|
|
|
 |  |
 |
 |
WSBA Info | |
|
For Lawyers | |
|
For the Public |  |
 |
For the Media |  |
|
CLE |  |
| | Bench Bar Guidelines | News Releases | Publications | |
|
|
October 2008These notices of imposition of disciplinary sanctions and actions are published pursuant to Rule 3.5(d) of the Washington State Supreme Court Rules for Enforcement of Lawyer Conduct, and pursuant to the February 18, 1995, policy statement of the WSBA Board of Governors. For a complete copy of any disciplinary decision, call the Washington State Disciplinary Board at 206-733-5926, leaving the case name, and your name and address. Note: Approximately 30,000 persons are eligible to practice law in Washington state. Some of them share the same or similar names. Bar News strives to include a clarification whenever an attorney listed in the Disciplinary Notices has the same name as another WSBA member; however, all discipline reports should be read carefully for names, cities, and bar numbers. Disbarred Stephen B. Blanchard (WSBA No. 12294, admitted 1982), of Edmonds, was disbarred, effective July 23, 2008, by order of the Washington State Supreme Court following a default hearing. This discipline is based on conduct in two matters involving failure to provide competent representation, lack of diligence, failure to communicate, charging unreasonable fees, trust account irregularities, withholding client funds, and violations of duties in connection with disciplinary matters. Matter No. 1: In May 2000, a client hired Mr. Blanchard and paid him $1,300 to make a claim against the Washington State Department of Natural Resources (DNR), which had cut down trees on her property without her permission. During 2001, the client telephoned Mr. Blanchard repeatedly concerning her claim, but he took no action. In March 2002, Mr. Blanchard filed a standard tort claim form with the Office of Risk Management on behalf of his client. Although the claim form clearly stated “Claimant must sign this claim form,” Mr. Blanchard did not inform the client, but instead signed it himself as her attorney. After the claim form was filed, the client called Mr. Blanchard repeatedly over a period of months asking him to file suit against the DNR before the statute of limitations expired. Mr. Blanchard filed suit in October 2003, five months after the statute of limitations had run out. The DNR moved for summary judgment based on the expiration of the statute of limitations and the fact that the client had not signed the claim form; the court entered summary judgment against the client on both grounds. Mr. Blanchard told the client that summary judgment was granted because she had not signed the claim form, without informing her that summary judgment had been entered in part because the statute of limitations had run out. Mr. Blanchard filed a notice of appeal from the summary judgment in March 2004. After filing the appeal, the Appeals Court warned him on several occasions that sanctions could be imposed because he failed to comply with the Rules of Appellate Procedure. The Appeals Court eventually dismissed the appeal due to Mr. Blanchard’s failure to file an appellate brief and imposed $250 in sanctions against him. Mr. Blanchard later admitted that he had been negligent in pursuing the client’s claim. The client brought a malpractice claim against Mr. Blanchard and was awarded a monetary judgment against him, which he has not paid. Matter No. 2: In December 2004, a client hired Mr. Blanchard to probate the estate of her brother, who had just died intestate. The client, who lived out of state, paid Mr. Blanchard an advance fee of $750 and $120 for a court filing fee. He deposited the entire amount into his general account. At the time of his death, the decedent’s assets consisted primarily of a Jeep and a retirement account. A car dealer offered to buy the Jeep for $2,050 on or before December 31, 2004, if the client or someone else obtained authority to sell it. The client placed the Jeep in a storage facility while awaiting legal authority. The client told Mr. Blanchard that she wanted to be appointed personal representative of her brother’s estate so that she could sell his Jeep and also obtain any mail the post office was holding for him. She also asked Mr. Blanchard to ascertain the status of the retirement account and the identity of any of its beneficiaries. The client returned to her home several days after hiring Mr. Blanchard and thereafter communicated with him by telephone and letter. He often failed to respond. On more than one occasion, the client requested an accounting of the money she had paid Mr. Blanchard, but he never provided one. Mr. Blanchard did not file a petition to probate the estate, did not communicate to the client why he failed to file the petition, and did not refund the money the client had paid him. Because no one was appointed personal representative