Statutory Interpretation in Washington

by Helen A. Anderson

Do not expect anybody's theory of statutory interpretation, whether it is your own or somebody else's, to be an accurate statement of what courts actually do with statutes. The hard truth of the matter is that courts in America have no intelligible, generally accepted, and consistently applied theory of statutory interpretation.(1)

It is easy to be cynical about statutory interpretation. It often appears that courts simply grab what is handy — be it legislative history, canon of construction, or caselaw — to support an interpretation. More than 50 years ago, Karl Llewellyn skewered judicial construction of statutes by pointing out that every canon of construction had its opposite canon, so that any result could be supported.(2) And yet, although Llewellyn's critique is often cited, many lawyers and judges still yearn for a consistent method of statutory construction to guide advocates and the courts.

Washington courts do have a loosely prescribed procedure for investigating statutory meaning. It is far from rigid, either in definition or application, but it represents an effort to achieve consistency. The court is to begin with the statute's plain meaning, and only if plain meaning leaves an ambiguity should the court resort to extrinsic aids to construction, such as legislative history or policy-based canons. This procedure is flexible. Plain meaning includes not only text but also context. The definition of ambiguity and the rule to avoid absurd results give further interpretive room. Nevertheless, the approach provides some structure for advocates and courts.

The Supreme Court recently described Washington's approach as follows:

A court's objective in construing a statute is to determine the legislature's intent. Dep't of Ecology v. Campbell v. Campbell & Gwinn, L.L.C, 146 Wn.2d 1, 9, 43 P.3d 4 (2002). "[I]f the statute's meaning is plain on its face, then the court must give effect to that plain meaning as an expression of legislative intent." Id. at 9-10, 43 P.3d 4. Plain meaning is discerned from the ordinary meaning of the language at issue, the context of the statute in which that provision is found, related provisions, and the statutory scheme as a whole. Id. at 9-12, 43 P.3d 4. An undefined statutory term should be given its usual and ordinary meaning. Burton v. Lehman, 153 Wn.2d 416, 422-23, 103 P.3d 1230 (2005). Statutory provisions and rules should be harmonized whenever possible. Emwright v. King County, 96 Wn.2d 538, 543, 637 P.2d 656 (1981). If the statutory language is susceptible to more than one reasonable interpretation, then a court may resort to statutory construction, legislative history, and relevant case law for assistance in discerning legislative intent. Cockle v. Dep't of Labor & Indus., 142 Wn.2d 801, 808, 16 P.3d 583 (2001).(3)

Of course, a court following this procedure can stop at the plain-meaning stage if it believes it has resolved the issue. Advocates, however, must argue in the alternative. So the careful advocate will usually include arguments addressing both plain-meaning and "extrinsic" aids to construction. Like a cable, an argument is stronger when it consists of many threads woven together.(4)
  
"Legislative intent" as the court's goal

Innumerable cases state that the goal of statutory interpretation is to effectuate the Legislature's intent.(5) It is not clear what this means: The intent as expressed in the words of the statute? An intent to be gleaned from the context or legislative history? Should a court's understanding of the Legislature's intent be allowed to trump otherwise unambiguous language? Perhaps because of the these and similar questions about the role of intent, the court has also stated a contrary view:

"We do not inquire what the legislature meant; we ask only what the statute means." Oliver Wendell Holmes, The Theory of Legal Interpretation, 12 Harv. L. Rev. 417, 419 (1899). "[I]t seems axiomatic that the words of a statute — and not the legislators' intent as such — must be the crucial elements both in the statute's legal force and in its proper interpretation." Laurence Tribe, Constitutional Choices 30 (1985).(6)

The method the court has established recently for statutory interpretation implies that legislative intent should be first ascertained through the language and context of the particular statute.

