November 2007

These notices of imposition of disciplinary sanctions and actions are published pursuant to Rule 3.5(d) of the Washington State Supreme Court Rules for Enforcement of Lawyer Conduct, and pursuant to the February 18, 1995, policy statement of the WSBA Board of Governors.

For a complete copy of any disciplinary decision, call the Washington State Disciplinary Board at 206-733-5926, leaving the case name, and your name and address.
NOTE: Approximately 30,000 persons are eligible to practice law in Washington state. Some of them share the same or similar names. Bar News strives to include a clarification whenever an attorney listed in the Disciplinary Notices has the same name as another WSBA member; however, all discipline reports should be read carefully for names, cities, and bar numbers.

Resigned in Lieu of Disbarment

Robert Louis Butler (WSBA No. 448, admitted 1958), of Seattle, resigned in lieu of disbarment, effective May 7, 2007. This resignation was based on his conduct between 1996 and 2006 involving failure to complete work in a probate matter, lack of diligence, failure to provide an accounting, failure to deliver estate records to a successor personal representative, failure to comply with court orders, commission of a criminal act, and non-cooperation with a disciplinary investigation. Robert Louis Butler is to be distinguished from Robert David Butler, of Bellingham.

Mr. Butler held a power of attorney for an individual who died in March 1996. In November 1996, Mr. Butler, who was named in the decedent’s will as personal representative, filed a probate petition to be appointed as personal representative for the estate. Between 1996 and 2006, Mr. Butler engaged in the following conduct that established grounds for discipline:

• Failing to complete work on or close the estate in a timely fashion;

• Failing to communicate with a lawyer representing the estate of a beneficiary about the status of the probate;

• Failing to provide a full accounting and the estate file to the lawyer representing the successor personal representative following entry of an order of substitution;

• Failing to comply with a court order requiring Mr. Butler to deliver the estate file to the lawyer representing the successor personal representative;

• Failing to comply with two court orders requiring Mr. Butler to pay $2,625 and $1,575 in attorney’s fees to the lawyer representing the successor personal representative;

• Using a power of attorney to withdraw funds from the decedent’s bank account prior to conversion of the bank account to an estate account and prior to being appointed as personal representative of the estate, and failing to account for $15,000 of those funds in the probate; and

• Failing to respond to a grievance or to cooperate with the Bar Association’s disciplinary investigation.

Mr. Butler’s conduct violated RPC 1.3, requiring a lawyer to act with reasonable diligence and promptness in representing a client; RPC 1.4, requiring a lawyer to keep a client reasonably informed about the status of a matter, promptly comply with reasonable requests for information, and explain a matter to the extent reasonably necessary to permit the client to make informed decisions regarding the representation; former RPC 1.14(b)(3), requiring a lawyer to maintain complete records of all funds, securities, and other properties of a client coming into the possession of the lawyer and to render appropriate accounts to his or her client regarding them; RPC 8.4(b), prohibiting a lawyer from committing a criminal act (here, theft) that reflects adversely on the lawyer’s honesty, trustworthiness, or fitness as a lawyer in other respects; RPC 8.4(i), prohibiting a lawyer from committing any act involving moral turpitude, or corruption, or any unjustified act of assault or other act which reflects disregard for the rule of law; RPC 8.4(j), prohibiting a lawyer from willfully disobeying or violating a court order directing him or her to do or cease doing an act which he or she ought in good faith to do or forbear; and RPC 8.4(l), prohibiting a lawyer from violating a duty or sanction imposed by or under the Rules for Enforcement of Lawyer Conduct in connection with a disciplinary matter (here, ELC 5.3).

Nancy Bickford Miller represented the Bar Association. Mr. Butler represented himself. Craig C. Beles was the hearing officer.

Disbarred

John B. Jackson III (WSBA No. 5208, admitted 1973), of Bremerton, was disbarred, effective April 18, 2007, by order of the Washington State Supreme Court following a stipulation approved by the Disciplinary Board. This discipline was based on his conduct in multiple matters involving unreasonable fees, trust account irregularities, commission of criminal acts, lack of diligence, failure to communicate with clients, and misrepresentation of facts.

Between December 2001 and March 2004, Mr. Jackson engaged in the following conduct that established grounds for discipline:

• Issuing 33 trust account checks disbursing funds which he was not entitled to disburse and without direction or authorization from the clients who owned the funds, thereby constituting the crime of theft in the first degree in violation of RCW 9A.56.030-040;

• Failing to account for the distribution of settlement funds and failing to promptly pay the funds to a client;

• In two matters, failing to pay or promptly pay funds that third parties were entitled to receive;

• Removing $18,605.66 from his trust account in distribution of a client settlement after having deposited only $17,000 of the client’s funds into the trust account;

• Failing to obtain release of a client’s settlement funds from the superior court registry for over nine months;

• Failing to expedite a client’s post-settlement dissolution proceeding;

• Misrepresenting to a client’s medical provider that he would reduce his fee by more than 50 percent in order to induce the medical provider to reduce her own fee;

• Failing to advise a client about the status of payments to her medical providers and the status of her settlement funds; and

• In two matters, failing to communicate and respond to the clients’ attempts to obtain information about their cases.

