child support and establishing a cumbersome visitation plan.
In December 2003, Ms. W found Ms. Lerner on the Internet and hired her from outside the state to try to modify the Washington support order and visitation. They executed a fee agreement that specified Ms. Lerner would provide itemized bills on a regular basis. Ms. Lerner’s approach was to challenge jurisdiction and nullify the prior court orders and thereby obtain a complete reversal of the custody arrangement, but her client repeatedly stated that her goal at the time was only to modify the orders, rather than disrupt the children’s lives with an abrupt change of custody. At the time, Ms. W was working and the support obligation consumed a large portion of her income; in the course of the representation, she had another child and became unemployed, making the support obligation even more burdensome.
Over a period of eight months, Ms. Lerner filed no pleadings and took no action to further her client’s objectives. She lacked the level of competence necessary to address the jurisdictional issues and ultimately ignored the matter. Meanwhile, Ms. W sent increasingly urgent e-mails inquiring about the status of her case, but received little or no response; when she repeatedly requested an accounting of her fee deposit, she received none.
In August 2004, Ms. Lerner withdrew from Ms. W’s case without informing her client. After Ms. W filed her grievance, Ms. Lerner’s office generated a reconstructed billing statement but she did not send it to her client. She ultimately refunded Ms. W’s fee.
Matter No. 2: Mr. Y was the subject of an administrative action to collect child support based on his having signed an affidavit acknowledging paternity of a child. The child’s mother received financial assistance from the state of Washington, which then instituted proceedings against Mr. Y to recover the amount of that assistance. However, the child’s mother later submitted an affidavit stating that another man, not Mr. Y, was actually the child’s father and was supporting the child.
Mr. Y hired Ms. Lerner to take action to relieve him of the support obligation. When she appeared in the administrative support proceedings on Mr. Y’s behalf, Ms. Lerner was informed that it was not within the jurisdiction of the administrative judge to grant the relief she sought. Ms. Lerner was told that she would first need to petition the Superior Court in order to disestablish Mr. Y’s paternity, and the administrative proceedings were continued to afford Ms. Lerner the opportunity to do so.
For nearly two years, Ms. Lerner obtained numerous continuances based on her false representations to opposing counsel and the administrative court that she was seeking relief in superior court. In the meantime, her client was obligated to continue paying the state installments on the balance it was due. The administrative judge finally ordered Ms. Lerner to provide a declaration as evidence that she had taken action in superior court, but Ms. Lerner failed to comply. By the time she moved to initiate action in superior court, her client had finished paying the Division of Child Support more than the amount it originally sought and the administrative proceedings were closed.
Ms. Lerner’s conduct violated RPC 1.1, requiring a lawyer to provide competent representation to a client; former RPC 1.2(a), requiring a lawyer to abide by a client’s decisions concerning the objectives of representation and to consult with the client as to the means by which they are to be pursued; RPC 1.3, requiring a lawyer to act with reasonable diligence and promptness in representing a client; RPC 3.2, requiring a lawyer to make reasonable efforts to expedite litigation consistent with the interests of the client; RPC 3.3(a)(1), prohibiting a lawyer from making a false statement of material fact or law to a tribunal; RPC 1.4, requiring a lawyer to keep a client reasonably informed about the status of a matter, promptly comply with reasonable requests for information, and explain a matter to the extent reasonably necessary to permit the client to make informed decisions regarding the representation; RPC 1.14(b)(3), requiring a lawyer to maintain complete records of all funds, securities, and other properties of a client coming into the possession of the lawyer and render appropriate accounts to his or her client regarding them; RPC 1.15(d), requiring a lawyer to take steps to the extent reasonably practicable to protect a client’s interests, such as giving reasonable notice to the client; and RPC 8.4(j), prohibiting a lawyer from willfully disobeying or violating a court order directing him or her to do or cease doing an act which he or she ought to do or cease doing in good faith.
Natalea Skvir represented the Bar Association. Kurt M. Bulmer represented Ms. Lerner. Stephen D. Funderburk was the hearing officer.