Plain meaning: text, context, and "background facts"

The court in Dep't of Ecology v. Campbell & Gwinn, L.L.C.,(7) defined plain meaning to incorporate more than simply the text in question:

[T]he plain meaning is still derived from what the Legislature has said in its enactments, but that meaning is discerned from all that the Legislature has said in the statute and related statutes which disclose legislative intent about the provision in question. . . . Of course, if, after this inquiry, the statute remains susceptible to more than one reasonable meaning, the statute is ambiguous and it is appropriate to resort to aids to construction, including legislative history.(8)
 
This expansive view of plain meaning allows courts to consider more than the text of the provision at issue. "Context" may even include matters outside of the code and session laws such as "background facts of which judicial notice can be taken . . . because presumably the legislature was also familiar with them when it passed the statute."(9)

There is a contrary view on the court. Justice Sanders would not include the context of a statute when first examining the text:

I take issue with the majority's [statement that] plain meaning is to be "'discerned from the ordinary meaning of the language at issue, as well as from the context of the statute in which that provision is found, related provisions, and the statutory scheme as a whole.'" Majority at 886.
 The term "plain meaning" necessarily means we do not look beyond the statutory language itself. "Where statutory language is plain and unambiguous, a court will not construe the statute but will glean the legislative intent from the words of the statute itself." Where a statutory term is not defined, it is "given its usual and ordinary meaning." Courts may not read into a statute a meaning that is not there.(10)

Despite this objection, the majority's approach has prevailed. Thus, the advocate should treat context broadly, but remain aware that some judges may have methodological objections.

Tools for reading the text of the disputed provision

The plain-meaning inquiry begins with the disputed text. The court may use some of the following guidelines to interpret particular words or phrases:

• Terms should be given their "usual and ordinary meaning," unless defined by the statute.(11)  
• Technical dictionaries should be used for technical terms.(12) 
• Common law usage may apply.(13)
 
Often-cited dictionaries include Webster's Third New International Dictionary of the English Language and Black's Law Dictionary. Sometimes the court will use an earlier edition in use at the time the relevant statutory language was drafted.(14) Sometimes it will simply use the most recent dictionary.(15)

Sometimes the court will determine meaning without a dictionary.(16) Where words have multiple dictionary definitions, the court must choose between the definitions based on other factors such as context.(17)

Where the relationship between words is in dispute, the court may resort to textual canons of construction (intrinsic aids to construction). There are many of these, including:

• The last antecedent rule: "Unless a contrary intention appears on the statute, qualifying words and phrases refer to the last antecedent."(18) The last antecedent rule does not necessarily apply where a comma precedes the qualifying word or phrase.(19)
• Ejusdem generis: "Where general words follow an enumeration of persons or things, by words of a particular and specific meaning, such general words are not to be construed in their widest extent, but are to be held as applying only to persons or things of the same general kind of class as those specifically mentioned."(20)
• Expressio unius: "To express one thing in a statute implies the exclusion of the other."(21)
• Noscitur a sociis: "A single word in a statute should not be read in isolation,"(22) or "A word is known by the company it keeps."(23)
• "May" is permissive; "shall" is mandatory.(24)
• All the language in a statute shall be given effect; no portion shall be rendered meaningless.(25)
 
For arguments based on grammar, courts may also consult Strunk and White's The Elements of Style(26) and Bryan Garner's A Dictionary of Modern Legal ¬Usage (2d ed. 1995).(27)

The context of the disputed provision as part of plain meaning

Context includes the statute as a whole, as well as the text of related statutes. Because there may be many related provisions, there may be many conflicting bases for comparison and context.(28) This broad view of context increases the potential sources of arguments about the text.

Several canons are particularly relevant to examinations of context. They pertain to how statutes should be reconciled with other statutes and the common law.(29)

• The borrowed statute rule: Where the legislature borrows a statute, it impliedly adopts the statute's judicial interpretations.
• The reenactment rule: When the legislature reenacts a statute, it incorporates settled interpretations of the reenacted statute.
• In pari materia: Similar statutes should be interpreted similarly.
• The presumption against repeals by implication.
• The rule requiring interpretation of provisions consistently with subsequent statutory amendments.
• The rule of continuity: Assume that the legislature did not create discontinuities in legal rights and obligations without some clear statement.
• The presumption that when the legislature acts, it intends to change existing law.
• The presumption in favor of following common-law usage where the legislature has employed words or concepts with well-settled common-law traditions.
• The presumption that the legislature is aware of prior law, including judicial or administrative interpretations of statutes.
• The presumption in favor of prospective application of a statute and its corollary canon, which rejects retroactive application of statutes.