Mr. Jackson’s conduct violated RPC 1.3, requiring a lawyer to act with reasonable diligence and promptness in representing a client; RPC 1.4, requiring a lawyer to keep a client reasonably informed about the status of a matter, promptly comply with reasonable requests for information, and explain a matter to the extent reasonably necessary to permit the client to make informed decisions regarding the representation; RPC 1.5(a), requiring a lawyer’s fee to be reasonable; former RPC 1.14(a), requiring that all funds paid to a lawyer or law firm be deposited in one or more identifiable interest-bearing trust accounts and that no funds belonging to the lawyer or law firm be deposited therein; former RPC 1.14(b)(3), requiring a lawyer to maintain complete records of all funds, securities, and other properties of a client coming into the possession of the lawyer which the client is entitled to receive; former RPC 1.14(b)(4), requiring a lawyer to promptly pay or deliver to the client as requested by a client the funds, securities, or other properties in the possession of the lawyer which the client is entitled to receive; RPC 8.4(b), prohibiting a lawyer from committing a criminal act (here, theft) that reflects adversely on the lawyer’s honesty, trustworthiness, or fitness as a lawyer in other respects; and RPC 8.4(c), prohibiting a lawyer from engaging in conduct involving dishonesty, fraud, deceit, or misrepresentation.

Christine Gray represented the Bar Association. Brett A. Purtzer represented Mr. Jackson. Kelby D. Fletcher was the hearing officer.

Disbarred

Mark A. Panitch (WSBA No. 12393, admitted 1982), of Seattle, was disbarred, effective February 12, 2007, by order of the Washington State Supreme Court following a default hearing. This discipline was based on his conduct involving lack of diligence, lack of communication, failure to expedite litigation, charging an unreasonable amount for expenses, false statements, dishonesty, trust account irregularities, failure to take reasonably practicable steps to protect client interests upon termination of representation, and failure to cooperate with disciplinary investigations.

Between 2000 and 2004, in three matters, Mr. Panitch engaged in the following conduct that established grounds for discipline:

• Charging a client unreasonable and unnecessary travel expenses;

• Failing to respond to client requests for information;

• Failing to inform a client that a summary judgment motion had been filed and noted for hearing, failing to file a response to a motion for summary judgment, failing to inform a client about a scheduled summary judgment hearing, and failing to inform a client that he did not intend to respond to a summary judgment motion or to be present at a summary judgment hearing;

• In two instances, failing to inform a client that the client’s case had been dismissed, and failing to take remedial action following the dismissal;

• Failing to inform a client that a judgment for attorney fees had been entered against the client;

• Falsely stating to opposing counsel that he had not received a summary judgment motion;

• Providing false information to a client about the status of her case;

• Vacating his office without providing forwarding information to the client, the court, or opposing counsel;

• Failing to respond to inquiries from the court concerning his participation in a case;

• Failing to comply with a court’s order to show cause;

• Failing to render an appropriate accounting of a $3,000 cost advance he had received from a client, failing to maintain complete records of the advance, and failing to return the unused portion of the advance upon termination of the representation;

• Failing to safeguard and return property and papers that clients had placed in his possession;

• Failing to provide the client file to a client’s new lawyer and failing to cooperate with the new lawyer in seeking to vacate an order of dismissal; and

• Failing to cooperate with disciplinary investigations and falsely testifying at a disciplinary deposition.