Suspended
Stephen J. Oelrich (WSBA No. 29263, admitted 1999), of Tacoma, was suspended for three years, effective February 9, 2009, by order of the Washington State Supreme Court. This discipline is based on conduct in six matters involving failure to provide competent representation, failure to abide by clients’ objectives, lack of diligence, failure to communicate, failure to return unearned funds, and conduct involving misrepresentation.
Matter No. 1: In March 2005, Mr. B paid Mr. Oelrich $2,000 to represent him in a child-support modification, to obtain a restraining order against his ex-wife, and to defend him in a contempt action for his alleged failure to pay child support and uninsured medical expenses. Mr. B was in the United States Army stationed in Virginia; he communicated with Mr. Oelrich by e-mail and relied on him to handle matters.
One of Mr. B’s objectives was to obtain a restraining order against his ex-wife to keep her from harassing him at work. Mr. Oelrich drafted a petition and Mr. B signed it. Mr. Oelrich never filed the petition. As a result, when Mr. B’s ex-wife harassed him at work, Mr. B had no recourse. Mr. B’s contempt hearing was originally scheduled for April 2005, but was rescheduled several times and ultimately re-set for June 2005. Mr. Oelrich requested a continuance because he had not completed the necessary paperwork. The court granted the continuance, but ordered a $250 sanction against Mr. B for the delay. Because Mr. B had questions about his case and had spoken to Mr. Oelrich directly on only one occasion, he called Mr. Oelrich’s office almost every day between June 2, 2005, and June 20, 2005. Mr. Oelrich never returned the calls. Mr. Oelrich did not inform Mr. B about the sanction. He then filed Mr. B’s response late, and the court refused to consider it. The court did not find Mr. B in contempt, but made several orders regarding healthcare, daycare costs, and attorney’s fees. The court granted Mr. B a $41-per-month credit for ordinary healthcare costs. The court also ordered that if the mother did not provide documentation of daycare costs to Mr. Oelrich, daycare costs would be immediately reduced. This would have had the effect of reducing Mr. B’s child-support obligation by $134.50 per month. Mr. Oelrich never sent Mr. B a copy of the order and did not adequately explain the impact of the order. Further, he never pursued the reduction in Mr. B’s child-support obligation for the healthcare credit or when the mother failed to provide the required daycare documentation.
In September 2005, Mr. B received a letter from the Division of Child Support (DCS) stating that his paycheck would be garnished for current and past-due support obligations. This did not take into account the daycare adjustment. Mr. B contacted Mr. Oelrich, who assured him that he would take care of it. In October 2005 and December 2005, Mr. B received two more letters from DCS stating that they were going to garnish his wages. Mr. Oelrich took no action on behalf of Mr. B with DCS or in superior court to prevent the garnishment. Mr. Oelrich took no action to follow through with implementing a court-ordered reduction of Mr. B’s child support obligation. During the course of the representation, Mr. Oelrich never responded to Mr. B’s questions and concerns on other matters. Mr. B ultimately hired another lawyer to implement the court’s order and clarify his child-support obligations, but his tax refund was seized and he overpaid healthcare expenses.
Matter No. 2: Mr. H hired Mr. Oelrich to pursue a personal injury case against Clark County on a contingency fee basis for an injury he received while incarcerated. The statute of limitations for this injury was three years and expired on October 30, 2003. Mr. H called Mr. Oelrich numerous times, urging him to file his claim. Mr. Oelrich did not return Mr. H’s calls. In November 2002, Mr. H paid Mr. Oelrich a filing fee of $110 to ensure that his case would be filed within the three-year statute of limitations. Thereafter, Mr. H left messages on Mr. Oelrich’s answering machine urging him to file his claim. Mr. Oelrich did not return Mr. H’s calls. Mr. Oelrich filed a suit against Clark County on June 17, 2004. The suit was filed in Thurston County, which was the wrong venue, according to statute. In addition, the statute of limitations had already expired on the date of filing and Mr. Oelrich did not serve any of the defendants within 90 days of filing his complaint. The defendants brought a motion to dismiss. Mr. Oelrich stated that his failure to serve defendants within 90 days was excusable neglect, due to “a simple act of oversight.” The court rejected Mr. Oelrich’s arguments, and Mr. H’s case was dismissed with prejudice.