The legislature has also enacted rules for reading statutes in context, and these rules may at times conflict with judicial canons.(30)

Avoiding "absurd" results: the escape clause

Even where text and context strongly support a particular construction, the court will avoid literal readings that result in "unlikely, absurd, or strained" consequences.(31) This commonly invoked principle can be brought in at any stage of the inquiry. Sometimes courts invoke it before looking at context or legislative history.(32) Sometimes it comes later in the analysis; often it is one of many reasons for a particular construction.

A critique of the "absurd results" canon is that it can mask simple policy preferences by the court. As the court itself once put it: "[I]t is the legislature's job — not ours — to stem the tide of potential absurd results that might result from impartially applying the plain meaning of statutory language."(33)

Ambiguity: more than one reasonable interpretation

Ambiguity marks the threshold between plain meaning and extrinsic sources or canons. Only if text and context are ambiguous is the court to look beyond plain meaning to, for example, legislative history or policy. However, the advocate should not feel too constrained by this general rule. The court will sometimes look to extrinsic aids without an express finding of ambiguity.(34) Advocates should always consider extrinsic aids as well as textual arguments.

A statute is ambiguous if it is susceptible to two or more reasonable interpretations.(35) "[S]tatutes are 'not ambiguous simply because different interpretations are conceivable.' Constructions that would yield 'unlikely' or 'absurd' results should be avoided."(36) Of course, one person's ambiguity is another's absurd result; ambiguity appears to be in the eye of the beholder.

Legislative history

Not all types of legislative history are of equal weight, and there is reason to be skeptical of many sources. Final bill reports are perhaps the most authoritative.(37) A single legislator's isolated statement is not as persuasive,(38) and that of a lobbyist carries even less weight.(39) Comments can be taken out of context and may not reflect the collective intent — if such a thing exists. Colloquies can be misleading: A legislator's argument that the proposed legislation will lead to terrible results might be used to support an argument that the enacted law was intended to lead to those results.(40) And there are many accounts of legislative history being manufactured.(41) An in-depth discussion of the various types and proper uses of legislative history is beyond the scope of this article.(42)

In Washington, there is little to no legislative history available for statutes enacted before the mid-1970s. More information exists for statutes enacted after that point, but only in the last 10 years has there been easy access to materials online.(43) It remains to be seen whether this easy availability of legislative history will result in more use of these materials in statutory interpretation.

Extrinsic canons based on policy preferences

Like legislative history, extrinsic canons are only to be consulted if the disputed provision is ambiguous. These canons represent the court's policy preferences, and include:

• Remedial statutes are to be liberally construed, and exemptions to such a statute interpreted narrowly.(44)
• Tax statutes are to be read in favor of the taxpayer,(45) although tax exemptions are to be construed narrowly.(46)
• Statutes in derogation of the common law are to be narrowly construed.(47) Justice Scalia has called this canon a "sheer judicial power grab."(48)
• Penal statutes must be strictly construed (the rule of lenity).(49)
• "Where possible, statutes should be construed so as to avoid unconstitutionality."(50) This canon reflects separation-of-powers considerations.

Conclusion

Washington courts have adopted a general methodology for statutory interpretation. While the methodology is flexible and has many exceptions, it nevertheless provides a structure for arguments and can help both judges and advocates approach the often complex questions of statutory meaning. 

Helen Anderson is an assistant professor at the University of Washington School of Law. She can be reached at hander@u.washington.edu. This article is an expanded version of a CLE presentation given at the King County Prosecutor's office on May 20, 2008. Much of this piece is based on the work of four students: Statutory Interpretation in Washington State: A Practitioner's Guide (2006) by Tim Crippen, Dustin Dailey, Katie Schmidt, and Luke Wickham.