Mr. Panitch’s conduct violated RPC 1.3, requiring a lawyer to act with reasonable diligence and promptness in representing a client; RPC 1.4(a), requiring a lawyer to keep a client reasonably informed about the status of a matter and promptly comply with reasonable requests for information; RPC 1.5(a), requiring a lawyer’s fee to be reasonable; former RPC 1.14(b)(2), requiring a lawyer to identify and label securities and properties of a client promptly upon receipt and place them in a safe deposit box or other place of safekeeping as soon as practicable; former RPC 1.14(b)(3), requiring a lawyer to maintain complete records of all funds, securities, and other properties of a client coming into the possession of the lawyer and render appropriate accounts to his or her client regarding them; former RPC 1.14(b)(4), requiring a lawyer to promptly pay or deliver to the client as requested by the client the funds, securities, or other properties in the possession of the lawyer which the client is entitled to receive; former RPC 1.15(d), requiring a lawyer to take steps to the extent reasonably practicable to protect a client’s interests, such as giving reasonable notice to the client, allowing time for employment of other counsel, surrendering papers and property to which the client is entitled, and refunding any advance payment of fee that has not been earned; RPC 3.2, requiring a lawyer to make reasonable efforts to expedite litigation consistent with the interests of the client; RPC 4.1(a), prohibiting a lawyer, in the course of representing a client, from making a false statement of material fact or law to a third person; RPC 8.4(c), prohibiting a lawyer from engaging in conduct involving dishonesty, fraud, deceit, or misrepresentation; RPC 8.4(d), prohibiting a lawyer from engaging in conduct that is prejudicial to the administration of justice; and RPC 8.4(l), prohibiting a lawyer from violating a duty or sanction imposed by or under the Rules for Enforcement of Lawyer Conduct (here, ELC 5.3(e) and 5.5(c)), in connection with a disciplinary matter.

Scott G. Busby represented the Bar Association. Mr. Panitch represented himself. Stephen D. Funderburk was the hearing officer.

Suspended

Oscar E. Desper III (WSBA No. 18012, admitted 1988), of Seattle, was suspended for 60 days, effective June 7, 2007, by order of the Washington State Supreme Court following a hearing. This discipline was based on his conduct in 2004 involving an act of assault on another lawyer.

In 2004, Mr. Desper was representing a criminal defendant charged with two felonies in superior court. During an omnibus hearing in June 2004, a disagreement arose between Mr. Desper and the prosecuting attorney about the terms of a potential plea agreement. There ensued a heated verbal exchange that became loud and escalated into a physical confrontation lasting about 10 seconds. The dispute concluded when Mr. Desper drew back his right arm, made a fist, and delivered a forceful blow to the prosecuting attorney’s chest. The prosecuting attorney stumbled backwards into the bailiff, who was standing with her back to the two men and who was thrown onto her computer. The bailiff then stepped between the two lawyers. Mr. Desper and the prosecuting attorney were escorted out of the courtroom.

Mr. Desper’s conduct violated RPC 8.4(b), prohibiting a lawyer from committing a criminal act that reflects adversely on the lawyer’s honesty, trustworthiness, or fitness as a lawyer in other respects; and RPC 8.4(i), prohibiting a lawyer from committing any unjustified act of assault or other act which reflects disregard for the rule of law, whether the same be committed in the course of his or her conduct as a lawyer, or otherwise, and whether the same constitutes a felony or misdemeanor or not.

Debra Slater represented the Bar Association. Jeffrey C. Grant represented Mr. Desper. Andrekita Silva was the hearing officer.

Suspended

Margita Dornay (WSBA No. 19879, admitted 1990), of Selah, was suspended for three years, effective June 21, 2007, by order of the Washington State Supreme Court following a hearing. This discipline was based on her conduct in 2002 involving falsely testifying in a court proceeding. For more information see In re Discipline of Dornay, 160 Wn.2d 671, 161 P.3d 333 (2007).

In 2001, Ms. Dornay began an extramarital affair with a King County Deputy Sheriff (hereinafter “Deputy”). When the affair began, Ms. Dornay, a partner with a law firm and a contract prosecutor for the city of Kenmore, was living with her husband and daughters. The Deputy was in the process of divorcing his wife. During the course of the affair, the couple took trips out of town together. During a trip in November 2001, the Deputy became enraged after an argument and slammed his head on a nightstand, cutting open his forehead. On another occasion, the Deputy put his service revolver in Ms. Dornay’s hand and told her to pull the trigger because if she did not love him, he wanted to die. Ms. Dornay’s relationship with the Deputy continued.

In February 2002, Ms. Dornay testified under oath at the Deputy’s divorce trial. She was called to testify regarding the child visitation exchanges she had witnessed between the Deputy and his wife. The Deputy’s lawyer did not know about Ms. Dornay’s ongoing affair with the Deputy. Ms. Dornay testified and answered a series of background questions about how well she knew the Deputy. While on the stand, Ms. Dornay was asked whether she had ever seen the Deputy “rageful at any time” or whether she had seen him “rant and rave” or “berate.” Ms. Dornay answered no to these questions. In its opinion, the Supreme Court found that: “If the judge had the benefit of Dornay’s truthful testimony at the time she testified on [Deputy’s] behalf, her testimony could have affected the judge’s decision regarding the parenting plan for [Deputy’s] three-year-old child.”

In March 2002, Ms. Dornay broke off relations with the Deputy. Soon after, she informed members of her family about the affair. At this time, she confessed that she was not truthful when she testified in court that she had never seen the Deputy in a rage.