Matter No. 3: Mr. F hired Mr. Oelrich to represent him in a child-support-modification action in early June 2005. Mr. F was in the Armed Forces and deployed in Iraq. Mr. F’s main concern was that his child support would increase based on extra pay that he was receiving due to his deployment. Mr. F’s extra pay was scheduled to end in November 2005, when he returned from Iraq. Mr. F wanted to ensure that his child support would not be based on this pay after November 2005. Mr. F and Mr. Oelrich agreed that contact between them would be by e-mail and telephone. Mr. F paid Mr. Oelrich $1,000. The fee agreement provided for an hourly billing rate. The modification hearing was scheduled for June 24, 2005. On that day, Mr. Oelrich e-mailed Mr. F requesting “basic information.” Mr. F responded with the answers and requested that he be notified of the outcome of the hearing. Mr. Oelrich sent Mr. F an e-mail a few days later explaining that the hearing was stricken because ‘’we needed to have more time to respond.” This was the last communication Mr. F had from Mr. Oelrich. The hearing was reset for July 22, 2005. Mr. Oelrich received notice of the new hearing date on June 27, 2005. Mr. Oelrich did not attend the July 22, 2005, hearing or inform Mr. F of the new date. A modification order was entered by default and was mailed to Mr. F by the prosecutor. This order increased Mr. F’s child-support obligation based on his deployment pay. Mr. F tried repeatedly to contact the respondent, without success. Mr. Oelrich did little, if anything to earn his fee on this matter, yet he did not return any of Mr. F’s fees. In August 2005, Mr. F sent additional e-mails and a letter to the respondent requesting information on his case and an accounting of his fees. Mr. Oelrich did not send Mr. F a statement for his services or otherwise account for the $1,000 that Mr. F paid him.
Matter No. 4: Ms. S hired Mr. Oelrich in 2003 to represent her in an employment discrimination lawsuit filed against her former employer and her labor union. On March 3, 2004, the court dismissed Ms. S’s claims following defendants’ motion for summary judgment. On March 26, 2004, Mr. Oelrich filed a Notice of Appeal in the Ninth Circuit. The Court set a briefing schedule that required Mr. Oelrich to file the opening brief by May 18, 2004, and mailed a copy of the order to him. On April 22, 2004, the court issued an order setting an assessment conference for May 21, 2004. Mr. Oelrich received a copy on April 23, 2004. On May 21, 2004, the court entered an order rescheduling the settlement assessment conference to June 22, 2004. Mr. Oelrich received a copy of this order as well. Mr. Oelrich did not attend the conference and did not return telephone messages left by court staff on his answering machine and with his staff.
On June 29, 2004, the court issued an order requiring Mr. Oelrich to file a notice within seven days indicating dates and times he would make himself available for a continuation of the settlement assessment conference. The order warned that failure to comply could result in dismissal of the appeal or sanctions. On July 16, 2004, Ms. S’s appeal was dismissed for failure to prosecute. Mr. Oelrich’s offices received this order on July 19, 2004. Ms. S tried unsuccessfully to reach Mr. Oelrich numerous times. He failed to return her calls. After months of failed attempts, Ms. S finally met with Mr. Oelrich. In his answer to the Bar Association’s complaint, Mr. Oelrich admitted that he told Ms. S that he missed the appeal deadline for her matter because he never received the court’s scheduling order, but stated that this was not a misrepresentation. Ms. S hired Attorney B to review her case. Attorney B determined that, given the court’s attempts to contact Mr. Oelrich, there was little or no chance that they would reinstate Ms. S’s appeal.
Matter No. 5: In September 2003, Mr. and Mrs. N paid Mr. Oelrich $2,000 to represent them in a child-custody-modification action against Mr. N’s ex-wife. After the modification action was filed, Mr. N decided that he wanted to transfer legal custody of his son to his ex-wife. He asked Mr. Oelrich to accomplish this. In December 2003, the ex-wife’s attorney (Lawyer C) set a hearing for December 30, 2003, to enter a final parenting plan. On that day, Mr. Oelrich signed a parenting plan drafted by Lawyer C without discussing it with Mr. N. This plan, while changing the residential time, did not change the designation of custodian to the mother. Mr. Oelrich did not provide Mr. or Mrs. N with a copy of the plan, despite repeated requests. In February 2004, Lawyer C wrote to Mr. Oelrich and informed him that Mr. N had claimed his son as an exemption on his 2003 tax return, in violation of a court order. Lawyer C requested a written assurance that Mr. N would file an amended return or she would bring a contempt action against Mr. N. Mr. Oelrich did not answer Lawyer C’s letter or inform Mr. and Mrs. N of the letter. Had they been informed of Lawyer C’s letter, Mr. and Mrs. N would have filed an amended return to avoid a contempt action.