of the estate, the offer to sell the Jeep expired, the storage facility took possession of it and the value did not rebound to the estate, and the post office would not release the decedent’s mail to the client and instead returned it to the senders. A Michigan lawyer, on behalf of the client, wrote to Mr. Blanchard in March 2005 demanding copies of the decedent’s death certificate, the keys to the Jeep, and return of the money the client had paid. Mr. Blanchard did not comply with the requests, but contacted the client and assured her that he would perform the tasks for which she had hired him. Mr. Blanchard took no steps to ascertain the status of the decedent’s retirement account until he received the March letter from the Michigan lawyer. In May 2005, the Michigan lawyer again wrote to Mr. Blanchard, noting that Mr. Blanchard had not complied with the earlier request. He asked Mr. Blanchard to return the client’s file and the fees paid, and stated that he would advise the client to file a grievance with the Bar Association. Mr. Blanchard did not answer the second letter. His paralegal mailed to the client the Jeep’s keys and several death certificates and stated that Mr. Blanchard would provide a billing statement, which he did not do. In February 2006, the clients in the two preceding matters filed grievances against Mr. Blanchard. He did not respond to the grievances or to subsequent certified letters from the Bar Association. Mr. Blanchard appeared for a deposition in April 2006 pursuant to a subpoena duces tecum, but failed to bring all of the documents listed in the subpoena. He did not produce any records relating to the money the client in the first matter paid him for his representation. He did produce billing statements for his representation of the client in the second matter; however, the bills included charges for work that was not performed by Mr. Blanchard. Mr. Blanchard’s conduct violated RPC 1.1, requiring a lawyer to provide competent representation to a client; RPC 1.2(a), requiring lawyers to abide by the client’s decisions concerning the objectives of the representation; RPC 1.2(c), allowing a lawyer to limit the scope of representation if the limitation is reasonable under circumstances and the client consents after consultation; RPC 1.3, requiring a lawyer to act with reasonable diligence and promptness in representing a client; former RPC 1.4, requiring a lawyer to keep a client reasonably informed about the status of a matter, promptly comply with reasonable requests for information, and explain a matter to the extent reasonably necessary to permit the client to make informed decisions regarding the representation; former RPC 1.5(a), requiring attorneys’ fees to be reasonable; former RPC 1.14(a), requiring all funds of clients paid to a lawyer to be deposited in an interest-bearing trust account; RPC 1.14(b), requiring a lawyer to promptly notify a client of the receipt of his or her funds, maintain complete records of the funds, and promptly pay or deliver to the client the funds in the possession of the lawyer to which the client is entitled to receive; RPC 3.2, requiring a lawyer to make reasonable efforts to expedite litigation consistent with the interests of the client; RPC 8.4(c), prohibiting a lawyer from engaging in conduct involving dishonesty, fraud, deceit, or misrepresentation; and RPC 8.4(l), prohibiting a lawyer from violating a duty or sanction imposed by or under the Rules of Enforcement for Lawyer Conduct in connection with a disciplinary matter. Natalea Skvir represented the Bar Association. Mr. Blanchard represented himself. Lee Grochmal was the hearing officer. Disbarred Gregory S. Zoro (WSBA No. 8212, admitted 1978), of Des Moines was disbarred, effective July 9, 2008, by order of the Washington State Supreme Court following approval of a stipulation. This discipline resulted from conduct in four matters involving failure to communicate; lack of diligence; trust account irregularities; forgery; and conduct involving dishonesty, fraud, deceit, and misrepresentation. Between approximately October 2002 and May 2007, Mr. Zoro engaged in the following conduct: • Failure to respond to repeated requests for information from a client and from a third party involved in a personal-injury matter, and failed to respond to messages left by a client in a second personal injury matter; Mr. Zoro’s conduct violated RPC 1.3, requiring a lawyer to act with reasonable diligence and promptness in representing a client; former RPC 1.4, requiring a lawyer to keep a client reasonably informed about the status of a matter, promptly comply with reasonable requests for information, and explain a matter to the extent reasonably necessary to permit the client to make informed decisions regarding the representation; former RPC 1.14(b)(3) and current RPC 1.15A(h)(2), requiring a lawyer to maintain complete