In May 2002, Ms. Dornay petitioned for an order of protection against the Deputy, alleging he was abusive and threatening to her and her family. At the protection order hearing in June 2002, Ms. Dornay testified under oath that the Deputy had screamed at her, raged at her, and ranted and raved during the course of their relationship, including the time period prior to the February 2002 dissolution trial. After the hearing, Ms. Dornay signed a sworn declaration that she “made the decision to perjure” herself at trial in February 2002. This sworn declaration was filed by the Deputy’s former wife’s lawyer in superior court in support of a petition to suspend the Deputy’s visitation rights with his child. In 2003, during a deposition taken in the course of the Bar Association’s disciplinary investigation, Ms. Dornay testified under oath that her February 2002 trial testimony was false.

In its opinion, the Supreme Court held “[t]he Washington Legislature and the courts of this state have recognized the profound impact of intimate partner violence. While the nature of Dornay’s relationship with [Deputy] does not excuse Dornay’s actions, it is a mitigating factor that merits substantial weight.”

Ms. Dornay’s conduct violated former RPC 3.3(a)(1), prohibiting a lawyer from knowingly making a false statement of material fact or law to a tribunal; RPC 8.4(b), prohibiting a lawyer from committing a criminal act that reflects adversely on the lawyer’s honesty, trustworthiness, or fitness as a lawyer in other respects; RPC 8.4(c), prohibiting a lawyer from engaging in conduct involving dishonesty, fraud, deceit, or misrepresentation; and RPC 8.4(d), prohibiting a lawyer from engaging in conduct that is prejudicial to the administration of justice.

Kevin M. Bank and Jean K. McElroy represented the Bar Association. Kurt M. Bulmer and Robert F. Noe represented Ms. Dornay. Lawrence R. Mills was the hearing officer.

Suspended

Mary Ebel Johnson a/k/a Mary W. Johnson (WSBA No. 15175, admitted 1985), of Oregon City, Oregon, was suspended for 30 days, effective July 3, 2007, by order of the Washington State Supreme Court imposing reciprocal discipline in accordance with an order of the Supreme Court of the State of Oregon following a hearing. This discipline was based on her conduct involving the practice of law while suspended. For more information, please see the October 2006 Oregon State Bar Bulletin, available at https://www.osbar.org/publications/bulletin/06oct/discipline.html. Mary Ebel Johnson is to be distinguished from Mary Ann Johnson of Bismarck, Mary Jeanne Johnson of Tacoma, Mary White Johnson of Spokane, and Mary Lou Johnson of Spokane.

Ms. Johnson’s conduct violated former Oregon Disciplinary Rule (DR) 3-101(B), prohibiting a lawyer from practicing law in a jurisdiction where to do so would be in violation of regulations of the profession in that jurisdiction; and Oregon Revised Statute (ORS) 9.160, prohibiting a person from practicing law unless that person is an active member of the Oregon State Bar.

Felice P. Congalton represented the Bar Association. Ms. Johnson was not represented by counsel.

Suspended

Bradley R. Marshall (WSBA No. 15830, admitted 1986), of Seattle, was suspended for 18 months, effective May 10, 2007, by order of the Washington State Supreme Court following an appeal. This discipline was based on his conduct between 1996 and 2000 involving conflicts of interest, failure to communicate with clients, failure to maintain complete records of client funds and to provide clients with an accounting, filing an appeal without client authority, charging excessive costs, and instructing a third party to create a deceptive invoice to conceal the nature of a fee arrangement. For additional information, see In re Discipline of Marshall, 160 Wn.2d 317, 157 P.3d 859 (2007).

Commencing in 1996, Mr. Marshall represented a number of longshoreman clients in a federal district court action alleging racial discrimination against several local unions. During the course of and following the representation, Mr. Marshall engaged in the following conduct that established grounds for discipline:

• Mr. Marshall did not explain to each of the clients the implications of, or the advantages and risks involved in, common representation, and he did not obtain written consent from the clients to multiple representation;

• Mr. Marshall filed an appeal of the dismissal of one of the defendants without the knowledge or authorization of several of his clients, and following commencement of the appeal he did not provide the clients with a meaningful explanation of the facts of the appeal and its consequences for each of them;

• Mr. Marshall instructed a nonlawyer who had initially referred the case to his office, and to whom the clients owed 10 percent of the final settlement proceeds as a consultant’s fee, to create an hourly invoice in an attempt to conceal the appearance of fee-sharing [Note that because the nonlawyer had a pre-existing agreement with the clients to pay a 10 percent fee, the Supreme Court concluded that Mr. Marshall did not split a fee in violation of RPC 5.4(a)];

• Mr. Marshall improperly charged contract attorney fees as costs in violation of the written fee agreement and treated a refund of a $41,000 cost advance as an expense chargeable to the client; and

• Mr. Marshall did not maintain complete records of the receipt and disbursal of settlement proceeds or provide an appropriate accounting to the client regarding the distribution of the funds.