On February 20, 2004, Lawyer C filed a contempt motion. The hearing was set for March 9, 2004. In support of her motion, Mr. N’s ex-wife described Lawyer C’s attempts to contact Mr. Oelrich. Mr. N was served with an Order to Show Cause a few days before the contempt hearing. Mrs. N called Mr. Oelrich several times, but he did not return her calls. On March 5, 2004, Mr. Oelrich’s assistant told Mrs. N that Mr. Oelrich could not attend the hearing. Mrs. N requested that Mr. Oelrich call her. Mr. Oelrich did not return her call or ask the court to continue the hearing. Mr. N attended the March 9, 2004, hearing and represented himself. At the hearing, Mr. N was held in contempt and ordered to pay attorney’s fees and costs of $195. After failing to obtain a copy of the final parenting plan from Mr. Oelrich, Mrs. N obtained one from Superior Court. It was only then that Mr. and Mrs. N realized that the final plan designated Mr. N as custodian of his son, contrary to his objectives. Mrs. N wrote Mr. Oelrich a letter detailing her complaints. Mr. Oelrich met Mrs. N at a restaurant to give her Mr. N’s file. Mr. Oelrich apologized profusely and blamed Lawyer C for the errors. He promised to remedy the parenting plan. Mrs. N contacted Mr. Oelrich on numerous occasions after that meeting, but Mr. Oelrich failed to return her calls. Mr. and Mrs. N eventually paid another attorney $2,500 to amend the final parenting plan.
Matter No. 6: Mrs. X contacted Mr. Oelrich in 2003 because her mother was preparing to sue her over a loan that Mrs. X’s mother had made to her. Mrs. X asked Mr. Oelrich to assist her in settling the matter. Mr. Oelrich told Mrs. X that he had written a letter and sent it to her mother’s attorney twice, but Mrs. X never received a copy of the letter, despite repeated requests. On July 13, 2003, Mrs. X gave Mr. Oelrich a cashier’s check to send to her mother’s attorney, but Mr. Oelrich never forwarded the check.
On March 2, 2005, Mrs. X’s mother sued Mrs. X and her husband in Pierce County Superior Court. The trial was scheduled for September 14, 2005. Mr. and Mrs. X took leave from work and appeared at the courthouse, but were informed when they arrived that the trial had been cancelled. Mrs. X e-mailed Mr. Oelrich requesting information, but did not receive a response. On September 23, 2005, Mr. Oelrich e-mailed a member of his staff and told her to call Mr. and Mrs. X that day to explain to them that the case had been reset because the opposing attorney had not perfected the case for trial. Mr. Oelrich stated in the e-mail that his office had identified a problem with the e-mail system and this would be explained in a letter he would write to Mr. and Mrs. X. Mr. Oelrich did not send a letter to them. The case against Mr. and Mrs. X was calendared again in the spring of 2006. In an e-mail dated March 1, 2006, Mrs. X specifically asked Mr. Oelrich if he could settle the case without going to trial. Mr. Oelrich did not pursue a settlement.
Between March and June 2006, Mr. Oelrich did not respond to Mrs. X’s frequent calls to his office for updates on the case. The court set a settlement conference for June 8, 2006, but it was re-scheduled at Mrs. X’s request. She met with Mr. Oelrich and asked him again to settle the case. On June 9, 2006, Mr. Oelrich wrote a letter to Mr. and Mrs. X stating that he intended to withdraw. After Mr. Oelrich withdrew, Mrs. X hired another attorney to represent her at the settlement conference. The case settled at the conference after about an hour. Mrs. X has repeatedly requested a copy of her file from Mr. Oelrich, who has not responded.