records of all funds, securities, and other properties of a client coming into the possession of the lawyer and render appropriate accounts to his or her client regarding them; current RPC 1.15A(c)(2), requiring a lawyer to hold property of clients and third persons separate from the lawyer’s own property and to identify, label, and appropriately safeguard any property of clients or third persons other than funds; current RPC 1.15A(h)(1), prohibiting a lawyer from depositing funds belonging to the lawyer in a trust account; current RPC 1.15A(h)(6), requiring that trust records be reconciled as often as bank statements are generated or at least quarterly; current RPC 1.15A(h)(7), prohibiting a lawyer from disbursing funds from a trust account until deposits have cleared the banking process and have been collected, unless the lawyer and the bank have a written agreement by which the lawyer personally guarantees all disbursements from the account without recourse to the trust account; current RPC 1.15A(h)(8), prohibiting disbursements on behalf of a client or third person from exceeding the funds of that person on deposit and prohibiting funds of a client or third person to be used on behalf of anyone else; current RPC 1.15B(a)(1) and (8), requiring that a lawyer maintain current trust account records and including a checkbook register or equivalent for each trust account and copies of all trust account client ledger reconciliations; RPC 8.4(b), prohibiting a lawyer from committing a criminal act that reflects adversely on the lawyer’s honesty, trustworthiness, or fitness as a lawyer in other respects; and RPC 8.4(c), prohibiting a lawyer from engaging in conduct involving dishonesty, fraud, deceit and misrepresentation. Natalea Skvir represented the Bar Association. Mr. Zoro represented himself. Suspended John L. Erickson (WSBA No. 4909, admitted 1973), of Bellingham, was suspended for 60 days, effective May 15, 2008, by order of the Washington State Supreme Court following approval of a stipulation. This discipline was based on conduct involving conflicts of interest; practicing law while suspended; conduct involving dishonesty, fraud, deceit, or misrepresentation; and violation of a duty in connection with a disciplinary matter. Matter No. 1: In June 2004, Mr. Erickson was hired by a client (Mr. B) to represent him in a marital dissolution proceeding against the client’s wife (Mrs. B). The dissolution did not proceed because Mr. and Mrs. B reconciled. In August 2005, Mrs. B’s mother filed for custody of Mr. and Mrs. B’s two children. Mr. Erickson jointly represented both Mr. and Mrs. B in the child-custody matter against Mrs. B’s mother. During that time, Mr. Erickson met with Mr. and Mrs. B jointly and was provided with information from Mrs. B that is covered by the attorney-client privilege and would constitute confidences or secrets. In May 2006, Mr. and Mrs. B separated again and their relationship became strained and adversarial. After the separation, Mr. Erickson represented Mr. B in the pending dissolution and child-custody matters. Mr. B’s interests in the matters were materially adverse to those of Mrs. B. Mr. Erickson failed to seek or obtain informed consent confirmed in writing from Mrs. B to represent Mr. B. In June 2006, Mrs. B filed a grievance with the Association alleging that Mr. Erickson failed to avoid a conflict of interest by continuing to represent Mr. B in the pending matters. The Association sent Mr. Erickson a copy of the grievance and a letter requesting him to respond to the grievance. Mr. Erickson did not respond, and continued to represent Mr. B. In July 2006, the Bar Association sent Mr. Erickson a second letter requesting him to provide a written response to the grievance. Mr. Erickson did not respond. Disciplinary counsel sent a third letter on February 7, 2007, requesting a response by February 26, 2007. Mr. Erickson received the letter, but did not respond to it. In March 2007, Mrs. B filed a motion to disqualify Mr. Erickson from representing Mr. B based on the conflict of interest. Mr. Erickson received the motion, but did not withdraw from the representation. He believed that Mrs. B would not be harmed by any potential conflict of interest because Mr. B was willing to accept her demands regarding the division of property. At the hearing on the motion to disqualify, Mrs. B told the court that Mr. Erickson could continue to represent her husband if he promptly completed the dissolution. Consequently, the court did not disqualify Mr. Erickson from the representation. Mr. Erickson never completed the dissolution. In March 2007, Mr. Erickson was served with a subpoena for deposition and subpoena duces tecum issued by the Association scheduling his deposition for April 2007. Mr. Erickson still did not respond to the grievance but did appear for his deposition. Matter No. 2: Mr. Erickson failed to