Mr. Marshall violated RPC 1.2(a), requiring a lawyer to abide by a client’s decisions concerning the objectives of representation and to consult with the client as to the means by which they are to be pursued; former RPC 1.2(f), prohibiting a lawyer from willfully purporting to act as a lawyer for any person without the authority of that person; RPC 1.4(b), requiring a lawyer to explain a matter to the extent reasonably necessary to permit the client to make informed decisions regarding the representation; RPC 1.5(a), requiring a lawyer’s fee to be reasonable; RPC 1.7(b), prohibiting a lawyer from representing a client if the representation of that client may be materially limited by the lawyer’s responsibilities to another client or to a third person, or by the lawyer’s own interests, unless the lawyer reasonably believes the representation will not be adversely affected and the client consents in writing after consultation and full disclosure of the material facts; former RPC 1.14(b)(3), requiring a lawyer to maintain complete records of all funds, securities, and other properties of a client coming into the possession of the lawyer and render appropriate accounts to his or her client regarding them; former RPC 1.14(b)(4), requiring a lawyer to promptly pay or deliver to the client the funds, securities, or other property in the possession of the lawyer which the client is entitled to receive; and RPC 8.4(c), prohibiting a lawyer from engaging in conduct involving dishonesty, fraud, deceit, or misrepresentation.

Special Disciplinary Counsel Carolyn Cairns represented the Bar Association at the hearing. Scott G. Busby represented the Bar Association on appeal. Kurt M. Bulmer represented Mr. Marshall at the hearing. Philip A. Talmadge represented Mr. Marshall on appeal. Robert M. Scales was the hearing officer.

Suspended

Christopher C. Meleney (WSBA No. 11123, admitted 1980), of Everett, was suspended for six months, effective April 13, 2007, by order of the Washington State Supreme Court following a stipulation approved by the Disciplinary Board. This discipline was based on his conduct in 2004 involving failure to communicate with clients, taking action without client authority, conflict of interest, and filing a bankruptcy petition in violation of the federal bankruptcy rules.

In July 2004, Mr. Meleney met with two principals of a company that operated a casino, restaurant, and inn (hereinafter “Company A”) and that was an operating subsidiary of an LLC. Company A was experiencing serious financial difficulties and a hearing concerning the revocation of its business license was scheduled to take place the following day.

Mr. Meleney advised the principals that if Company A filed a voluntary bankruptcy petition, or if an involuntary petition was filed against it, the automatic bankruptcy stay would stop the license revocation hearing from taking place and give Company A the time it needed to obtain an infusion of funds. Mr. Meleney advised the principals that he would not represent Company A in filing a voluntary petition. Furthermore, it was unlikely that the consent of all of the owners could be obtained in time to stop the license revocation hearing. One of the principals agreed to make contact with Company A’s creditors regarding filing an involuntary petition.

On the morning of the license revocation hearing, Mr. Meleney met with the two principals, and they decided to pursue the filing of an involuntary bankruptcy petition. One of the principals paid Mr. Meleney $2,500 as attorney’s fees and costs to file the involuntary petition.

Representatives from three of Company A’s creditors telephoned Mr. Meleney. He did not adequately explain to these creditors that they would be the petitioning creditors initiating bankruptcy proceedings against Company A. In July 2004, Mr. Meleney filed an involuntary bankruptcy petition against Company A on behalf of these three creditors. In the petition, and later in an amended petition, Mr. Meleney stated that he was attorney for the petitioning creditors. In September 2004, Mr. Meleney filed a motion for an order of default and default judgment against the debtor, Company A, for failure to file schedules. In the motion, Mr. Meleney again indicated that he was the attorney for the petitioning creditors. The company’s bankruptcy case was dismissed in October 2004 for failure to file schedules. Other than the telephone conversation that took place before the bankruptcy petition was filed, Mr. Meleney had no contact with the petitioning creditors until he sent them a letter in November 2004 advising them that the bankruptcy had been dismissed.

In January 2005, in response to a United States trustee’s motion for sanctions, Mr. Meleney stipulated, in order to settle pending hearings, that he had violated Bankruptcy Rule 9011 by filing the bankruptcy petition. Rule 9011 provides that by presenting a petition to the court, an attorney certifies that to the best of his knowledge, formed after reasonable inquiry, the petition is not being presented for any improper purpose, such as to harass or cause unnecessary delay or needless increase in the cost of litigation. Mr. Meleney also agreed to pay $2,161 to the State of Washington, to be distributed to former employees of Company A whose ability to collect owed wages was negatively impacted by the filing of the bankruptcy petition.