Mr. Oelrich’s conduct in these six matters violated RPC 1.1., requiring a lawyer to provide competent representation to a client; former RPC 1.2(a), requiring a lawyer to abide by a client’s decisions concerning the objectives of representation and to consult with the client as to the means by which they are to be pursued; RPC 1.3, requiring a lawyer to act with reasonable diligence and promptness in representing a client; former RPC 1.4, requiring a lawyer to keep a client reasonably informed about the status of a matter, promptly comply with reasonable requests for information, and explain a matter to the extent reasonably necessary to permit the client to make informed decisions regarding the representation; former RPC 1.14(b), requiring a lawyer to maintain complete records of client funds and property, and to promptly pay the funds to the client upon request; former RPC 1.15(d), requiring a lawyer to take steps to the extent reasonably practicable to protect a client’s interests, such as surrendering paper and property to which the client is entitled and returning any advance payment of fee that has not been earned; and RPC 8.4(c), prohibiting a lawyer from engaging in co
Francesca D’Angelo represented the Bar Association. Stephen J. Oelrich represented himself, but did not appear for the hearing. William J. Murphy was the hearing officer.
Suspended
Jeffery A. Richard (WSBA No. 28219, admitted 1998), of Seattle, was suspended for one year, effective upon the termination of his current suspension for failure to comply with continuing legal education requirements of APR 11, by order of the Washington State Supreme Court following a default hearing. This discipline is based on conduct involving practicing law while suspended. Jeffery A. Richard is to be distinguished from Jeffrey A. Richards of Bellevue.
On December 7, 2006, Mr. Richard was suspended from the practice of law for failure to comply with his 2003–2005 MCLE requirements. Notice of this suspension was sent to Mr. Richard via certified mail to the address on file with the Bar Association on November 30, 2006. Mr. Richard has remained in suspended status since December 7, 2006, and has never served an affidavit of compliance as required by the rules (ELC 14.3). On February 2, 2007, Mr. Richard filed a Petition to Appeal Ballot Title on behalf of clients in Thurston County Superior Court. On February 16, 2007, Mr. Richard appeared in court and presented argument on behalf of clients. Mr. Richard knew, but did not inform these clients, that his license to practice law was suspended.
On March 2, 2007, the Bar Association opened a grievance against Mr. Richard for practicing law while his license was suspended. By letters dated March 2, 2007, and April 6, 2007, the Bar Association asked Mr. Richard to respond to this grievance. Mr. Richard did not do so.
On March 15, 2007, Mr. Richard billed a client $22,902 for providing legal services from January 1, 2007, through March 15, 2007. Mr. Richard knew, but did not tell the client, that his license to practice law was suspended. On April 16, 2007, Mr. Richard was listed as one of the attorneys for the same clients on a Petition to Appeal Ballot Title filed in Thurston County Superior Court. In support of the petition, Mr. Richard prepared declarations for one of the petitioners and a witness. These declarations had the name and address of Jeffery A. Richard and Associates printed on them. Mr. Richard presented the petitioner and the witness with the declarations for their signature on or about April 6, 2007. Mr. Richard did not inform them that he was no longer an active lawyer.
Mr. Richard’s conduct violated RPC 1.4(b), requiring a lawyer to explain a matter to the extent reasonably necessary to permit the client to make informed decisions regarding the representation; RPC 8.4(b), prohibiting a lawyer from committing a criminal act (here, RCW 2.48.180, unlawful practice of law) that reflects adversely on the lawyer’s honesty, trustworthiness, or fitness as a lawyer in other respects, and RPC 8.4(l), prohibiting a lawyer from violating a duty or sanction imposed by or under the Rules for Enforcement of Lawyer Conduct (here, ELC 5.3(e) and ELC 14.2) in connection with a disciplinary matter.
Francesca D’Angelo represented the Bar Association. Mr. Richard represented himself.
Reprimanded
James V. O’Conner (WSBA No. 2826, admitted 1959), of Seattle, was ordered to receive a reprimand on February 9, 2009, following approval of a stipulation by a hearing officer. This discipline was based on conduct involving dishonesty, fraud, deceit, or misrepresentation. James V. O’Conner is to be distinguished from James N. O’Connor of Bainbridge Island and James P. O’Connor of Portland, Oregon.