timely pay his annual 2007 Association license fees. In March 2007, Mr. Erickson received a pre-suspension notice by certified mail from the Association. In April 2007, the Association left a voicemail message at Mr. Erickson’s office warning him that he would be suspended if he failed to pay his license fees. Mr. Erickson did not return the call. In June 2007, additional notices of suspension were sent to Mr. Erickson by certified mail, but that mail was returned unclaimed. Mr. Erickson was suspended for nonpayment of license fees on June 13, 2007, and was notified by telephone of his suspension that same day. After receiving that call, Mr. Erickson contacted a staff person at the Association (Ms. X) regarding getting reinstated. He filled out and submitted an application for change of membership, on which he left several answers blank. The application, mailed to the Association with a check to cover the outstanding fees, inaccurately reflected that Mr. Erickson had not had any direct or continuing active legal experience since leaving active status. Believing he would be immediately reinstated, Mr. Erickson continued to practice law. On June 27, 2007, Ms. X left Mr. Erickson a voicemail, and sent him an e-mail, asking him to call her because he did not complete the application. Mr. Erickson did not return the call and did not retrieve the e-mail until a later date. On July 3, 2007, Ms. X sent Mr. Erickson a letter asking him to complete the application so that she could proceed with his status change. When Mr. Erickson received Ms. X’s letter, he knew he had not yet been readmitted to practice law. On July 24, 2007, Mr. Erickson e-mailed responses to the inquiries made by Ms. X inaccurately stating “I have not engaged in the practice of law between the time I was suspended and paid my dues.” In fact, Mr. Erickson did practice law after his June 13, 2007, suspension. On July 31, 2007, the Association reinstated Mr. Erickson’s license to practice law. In August 2007, the Association opened a grievance against Mr. Erickson for practicing law while under suspension and sent him a letter requesting a response to the grievance within two weeks. Mr. Erickson received the letter but did not respond to it. In September 2007, the Association sent letters to Mr. Erickson by certified mail (which were returned unclaimed) and by regular mail, along with copies of the earlier letters. Mr. Erickson received the letter sent by regular mail, but knowingly failed to timely respond to it. In October 2007, Mr. Erickson was personally served with a second subpoena for deposition and subpoena duces tecum for failing to respond to the grievance; he attended the second deposition at the offices of the Association. Mr. Erickson’s conduct violated RPC 1.9(a), prohibiting a lawyer who has formerly represented a client in a matter from thereafter representing another person in the same or a substantially related matter in which that person’s interests are materially adverse to the interests of the former client unless the former client consents in writing after consultation and a full disclosure of the materials facts [former RPC 5.5(a), prohibiting a lawyer from practicing law in a jurisdiction where the doing so violates the regulation of the legal profession in that jurisdiction]; current RPC 5.8(a), prohibiting a lawyer from engaging in the practice of law while on inactive status, or while suspended from the practice of law for any cause; RPC 8.4(c), prohibiting a lawyer from engaging in conduct involving dishonesty, fraud, deceit, or misrepresentation; and RPC 8.4(l), prohibiting a lawyer from violating a duty or sanction imposed by or under the Rules for Enforcement of Lawyer Conduct in connection with a disciplinary matter [here, ELC 1.5]. Jonathan H. Burke represented the Bar Association. Mr. Erickson represented himself. Suspended Kathryn E. Jackson (WSBA No. 17488, admitted 1987), of Salem, Oregon, was suspended for 60 days, effective June 9, 2007, by order of the Washington State Supreme Court imposing reciprocal discipline in accordance with an order of the Supreme Court of the State of Oregon following a stipulation. This discipline is based on conduct involving failure to timely respond to a request for production and inaccurate statements made to court and opposing counsel in a personal-injury matter. For more information, see the Oregon State Bar Bulletin (August/September 2007), available at www.osbar.org/publications/bulletin/07augsep/discipline.html. Ms. Jackson’s conduct violated Oregon’s Code of Professional Responsibility, DR 1-102(A)(4), prohibiting a lawyer from engaging in conduct that is prejudicial to the administration of justice; and DR 6-101(A), requiring a lawyer to provide competent representation to a client. Joanne S. Abelson represented the Bar Association. Ms. Jackson represented herself. Suspended Clinton L. Morgan (WSBA