Mr. Meleney’s conduct violated RPC 1.2(a), requiring a lawyer to abide by a client’s decisions concerning the objectives of representation and to consult with the client as to the means by which they are to be pursued; RPC 1.2(d), prohibiting a lawyer from counseling a client to engage, or assisting a client, in conduct that the lawyer knows is criminal or fraudulent; former RPC 1.2(f), prohibiting a lawyer from willfully purporting to act as a lawyer for any person without the authority of that person; RPC 1.4(a), requiring a lawyer to keep a client reasonably informed about the status of a matter and promptly comply with reasonable requests for information; RPC 1.4(b), requiring a lawyer to explain a matter to the extent reasonably necessary to permit the client to make informed decisions regarding the representation; RPC 1.8(f), prohibiting a lawyer from accepting compensation for representing the client from one other than the client unless the client consents after consultation and there is no interference with the lawyer’s independence of professional judgment or with the client-lawyer relationship, and information relating to the representation of a client is protected as required by RPC 1.6; and RPC 8.4(d), prohibiting a lawyer from engaging in conduct that is prejudicial to the administration of justice.

Debra Slater represented the Bar Association. Leland G. Ripley represented Mr. Meleney. James C. Lawrie was the hearing officer.

Suspended

Stephen J. Plowman (WSBA No. 21823, admitted 1992), of Bellevue, was suspended from the practice of law for three years, effective April 13, 2007, by order of the Washington State Supreme Court following a stipulation approved by the Disciplinary Board. This discipline was based on his conduct in 2005 involving the commission of a criminal act.

In 2005, one of Mr. Plowman’s clients, who has since been convicted of narcotics trafficking in federal court, became interested in acquiring a laundromat located in Seattle. The laundromat’s negotiated price was in excess of $150,000. Mr. Plowman provided legal assistance to the client in purchasing the laundromat. Mr. Plowman received two cashier’s checks from the client, which were in the names of third parties and totaled approximately $56,000. Mr. Plowman deposited these checks in his client trust account to be used in partial payment for the laundromat. Mr. Plowman then met with the client at a residence in Seattle and received from the client approximately $120,000 cash in paper bags to pay the balance for the laundromat. Mr. Plowman brought the money to his Bellevue law office and stored it in a safe. The currency was proceeds derived by the client from his participation in cocaine trafficking in Seattle. Mr. Plowman did not document his receipt of this currency in any way and willfully failed to file a “Report of Cash Payments Over $10,000 Received in a Trade or Business” with the Internal Revenue Service, as required by law, indicating the identity of the individual from whom the cash was received, the person on whose behalf the such transaction was conducted, and a description of the transaction and the method of payment.

In June 2005, Mr. Plowman met with the seller of the laundromat and delivered a check drawn on his client trust account in the amount of approximately $60,000. Mr. Plowman also delivered approximately $100,000 of the cash received from his client to the seller to pay the balance due on the laundromat. The purchase and sales agreement reflected a total sales price of $60,000, whereas the true sales price was approximately $160,000. Of the remaining cash, some was used to pay laundromat expenses and some was taken by Mr. Plowman as his fee.

In October 2006, Mr. Plowman pleaded guilty to the felony crime of failure to file a currency transaction report (Form 8300), in violation of 31 U.S.C. §§ 5531(a) and 5322(b).

Mr. Plowman’s conduct violated RPC 8.4(b), prohibiting a lawyer from committing a criminal act that reflects adversely on the lawyer’s honesty, trustworthiness, or fitness as a lawyer in other respects.

Francesca D’Angelo represented the Bar Association. Mr. Plowman represented himself.

Reprimanded

Craig S. Jepson (WSBA No. 25154, admitted 1995), of Austin, Texas (formerly of Concord, New Hampshire), was ordered to receive a reprimand on April 4, 2007, by order of the Washington State Supreme Court imposing reciprocal discipline in accordance with an order of the New Hampshire Professional Conduct Committee following a stipulation to a public censure. This discipline was based on his conduct in 2006 involving filing a false report with a law school committee.

In January 2005, Mr. Jepson was admitted to practice law in the state of New Hampshire. Mr. Jepson worked full-time as a tenured professor of law at the Franklin Pierce Law Center in Concord (Pierce Law). For the academic year 2005-2006, Mr. Jepson was appointed to serve on a faculty committee charged with assessing the performance and qualifications of another law professor in connection with that professor’s application for tenure. As part of his committee responsibilities, Mr. Jepson was required to attend classes conducted by the professor and to submit a report of his observations to the committee chair. Mr. Jepson prepared and submitted a report describing two of the professor’s classes in detail. The report was a fabrication. Mr. Jepson had not attended any of the professor’s classes. In response to initial informal inquiries of other committee members, Mr. Jepson reiterated falsely that he had attended the professor’s classes. Once it was established that the report was a fabrication, Mr. Jepson admitted his misconduct and apologized to the faculty. Mr. Jepson’s misconduct did not prejudice the professor’s candidacy for tenure. Mr. Jepson resigned from the law school faculty.