NOTES
 1.  Hart, Henry M. Jr. and Sachs, Albert M., The Legal Process 1169 (William M. Eskridge Jr. and Philip P. Frickey, eds., 1994).
 2. Llewellyn, Karl N., "Remarks on the Theory of Appellate Decision and the Rules of Canons About How Statutes Are to Be Construed," 3 Vand. L. Rev. 395, 401 (1950). Llewellyn's pairing of opposing canons is often cited, but Justice Scalia criticizes the pairings as inapposite. He argues that Llewellyn shows no more than that no canon is absolute. Scalia, Antonin, "A Matter of Interpretation: Federal Courts and the Law" 26 (1997).
 3. Christensen v. Ellsworth, 162 Wn.2d 365, 372–373, 173 P.3d 228(2007).
 4.  See Eskridge, William N. and Frickey, Philip P., "Statutory Interpretation as Practical Reasoning," 42 Stan. L. Rev. 321, 351 (1990).
 5. See, e.g., Christensen v. Ellsworth, supra, note 3; Quadrant Homes v. State Growth Management Hearings Bd., 154 Wn.2d 224, 244, 110 P.3d 1132 (2005) ("The primary goal of statutory construction is to discern the legislature's intent"); Featherstone v. Dessert, 173 Wash. 264, 268, 22 P.2d 1050, 1052 (1933) ("In the interpretation of a statute, the intent of the legislature is the vital thing, and the primary object is to ascertain and give effect to that intent").
 6. Davis v. State ex rel. Department of Licensing, 137 Wn.2d 957, 964, n.1, 977 P.2d 554 (1999).
 7. 146 Wn.2d 1, 9, 43 P.3d 4 (2002).
 8. Id.
 9. Id. at 11, citing 2A Norman J. Singer, Statutes and Statutory Construction § 48A:16, at 809–10 (6th ed. 2000).
 10. Udall v. T.D. Escrow Services, Inc., 159 Wn.2d 903, 917, 154 P.3d 882 (2007) (Sanders, J., concurring) (citations omitted).
 11. Burton v. Lehman, 153 Wn.2d 416, 422, 103 P.3d 1230 (2005).
 12. See, e.g., City of Spokane ex rel. Wastewater Management Dep't v. Washington Dep't of Revenue, 145 Wn.2d 445, 452, 38 P.3d 1010 (2002) (Dictionary of Waste and Water Treatment); State v. Klein, 156 Wn.2d 103, 117, 124 P.3d 644 (2005) (American Psychiatric Association's Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders).
 13. State v. Roggenkamp, 153 Wn.2d 614, 623, 106 P.3d 196 (2005) (holding "reckless manner" and "reckless driving" are terms of art long interpreted by courts and used by the Legislature).
 14. See American Continental Ins. Co. v. Steen,151 Wn.2d 512, 520, 91 P.3d 864 (2004) (Webster's 1947 edition).
 15. See Troxell v. Rainier Public School District, 154 Wn.2d 345, 352, 111 P.3d 1173 (2005) (citing 2002 Webster's for provision last amended before that date).
 16. Thurston County ex rel. Bd. of County Com'rs v. City of Olympia,151 Wn.2d 171, 178, 86 P.3d 151 (2004) (defining "at" without a dictionary).
 17. See State v. Lilyblad, 163 Wn.2d 1, 9–10, 177 P.3d 686 (2008) (construing phrase "make a telephone call").
 18. Boeing v. Dep't of Licensing, 103 Wn.2d 581, 587, 693 P.2d 104 (1985) ("the qualifying phrase 'operating under a certificate of public convenience and necessity' refers to the immediate antecedent phrase 'any air carrier or supplemental air carrier.' It does not refer to the prior phrase 'the operation of aircraft'").
 19. In re Sehome Park Care Ctr., Inc., 127 Wn.2d 774, 781, 903 P.2d 443 (1995) (comma introducing "but only if" qualifying clause supported argument that qualifier applied to all of the nouns listed before the clause).
 20. Cockle v. Dep't of Labor and Industries, 142 Wn.2d 801, 808, 16 P.3d 583 (2001).
 21. State v. Delgado, 148 Wn.2d 723, 728, 63 P.3d 792 (2002).
 22. State v. Roggenkamp, supra, n. 13, 153 Wn.2d at 623.