No. 22181, admitted 1992), of Olympia, was suspended for nine months, effective November 10, 2008, by order of the Washington State Supreme Court following approval of a stipulation. This discipline was based on conduct involving a conflict of interest. In fall of 2001, Mr. Morgan was hired by a client (Ms. Y) to represent her in her dissolution. Mr. Morgan filed the dissolution petition on December 12, 2001. Mr. Morgan and Ms. Y developed an attraction to one another and eventually entered into an inappropriate intimate relationship. There are conflicting accounts as to whether this relationship commenced in January or February 2002. On January 28, 2002, Mr. Morgan filed a notice of withdrawal and substitution in Ms. Y’s case, substituting an associate at his law firm as attorney of record. Mr. Morgan did not tell this associate about his inappropriate intimate relationship with Ms. Y. According to the associate, she regularly asked Mr. Morgan for advice on Ms. Y’s case. Mr. Morgan denies this. In May 2002, Ms. Y’s husband confronted Ms. Y about the nature of her relationship with Mr. Morgan, and became increasingly hostile to her. In late July or early August 2002, Mr. Morgan’s associate asked Mr. Morgan to help negotiate a settlement of Ms. Y’s case with opposing counsel. Mr. Morgan agreed and became actively involved in settlement negotiations. He finalized the financial aspects of the settlement. Prior to his re-entry into the case to negotiate the settlement, Mr. Morgan did not advise Ms. Y of any potential conflicts of interest or the risks of his representing her in light of their inappropriate intimate relationship, and did not have her sign a written waiver. The settlement was completed in August 2002 and the dissolution became final the next month. Mr. Morgan and Ms. Y’s relationship ended several months later. In 2004, when Ms. Y was having difficulty living with the financial settlement, she sought counsel from other lawyers and subsequently brought a malpractice action against Mr. Morgan, his associate, and his law firm, which settled. Ms. Y filed a grievance with the Association after the settlement of the malpractice case. Mr. Morgan’s conduct violated former RPC 1.7(b), prohibiting a lawyer from representing a client if the representation may be materially limited by the lawyer’s own interests, unless the lawyer reasonably believes the representation will not be adversely affected and the client consents in writing after full disclosure. Joanne S. Abelson represented the Bar Association. Kenneth S. Kagan represented Mr. Morgan. Suspended Joseph Y. Prather (WSBA No. 11525, admitted 1981), of Vancouver, was suspended for one year, effective May 14, 2008, by order of the Washington State Supreme Court following approval of a stipulation by the Disciplinary Board. This discipline is based on conduct in three matters involving charging unreasonable fees, failing to return clients’ funds, failing to act with reasonable diligence, lack of communication, and conflicts of interest. Between June 22, 2005, and September 11, 2007, Mr. Prather engaged in the following conduct in five matters that gave rise to the discipline: • Failure to refund unearned fees to three clients in three different matters when he had done little or no work of benefit to the clients; Mr. Prather’s conduct violated former RPC 1.3, requiring a lawyer to act with reasonable diligence and promptness in representing a client; former RPC 1.4, requiring a lawyer to keep a client reasonably informed about the status of a matter, promptly comply with reasonable requests for information, and explain a matter to the extent reasonably necessary to permit the client to make informed decisions regarding representation; RPC 1.5(a), requiring a lawyer’s fee to be reasonable; former RPC 1.14(b)(4) and current RPC 1.15A(f), requiring a lawyer to promptly pay or deliver to the client as requested by a client the funds, securities, or other properties in the possession of the lawyer which the client is entitled to receive; former RPC 1.15(d) and RPC 1.16(d), requiring a lawyer to take steps to the extent reasonably practicable to protect a client’s interests, such as refunding any advance payment of fee that has not been earned. Francesca D’Angelo represented the Bar Association. Joseph J. Ganz represented Mr. Prather. Suspended Michael B. Roff (WSBA No. 31356, admitted 2001), of Otis Orchards, was suspended for six months, effective July 15, 2008, by order of the Washington State Supreme Court following approval of a stipulation. This discipline is based on two matters involving failure to deposit client funds in a trust account and charging unreasonable fees. Matter No. 1: A woman (Ms. Z) was charged with theft and forgery in relation to her embezzlement of funds from her former employer. After being fired by her employer, but before police had referred the matter