Mr. O’Conner was a principal of a limited liability mortgage company (Mortgage LLC). During all material times, Mr. O’Conner was not active in managing Mortgage LLC. On December 21, 2006, Mr. O’Conner knowingly notarized the signature of Mr. W on loan documents processed by a Mortgage LLC mortgage processor (Ms. H) without Mr. W being present and without personal knowledge whether Mr. W actually executed the loan documents. One loan document notarized by Mr. O’Conner inaccurately acknowledged that Mr. W “personally appeared before me” on December 21, 2006, and that the document was executed “as their free and voluntary act and deed.” Four other loan documents notarized by Mr. O’Conner inaccurately reflected that the documents were “sworn to and subscribed before” Mr. O’Conner. Although Ms. H was a licensed notary at the time, she did not notarize Mr. W’s signature on the loan documents, because the lender had a policy against having the employee of the mortgage broker acting as the signing agent and notary. Mr. O’Conner agreed to notarize the signatures of Mr. W on the loan documents to prevent the lender from knowing that Ms. H processed the loan and acted as the signing agent. Mr. O’Conner agreed to notarize the loan documents without personal knowledge that Mr. W actually signed them based on Ms. H’s assurance that Mr. W actually signed the documents. Although Mr. W actually signed the loan documents, he subsequently sued Mr. O’Conner, Mortgage LLC, and other parties claiming, among other things, that he was coerced into signing the loan documents. At the time Mr. O’Conner notarized Mr. W’s signature on the loan documents, Mr. O’Conner had no reason to believe that Mr. W was pressured to execute the loan documents. Mr. O’Conner and Mortgage LLC settled the lawsuit and Mr. O’Conner paid Mr. W a substantial monetary settlement.
Mr. O’Conner’s conduct violated RPC 8.4(c), prohibiting a lawyer from engaging in conduct involving dishonesty, fraud, deceit, or misrepresentation.
Jonathan Burke represented the Bar Association. Mr. O’Conner represented himself. Dennis Smith was the hearing officer.
Admonished
Michael J. Cranston (WSBA No. 16122, admitted 1986), of Seattle, was ordered to receive two admonitions on October 17, 2008, by order of a review committee of the Disciplinary Board. This discipline is based on conduct involving trust account irregularities and the unauthorized practice of law.
During January and February 2007, the Bar Association received overdraft notices of Mr. Cranston’s trust account. Also during this time, Mr. Cranston deposited earned fees and non-client funds into his trust account and wrote checks for personal expenses from this account. Mr. Cranston did not keep complete transaction records for his trust account.
On August 20, 2007, the Washington State Supreme Court suspended Mr. Cranston’s license to practice law for failure to comply with the 2004–2006 CLE requirements. Mr. Cranston continued to represent a client in an insurance matter while his license was suspended. During his suspension, he continued to negotiate a settlement between the insurance company and his former client, he sent an e-mail to the insurance company referring to his client, he sent a letter on his law-office letterhead, and he eventually deposited and disbursed the settlement funds from his trust account. Mr. Cranston did not notify the insurance company of his suspension.
Mr. Cranston’s conduct violated RPC 1.15A(h)(1), prohibiting funds belonging to a lawyer to be deposited or retained in a trust account, except funds to pay bank charges, funds belonging in part to a client or third person and in part presently or potentially to the lawyer, or funds necessary to restore appropriate balances; RPC 1.15A(h)(2), requiring a lawyer to keep complete trust account records as required by the rules; RPC 1.15A(h)(5), requiring that all trust account withdrawals be made only to a named payee and not to cash; RPC 1.15B, requiring a lawyer to maintain current trust-account records and listing, at minimum, what the records must include; RPC 5.5, prohibiting a lawyer from practicing law in a jurisdiction in violation of the regulation of the legal profession in that jurisdiction; RPC 5.8(a), prohibiting a lawyer from engaging in the practice of law while on inactive status, or while suspended from the practice of law for any cause, and RPC 8.5(l), prohibiting a lawyer from violating a duty or sanction imposed by or under the Rules for Enforcement of Lawyer Conduct in connection with a disciplinary matter (here, ELC 14.2).
Marsha A. Matsumoto represented the Bar Association. Mr. Cranston represented himself.