 23. S.D. Warren Co. v. Maine Bd. of Environmental Protection, 547 U.S. 370, 378 (2006). This canon is "invoked when a string of statutory terms raises the implication that the 'words grouped in a list should be given related meaning.'" Id. (citation omitted).
 24. Washington State Coalition for the Homeless v. Dep't of Social and Health Serv's, 133 Wn.2d 894, 907-908, 949 P.2d 1291 (1997).
 25. Judd. v. American Tel. and Tel. Co., 152 Wn.2d 195, 202, 95 P.3d 337 (2004).
 26.  Cited in State v. Tunney, 77 Wn. App. 929, 933, 895 P.2d 13 (1995); Sackman Orchards v. Mountain View Orchards, 56 Wn. App. 705, 706, 784 P.2d 1308.
 27. Cited in Griffin v. Thurston County, 137 Wn. App. 609, 619, 154 P.3d 296 (2007); George v. Farmers Ins. Co. of Washington, 106 Wn. App. 430, 447, 23 P.3d 552 (2001) (Gross, J., dissenting).
 28. Compare the majority opinion with Justice Owens's dissent in Dep't of Ecology v. Campbell & Gwinn, L.L.C., 146 Wn.2d 1, 43 P.3d 4 (2002).
 29. These canons are discussed in, Talmadge, Philip A., "A New Approach to Statutory Interpretation in Washington," 25 Seattle U. L. Rev. 179, 197 (2001).
 30. See RCW 1.12.010-.070.
 31.  In re Parentage of J.M.K., 155 Wn.2d 374, 387, 119 P.3d 840 (2005); State v. J.P., 149 Wn.2d 444, 450, 69 P.3d 318 (2003).
 32. See, e.g., Berrocal v. Fernandez, 155 Wn.2d 585, 590, 121 P.3d 82 (2005).
 33. ATU Leglislative Council of Washington State v. State, 145 Wn.2d 544, 560, 40 P.3d 656 (2002).
 34. See, e.g., Snohomish County Fire Protection District No. 1 v. Washington State Boundary Review Board, 155 Wn.2d 70, 79, 117 P.3d 348 (2005); State v. Votava, 149 Wn.2d 178, 183-186, 66 P.3d 1050 (2003).
 35. Campbell & Gwinn, 146 Wn.2d at 12.
 36. Densley v. Department of Retirement Systems, 162 Wn.2d 210, 221, 173 P.3d 885 (2007).
 37. Kadorian v. Bellingham Police Dep't, 119 Wn.2d 178, 185, 829 P.2d 1061 (1992)("express statement of the legislative intent").
 38. See State v. Lilyblad, 134 Wn. App. 462, 468, n.3, 140 P.3d 614 (2006), aff'd 163 Wn.2d 1, 177 P.3d 686 (2008) (finding statute ambiguous despite floor statement by senator).
 39. Western Telepage, Inc. v. City of Tacoma Dept. of Financing, 140 Wash.2d 599, 611, 998 P.2d 884 (2000).
 40. Mikva, Abner J., "Statutory Interpretation: Getting the Law to Be Less Common," 50 Ohio St. L.J. 979, 980-81(1989).
 41. A recent example is recounted in Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, 548 U.S. 557, 580, n. 10 (2006) (statements inserted into the Congressional Record after debate had concluded).
 42. See, e.g., Talmadge, supra, note 29. For an excellent guide to Washington legislative research, see Jarrett, Peggy and Nyberg, Cheryl, Washington Legislative History, Legal Research Guide, updated April 24, 2008, http://lib.law.washington.edu/ref/washleghis.html. For a discussion of statutory interpretation in general, see Eskridge, William N. and Frickey, Philip P., "Statutory Interpretation as Practical Reasoning," 42 Stan. L. Rev. 321 (1990).
 43. See www.leg.wa.gov/legislature.
 44. Bostain v. Food Express, Inc., 159 Wn.2d 700, 712, 153 P.3d 846 (2007).
 45. Agrilink Foods, Inc. v. State Dep't of Revenue, 153 Wn.2d 392, 399, n.1, 103 P.3d 1226 (2005).
 46. Simpson Inv. Co. v. State, Dept. of Revenue, 141 Wn.2d 139, 149, 3 P.3d 741 (2000).
 47. Sleasman v. City of Lacey, 159 Wn.2d 639, 642 n.4, 151 P.3d 990 (2007).
 48. Antonin Scalia, supra note 2, at 29.
 49. State v. Jacobs, 154 Wn.2d 596, 601, 115 P.3d 281 (2005).
 50. Washington State Republican Party v. Washington State Pub. Disclosure Comm'n, 141 Wn.2d 245, 280, 4 P.3d 808, 827 (2000).