to the prosecutors, Ms. Z hired Mr. Roff to represent her. Ms. Z and Mr. Roff entered into a written fee agreement wherein Mr. Roff agreed to represent Ms. Z during the investigation and through trial, if charges were filed, in exchange for a flat fee of $15,000. Ms. Z paid $5,000 at the time the fee agreement was signed and her mother paid the $10,000 balance soon thereafter. Ms. Z asked Mr. Roff to negotiate a repayment schedule with her employer to avoid being charged criminally or to mitigate any sentence she might receive. Mr. Roff agreed to contact the employer and advised Ms. Z to accumulate any funds she could to pay to the employer. After charges were filed, Ms. Z sold her house and gave $25,000 of the proceeds to Mr. Roff to hold in trust for possible payment to the employer if agreement could be reached. Mr. Roff did not have a trust account because he only accepted “non-refundable retainers” from clients. Mr. Roff deposited Ms. Z’s $25,000 in his general account, despite the fact that the money was client funds. The balance in Mr. Roff’s general account never fell below the balance of Ms. X’s client funds that were in his possession. Ms. X later asked Mr. Roff to return $5,000 of the client funds and, later, to return another $10,000 of the client funds. Mr. Roff did so, leaving $10,000 of Ms. Z’s client funds in his possession. At the time Mr. Roff returned the $10,000, he also asked Ms. Z to sign a receipt and a new fee agreement, which provided that Ms. Z was agreeing to pay Mr. Roff an additional $10,000 for the same representation in the embezzlement case. Ms. Z did so. The new fee agreement acknowledged that this additional $10,000 had already been paid. The purpose of the new fee agreement was to change the $10,000 in client funds remaining in Mr. Roff’s possession into an additional fee for Mr. Roff. The purported consideration given for the $10,000 fee increase was that Mr. Roff would be available for consultation with Ms. Z 24 hours a day and would pay all costs associated with the case out of his fee. Mr. Roff was, however, already obligated to communicate and consult with Ms. Z up through trial. The prosecutor subsequently advised Mr. Roff that Ms. Z should turn herself in. She did so on March 28, 2006, without advising Mr. Roff. Lawyer A, whom Ms. Z had retained to represent her on related civil matters, later notified Mr. Roff that Ms. Z was in custody, demanded a refund of the $25,000 fee that Ms. Z had paid, and threatened to file a Bar complaint. Mr. Roff believed this letter terminated his representation of Ms. Z. Another lawyer appeared on Ms. Z’s behalf. She pled guilty to the charges of theft and forgery, and was sentenced in July 2006. Prior to the grievance being filed, Mr. Roff and Lawyer A, acting on Ms. Z’s behalf, began negotiating over the demand that Mr. Roff refund his fee to Ms. Z. They agreed that Mr. Roff would retain the original $15,000 fee and that he would refund the $10,000 balance, which he refunded in October 2006. Matter No. 2: In November 2005, a man (Mr. Y) was arrested in Spokane on a felony fugitive warrant from California. Mr. Y’s wife retained Mr. Roff to represent her husband. They paid Mr. Roff $2,500, which was a “non-refundable” flat fee. After Mr. Roff was hired, he consulted with Mr. Y, appeared with Mr. Y in court three times, and succeeded in having the fugitive matter dismissed when a California governor’s warrant was not served on Mr. Y within the required time. Several months later, a California sheriff’s deputy advised Mr. Y that the California governor’s warrant was being reissued and that he would be re-arrested in Spokane if he did not voluntarily travel back to California and turn himself in. A Spokane County public defender also called Mr. Y and told him that the governor’s warrant had been received in Spokane. Mr. Y went back to Mr. Roff for additional assistance. Even though Mr. Y was being sought on the same California warrant, Mr. Roff considered this second phase to be separate and distinct from the initial representation and charged Mr. Y another $3,000 flat fee, which Mr. Y paid. Mr. Roff spoke with the California sheriff’s deputy, but did little work on Mr. Y’s behalf thereafter. Mr. Y subsequently requested from Mr. Roff a refund of all fees paid and an accounting of time spent. Mr. Roff, believing he had earned fees in the matter, disputed Mr. Y’s claim to a full refund. Mr. Y sued Mr. Roff in small claims court. Mr. Roff participated in a mediation with Mr. Y. Mr. Roff refunded the second $3,000 fee and Mr. Y agreed that the initial $2,500 had been earned. Mr. Roff’s conduct violated former RPC 1.14(a), requiring all funds of clients paid to a lawyer or law firm be deposited in one or more identifiable interest-bearing trust accounts maintained as set forth in the rules, and no funds belonging to the lawyer or law firm be deposited therein; and