Mr. Jepson’s conduct violated New Hampshire RPC 8.4(a), prohibiting a lawyer from violating the Rules of Professional Conduct; and New Hampshire’s RPC 8.4(c), prohibiting a lawyer from engaging in conduct involving dishonesty, fraud, deceit, or misrepresentation.

Joanne S. Abelson represented the Bar Association. Mr. Jepson represented himself.

Reprimanded

Jeffrey G. Poole (WSBA No. 15578, admitted 1986), of Everett, was ordered to receive a reprimand on February 5, 2007, following a stipulation approved by a hearing officer. This discipline was based on his conduct between 2002 and 2004 involving a conflict of interest.

In March-April 2002, Mr. Poole requested and obtained a personal loan from a private lender. At that time, Mr. Poole was representing a client in a litigation matter involving property on which the lender held a secured interest. Mr. Poole was in regular contact with the lender on his client’s behalf. In April, Mr. Poole executed a promissory note and deed of trust to secure a loan from the lender, which required him to make monthly interest payments and then a balloon payment that would pay the loan in full after one year. Mr. Poole, on his own behalf, subsequently proposed another business transaction with the lender related to property in Bothell that he wanted to develop. At that time, his client’s litigation matter involving the lender had not been completely resolved. Mr. Poole’s client was not involved in nor informed about the Bothell property proposal. The lender did not make a loan to Mr. Poole in connection with the Bothell property.

Mr. Poole’s loan payments became past due. A representative of the lender wrote to Mr. Poole and left telephone messages, but received no answer. In September 2003, the lender filed for bankruptcy. During the time that Mr. Poole’s loan was outstanding, he continued to communicate and negotiate with the lender on his client’s behalf in regard to financing other projects and in an attempt to delay foreclosure of the lender’s security interests in his client’s properties. In October 2003, Mr. Poole communicated with the lender about its bankruptcy and its effect on the lender’s business relationship with his client. In April 2004, on his client’s behalf, Mr. Poole communicated with the lender regarding a loan secured by his client’s boat. At the time, Mr. Poole was delinquent on his own loan from the lender.

Mr. Poole never disclosed to the client his independent business relationship with the lender or explained to the client the implications of this relationship, and he failed to obtain consent in writing from the client.

Mr. Poole’s conduct violated former RPC 1.7(b), prohibiting a lawyer from representing a client if the representation of that client may be materially limited by the lawyer’s responsibilities to another client or to a third person, or by the lawyer’s own interests, unless the lawyer reasonably believes the representation will not be adversely affected and the client consents in writing after consultation and a full disclosure of the material facts.

M. Craig Bray and Christine Gray represented the Bar Association. Mr. Poole represented himself. David W. Wiley was the hearing officer.

Reprimanded

G. Thomas Ryan (WSBA No. 9634, admitted 1979), of Puyallup, was ordered to receive a reprimand on March 13, 2006, following a stipulation approved by a hearing officer. This discipline was based on his conduct in 2005 involving lack of diligence and failure to communicate with a client.

In January 2005, Mr. Ryan was hired by clients who wanted to petition for custody of their grandchild. According to the clients, they asked Mr. Ryan to file the petition by January 24, 2005, and he agreed to do so. The clients paid Mr. Ryan $2,700 for advance fees and costs. Between January 24 and January 27, the clients called Mr. Ryan’s office many times. He did not take or return any of their telephone calls.

In early February, the biological father, who had custody of the child, took the child out of state to visit his parents. On February 9, Mr. Ryan filed the clients’ nonparental custody petition, noted a hearing on the petition for February 28, 2005, and obtained an ex parte temporary restraining order (TRO) immediately restraining the parents from having contact with the child and placing him in the clients’ custody. Mr. Ryan had the child’s mother served with the petition, but the process server could not personally serve the child’s father because he was out of state visiting his parents. Mr. Ryan had not obtained an order authorizing peace officers to remove the child from either of the parents’ custody (a pick-up order). Without a pick-up order, the TRO was unenforceable. The clients asked Mr. Ryan to obtain a pick-up order. Mr. Ryan declined to do so. He met with the clients and informed them that Child Protective Services (CPS) had filed a recommendation that the mother be awarded custody of the child. Mr. Ryan recommended that the clients strike the hearing date based on the CPS letter. The clients disagreed with his recommendation.