RPC 1.5(a), requiring that a lawyer’s fee be reasonable (and specifying that one of the factors considered in determining the reasonableness of a fee is the time and labor required to perform the legal service). M. Craig Bray represented the Bar Association. Mr. Roff represented himself. Suspended George Trejo Jr. (WSBA No. 19758, admitted 1990), of Yakima, was suspended for three months, effective June 12, 2008, by order of the Washington State Supreme Court following an appeal. This discipline resulted from conduct involving trust-account irregularities and lack of supervision of a non-lawyer assistant. The suspension is to be followed by two years’ probation. For more information, see In re Disciplinary Proceeding Against Trejo, 185 P.3d 1160 (2008). Since 1995, Mr. Trejo maintained a solo practice with one employee (Ms. G). In May 2003, the Bar Association received notification that Mr. Trejo’s trust account was overdrawn. A few days later, a certified public accountant employed as an auditor by the WSBA requested an explanation of the overdraft. Mr. Trejo explained that Ms. G, after being confronted, admitted to writing checks to herself from the trust account without Mr. Trejo’s permission. Ms. G would deposit the check into her personal checking account to cover personal debts and, later, when her personal account was sufficiently funded, she would write a check back to the trust account. This happened approximately 12 times in amounts ranging from $20 to $2,050. Ms. G’s check-floating scheme delayed payments to one of Mr. Trejo’s clients, who was receiving checks every two weeks from the Department of Labor and Industries (L&I). The L&I check was deposited into Mr. Trejo’s trust account. Mr. Trejo would then issue a check for 90 percent of the L&I check to the client and issue a check to either himself or to Ms. G for the remaining 10 percent. During the period of January 2002 to May 2003, there were insufficient funds in the client trust account to timely pay the client on five separate occasions. The shortages lasted from a few days to a few weeks. Once Ms. G replenished the trust account, a check was written to the client. Around May 2003, Ms. G’s check to the trust account bounced. This, in turn, caused the check issued to the client to bounce and resulted in an overdraft notification. Ms. G also admitted to misappropriating two payments for her personal use. She took a check for $860, endorsed it by signing Mr. Trejo’s name, cashed the check, and then misappropriated the funds. Another incident involved a wire transfer of $2,000 into the trust account. Ms. G issued to herself a check for $2,000, again signing Mr. Trejo’s name without his permission. Ms. G was authorized to sign checks using Mr. Trejo’s name, but Mr. Trejo was unaware of any of these activities prior to the May 2003 overdraft notification, because he did not review his bank statements. Mr. Trejo’s law office maintained inadequate trust-accounting procedures and records. His records for the trust account “consisted solely of a handwritten journal that listed the number of the checks written out of the trust account, the date on which the check was issued, the payee, and the amount of the check.” Some of the checks noted which client was associated with the check. Three trust-account checks were not accounted for in the journal. The journal did not track deposits or reflect a running balance. Mr. Trejo kept his monthly bank statements, but did not review them. Mr. Trejo did not reconcile his journal with the bank statements. Mr. Trejo did not maintain individual client ledgers or any records that could be that could be used to accurately determine client balances in the trust account. Thus, Mr. Trejo could not identify the funds in the trust account that belong to each client. Mr. Trejo did not maintain a bank account in Washington for his personal or business funds. When Mr. Trejo received a check or wire transfer from a client, the funds were deposited into the trust account regardless of their nature. Earned fees were deposited into the trust account 66 times during the audit period. The earned fees constituted $117,782.74 of the $150,599.66 deposited into the trust account from January 2002 to May 2003. Once the earned fees were deposited, a trust-account check was issued to Mr. Trejo or Ms. G, who then cashed the check and kept the cash in Mr. Trejo’s office. Other than the L&I check deposits, client funds were deposited into the client trust account nine times during the audit period. In one instance, Mr. Trejo deposited money into the client trust account and then issued a trust-account check to pay for a personal debt. At the conclusion of her audit, the WSBA auditor explained the proper procedures for handling a trust account and keeping complete records. In March 2004, the auditor conducted a follow-up audit of Mr. Trejo’s trust account. The auditor concluded that Mr. Trejo implemented a number of her recommendations; however, the auditor also found that Mr. Trejo failed to use client ledgers consistently, failed to identify deposits by clients, and failed to reconcile the client ledgers to the check register. Mr. Trejo also continued to deposit earned fees into the client trust account. Debra J. Slater represented the Bar Association. Mr. Trejo represented himself. Richard B. Price was the hearing officer. Suspended Joseph P. Williams (WSBA No. 34236, admitted 2003), of Darrington, was suspended for one year to be followed by two years’ probation, effective July 17, 2008, by order of the Washington State Supreme Court following approval of a stipulation. This discipline was based on conduct involving engaging in criminal behavior and violating court orders. Joseph P. Williams is to be distinguished from Joseph S. Williams Jr. of Santa Ana, California. In October 2004, Mr. Williams was arrested by the Seattle police. At the time of his arrest, Mr. Williams possessed cocaine. Mr. Williams was charged in King County Superior Court with possessing cocaine, a class C felony, and released on personal recognizance. He declined to participate in Drug Diversion Court. Mr. Williams signed an order setting his case scheduling hearing for March 23, 2005. He failed to appear for his case scheduling hearing, and a bench warrant was issued. On March 24, 2005, Mr. Williams appeared in court, and the warrant was quashed. Mr. Williams signed an order setting his omnibus hearing for May 6, 2005. He failed to appear for his omnibus hearing, and a bench warrant was issued. Mr. Williams went to work in Alaska for the summer. In October 2005, Mr. Williams was arrested by the Seattle police and charged in King County Superior Court with robbery in the second degree, a class B felony. In December 2005, Mr. Williams was charged with bail jumping, a class C felony, for failing to appear at his May 2005 omnibus hearing. Mr. Williams signed an order setting his omnibus hearing for January 20, 2006. He failed to appear for his January 20, 2006, omnibus hearing, and a bench warrant was issued. On January 30, 2006, Mr. Williams appeared in court and the warrant was quashed. In February 2006, Mr. Williams pleaded guilty to assault in the fourth degree, a gross misdemeanor, and to patronizing a prostitute, a misdemeanor. In May 2006, Mr. Williams pleaded guilty to attempted possession of cocaine, a gross misdemeanor, and to attempted bail jumping, also a gross misdemeanor. Mr. Williams conduct violated RPC 8.4(b), prohibiting a lawyer from committing a criminal act that reflects adversely on the lawyer’s honesty, trustworthiness, or fitness as a lawyer in other respects; RPC 8.4(d), prohibiting a lawyer from engaging in conduct involving dishonesty, fraud, deceit, or misrepresentation; RPC 8.4(i), prohibiting a lawyer from committing any act involving moral turpitude, or corruption, or any unjustified act of assault or other act which reflects disregard for the rule of the law; and RPC 8.4(j), prohibiting a lawyer from willfully disobeying or violating a court order directing him or her to do or cease doing an act which he or she ought in good faith to do or forbear. Scott G. Busby represented the Bar Association. Peter G. Cogan represented Mr. Williams. Admonished Novelle F. Ballard (WSBA No. 18830, admitted 1989), of Port Ludlow, was ordered to receive an admonition on May 16, 2008, by order of a review committee of the Disciplinary Board. Ms. Ballard’s discipline was based on conduct involving a conflict of interest. During 2005, Ms. Ballard defended a client (Ms. J) in an insurance matter. In 2006, an insurance company asked that Ms. Ballard defend their client in a lawsuit in which Ms. J was the complainant. Ms. J had changed her name, and her lawyer in the second matter notified Ms. Ballard of the name change and the conflict of interest. After notification of the conflict, Ms. Ballard filed a Notice of Appearance to represent the insurance company client against Ms. J. At the time the Notice of Appearance was filed, Ms. Ballard was continuing to represent Ms. J in the earlier matter. Ms. Ballard did not determine whether this was a waivable conflict or obtain a waiver of the conflict of interest. Ms. Ballard stated that she filed the Notice of Appearance to protect the statute of limitations and did not significantly participate in the case. Ms. Ballard’s conduct violated RPC 1.7, prohibiting a lawyer from representing a client whose interests are directly adverse to another client unless (1) the lawyer reasonably believes the representation will not adversely affect the relationship with the other client, and (2) each client consents in writing after consultation and a full disclosure of the material facts. Kevin M. Bank represented the Bar Association. Ms. Ballard represented herself. |