A lawyer for the mother entered a notice of appearance in the proceeding and filed responsive pleadings, which were voluminous and contained several declarations refuting the allegations set for the in the clients’ nonparental custody petition. The mother asked the court to dismiss the petition and requested an award of attorney’s fees for having to respond to a frivolous petition. Mr. Ryan did not extensively review the responsive pleadings before the hearing. At the hearing, the commissioner determined that the nonparental custody petition could not be considered because Mr. Ryan had not provided the court with the clients’ DCFS/CPS background checks or criminal background checks as required by statute. The commissioner entered an order placing the child with his mother, directing Mr. Ryan to file the background checks, and ordering a new hearing to take place within 60 days. The mother’s motion to dismiss and request for attorney’s fees was also to be heard at that time.

After the hearing, the clients waited outside the courtroom to speak with Mr. Ryan, but they could not locate him. After waiting a week for Mr. Ryan to contact them and discuss the next steps, the clients made several attempts to contact Mr. Ryan. He did not return any of their telephone messages. During one attempt, Mr. Ryan answered the telephone, and the client expressed dissatisfaction with the representation and told Mr. Ryan to do the job correctly or refund the fee. Mr. Ryan told the client he would discuss the case with her after she calmed down. During the following week, he did not return any of their calls.

In March 2005, the clients filed a grievance with the Bar Association. In Mr. Ryan’s written response to the grievance, he stated that he intended to withdraw from the case. Mr. Ryan did not tell the clients he intended to withdraw and did not file a notice of withdrawal. He did not obtain the DCFS/CPS background checks or the criminal background checks as required by the commissioner’s February 28 order.

On June 2, the child’s mother filed a motion to dismiss the case and for attorney’s fees, noting the motion for a hearing on June 10, 2005. Mr. Ryan did not immediately notify his clients about the pending hearing. On the afternoon of June 8, he mailed them a copy of the motion to dismiss and supporting documentation. Included in the mailing were Mr. Ryan’s notice of intent to withdraw and his response to the motion to dismiss. The response consisted of a motion for a three-week continuance on grounds that Mr. Ryan was withdrawing as counsel of record. Under the terms of notice, Mr. Ryan’s withdrawal was effective on July 22, 2005, although he did not intend to do any further legal work for the clients. The clients received this information the evening before the hearing.

Meanwhile, on June 7, 2005, disciplinary counsel informed the clients about the hearing on June 10. The clients called several lawyers listed in the Yellow Pages, asking if any of them would represent them at the hearing. A lawyer agreed to accompany the clients to the hearing, although she told them she could not file a notice of appearance, as Mr. Ryan was still the attorney of record. Mr. Ryan did not appear at the June 10 hearing, at which the commissioner entered an order continuing the motion to dismiss in order to give the new lawyer time to respond. The order indicated that the court would grant the mother’s request for attorney’s fees. In August 2005, the commissioner entered an order dismissing the nonparental custody petition and awarding the mother $3,510.50 for attorney’s fees and costs incurred in defending against the petition.

Mr. Ryan’s conduct violated RPC 1.3, requiring a lawyer to act with reasonable diligence and promptness in representing a client; RPC 1.4(a), requiring a lawyer to keep a client reasonably informed about the status of a matter and promptly comply with reasonable requests for information; and RPC 1.4(b), requiring a lawyer to explain a matter to the extent reasonably necessary to permit the client to make informed decisions regarding the representation.

Leslie C. Allen represented the Bar Association. Mr. Ryan represented himself. James M. Danielson was the hearing officer.

Admonished

Isak D. Bressler (WSBA No. 31747, admitted 2001), of Seattle, was admonished by a review committee of the Disciplinary Board. This discipline was based on his conduct in 2005 involving lack of diligence and noncooperation with a disciplinary investigation.

In 2005, Mr. Bressler was hired to represent a client in a bankruptcy matter. Because of a calendaring error, Mr. Bressler neglected to attend the client’s first meeting of creditors. He also failed to provide information requested by the trustee.

Mr. Bressler and the client reached an agreement that he would refund $200 in August 2005, but he did not mail the check to the client until October 2005. During the ensuing disciplinary investigation, Mr. Bressler failed to respond fully to disciplinary counsel’s requests for information.

Mr. Bressler’s conduct violated RPC 1.3, requiring a lawyer to act with reasonable diligence and promptness in representing a client; and RPC 8.4(l), prohibiting a lawyer from violating a duty or sanction imposed by or under the Rules for Enforcement of Lawyer Conduct (here, ELC 1.5).

Nancy Bickford Miller represented the Bar Association. Mr. Bressler represented himself.